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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the Western 
states responded to the Polish crisis (1980-83), both 
severally and collectively, with particular reference to 
their capacity for coordinated action. The thesis 
concentrates on the interaction between the major Western 
states (France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the United States) inside the broader 
Western institutional framework (looking in particular at 
NATO, the European Community, European Political 
Cooperation and CoCom). It assesses the impact and relative 
importance of the various Western institutional networks 
and of longer term conflicting Western aims in Poland for 
the success and failure of coordination. It also analyses 
the relevance of wider transatlantic disputes over detente 
for coordination. It is argued that the domestic Polish 
crisis gradually spilled over into East-West and West-West 
relations, ultimately triggering one of the most serious 
crises in the history of the Western alliance.
The thesis is different from that of other studies of 
international crises in that most such studies concentrate 
on relations between governments who identify each other 
as "enemies", whereas the main concern here is with 
relations within one "enemy camp". Highlighting the 
political and economic, as well as security dimensions to 
the crisis, the thesis also shows that the Western states 
were faced with a more complex problem than a classic 
foreign policy crisis. Finally, the complexity of the 
issues raised as a result of the Polish crisis meant that 
the Western states were faced not only with the problem of 
reconciling different and sometimes conflicting national 
objectives, but also with the need to reconcile 
contradictory economic, political and security concerns 
cutting across national borders.
Against this backdrop the thesis argues that the problem 
of coordination is more complex than what is implied by the 
neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist perspectives, 
and that the success and failure of coordination rests with 
the individual states, navigating within the constraints 
of domestic politics, alliance politics and international 
[in this case East-West] relations.
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CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the Western 
states responded to the Polish crisis of 1980-83, both 
severally and collectively, with particular reference to 
their capacity for persistently coordinated action.
According to Timothy Garton Ash, the Polish crisis marked the 
beginning of the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe:
"The Polish revolution of 1980-81 was the first great 
contraction in the birth of [the] new Europe. If Yalta 
began in Poland, there is a real sense in which the end 
of Yalta also began in Poland."1
The crisis was triggered by the development of strikes across 
Poland over the summer of 1980. In August, the Polish 
authorities were forced to sign an agreement (the Gdansk 
agreement) with Polish workers which recognised, amongst 
other things, the workers' right to create an independent 
trade union - Solidarity. In the sixteen months that followed 
the signing of the Gdansk agreement, a political and economic 
struggle developed between the Polish authorities and the 
Solidarity movement over the interpretation and 
implementation of the agreement. Reforms were introduced 
which substantially enhanced individual liberties in Poland.
timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, 
London, Granta Books, 1991 ed., p. 371.
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Yet there was constant pressure from the Soviet Union, as 
well as from Poland's other East European neighbours, to halt 
the reform process. It was ended with the imposition of 
martial law in Poland on 13 December 1981.2 Brown has argued 
that the Polish crisis was "potentially the worst in Eastern 
European communist history":3 It remained in essence a 
grassroots movement, driven forward by the workers, albeit 
strongly supported by other groups in society. These were the 
very same workers who were supposed to be the backbone of the 
ruling Communist party. In this respect, the crisis was more 
damaging to communism than the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968 
or the Hungarian crisis of 1956.
The crisis also posed serious difficulties for the Western 
alliance. It occurred at a time of growing tension both in 
East-West relations and in relations within the Western camp. 
We now know that, had martial law failed to return "order" to
Solidarity still survived underground and the first non 
communist government in Eastern Europe was formed in Poland 
after the so-called round table negotiations between 
Solidarity, the Catholic Church and the Polish government 
(concluded 5 April 1989). For the transitions from communism 
in Eastern Europe, see George Schopflin, Politics in Eastern 
Europe, Oxford, Blackwell, 1994 or Misha Glenny, The Rebirth 
of History: Eastern Europe in the Age of Democracy,
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1993.
3J.F. Brown, Surge to Freedom. Duke University Press, 
1991, p. 76.
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Poland, plans were being made for a Warsaw Pact 
intervention.4 European detente was already under 
considerable strain as a result of the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan in December 1979. No doubt, an intervention in 
Poland would have provided the final blow to the process. It 
would also have resulted in considerable instability on the 
European continent. Indeed, most observers consider that a 
Warsaw Pact intervention would have provoked armed resistance 
by the Poles.5 Against this backdrop, the Polish crisis 
represented serious problems for the West, not only in terms 
of East-West relations, but also in terms of West-West 
relations. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had 
revealed important differences in the interests and 
objectives of the member states of the Western Alliance and 
revived the debate about an Atlantic crisis. The United 
States' attempts at convincing the West Europeans to follow 
their line on sanctions against the Soviet Union had failed 
dramatically. Events in Poland promised to play directly into 
existing transatlantic disagreements and to continue to 
undermine confidence in the Alliance.
4Mark Kramer, "Poland, 1980-81. Soviet Policy during the 
Polish crisis", Cold War International History Project, 
Bulletin, Washington DC, Woodrow Wilson International Center, 
Issue 5, Spring 1995, pp.1, 116-139.
5Arthur Rachwald In Search of Poland: The Superpowers1 
Response to Solidarity, 1980-89. Calif, Hoover University 
Press, 1990, p. 10.
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Most studies of the Polish crisis focus on the domestic
dimension of events in Poland, on their impact on communist 
rule and on Poland's relations with the Soviet Union.6 Two 
authors in particular have studied the Polish crisis in the 
context of East-West relations. Arthur Rachwald, who 
considers the Polish crisis to have been "the last major, 
protracted cold war battle in Europe", outlines the policies 
of the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as events 
in Poland itself.7 He considers the United States' policy 
towards Poland to have been a major success, and the United 
States to have played a vital part in provoking the eventual 
downfall of communism in Poland.8 Thomas C. Cynkin focuses on 
the process of signalling between the Soviet Union and the 
United States in the period leading up to the imposition of
6Numerous books and articles have been published on the 
domestic dimension of the Polish crisis and on the role of 
the Soviet Union. On the domestic dimension, see for example 
Neil Ascherson, The Polish August: The Self-Limiting
Revolution. UK, Penguin Books, 1982; Kevin Ruane, The Polish 
Challenge, London, BBC, 1982; Timothy Garton Ash, op. cit 
and, for the period after martial law, George Sanford, 
Military Rule in Poland, London, Croom Helm, 1986. On Soviet 
policy during the crisis see Sydney Ploss, Moscow and the 
Polish Crisis: An Interpretation of Soviet Policies and
Intentions, Boulder, Westview Press, 1986; Richard Weitz, 
"Soviet decision-making and the Polish crisis", pp. 191-212 
in East European Quarterly, vol XXII, no 2, June 1988; 
Wladimir Wozniuk, "Determinants in the development of the 
Polish crisis of 1980: the interplay of domestic and external 
factors", pp. 317-33 in East European quarterly, vol XX no 3, 
Sept. 1986; Peer H. Lange, "Poland as a problem of Soviet 
security policy", pp. 330-343 in Aussenpolitik, vol 32, no 
41, 1981.
7Rachwald, op. cit, p. xii.
8Rachwald, op. cit, in particular pp. 47-63.
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martial law in Poland.9 He is more sceptical about the 
achievements of US policy. However, both of these studies 
concentrate exclusively on the interaction between the two 
superpowers during the crisis. They do not take into 
consideration the role of the West European states. 
Consultations with its allies formed an important part of US 
policy towards the Polish crisis. Indeed, there was concern 
inside the Western camp from early on in the crisis that it 
must not split the West. The Alliance dimension also put 
constraints on US policy-making in the crisis, and in this 
respect can account for some of the weaknesses in the United 
States' policy identified by Cynkin. Independent of this, 
however, the Polish crisis challenged the cohesiveness of the 
Atlantic Alliance. It is this issue, as well as the efforts 
of the Western allies to keep a coherent policy line 
throughout the crisis, that constitutes the central theme of 
this thesis.10
9Thomas C. Cynkin, Soviet and American Signalling in the 
Polish Crisis. London, Macmillan Press, 1988.
10The ability of the Polish crisis to create difficulties 
for Western Alliance is pointed out in Hugh Macdonald, "The 
Western Alliance and the Polish Crisis", pp.42-50 in The 
World Today. February 1982; Dimitri K. Simes, "Clash over 
Poland", Foreign Policy, no 46, Spring 1982; Martin Saeter, 
"Polen krisen og vestlig splittelse", Internasional Politikk, 
no 1, jan/mars 1982, pp.45-60. Studies of European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) sometimes refer to the Polish crisis as 
part of discussions on EPC crisis mechanisms, see for 
example, Simon Nuttall, European Political Cooperation, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 191-207. The EPC dimension 
to Western policies receives a more detailed discussion in 
Neil Winn, The limits of European influence in American 
crisis policy-making: the cases of Poland 1980-82. Grenada
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The thesis examines the Western responses to the Polish 
domestic crisis from 1980 to 1983. It seeks to assess the 
extent to which the Western states were able to coordinate 
their responses to events in Poland, and to sustain an active 
and cohesive policy throughout the crisis. By the same token 
it also undertakes to define how the foreign policies were 
coordinated, as well as to identify and explain any 
difficulties encountered in this process. It is not the aim 
to analyse the Polish domestic aspects of the crisis, or its 
consequences for the Soviet system. These issues are only 
taken into consideration in so far as they are necessary to 
explain the policy of the West.
In order to fulfil these objectives, chapter two of the 
thesis outlines Western policies towards Poland and Eastern 
Europe from the end of the Second World War and up to the 
outbreak of the Polish crisis. This chapter identifies the 
specific factors that, in the post-war world, contributed to 
pulling the Western states' policies together, or conversely, 
to separating them. It argues that policy towards Eastern 
Europe since the Second World War has led to surprisingly few 
conflicts within the Western alliance. It is suggested that 
this is due in part to the fact that Eastern Europe was 
rarely given high priority by Western states. In other words,
1983 and Libya 1986. PhD thesis, European University 
Institute, Florence, May 1995.
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there was not enough at stake in Eastern Europe for any one 
state to be able to provoke a clash with its allies. Yet, the 
chapter identifies elements of change in the 1970s. Detente 
brought East and West in Europe closer together, and the 
development of detente "unlocked" specific European 
perspectives on East-West relations, thus making policy 
towards Eastern Europe a more contentious issue amongst the 
Western allies by the time of the Polish crisis.
Chapter three of the thesis discusses the institutional 
networks available to Western policy-makers in their efforts 
to coordinate their response to Poland. Thus, it not only 
examines the internal workings of NATO, but also the roles of 
the European Community and European Political Cooperation, 
COCOM and G7. The thesis considers the Western "alliance" in 
fact to constitute a whole configuration of economic trade, 
political and security relationships. It suggests that none 
of the Western institutional frameworks were geared towards 
responding to a type of crisis such as that in Poland. It 
also suggests that, although Western institutions provide 
ample opportunities for consultation, they do not always 
provide a suitable basis for common action. Finally, the 
chapter points to the fragmentation of the Western 
institutional framework and the potential for competition 
between NATO and EC/EPC in particular in the context of a 
crisis such as the Polish one.
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Having looked at the actors and structures involved in 
Western coordination, chapters four, five and six of the 
thesis turn to examine the crisis itself and the process of 
developing a collective Western response to it. These 
chapters analyse the issues that the Polish crisis raised for 
the Western states, trace the interaction principally between 
the four major Western states, identify the Western 
institutional networks used for Western coordination, and 
discuss to what extent the Western states managed to provide 
a coordinated response to events in Poland. They are divided 
chronologically into three distinct phases. They suggest that 
there was a gradual spillover from the initially domestic 
Polish crisis into East-West relations and finally into West- 
West relations, ultimately provoking an intra-mural crisis in 
the Western camp.11 During the first phase of the crisis
(examined in chapter four), which lasted until early December
1980, the Western states tended to play down the significance 
of events in Poland for East-West relations.12 They 
emphasised that this was an internal Polish issue which 
should be dealt with at the domestic level. Chapter five
iqThe concept of an intra-mural crisis is used by Coral 
Bell, The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic
Management, London, Oxford University Press for RIIA, 1971,
p. 7.
12A special meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries was held 
in Moscow on 5 December 1980 to discuss the Polish crisis. 
Although a decision to intervene militarily was not taken, it 
increased Western concern about the risk of Soviet 
interference in Poland. Rachwald, op. cit. p. 11 and Kramer, 
op. cit.
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looks at the period after December 1980 up to the imposition 
of martial law. In this phase, the crisis spilled over into 
East-West relations. The Western states systematically warned 
that a Soviet intervention in Poland would mean the end of 
detente. At the same time they carried out contingency 
planning for this possibility. Chapter six examines the 
period after the imposition of martial law in Poland on 13 
December 1981. During the first two phases, Western cohesion 
was maintained by a form of 'muddling through' policy in 
which Western states concentrated on the policies on which 
they could agree, and put other issues on the backburner.13 
After 13 December, this compromise broke down. Events in 
Poland spilled over into West-West relations and provoked one 
of the most serious crises in the history of the Western 
alliance.
Chapter seven of the thesis revisits the crisis in the 
Western camp and examines the causes of the breakdown of 
Western coordination. The chapter emphasises in particular 
the importance of domestic politics for understanding Western 
policies. Contrary to what one might expect bearing in mind 
the pre-existing transatlantic difficulties, it does not find 
that there was a deliberate attempt to promote a distinct 
European response to the Polish crisis.
13Charles E. Lindblom, "The science of muddling through", 
Public Administration Review, Washington, vol 19, spring 
1959, pp. 79-88.
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The concluding chapter, chapter eight, assesses the record of 
Western coordination, the performance of the institutional 
networks and the impact of the Polish crisis on the evolution 
of the Western alliance.
Some further clarification regarding the scope and approach 
of the thesis is required. Firstly, the development of 
strikes in Poland during the summer of 1980 provides the 
starting point and events up until late 1983 are taken into 
account. At this date the Western sanctions against Poland 
and the Soviet Union imposed in response to martial law were 
substantially scaled down, and transatlantic relations were 
stabilised. Many studies of the Polish crisis examine only 
the period up to the imposition of martial law in December 
1981.14 The imposition of martial law was the most important 
turning point in the crisis, yet the period after martial law 
was particularly important from the Western perspective. It 
was after martial law that Western cohesion broke down, and 
that the differences between the Western positions really 
came to the surface.15
14See for example Cynkin, op. cit.
15Rachwald extends his examination up to 1989, arguing 
that the Solidarity movement did not disappear after martial 
law, and that its establishment in 1980 should be seen as the 
first step in a process that culminated with the breakdown of 
the communist regime in Poland in 1989. There is still a case 
for centering the analysis around martial law, however, 
despite the fact that Solidarity survived beyond this event. 
It is particularly justifiable for this thesis, which aims to 
examine how a group of states respond to a particular
17
The second clarification that needs to be made is regarding 
the concept of "the West". The thesis does not seek to 
discuss this concept in itself, or indeed to make any 
judgement about which states qualify as being part of the 
West. The term is used against the backdrop of the Cold War, 
in order to identify and distinguish between the members of 
the Atlantic Alliance and those of the Warsaw Pact.16 
Thirdly, the thesis looks principally at the position of the 
four major Western states in the Western alliance (France, 
Britain, West Germany and the United States).17 By virtue of 
their status as major powers, these states were all 
influential actors in the alliance, and all played an 
important part in shaping the Western response to Poland. 
They also, by their different responses to events in Poland, 
provide sufficient material to enable the thesis to address 
the problem of coordination, and the tension between common 
and conflicting interests within an alliance. West Germany
external event, rather than to examine their long term 
policies toward Poland.
16Indeed, as Milan Kundera argues, Poland itself is part 
of Western culture, "The tragedy of Central Europe", New York 
Review of Books, vol 31, no 1 , 1984. Alfred Grosser takes a 
similar approach to this study in Les Occidentaux: Les Pays 
d 1Europe et les Etats Unis Depuis la Guerre. Paris, Editions 
Fayard, 1978. For a discussion of the concept and meaning of 
"the West" see in particular J. M. Roberts, The Triumph of 
the West, London, BBC, 1985. Also Christopher Coker, War and 
the 20th Century. London, Brasseys, 1994, pp. 226-257 and 
Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West. London, Allen and 
Unwin, 1938.
17France, despite having left the military structure of 
NATO in 1966, was still a member of the Atlantic Alliance.
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was particularly affected by the Polish crisis. The crisis 
threatened to undermine the carefully constructed Ostpolitik 
and Deutschlandpolitik. The West German government's 
dissenting views on how to react to martial law created 
anxiety amongst its allies. France, the traditional dissenter 
in the Western camp, was initially closer to the United 
States than to West Germany over martial law. Yet France as 
well as Britain had a clear interest in stability in Poland. 
What is more, Britain was particularly important inside the 
Western camp in the run-up to martial law, because it held 
the Presidency of European Political Cooperation (EPC) from 
June until December 1981. Finally, as the hegemonic power in 
the alliance, the United States was a central player in this 
drama. It played an important part in formulating Western 
responses to Poland, as well as in provoking the breakdown in 
Western cohesion after martial law.
The choice to focus on these four states does not indicate 
that other states had no policy towards Poland, or that they 
had no input into the coordination process.18 It simply
18Greece became very vocal on foreign policy once it 
joined the European Community in 1981. Indeed, Greece and 
Denmark did, in the context of EPC and the European 
Community, adopt dissenting positions on sanctions against 
Poland.. Italy as well as Canada, which has a large number of 
Polish immigrants, have always had important relations with 
Poland. Greece's and Denmark's opposition to EC sanctions is 
discussed in Simon Nuttall, "Interaction between European 
Political Cooperation and the European Community", pp. 211— 
249 in Yearbook of European Law, no 7, 1987 (see in
particular pp. 231-2). For Canada's relations with Poland see
19
reflects the distinction in practice between the United 
States and its principal alliance partners, on the one hand, 
and the smaller members of NATO and the European Community on 
the other, who rarely displayed the capacity for independent 
initiatives in Eastern Europe. This point is even more 
salient, bearing in mind that there is an element of '’self- 
legitimation" in relations between the larger states: even if 
not a formal "directoire", they often attributed more 
importance to consultation with each other than with the 
"smaller" allies. Indeed they met regularly in the forum 
frequently referred to as the "Quad" or "Berlin" group, 
whereby major NATO states used the special status of Berlin 
as an excuse for meeting without their smaller and sometimes 
irritating, partners.19
Adam Bromke et al, Canada's Response to the Polish Crisis, 
Toronto, Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1982 
and D.H. Avery and J. K. Fedorowicz, The Poles in Canada. 
University of West Ontario. Italy's relations with Poland are 
dealt with in Vojtech Mastny (ed) Italy and East Central 
Europe, Boulder, Westview Press, 1995.
19William Wallace, "Introduction: cooperation and
convergence in European foreign policy" pp.1-15 in 
Christopher Hill (ed) National Foreign Policies and European 
Political Cooperation, London, George Allen and Unwin for 
RIIA, 1983.
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Transatlantic relations and the crisis in Poland
This study examines the problem of coordination in the 
specific context of the Western alliance in the early 1980s. 
Transatlantic relations were at this point in a state of 
flux, with member states developing diverging views on East- 
West relations, and part of domestic public opinion on both 
sides of the Atlantic questioning the basis on which the
Western alliance was established.20 In addition to
highlighting these transatlantic differences, the Polish 
crisis brought with it particular dilemmas related to Western 
policies toward Eastern Europe. Thus, this study should
provide further insights not only into how states interact
inside close institutional networks, but also into the state 
of transatlantic relations in the early 1980s, as well as the 
particular dilemmas facing Western states in relation to 
crisis situations in Central and Eastern Europe.
The Polish crisis was perhaps less dramatic than the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan, because of the absence of war.
20A1though, with the benefit of hindsight, it might be 
argued that detente ended with the Soviet intervention of 
Afghanistan and the United States' reaction to this
intervention, European governments were still in favour of a 
continuation of what they saw as a distinctly European
detente. Part of the left in Europe even sought a further 
extension of detente, through measures such as unilateral
disarmament. On the other side of the Atlantic, NATO was
questioned from a different perspective, as the idea of a 
withdrawal of US troops from Europe gained more support.
21
At the same time it was, in a sense more crucial to the 
Western alliance because it took place in Europe. In fact, 
any crisis in Eastern Europe was a two-edged sword for 
Western policy-makers, and this was even more so with the 
Polish crisis. Events in Poland corresponded to the 
aspirations the Western states claimed to have for East 
European societies. Still, unless the evolution of events was 
kept under control, the stability of the East-West system in 
Europe would be under threat. This contradiction between 
support, in principle, for political change in Eastern 
Europe, and the risks that such change was perceived to 
entail for Western security, was a constant dilemma in 
Western policies toward Eastern Europe. After a decade of 
detente, which had increased political and economic exchanges 
between Poland and the West, this dilemma was even more 
strongly felt, in particular by West Germany. It was no 
longer possible for the West to stand idly by and do nothing 
about events in Eastern Europe. However, at the same time, 
the Western states were never going to fight for Poland, as 
they had nominally done in 1939. In this sense, the Polish 
crisis was a half-way house between the Cold War and the post 
Cold War situation. The Western response to Poland had to be 
pitched at the right level, in between complete passivity and 
intervention.
22
Does this mean that the Polish crisis was also a crisis for
the West? The most comprehensive studies of international
crises have been produced by Michael Brecher. According to
Brecher, a foreign policy crisis is
"a breakpoint along the peace-war continuum of a state's 
relations with any other international actor(s). It is 
a situation with four necessary and sufficient 
conditions, as these are perceived by the highest-level 
decision-makers of the actor concerned: (i) a change in 
its external or internal environment which generates 
(ii) a threat to basic values, with a simultaneous or 
subsequent (iii) high probability of involvement in 
military hostilities, and the awareness of (iv) a finite 
time for response to the external value threat."21
The Polish crisis does not fit straightforwardly into the 
definition of crisis in terms of Brecher. Most difficult to 
apply is the notion of a threat to the basic values of 
Western states.22 There was a strange duality in Poland's 
relations with the Western alliance. There was no risk of 
direct Western military involvement in Poland, nonetheless
21Michael Brecher, "A theoretical approach to 
international crisis behaviour" pp. 5-24 in Brecher (ed), 
Studies in Crisis Behaviour. New Brunswick, Transaction 
Books, 1978, quotation on p. 6. See also his Crisis in World 
Politics: Theory and Reality. Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1993; 
Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfield, Crises in the Twentieth 
Century, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1989; Brecher, Wilkenfield 
and Patrick James, Crisis. Conflict and Instability, Oxford, 
Pergamon Press, 1989 and Brecher and James, Crisis and Change 
in World Politics. Boulder, Westview Press, 1986.
22According to Brecher, "basic values" include "core 
values" such as survival of the society and population, 
political sovereignty and territorial independence, and "high 
priority values", deriving form ideological/and or material 
interests, as defined by those who wield decision-making 
authority at the time of a specific crisis. A crisis exists 
when the high priority values under threat are accompanied by 
a threat to one or more "core values".
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the possibility of a military intervention by the Warsaw Pact 
would have indirect effects on Western security. In this 
respect, despite being outside the Western sphere of 
influence, Poland was integral to Western strategic concerns. 
A military intervention in Poland would have destabilised the 
military and political environment in Europe.23 Cynkin argues 
that Poland was within the area of "national interest" to the 
United States but not within the area of "vital interest".24 
He still considers the United States to have engaged in 
"crisis management" in relation to Poland, and he sees Poland 
as a "low level crisis" for the United States.25 One might 
add that for West Germany in particular, the prospects of a 
military confrontation in Poland, involving East German 
troops, was serious.26 In turn, such an event would, because 
of their close security relationship, have become a crisis
23It must be added that the criteria of "involvement in 
military hostilities" for a foreign policy crisis is 
contested. See Christopher Hill, "EPC's performance in 
Crises", pp. 135-146 in Reinhardt Rummel (ed) Toward 
Political Union: Planning a Common Foreign and Security
Policy in the European Community, Boulder, Westview Press, 
1992, in particular, p. 136. Indeed, if involvement in 
military hostilities is a condition for an international 
crisis, an important turning point in the history of the 
European Community, such as the 1965 crisis would not be 
called a crisis.
24The "vital interest" is defined as an area into which 
the United States is willing to project military force and 
over which it is willing to fight.
25Cynkin, op. cit., p. 4.
26The inclusion of East German troops in Warsaw Pact 
plans for an intervention in Poland is confirmed in Kramer, 
op. cit.
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also for West Germany's allies. The notion of "finite time" 
is more easily applicable. The sense that a military 
intervention in Poland might be imminent was constantly 
present in Western deliberations. The imposition of martial 
law provided a turning point at which Western states could no 
longer sit on the fence but had to make a clear choice about 
how to respond. Consequently, there was also considerable 
uncertainty about the direction of events in Poland and in 
particular about Soviet behaviour. According to Snyder and 
Diesing:
"... it is this element of uncertainty ...that lends to 
an event its 'crisis atmosphere', i.e. to feelings of 
fear, tension and urgency. If each party knew what the 
other intended to do - and also knew its own intentions 
in the light of that knowledge, there could be no
• • it 27crisis.
Most importantly, however, the main focus of this thesis is 
different from that of other studies of international crises. 
Most crisis studies focus on relations "between governments 
who identify each other as enemies, or at least potential 
enemies".28 The main concern here is the interaction inside 
one of the "enemy" camps, rather than of relations between 
two enemies.29 The thesis examines how what started out as
27Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations. 
Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 9.
28Snyder and Diesing, op. cit, p. 7.
29Examining coordination in the particular context of a 
crisis is still useful because "a crisis distils many of the 
elements that make up the essence of politics in the 
international system". Snyder and Diesing, op. cit, p.4.
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a domestic crisis in Poland, in turn created internal 
dilemmas for the Western camp and ultimately provoked an 
intra-mural crisis in the West.30 It will examine how the 
conflicting tendencies inside the Western alliance found 
expression in the Polish crisis and to what extent they can 
be seen as responsible for the breakdown of Western 
coordination. This approach should also provide further 
insights into the particular state of the transatlantic 
relationship and enable the study to draw some conclusions 
about the extent of the differences and divergences between 
the interests of the Western states both with regard to 
East-West relations and with regard to the Atlantic Alliance 
itself. In this context it will pay particular attention to 
how, or to what extent, Poland's strategic location in the 
centre of Europe affected coordination amongst Western 
allies.31 Detente in Europe, although it had developed under
30This phenomenon is similar to what Richard Lebow has 
called "spinoff crises", in other words, "secondary 
confrontations arising from a nation's preparation for or 
prosecution of a primary conflict... [they] develop 
when...action, designed to advance the initiator's interests 
in primary conflicts, provoke confrontations with third 
parties." Yet, as with Brecher, Lebow considers the 
probability of war to be a condition for an international 
crisis, whereas inside the Western alliance, this was not a 
possibility. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The 
Nature of International Crisis, London and Baltimore, John 
Hopkins University Press, 1981, p. 41.
31Throughout the history of Europe, Poland has played a 
crucial role in the continent's balance of power. Karen 
Dawisha points to "a peculiarly Polish predicament. The 
largest country of Eastern Europe, the land link between 
Russia and Germany, the single most vital geographic buffer 
against future Western incursions into Russian soil - for all
26
the wings of superpower detente, had acquired its own 
momentum by the late 1970s. The thesis will assess how the 
crisis in Poland highlighted this process and, at the same 
time, indicated its fragility. It will discuss to what extent 
events in Poland threatened to expose the divergent views on 
the purpose and utility of continued detente inside the 
Western alliance as well as its impact on Alliance consensus.
The divergence between Europe and the United States over 
detente found expression in several practical issues. Very 
important in the early 1980s was the question of East-West 
trade.32 The United States was pressing for a strengthening 
of the trade export ban through COCOM, and was concerned in 
particular about preventing the trans-siberian gas pipeline 
agreement between the West Europeans and the Soviet Union 
from going ahead. There were also fundamental differences 
between the two sides of the Atlantic on the use and utility
these reasons and many more Poland always emerged as the most 
important Soviet ally in Eastern Europe. But...Poland was 
also the most likely candidate to play the Trojan horse in 
the socialist community - not the nation that stands between 
East and West, but rather the one that is the West in the 
East." Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.75.
32Richard N. Perle, "The strategic implication of West- 
East technology transfer", pp. 74-81; Peter Wiles, "Is an 
anti-Soviet embargo desirable or possible", pp. 91-104 and 
Dale Tahtinen, "Economic relations between East and West", 
pp. 105-110. All are papers from the 1983 annual conference 
of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 
published in Robert O'Neill (ed) The Conduct of East-West 
Relations in the 1980s. London, Macmillan, 1985.
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of economic sanctions in East- West relations. Finally, the 
debate on INF weapons was emerging on the transatlantic 
agenda. The thesis explores the interconnections between 
these issues and the Western responses to the Polish crisis.
A change in attitude was also evident at the domestic 
political level of Western states, as the anti-nuclear 
movement gained momentum in western, and particular northern, 
Europe. The bloc division in Europe, as well as the 
confrontational Cold War policies, were increasingly 
questioned in parts of Europe, whereas they were regaining 
support in the United States.33 The interconnection between 
these domestic developments and Western attempts to provide 
a coordinated response to Poland must be explored.
Three additional themes must be highlighted at this point. 
First is the hybrid nature of the Polish crisis and the 
problems it raised for Western policy-makers. The Polish 
crisis was not a pure 'security crisis', but also raised 
economic and political issues for Western states. Thus, a 
coordinated response may have been more difficult to achieve. 
Second is the question of policy fragmentation and, in 
particular, the question of coexistence or competition 
between the Atlantic and European institutional networks. The
33Pierre Hassner, "The shifting foundation", pp. 13-20, 
Foreign Policy, no 48, Fall, 1982.
28
development of the Polish crisis coincided with efforts to 
strengthen European Political Cooperation. The London report 
of 1981 was particularly important in clearing new ground by 
reinforcing the consultation mechanisms of EPC and by the 
setting up of a crisis consultations mechanism.34 The early 
1980s also saw moves towards mending the separations between 
European Community external relations and EPC. The Polish 
crisis was a particularly important case in this respect 
because it presented economic as well as political/security 
issues to the West, and required both an economic and 
political response, thus encouraging close interaction 
between EPC and the EC.35 Finally, there were calls for a 
security dimension to EPC in the early 1980s, with the 
Genscher Colombo plan.35 This push for a strengthening of 
EPC, combined with the strengthening of the EC's economic 
power, was both a sign of the frustration with transatlantic 
relations and a seed for further difficulties inside NATO. 
The thesis will consider which Western institutions were seen 
to be most effective for the coordination of Western policies
^For an overview of the developments of EPC in the late 
1970s and early 1980s see Nuttall, 1992, op. cit. pp.149-238.
35Nuttall, 1987, op. cit. pp. 225-227.
36Yet it failed to collect the necessary support from a 
majority of member states. Even France at this stage, 
although it later changed its mind, opposed the Genscher- 
Colombo plan. See Henrik Larsen, Discourse Analysis and 
Foreign Policy: The Impact of the Concepts of Europe.
Nation/State. Security and the Nature of International 
Relations on French and British Policy toward Europe in the 
1980s. PhD thesis, London School of Economics, 1993, p. 283.
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toward Poland and examine whether or not there was a clash 
between these different institutional networks, and assess 
the strength of the pull towards increased European 
"independence" from the United States.
A final underlying theme is that of different foreign policy 
orientations, principles and values. The question of whether 
or not the Western states shared similar values and perceived 
themselves to be adhering to a set of common norms has 
already been mentioned with regard to the discussion on how 
to conceptualise coordination inside an Alliance. In addition 
to the question of whether or not the Western alliance is 
different from other alliances, in that its member states 
adhere to a common set of values and principles when 
interacting with each other, there is the question of whether 
or not these states could be seen to promote shared values 
and principles externally in response to the crisis. The 
presence or absence of such common values may have functioned 
as a cement, or conversely, created further divisions, in the 
process of coordination. The thesis argues that beyond the 
conflict over how to deal with the Soviet Union, there were 
differences in foreign policy traditions and values both 
between the Western states and inside each Western state, 
thus making cohesion even more difficult.
30
Coordinating foreign policies
There is no universal, overarching definition of
'coordination' in international relations literature. In the
words of A. J. R. Groom and Alexis Heraclides,
"There is surprisingly little theoretical literature 
about the ways in which governments come together to 
solve problems or to take advantage of opportunities by 
working together in concert without prejudicing their 
sovereignty. "37
Karvonen and Sundelius use a general definition which 
suggests that coordination implies "the creation of a common 
order for a number of separate elements that are distinct but 
also somehow linked with regard to their task". They consider 
the basic motive behind coordination to be "to secure that 
the output of various parts will not be in fundamental 
conflict".38 In other words, policy coherence is seen as a 
basic objective behind all forms of coordination. This
37A.J.R. Groom and Alexis Heraclides, "integration and 
disintegration", pp. 174-193 in Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom 
(eds), International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory. 
London, Pinter, 1985, quote on p.181. They also make a 
distinction between neo-functionalism, regionalism and 
federalism on the one hand, which they call "state building" 
theories of integration and, on the other hand, "state by­
passing" or "state preserving" modes of integration. The 
latter are closer to the concern of this thesis.
^They have studied the process of coordination of 
foreign policy within states (between different agencies of 
the state), rather than, as this thesis does, between states. 
Yet, their definition of coordination is sufficiently broad 
to serve also for the purpose of this thesis. Lauri Karvonen 
and Bengt Sundelius, Internationalization and Foreign Policy 
Management, Aldershot, Gower, 1987, p. 82.
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definition of coordination does not differ radically from 
Northedge's. He refers to coordination as "the harmonisation 
of the foreign policy of one country with that of another".39 
Coordination can thus be seen as closely linked to 
cooperation, in the sense that the latter is a necessary 
prerequisite for the achievement of the former. In the words 
of Robert Keohane "cooperation occurs when actors adjust 
their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of 
others, through a process of policy-coordination."40 
Still, in the case of Northedge, it is not clear whether he 
considers "harmonisation" of foreign policies to produce 
identical foreign policies or merely compatible policies. 
This thesis follows Karvonen and Sundelius in that it does 
not regard successful coordination as requiring identical 
foreign policies, only policies that are compatible with each 
other.41
39F. S. Northedge, "The nation-state and the coordination 
of foreign policies", pp.25-44 in Werner Link and Werner Feld 
(eds), The New Nationalism: Implications for Transatlantic
Relations, New York, Pergamon Press, 1979, quote on p. 31.
40Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and 
Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ, 
Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 51. Keohane also makes 
a useful distinction between "harmony" , which refers to a 
situation in which actors' policies automatically facilitate 
the attainment of others' goals and "cooperation", which 
requires some adjustment of policy.
41Paul Taylor holds a dissenting view on the concept of 
coordination. He distinguishes between coordination, 
cooperation and harmonisation. In both coordination and 
cooperation the state is seen to retain powers and 
responsibilities, yet in coordination, international 
institutions are seen to have a stronger influence than in
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The particular problem of foreign policy coordination stems 
from the anarchical nature of the international system.42 The 
absence of an overarching authority which can force 
coordination to take place makes successful coordination the
cooperation. He considers coordination to "involve the 
adjustment of government policies by a process of intensive 
consultation within an international institution in order to 
establish and maintain a programme which is designed to 
obtain goals generally regarded as being overwhelmingly 
important...The international institution has the task of 
deciding the programme with the advice and consent of member 
states." Again, it is not clear whether "common policies" are 
taken to mean a single policy, or a more loose, common set of 
national policies, ,similar to what one may observe in the 
current Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the 
European Union. Cooperation is defined as "a limited 
involvement of states in a joint enterprise, limited both in 
scope and duration, and focused upon a specific predetermined 
objective". Thus, Taylor's definition of cooperation comes 
closer to our definition of coordination. "Harmonisation" for 
Taylor involves the ability of an international institution 
to identify and exploit existing compatibilities between 
states. It depends on the existence of actual compatibility 
of interests and on the reluctance of states to act so as to 
endanger these compatibilities. Taylor's focus is different 
from that of this study. His main objective is to examine the 
role of international organisations, while here, NATO is only 
one part of the analysis. It will be important for the thesis 
to be alert to whether or not the Western institutions were 
capable of "directing" Western coordination, but, from the 
outset, the states are taken to be the dominant actors who 
"drive" the coordination process. Paul Taylor, "Coordination 
in international organization", pp. 29-43, in P. Taylor and 
AJR Groom, Frameworks for International Co-operation, London, 
Pinter Publishers, 1990.
42It is worth noting that the meaning of "anarchy", 
despite being widely used in International Relations 
literature, is ambiguous. See Helen Milner, "The assumption 
of anarchy in international relations theory: a critique", 
pp. 67-85 in Review of International Studies. No. 1, vol. 17,
1991. We refer to 'anarchy' as it is defined by Hollis and 
Smith, "...the international system is anarchic. By this we 
mean not that it is chaotic, but simply that there is no 
government above the states which comprise it", Martin Hollis 
and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International 
Relations, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, p.7.
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exception rather than the rule. Yet, when the structures of 
the international system are broadly constant factors, it 
becomes important to explain why it is that coordination at 
some times works better than at other times. The value of 
successful coordination, in the sense that it can reinforce 
states' capacity to achieve their objectives, is self- 
evident. In the particular context of the Atlantic Alliance, 
the importance of cohesion is always underlined, and 
considered to be vital to the credibility of the 
organisation. The failure to coordinate is seen as a failure 
for the alliance overall. Hence, at the time of the emergence 
of the Polish crisis, the Atlantic Alliance was undergoing a 
crisis of confidence. Its purpose and utility were being 
questioned and its ability to respond to the concerns of its 
member states was put in doubt. In this context coordination 
was important, yet even more difficult to achieve.43
Traditional alliance theories, although tending to focus on 
the origins of Alliances, also recognise the importance of 
Alliance cohesion.44 From their perspective, states are seen
43The crisis in the Alliance in the early 1980s is 
discussed in Josef Joffe, The Limited Partnership: Europe, 
the United States and the Burdens of Alliance, Cambridge, 
Mass., Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987.
^For an overview of the literature on alliance theories 
see James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfalzgraff (eds), 
Contending Theories of International Relations. New York and 
London, Harper, 1990, pp. 449-454 and Glenn H. Snyder, 
"Alliances, balance and stability", pp. 121-142 in 
International Organization. 45, 1, Winter 1991. According to
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to join alliances in response to external threats and to 
disband the alliance once their objectives are achieved. The 
cohesiveness of the alliance is seen to depend, ultimately, 
on the balance sheet of the costs and benefits of collective 
action for each individual state. The larger the size of a 
coalition, the smaller the percentage of benefits to each 
participant, and the less likely the collective action is 
seen to be.45
Recent literature on this issue is dominated by a debate 
between the so-called neo-realists and neo-liberal 
institutionalists.46 Both perspectives accept that the 
anarchical nature of the international system puts particular 
constraints on cooperation. Yet, neo-realists consider 
international anarchy to represent a greater hindrance to 
inter-state coordination than the neo-liberal
Snyder, George Liska's Nations in Alliance, Baltimore, The 
John Hopkins Press, 1962 "...remains the only comprehensive 
theoretical treatment of Alliances and alignments". See also 
William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions, New 
Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1962 and Mancur 
Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press, 1965.
45This is argued by Mancur Olson, op. cit. p. 48.
46For the neo-realist perspective see Kenneth Waltz, 
Theory of International Politics, New York, Random House, 
1979 and Robert Keohane, (ed), Neorealism and its Critics, 
New York, Columbia University Press, 1986. For the 
neorealist-neoliberal institutionalist debate, see David 
Baldwin, (ed), Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism: The
Contemporary Debate, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1993.
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institutionalists do.47 The two perspectives also disagree 
on whether or not states have a common interest in co­
operating: the neo-liberal institutionalists stress states' 
interest in maximising their absolute gains, whereas the neo­
realists consider states to be interested mostly in relative 
gains. Also, the neo-liberal institutionalists have more 
confidence than the neo-realists in the ability of 
international institutions to reduce the consequences of 
international anarchy and increase the probability of co­
operation.48 They follow in the tradition of the older
47The neo-liberal institutionalist perspective builds on 
"regime theories" which dominated much of International 
Relations literature in the early 1980s. The concept of 
"regime" (defined as "recognised patterns of practice around 
which expectations converge" and representing the 
"institutional legacy of hegemony") is used to explain how 
cooperation in international political economy could continue 
despite the decline of United States' hegemony. Robert 
Keohane, 1984, op. cit. See also Stephen D. Krasner (ed), 
International Regimes. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 
1983; Andrew Moravcsik, "Preference and Power in the European 
Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach",pp. 473- 
524 in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no. 4, 
December 1993. Regime theory received criticism, in 
particular from European academics, for being amongst other 
things: "a fad;... imprecise and woolly;...value biased, as 
dangerous as loaded dice...", Susan Strange, "Cave! Hie 
dragones: a critique of regime analysis", International
Organization. 36, 2, Spring 1982, reprinted in Krasner, op. 
cit, pp. 337-354.
48This is based chiefly on Baldwin, "Neoliberalism, 
Neorealism and World Politics", pp.3-25 in Baldwin op. cit. 
He also points out that the neo-realists tend to be more 
interested in studying security issues, whereas the neo­
liberals concentrate on economic issues. This, according to 
Baldwin, might explain why the former find less cooperation 
in the international system than the latter. In the case of 
the Polish crisis, the West had to deal with security as well 
as political and economic issues.
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alliance theories in their emphasis on rationality and state 
behaviour based on a calculation of gains and losses.
Despite the dominant position of the neo-liberal
institutionalist/neo-realist debate in international
relations literature, several authors have, albeit from
different perspectives, pointed to the many similarities
between these two positions. According to Steve Smith,
"the two accounts are very similar; ...In an important 
sense they are part of a specific view of international 
politics rather than two alternatives that together 
define the space within which debate about international 
theory can take place."49
According to Risse-Kappen:
"neo-liberal institutionalism should not be regarded as 
part of the liberal paradigm. This 'cooperation under 
anarchy' perspective shares all realist core 
assumptions, but disagrees with structural realists on 
the likelihood of international cooperation among self- 
interested actors."50
This thesis fits uncomfortably into the straitjacket of the 
neo-liberal institutionalist/neo-realist debate, although it 
is in some respects closer to the neo-liberal 
institutionalist perspective than the neo-realist. It agrees
49Steve Smith, "The self-images of a discipline: a
genealogy of International Relations theory", pp. 1-37 in Ken 
Booth and Steve Smith, International Relations Theory Today. 
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, quote on p. 24.
50Thomas Risse Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies. 
Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 
26. See also, Richard W. Mansbach, "Neo- this and neo- that: 
or, 'Play it Sam' (again and again)", pp. 90-95 in Mershon 
International Studies Review, vol 40, April 1996.
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that the scope of these approaches is too narrow. 
Consequently, it draws on different elements of international 
relations literature. The starting point of the thesis is the 
states, which are seen to be, ultimately, decisive in shaping 
the process of coordination.51 Yet, this does not mean one 
has to assume that states are not influenced by involvement 
in institutional networks, and by close, long-term 
interaction with other states inside such networks. Neither 
does it mean one has to assume that the state is 
representative of all inside its borders, or that its actions 
are at all times rational and pitted against the interest of 
other states. The thesis will question whether or not an 
external threat is the only circumstance that can keep states 
together. It will suggest that other elements might be taken 
into consideration and provide a further understanding of 
transatlantic coordination, in particular the domestic 
political context and the Western institutional networks.
Thus, the thesis emphasises three themes in particular, which 
are only partially, or not at all, taken into consideration 
by the neo-liberal institutionalist - neo-realist debate. The 
first of these is the impact of the Western institutional 
network. The neo-liberal institutionalists do point to the
51In the words of Fred Halliday: "The state and its
associates have a distinct advantage and can mobilise 
resources within and beyond state boundaries far in excess of 
those who challenge them.", Fred Halliday, Rethinking 
International Relations. London, Macmillan, 1994, p. 85.
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importance of institutional structures in facilitating 
cooperation, yet they still consider the interaction between 
states inside these structures to be based on self-interested 
calculations of the costs and benefits of coordination. Two 
additional aspects of the role of international institutions 
are explored here. Firstly, the impact on the coordination 
process of the special nature of an alliance such as NATO, 
compared to other international organisations, is considered. 
It may well be that the specific nature of NATO itself, not 
only makes coordination more possible, but in turn generates 
its own problems of coordination. Secondly, the possibility 
that the Western alliance has, over time, produced ties that 
bind the member states, despite its intergovernmental 
character, is examined. When entering an alliance, states 
accept, as well as come to expect, adherence to certain rules 
and norms, the most important of these being consultation 
with the other allies on issues of common concern.52 This
52Thus the liberal argument that democracies rarely go to 
war against each other is taken as a "given" - yet this does 
not mean that there is an absence of conflict between the 
Western states. The aim of the thesis is to identify the 
sources of these conflicts, the importance of the conflicts, 
as well as the extent to which - and how - they were overcome 
in the context of the Polish crisis. For the "democratic 
peace" argument see Michael Doyle, "Kant, liberal legacies, 
and foreign affairs", Philosophy and Public Affairs, no. 3, 
vol. 12, 1983, pp. 204-35 and no 4, pp. 323-53. See also
Risse-Kappen, who argues that "Peace and conflict research 
has reached a consensus that democracies rarely fight each 
other", p. 491 in "Democratic Peace - warlike democracies? A 
social constructivist interpretation of the liberal 
argument", pp. 491-517 in European Journal of International 
Relations, Special issue on Democracy and Peace, no 4, vol.1, 
1995.
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also includes the implicit expectation that other allied 
states take their perspectives into consideration.53 
Consequently, the individual states' policies and outlook 
cannot be seen as completely immune to the influence of the 
other allied states.54 This does not, however, have to have 
taken place in such an orderly fashion that the individual 
national perspectives on foreign policy are replaced by a 
common perspective.
These questions are often raised in studies of what is now 
called the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the 
European Union.55 They have received much more limited 
attention in studies of NATO. Most of the literature on NATO
53Alliance theories do to some extent take this into 
consideration. They point out that a "sense of community" may 
reinforce alliances. They also recognise that periodic 
consultation contributes to the development and preservation 
of alliance cohesion.
^The thesis does not aim to dispute that the primary 
motivation for the creation of NATO was the perception of a 
Soviet threat. What it wishes to discuss is the possibility 
that membership of the Alliance has had unintended 
consequences for the foreign policy orientation of member 
states.
55For this see Wolfgang Wessels, "EPC After the Single 
European Act: Towards a European Foreign Policy via treaty 
Obligations?", pp. 143-160, in Martin Holland (ed) The Future 
of European Political Cooperation, London, MacMillan, 1991; 
Frangoise de la Serre, "The scope of national adaptation to 
European Political Cooperation", pp. 194-210, in A. Pijpers, 
E. Regelsberger and W. Wessels (eds), European Political 
Cooperation in the 1980s: a Common Foreign Policy for Western 
Europe?, London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988, and Christopher Hill 
(ed), The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy. London, 
Routledge, 1996.
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focuses on military strategic issues, and hardly discusses 
the political aspects of the Alliance. Karl Deutsch's concept 
of a "pluralistic security community" and Richard Neustadt's 
study of alliance politics are exceptions, but these works 
date back more than twenty-five years.56 When political 
issues are discussed, this is done with reference to 
divergences between member states, and with little 
consideration for the possibility that membership in the 
Alliance might over time have had an impact on individual 
states' foreign policies, and created ties that are not so 
easily broken.
The second issue that the thesis will bring into the equation 
is the impact of domestic politics. According to Skidmore and 
Hudson,
"Foreign policy decision-makers are not simply agents of 
the national interest but political animals who must 
worry about their survival in office and the viability 
of their overall set of political goals, domestic and 
foreign. There exists little reason to expect that the 
pattern of domestic and international rewards and 
punishments for various sorts of foreign policy choices 
will naturally coincide. Where they do not, foreign
56Karl Deutsch et al., Political Communities and the 
North Atlantic Area. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University 
Press, 1957 and Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1970. A recent adaptation is 
found in Emmanuel Adler, "Europe's new security order: a
pluralistic security community", pp. 287-327 in Beverly 
Crawford (ed), The Future of European Security, Center for 
German and European Studies, Univ. of California at Berkeley,
1992. Adler applies the concept to a study of the CSCE. His 
conception of the ability of institutions such as the CSCE to 
ensure 'global peace' is more optimistic than the perspective 
of this thesis.
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policy officials may be compelled to choose between 
domestic rewards at international cost or international 
rewards at domestic cost."57
The importance of domestic politics for states' foreign 
policy was first emphasised by students of foreign policy 
analysis.58 It has now been accepted more widely.59 There is 
no reason to exclude the domestic political dimension when 
looking at how states coordinate their foreign policies. Most 
foreign policy analysts consider the internal workings of the 
state, in other words the decision-making process.60 It is 
not enough to look at the decision-making process itself. The 
environment beyond the state structures themselves must also 
be taken into consideration. In the words of Chris Farrands,
57Davis Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson, "Establishing the 
limits of state autonomy", pp. 1-22 in Skidmore and Hudson 
(eds), The Limits of State Autonomy. Boulder, Westview Press, 
1993, quote on p. 3/4.
Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Analysis", pp. 93-108 in 
Light and Groom (eds), Contemporary International Relations: 
A Guide to Theory, London, Pinter, 1994, p. 93.
59See for example Fred Halliday, op. cit, p. 35 and 
Marcel Merle, Socioloqie des Relations Internationales, 
Paris, Dalloz, 1982, p. 328.
60One of the first to highlight the importance of opening 
up the 'black box' of the state was Graham Allison in his now 
classic study, Essence of Decision, Harper Collins, 1971. See 
also William Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain. 
London, Allen and Unwin for RIIA, 1976; Michael Clarke and 
Brian White (eds), Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign 
Policy Systems Approach. Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1989.
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"Foreign policy is a process. The members of a decision­
making elite receive their values, assumptions and 
expectations about the world from a wider society".61
This must also include the particular historical experiences 
of the "domestic community" and the way in which these are 
reflected in the domestic political debate at any particular 
time. Western policies and reactions to the Polish crisis 
were embedded in longer term concerns, and should not be seen 
as entirely separate from them.62 An a-historical approach 
to foreign policy limits the possibility for understanding 
states', as well as other actors', behaviour.
It follows logically from the emphasis on domestic politics, 
as well as from the concern about the impact of common 
institutions on the foreign policy of states, that this 
thesis also questions the neo-liberal institutionalist and 
neo-realist assumptions of rationality.63 From both these 
perspectives, states are seen to act rationally, with the aim
61Chris Farrands, "State, Society, Culture and British 
Foreign Policy", pp.50-7 0 in Brian White, Michael Smith and 
Steve Smith (eds), British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change 
and Transformation. London, Unwin Hyman, 1988, quote on p.51.
62For the importance of history for states' foreign 
policy, see for example Christopher Hill, "The historical 
background. Past and present in British foreign policy", pp. 
24-49 in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (eds), 
op. cit. See in particular p. 25.
63A useful overview of the rational choice approach is 
found in Hugh Ward, "Rational Choice Theory", pp. 76-93 in 
David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds), Theory and Methods in 
Political Science, London, Macmillan, 1995.
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of maximising their goals, and to bargain amongst themselves, 
on the basis of clearly defined interests. The probability of 
coordination is assessed on the basis of its costs and 
benefits for individual states. It is difficult to conceive 
of coordination as proceeding exclusively on the basis of 
calculations of self interest, in particular when one decides 
to open up the black box of the state.64 The rational actor 
perspective presupposes that states' interests and objectives 
are clearly identifiable, and almost self-evident. It ignores 
the possibility that each state might "contain" a variety of 
interests and objectives as well as the possibility that 
foreign policy objectives could be mutually irreconcilable. 
Furthermore, it excludes the possibility that foreign policy 
objectives might emerge or change in the process of policy­
making and in the process of interaction between states. 
Finally, it does not take into consideration the impact of 
values and beliefs on foreign policy, let alone any 
discussion of the shared objectives of a group of states. The 
neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist analysis of 
international bargaining might be a useful approach when 
examining a situation in which states face a negotiating
64An exception is Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and 
domestic politics: the logic of two-level games", first
published in International Organization. 42, summer 1988, pp. 
427-460, reprinted in Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert 
Putnam (eds), Double- Edged Diplomacy. London, University of 
California Press, 1993, pp. 431-486. Putnam uses rational 
choice theory to analyse the combined impact of domestic and 
international factors on international bargaining.
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agenda which is clearly defined and limited in scope. In a 
complex situation such as the Polish crisis, which involved 
economic, political and security matters, and was 
characterised by considerable uncertainty and volatility 
these images of rational "bargaining" are less useful. What 
is more, it may well be that these notions of international 
bargaining are most valuable when applied to economic 
negotiations, such as those in the GATT, where goals can be 
defined more clearly from the outset and where gains and 
losses are more easily calculated.65
Conclusion
Any attempt at coordinating the foreign policies of a group 
of states provokes tension between the particular interests 
of each state and the common interest of the group as a 
whole. Attempts at coordination raise issues of sovereignty
65The Realists criticise Putnam's article for drawing 
mainly on examples of bargaining about economic cooperation 
between advanced industrialised democracies - a subset biased 
toward domestic theories by the preponderance of economic 
issues. Yet, these examples may also be biased in the sense 
that rational bargaining is more likely to take place over 
purely economic issues. Andrew Moravcsik argues that the 
Realist critique is not convincing, yet, the cases he quotes 
involving bargaining on political and security issues still 
involve a narrowly defined agenda, thus excluding large 
sections of international interaction, see his "Introduction. 
Integrating international and domestic theories of 
international bargaining", pp. 3-42 in Evans, Jacobson and 
Putnam (eds), op. cit.
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and conflicting national foreign policy traditions and 
aspirations. This thesis will discuss the possibility that 
foreign policy coordination can be further complicated by 
inputs from domestic politics, and furthermore, that the 
existence of common Western institutions might not only 
temper conflict but also generate their own problems of 
coordination. In addition to constituting an important 
turning point in Polish and European politics, the crisis in 
Poland is a logical case for exploring these issues. This 
study should also provide some conclusions about the meaning 
and importance of the Atlantic "crisis" in the early 1980s. 
Finally, as a halfway house between the Cold War and the 1989 
revolutions, the Polish crisis and the Western responses to 
it, should produce further insight into the Western dilemma 
of striking the right balance between intervention, which was 
impossible, and passivity, which had, by the early 1980s, 
become unacceptable.
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CHAPTER TWO. WESTERN POLICIES IN EASTERN EUROPE
Introduction
This chapter raises three analytically separate yet, in 
practice, closely intertwined issues. Firstly, and most 
importantly, it seeks to identify the distinctive elements in 
each of the major Western states' relations, primarily with 
Poland, but also with the rest of Eastern Europe. Secondly, 
it explores to what extent Poland, as well as the rest of 
Eastern Europe, played a special role in Western states' 
East-West policy. Thirdly, it assesses the interaction 
between individual Western states' relations with Poland and 
Eastern Europe and their role in the Western alliance, with 
particular reference to alliance cohesion. It does not aim to 
present a detailed chronology of relations between each of 
the four major Western states and Eastern Europe. Neither 
does it aim to present an overview of the history of the Cold 
War, of the evolution of East-West relations or of Western 
relations with the Soviet Union.
The.starting assumption is that the historical experience of 
states does influence their foreign policy, even if the 
"lessons" that policy-makers learn from history are not
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always the right ones.1 As Christopher Hill has argued, 
"States' past successes and failures, friendships and 
enmities live on in the minds of present-day decision-makers 
both at home and abroad".2 Thus, this examination of long­
term trends in Western relations with Poland and Eastern 
Europe should enhance the understanding of Western reactions 
to the Polish crisis in the early 1980s, and of the problems 
encountered in coordinating these reactions. The chapter 
concentrates on the period after the end of the Second World 
War, although it does also refer back to earlier periods. It 
deliberately takes a broad perspective, looking not only at 
policies towards Poland, but towards what will be termed 
Eastern Europe.3
Examining the above issues is not an altogether 
straightforward task. On the one hand, Poland's position at 
the heart of Europe has, historically, given it a strategic 
importance both for its Eastern and Western neighbours. 
Indeed, it has played a decisive role in the making and 
breaking of the balance of power in Europe. Polish
^ee Ernest May, Lessons From the Past: The Use and
Misuse of History in American foreign policy, London, Oxford 
University Press, 1973.
2Christopher Hill, "The Historical Background: Past and 
Present in British Foreign Policy", pp. 24-49, in M. Smith, 
S. Smith and B. White, British Foreign Policy. London, Unwin 
Hyman, 1988, p. 33.
3Eastern Europe is defined as the member states of the 
Warsaw Pact, with the exclusion of the Soviet Union.
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sovereignty has been the main obstacle to Russian and later
Soviet excursions westwards and into Europe and conversely,
it represented a shield against Western aggression towards
Russia and the Soviet Union. As a result of its strategic
position, Poland was not only a buffer state, but also an
object of dispute amongst Western powers, and in particular
France and Germany. Norman Davies has argued,
"In each of the major crises of modern Europe, the 
Polish issue has proved a bone of contention between the 
great powers."4
The Polish question was central to the outbreak of the Second 
World War, to the breakup of the wartime alliance, as well as 
to the onset of the Cold War.5 On the other hand/ it could be 
argued that the onset of the Cold War altered the conditions 
of interaction between East and West in Europe so much that 
previous conflicts of interest amongst Western states over 
Eastern Europe became irrelevant or insignificant.6 The Cold 
War and the division of Europe provided the West with an 
overall unity of purpose - the defence against a perceived
4Norman Davies Heart of Europe: A Short History of
Poland. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 433.
5A.W. DePorte, Europe Between the Superpowers: The
Enduring Balance. New Haven and London, Yale University 
Press, 1986 p. 92.
6A corresponding argument for the post-cold War period 
is put forward by the neo-realists, who argue that with the 
end of the Cold War, Europe will return to conflict, as old 
enmities and conflicts were only kept "on hold" because of 
bipolarity. See in particular John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to 
the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War",
International Security. Summer 1990, vol 15, no.1, pp. 5-56.
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Soviet threat - which had not previously existed, and which 
might have made the historical conflicts of interest in 
Eastern Europe immaterial.7 Furthermore, it could be argued 
that there were no specific Western policies towards Eastern 
Europe during the Cold War, that they were only footnotes in 
Western policies towards the Soviet Union, or in overall 
East-West relations. The division of Europe into two military 
and ideologically antagonistic blocs may have eliminated 
Western interests in conducting a separate policy, distinct 
from their Soviet policy, towards Eastern Europe.
The chapter seeks, against the backdrop of the Cold War and 
Western relations with the Soviet Union, to bring out what 
was particular about Western relations with Eastern Europe 
and Poland. In the same context, it also aims to establish 
what was distinctive to individual Western states' relations 
with Eastern Europe. It takes the view that, although Western 
policies towards Eastern Europe cannot be seen in isolation 
from the overall developments in East-West relations, it 
remains worthwhile and important to attempt to single out
7Some argue that the Cold War had already begun in 1917. 
See for example H. Higgins, The Cold War, London, Heineman 
Educational Books, 1984 and Andre Fontaine, Un Seul Lit Pour 
Deux Reves: Histoire de la "Detente", Paris, Fayard, 1981. 
The distrust of Soviet communism is already evident in 
British and French deliberations about how to deal with 
Hitler in the 1930s. However, it was only after 1948/9 that 
it became an all-consuming theme in Western politics. Before 
World War Two there were other issues that were of equal 
importance or greater importance and bipolarity came only 
after the Second World War.
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what was distinctive in their relations with Eastern Europe. 
Furthermore, it is by no means certain that the perception of 
a Soviet threat, in itself subjective and open to various 
interpretations, would lead to homogenous policies on Eastern 
Europe, or to policies that were subordinated to relations 
with the Soviet Union.
Britain's relations with East and Central Europe are 
discussed first, then France, West Germany, and finally the 
United States are examined. Each section focuses on the most 
salient elements and phases in each state's policy towards 
Eastern Europe since World War Two, rather than attempting to 
provide a detailed chronology of their policies towards the 
region. Organising the material in this way might predispose 
towards Realist conclusions, and in particular to the 
conclusion that the Western states were domestically coherent 
and had a static "national interest" in Eastern Europe. The 
alternative would be to organise the chapter chronologically, 
thus focusing on the evolution of Western relations with 
Eastern Europe. This would, in turn, encourage the conclusion 
that there was such a thing as a "Western" policy towards 
Eastern Europe, and that the "West" can be seen as a unitary 
actor with regard to Eastern Europe in the post-war period. 
Although the thesis questions some of the Realists' 
assumptions, it considers that the fate of coordination rests 
with individual states. Consequently, an examination of the
distinctive elements in Western states' approaches to Poland 
and Eastern Europe is a useful starting point.
Western policies in Eastern Europe; national trends and 
traditions
Britain
"France's drama is the discrepancy between a broad 
vision and limited means. Britain's great enigma lies in 
the deficiency of the vision."8
Although this quote refers to the overall characteristics of 
French and British foreign policy, it also applies to their 
respective policies in Eastern Europe. For Britain, the 
"deficiency of the vision", is accompanied, in the case of 
Eastern Europe, by an absence of any serious interest in the 
region.9 After the Second World War, policy towards Eastern 
Europe became part and parcel of British policy towards the
8Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles, Or the Setting 
of American Foreign Policy, New York and London, McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1968, p. 439.
9Alex Pravda points to the limited number of academic 
works examining British-Soviet relations during the Cold War. 
He argues that this sparseness of literature reflects the 
nature of British-Soviet relations, and that Britain has had 
a less discernible role in relation to the Soviet Union than 
West Germany and France. This is even more true with 
reference to Eastern Europe. Alex Pravda, "Introduction: pre­
perestroika patterns", pp. 1-16 in Alex Pravda and Peter 
Duncan (eds) Soviet-British Relations Since the 1970s, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 1.
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Soviet Union. This policy was in turn firmly anchored in a 
commitment to the Western alliance - in particular the 
alliance with the United States. Still, as the country for 
which Britain declared war in 1939, Poland had some resonance 
with British policy-makers.
Britain, Poland and the legacy of Yalta
It is difficult to achieve a clear understanding of British
policy towards Poland at the time of the Second World War.10
Historians disagree on the significance of Britain's 
guarantee to Poland in March 1939. The orthodox view has 
tended to be that the guarantee represented a radical
departure in Britain's foreign policy, not only because it 
signalled the abandonment of Chamberlain's policy of 
appeasement, but also because Britain had traditionally led 
a policy of disengagement in Eastern Europe. This perspective 
has since been challenged in at least two respects. Simon 
Newman argues that the Polish guarantee was not a new
departure in British policy, but rather the ultimate 
manifestation of Britain's continued determination to prevent
10On the outbreak of the Second World War, see for 
example Nicholas Bethell, The War Hitler Won, London, Allan 
Lane The Penguin Press, 1972; Donald Cameron Watt, How War 
Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938- 
1939, London, Heinemann, 1989; John Lukacs, The Last European 
War, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976; A. J. P. Taylor, 
The Origins of the Second World War, London, Hamish Hamilton, 
1961 .
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German expansion in Eastern Europe.11 Anita Prazmowska, on 
the other hand, sees the guarantee as a continuation of the 
"traditional and long-term policy of successive British 
governments of disengagement from the affairs of Central and 
Eastern Europe".12 She stresses that Britain had no interest 
in Central and Eastern Europe, neither in economic nor 
military terms, in the inter-war period. She emphasises the 
"haphazard nature of British considerations and plans made in 
March."13 Thus, she argues that, although the Polish 
guarantee indicated British resolve to deter German 
aggression, it reflected continuity in British policy towards 
East and Central Europe: Not only was it not intended as a 
direct commitment to defend Polish territory, it was also a 
retreat from an initial proposal, emerging after the German
^Newman argues that : "...the appeasers were anxious to 
maintain the balance of power in Europe in 1938-9. The 
reasons given were traditional: ...it has always been the
tradition of his Majesty's government to prevent one power 
from attaining a predominant position on the continent." P. 
218 in Simon Newman, March 1939: The British Guarantee to 
Poland, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976. See his introduction 
for an outline of the traditionalist assumptions on the 
Polish guarantee, pp. 1-7.
12Anita Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern 
Front, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 2.
13A similar perspective is taken by Elisabeth Barker: 
"...the decision to accept the entanglement in the Balkans 
was not the outcome of serious political or military 
planning. It was a hastily improvised reaction...and followed 
on the heels of the equally improvised decision to guarantee 
Poland." British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second 
World War. London, Macmillan, 1976, p. 3-4.
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occupation of Czechoslovakia, of a British guarantee to all 
the states in Central and Eastern Europe.14
What is important for this thesis, however, is the agreement 
between Prazmowska and Newman, as well as the orthodox 
perspective, that Eastern Europe was not central to British 
foreign policy between the wars. According to Newman, the aim 
of the Polish guarantee was to maintain a certain balance 
between the great powers on the European continent, and to 
stop German expansionism. Thus, it was not an indication of 
a strong commitment to Polish territorial integrity in its 
own right.15
The controversy over Britain's commitment to Poland and 
Eastern Europe is equally strong in the literature on the end 
of the Second World War, and the beginning of the Cold War.
14Prazmowska, op. cit. p.56. The first point is 
contradicted by Christopher Hill, who shows that the British 
Cabinet, as well as Chamberlain himself, did not, in 
September 1939 consider reneging on the Polish guarantee. 
Christopher Hill, Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University press, 1991, pp.85-99. It 
might, of course still be true that, in the minds of policy­
makers, the guarantee, when it was formulated in March, was 
not expected to lead to war, and that as a result of 
subsequent events, British perceptions changed to such an 
extent that by September there was a commitment to use force 
which had not existed previously.
15Hill also argues that "The criterion on which British 
policy at this stage was assessed was not so much the 
absolute territorial integrity of Poland, but rather whether 
or not Germany was bent on European hegemony", Hill, 1991, 
op. cit, p. 94.
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The debate over Britain's commitment to Poland at the end of 
the Second World War reflects the wider debate over the 
causes of the division of Europe, and the role and 
responsibility of the wartime allies for this turn of 
events.16 The conference between Stalin, Roosevelt and 
Churchill in Yalta in February 1945 has emerged as a symbol 
of this division, and conjures up the image of great powers 
bargaining over the fate of the people of Eastern Europe, 
dividing the continent amongst themselves into spheres of 
influence. In the words of Brzezinski, "The myth is that at 
Yalta the West accepted the division of Europe".17
Amongst the strong critics of British policy after the Second 
World War is Nikolai Tolstoy, who in accordance with the
16The literature on the Cold War focuses almost 
exclusively on the role of the two Superpowers. Its
significance for the understanding of Western policies 
towards Eastern Europe will be discussed in the section on 
the United States. An exception is Wilfried Loth, "Which 
Yalta? Reflections on the division of Europe", pp-. 419-433, 
Atlantic Quarterly. vol 2, issue 4, Winter 1984. He
emphasises the responsibility of the West Europeans in 
particular for the establishment of the two military blocs. 
See also Elisabeth Barker: "In a dangerous world, an
impoverished and weakened Britain, faced by seeming Soviet 
hostility and aggressiveness ...had inevitably to cling to 
the hope of American economic and military support." The 
British Between the Superpowers, 1945-1950. London, 
Macmillan, 1983, p. 27.
17Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The future of Yalta", Foreign 
Affairs, 63, no 2, Winter 1984-5, pp. 279-280, 294-302.
Reprinted in Robbin Laird and Erik Hoffmann (eds), Soviet 
foreign policy in a changing world. New York, Aldine
Publishing Company, 1975, pp.949-956, quote on p.949.
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"myth" of Yalta considers Britain to have sacrificed Eastern
Europe for its own interests:
"Eden's policy towards the Soviet Union rested on the 
belief that any concession to Soviet demands, however 
base or cruel, that did not in his view affect British 
strategic or political interests was necessary to 
furtherance of good relations between the powers"
Further reinforcing the image of Britain knowingly abandoning 
Eastern Europe to Stalin, is the account of Churchill's 
meeting with Stalin in Moscow in 1944. During the meeting, 
Churchill produced a piece of paper on which the East 
European states were listed together with a percentage 
indicating the influence that the Soviet Union and the West 
would"have in each state.19
18Nikolai Tolstoy, Stalin's secret war. London, Jonathan 
Cape, 1981,p. 323. See also his reference to Churchill's 
reaction to the massacre of Polish officers in Katyn, p. 179 
and Nicolas Bethell, The Last Secret. London, Andre Deutsch, 
1974, on the forced repatriation of prisoners of war to the 
Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War.
19The following division was suggested by Churchill: 
Rumania: Russia 90%, others 10%; Greece: Britain/USA 90%, 
Russia 10%; Yugoslavia: 50-50; Hungary: 50-50; Bulgaria:
Russia 75%, others 25%. See Curtis Keeble, Britain and the 
Soviet Union. 1917-89. London, Macmillan, 1993, pp. 190-1. 
According to Keeble these percentages were meant to be "an 
indication of the relative interest and sentiment of the 
British and Soviet governments". They were, in his view, not 
meant to define rigid spheres of interest. The "agreement" is 
also outlined in John Lukacs, Decline and Rise of Europe, 
West Port, Greenwood Press, 1965, pp. 33-4. Lukacs argues 
that the agreement had some merit, in particular because it 
ensured that Greece remained within the Western sphere of 
influence.
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Yet the issue is far from straightforward. The British 
government devoted considerable time and effort to 
negotiating the future composition of the Polish government, 
both at Yalta and on other occasions.20 The proceedings of 
the Yalta conference itself indicate that the decisions 
reached, in particular the commitment made by all three 
participants to free elections in Eastern Europe, did not 
amount to the division of Europe and thus had little 
influence on the fate of Eastern Europe.21 In fact, it is 
often argued that Britain was simply de facto defeated by the 
balance of military forces in Eastern Europe. According to 
Curtis Keeble,
"It was plain that, in practical terms, Britain had 
little more chance of securing the independence of 
Poland in 1945 than in 1939.1,22
20Lukacs argues that Britain, from 1940, considered the 
tacit acceptance of Soviet territorial demands in the 
Baltics, Bulgaria and Rumania as the price necessary to pay 
for Soviet co-operation against Hitler. Yet, he argues that 
with Poland, Churchill hoped that "an essentially democratic 
regime" would be allowed to exist, pp. 33-4, Lukacs, 1965, 
op. cit. Britain's lukewarm support for Hungary, Rumania and 
Bulgaria is confirmed by Elisabeth Barker. She argues that 
Britain did, after 1944, only make half-hearted attempts at 
keeping them from falling into the Soviet sphere, p. 216. 
"British policy toward Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, pp. 
201-219 in Martin Me Cauley, (ed), Communist Power in Europe, 
1944-49. London, Macmillan, 1977.
21See Loth, op. cit. p 419. For the Yalta conference, see
also Jean Laloy, Yalta: Hier, Auiourd'hui, Demain, Paris,
Robert Laffont, 1988.
22Keeble, op. cit., p. 196. The same argument is
presented by DePorte, op. cit. p. 95.
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Others again have argued that it was too late by the time of 
the Yalta conference to "save" Poland, and consequently that 
Churchill's efforts at negotiations at the end of the War 
were futile:
"...there was never any need to impose communism in 
Poland by brute force ... all the elements which might 
conceivably have mounted organised resistance [against 
the USSR] had already been eliminated by the course of 
prior event. They had been discredited by pre-war or 
wartime failures, deserted by allied powers, or 
destroyed by the Warsaw rising. In 1944-5 there was no 
one left ... Stalin was given what he wanted without a 
struggle" .23
Perhaps most convincing is Lundestad's view that although 
Britain, together with the United States, did attempt to 
prevent Soviet control in Poland, these countries' main 
interests did not lie in this region:
"... two overriding facts determine[ed] the situation in 
Eastern Europe, namely that the Red Army was already in 
control of most of the region and that the Western 
Powers had their most important interests
elsewhere. . . "24
Brzezinski argues that "Yalta remains of great geopolitical 
significance because it symbolises the unfinished struggle 
for the future of Europe."25 It also remains significant
23Norman Davies, "Poland", pp. 39-57 in McCauley (ed), 
op. cit.
24Geir Lundestad, The American "Empire". Oslo, Norwegian 
University Press, 1990, p.152.
25Brzezinski, op. cit, p. 949.
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because it symbolises the moral ambiguity in Western policies 
towards Eastern Europe at the end of the War. The question of 
whether or not more could have been done at the end of the 
war, or at an earlier stage, to prevent a Soviet takeover in 
Eastern Europe, is essentially unanswerable. What is 
important for this thesis is that Britain and the West has 
never managed to escape totally from the sense of 
responsibility for the fate of Eastern Europe. Its dilemmas 
are reflected in Western relations with Eastern Europe in the 
post-war era. Both Poland and Britain were central to the 
decisions made at Yalta with Poland as a ’victim' of Yalta 
and Britain as one of its principal architects.
Defence and disengagement: Britain and the Cold War 
Having failed to achieve the independence of Poland and the 
other East European states, Britain's foreign policy in the 
post-war period was designed to fit in with geopolitical 
realities in Europe. These early years of the Cold War set a 
pattern for Britain's East-West policy in the post-war 
period.26
Britain was influential in establishing the Cold War 
structures in Europe. Churchill's famous speech in Fulton, in 
which he talked about an "iron curtain" having descended over
26Brian White, Detente and Changing East-West Relations. 
London and New York, Routledge, 1992, p. 48.
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Europe, was the first publicly to alert attention to the
political evolution in Eastern Europe. Britain also played a
key role in the establishment of the Western alliance.27 With
regard to Eastern Europe, Northedge argues that:
"..the expansion of Soviet power in Eastern Europe at 
the end to the Second World War was to a large extent 
inescapable, whatever its moral quality, and ...the rest 
of the world could not be expected to commit suicide in 
a vain attempt to reverse it."28
Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe was, although somewhat
ambiguously, accepted even by Churchill, in a speech to the
House of Commons after Stalin's death in 1953:
"Russia has a right [he said] to feel assured that as 
far as human arrangements can run the terrible events of 
the Hitler invasion will never be repeated, and that 
Poland will remain a friendly Power and a buffer, though 
not, I trust, a puppet state."29
Britain did not, unlike the United States, adopt
confrontation as a political strategy towards the Soviet
bloc. Britain was critical of the American tendencies to
embrace a rhetoric of "liberation". It considered the cost of
such a policy far too high. White points out that
"For the Americans, the Cold War had become synonymous 
with political warfare between ideologically opposed
27Loth, op. cit. especially p. 432. See also Anne 
Deighton (ed), Britain and the First Cold War. London, 
Macmillan, 1990, for a discussion of British policy on East- 
West relations in the early post-war years.
28F.S. Northedge and Audrey Wells, Britain and Soviet 
Communism, London and Basingstoke, The Macmillan Press Ltd, 
p. 133.
29Quoted in Northedge and Wells, op. cit. p. 128.
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blocs. ... The more pragmatic British, however, could 
not wholly accept this overtly ideological approach to 
East-West relations. Containment was regarded as a 
short-term strategy and the Cold War as a necessary but 
temporary phase in relations. It soon became clear that 
the longer-term objective of British policy was the 
normalisation of relations with the Soviet bloc."30
In the same way as "realism" had led Britain to encourage the 
creation of a strong Western defence, it led to a search for 
normalization and stabilisation of the international 
situation in the post-war era, rather than to an attempt to 
overthrow it.
In the same vein, Britain considered it important to make it 
clear that NATO's role was to defend its member states from 
a Soviet attack, and not to expel communism in Eastern 
Europe.31 Hence, British governments, both Labour and 
Conservative, took the lead in efforts to create detente with 
the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, by pushing for East-West 
negotiations. The first British attempts at improving 
relations with the Soviet Union were related to the German 
question, but it also affected Central and Eastern Europe. 
British foreign minister Eden proposed a demilitarised area 
between East and West at the Geneva summit in 1955. This 
proposal was expected to encourage a reduction on the Soviet
30Brian White, "Britain and East-West relations", pp. 
149-167 in Brian White, Michael Smith and Steve Smith, op. 
cit, quotation on p. 156.
31Northedge and Wells, op cit, p. 126.
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Union's grip on East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and
Hungary. According to Northedge,
"This conception continued to interest the British 
Foreign Office throughout the 1950s and became the 
inspiration of many schemes for 'disengaging' the armed 
forces of East and West from the line in Central Europe 
where they confronted each other."32
The British search for what Northedge calls "disengagement" 
was not diverted by disturbances in Poland and Hungary in 
1956 and the subsequent Soviet intervention in Hungary.33 
Rather than a cause for strengthening the fight against 
communism, Hungary was seen as a reason for continuing the 
policy of disengagement, and for establishing a more 
acceptable security system in Europe.34 It was against this 
backdrop that Britain in 1957 expressed interest in the plan 
of the Polish Prime Minister, Adam Rapacki, presented to the 
UN, for a nuclear arms free zone in Central Europe.35
32Northedge, 1974, op. cit. p. 243.
33It must be added that there was a feeling in Britain 
that the situation was partly caused by US rhetoric about a 
'liberation' in Eastern Europe. Also, Britain was virtually 
paralysed in 1956 because of the Suez crisis, and thus not in 
a position to influence events. See Keeble, op. cit. p. 255 
and Northedge and Wells, op. cit. p.126.
34Keeble argues that "deplorable though the Soviet action 
in Hungary... had been, th[is] countr[y] had been accepted by 
the Western powers as falling within the imperial ringfence 
of the Soviet Union.", op. cit. p. 291.
35The Rapacki plan proposed a nuclear free zone in 
Central Europe. The plan was eventually rejected by the 
British Foreign Secretary, Selwin Lloyd, apparently as a 
result of pressure from the United States and West Germany. 
Northedge and Wells, op. cit, p. 130. For West German 
opposition to the Rapacki plan, see Helga Haftendorn,
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Britain’s policy of disengagement was perhaps inspired by a
tradition of ’’realpolitik", yet it was also aimed at
providing a special role for Britain in a world dominated by
the Superpowers. Brian White has argued that:
"The perceived linkage between a detente policy and 
Britain's position in the international hierarchy became 
most explicit when the United States directly challenged 
Britain’s leading role in East-West relations. 
Macmillan's understandable concern...was that direct 
superpower contact might diminish the status that had 
accrued from a mediating role and reveal Britain as a 
'second rate power".36
As a direct dialogue developed between the superpowers in the 
1960s, Britain's role as a bridge builder was bound to 
diminish. Although, Macmillan's diplomatic initiatives in the 
early 1960s were crucial to the Soviet and American signing 
of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, British initiatives 
had few tangible results, in particular for Eastern Europe.37
Britain, the Western alliance and Eastern Europe
By the early 1960s, Britain had been overtaken in its efforts 
to create detente by the United States at Superpower level, 
and at the European level by the French President De Gaulle.
Security and Detente: Conflicting Priorities on German
Foreign Policy. New York, Praeger, 1985, pp. 61-68.
36White, 1992, op. cit. p. 73.
37White in White, Smith and Smith, op. cit. p.160-1.
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The Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia did not change 
this, despite signalling the end of France’s ambitions of a 
Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.38 Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson's statement to Parliament, which was recalled 
as a result of the intervention, reflected Britain's 
continued commitments to what Light describes as "vigilance 
and agreement", as well as its commitment to the Western 
alliance:
"The lesson for us is that not only must our posture in 
the North Atlantic Treaty be flexible in its definitive 
postures; it must be flexible equally in its readiness 
to respond to the opportunities of detente..."39
The British emphasis on its relationship with the Western 
alliance and in particular the United States, resulted in 
British policy towards Eastern Europe being conducted largely 
through multilateral institutions, and with a deliberate 
search for co-operation and cohesion with the other Western 
allies.40 Britain did not, as did the French and the West
•^Both public opinion and government reaction in Britain 
to the intervention in Czechoslovakia was strong, not less so 
because of the symbolic significance Czechoslovakia held in 
Britain after 1938. Yet, sanctions were not an issue for the 
British government in 1968.For a discussion of Britain's 
reaction to Czechoslovakia see Elisabeth Barker, Britain in 
a Divided Europe, 1945-1970. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1971, especially pp. 275-278.
39Harold Wilson, The Labour Government. 1964-1970. 
London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971, p. 554.
40White has also argued that in addition to security 
concerns, economic considerations were important for 
Britain's emphasis on the Atlantic Alliance from the early
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Germans, attempt to adopt an autonomous policy towards the
Soviet Union and even less so towards Eastern Europe.41
Michael Clarke has argued that:
"Its [Britain's] policy towards the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe is reactive rather than initiatory, . . .It 
is concerned, above all, with Western unity as a 
prerequisite for any dealings with the Eastern bloc."42
In the 1970s, Britain took part in the CSCE process, yet it 
was far more sceptical of it than were the French and the 
Germans. Britain had fewer interests at stake, yet according 
to Pravda, British scepticism over the CSCE process was also 
due to the potential it had for weakening the Atlantic links 
and Britain's Euro-Atlantic role.43
days of the Cold War. white, 1992, op. cit. p. 47. See also 
Angela Stent, "The USSR and Western Europe", pp. 443-456 in 
Laird and Hoffmann, op. cit.
41Margot Light suggests that this was partly due to 
Britain's traditional emphasis on international cooperation 
and partly a response to the realisation of Britain's 
declining power, and the limits this imposed on British 
foreign policy, Margot Light, "Anglo-Soviet Relations: 
Political and Diplomatic", pp.120-146 in Alex Pravda and 
Peter Duncan, Soviet-British Relations Since the 1970s. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.129.
42Michael Clarke "The Debate on European Security in the 
United Kingdom", p. 129, pp.121-140, in Ole Waever, Pierre 
Lemaitre and Elzbieta Tromer (ed), European Polyphony: 
Perspectives beyond East-West Confrontation. Macmillan, 
London 1989.
43Pravda, op. cit, p. 10. For a discussion of Britain and 
the CSCE see Philip Williams, "Britain, detente and the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe", pp. 221- 
253 in Kenneth Dyson, European Detente: Case Studies of the 
Politics of East-West Relations, London, Frances Pinter, 
1986; Michael Clarke, "The implementation of Britain's CSCE 
policy, 1975-1984", pp. 142-165 in Steve Smith and Michael 
Clarke (eds), Foreign Policy Implementation. London, George
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In summary, Poland remained symbolically important to Britain 
in the post-war era, yet at the same time, Britain's main 
interests continued to lie elsewhere. To the extent that 
Britain had a policy in Eastern Europe, it was part and 
parcel of its Soviet policy and closely interconnected with 
Britain's attachment to the Western alliance and the United 
States in particular. If in its approach to Eastern Europe, 
Britain did not adhere to the universalistic tendencies of 
the United States, its policy was firmly Atlanticist, and 
slightly sceptical of the 1970s detente. Despite the 
disagreement with West Germany over its attempt at 
"disengagement" in the 1950s, Eastern Europe was not, for 
Britain, an issue worth controversy with its allies.
France
Much of France's policy towards Central and Eastern Europe 
has been influenced by its relations with Germany. 
Historically, France has shared with the East European 
countries, and with Poland in particular, a deep suspicion of 
German intentions, and fear of German power. As a result, at 
some points in history, France and the East European 
countries have been "natural allies". Immanuel Geiss has 
described the relationship between Germany, France and their 
Eastern neighbours in the following terms:
Allen and Unwin, 1985.
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"The relationship of Germans, Poles and Russians will 
become even clearer, if the French to the West are 
included as well: As Germany's neighbours to the West 
they had become the 1 arch enemy' of the Germans in the 
19th century and were, therefore, the 'natural' allies 
of the Poles (whenever they had an independent state) 
and of the Russians (when the Polish question had 
disappeared). The Russians, whenever they had as their 
Western neighbours an independent Poland, co-operated 
with the Germans in crushing Poland. When that had been 
achieved, the Germans as new neighbours also became 
sooner or later the enemies of the Russian/Soviets, who 
found their 'natural' allies further to the West."44
However, in addition to its continuous concern about German 
power, French policy towards Eastern Europe has also been 
influenced by the French perception of itself as a country 
representing the ideals of self-determination, national 
independence and individual freedom, as they were expressed 
in the French Revolution. According to Pierre Hassner, France 
sees itself as a country with a mission: "a country that is 
not itself if it does not defend a goal beyond itself - 
whether a principle, or a vision of European or world 
order".45 Finally, the continued effort made by France to 
maintain its status as a great power has also been important 
in its policy towards Eastern Europe.
^Immanuel Geiss, "German Ostpolitik and the Polish 
Question", East European Quarterly, XIX, no. 2, June 1985, 
pp. 210-218. Quotation from p. 202-3.
45Pierre Hassner, "The view from Paris", pp. 188-231 in 
Lincoln Gordon (ed), Eroding Empire: Western Relations With 
Eastern Europe, Washington DC, The Brookings Institution, 
1987, p.204.
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France, Eastern Europe and the German question
Napoleon Ill's brief restoration of Poland's sovereignty in 
the form of the Duchy of Warsaw, in 1807, is often quoted as 
the first example of revolutionary France defending the 
ideals of national independence in Eastern Europe. It is also 
seen as the starting point of a long "friendship" between 
France and Poland. The importance of Franco-Polish relations 
is frequently emphasised in French texts on relations with 
Poland:
"La France pour la Pologne represente un peuple ami 
libre, qui fut, pendant plus d'un siecle de partage, le 
symbole de l'espoir pour les patriotes d'un Etat qui 
avait disparu en tant que tel de la carte de 1'Europe, 
et dont 1'unite nationale ne subsistait que dans le coe r 
de sa population."46
However, the "romance" between France and Poland never 
produced the desired outcome for either side. France was 
never strong enough to guarantee the security of Poland, 
indeed, when it considered it more convenient, France turned 
to the Soviet Union to further its aims. Likewise, from the 
French perspective, links with Poland, or other East European 
states, never guaranteed France the desired status as a great 
power, and never provided sufficient counterforce for France 
to withstand the power of Germany in Europe.
46Jadwiga Castagne, "Les Relations Franco-Polonaises 
(1945-97)", Notes et Etudes Documentaires. no. 3922, 25 Sept. 
1972, p. 5. See also Zbigniew Mazur, "Les Relations Polono- 
Frangaises dans la Periode d 'Apres-Guerre", La Pologne et les 
Affaires Occidentales, Vol. 12, no.1, 1977.
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French policy in Eastern Europe was most active in the inter­
war period and in the first years of the Fifth Republic. In 
the new European order that emerged at the end of the First 
World War, an important issue for France was to manage its 
relations with Germany. This was a concern it shared with the 
East European states.47 In order to achieve the objectives 
of keeping revisionist Germany in control and maintaining the 
status quo of Versailles, France developed the system of 
"alliances de revers". In 1921, a defensive alliance was 
signed with Poland. A similar alliance was concluded with 
Czechoslovakia in 1924. France also acted as the patron of 
the Petite Entente between Czechoslovakia, Rumania and 
Yugoslavia.48 However, the system of "alliances de revers" 
was fragile. Having little, if any, experience of democratic 
government and suffering from ethnic disputes both 
domestically and externally, the newly created East European 
regimes were weak and unstable. Furthermore, and more 
importantly in this context, France did not really have the 
capacity to uphold its commitments in Central and Eastern
47In fact, Geiss argues that the continuing weakness of 
Germany (as well as the Soviet Union) in the interwar years 
was the basic precondition for Poland's future as an 
independent state, op. cit.p. 212.
48For France's relations with Eastern Europe in the 
inter-war period see Piotr S. Wandycz, France and Her Eastern 
Allies. 1919-1925. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press, 1962; The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances. 1926- 
36, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1988; and 
Nicole Jordan, The Popular Front and Central Europe: The
Dilemmas of French Impotence.: 1918-1940. Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1992.
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Europe. Finally, the strategy of "alliances de revers" was in 
flagrant contradiction with the guiding principle of French 
security policy at the time, that of the Maginot line, which 
was purely defensive:
"The divorce between the defensive strategy of France 
incarnated by the Maginot Line and the diplomacy of 
support to the Eastern European countries is still used 
today in military schools as the best example of 
discrepancy between strategy and diplomacy."49
As Germany regained its strength and began to reassert its 
ambitions in East and Central Europe, the contradictions in 
the French position increased. Gradually, French diplomacy in 
the area disintegrated.50 In 1935 France signed a mutual 
assistance pact with Poland's arch-enemy, the Soviet Union, 
further underlining the inconsistencies of its Eastern 
diplomacy.51 In 1938 it proved incapable of guaranteeing the 
independence of Czechoslovakia, and in September 1939, 
despite declaring war on Germany, it remained immobile while
49Dominique Moisi, "French Policy Towards Central and 
Eastern Europe", in William Griffith (ed), Central and 
Eastern Europe: The Opening Curtain?, Boulder, San Francisco 
and London, Westview Press, 1989, pp. 353-365.
50For a review of French policy in Eastern Europe in the 
1930s, see Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, La Decadence, 1932-1939, 
Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1979. French foreign policy 
leading up to the Second World War is dealt with in Anthony 
Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second World War, 
London, Cass, 1977.
51For a study of the history of Franco-Soviet relations 
see Maxime Mourin, Les Relations Franco-Sovietiques, 1917—
1967. Paris, Payot, 1967.
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Poland was absorbed by its two traditional enemies, the 
Soviet Union and Germany.
In the post-war period, an alliance with the Central and East 
European countries was no longer an option for French policy­
makers.52 Efforts to contain Germany expressed themselves 
chiefly by attempting to tie the Federal Republic to Western 
institutions, first through the failed European Defence 
Community (EDC), then in the West European Union (WEU) and 
NATO, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and later 
the European Community.53 This does not mean, however, that 
Eastern Europe disappeared completely from the French foreign 
policy agenda. In fact, French "designs" in Eastern Europe 
disappeared during the Fourth Republic only to return in 
force under the Fifth, at the initiative of de Gaulle.54
52For a record of the bilateral relations between France 
and the Eastern European countries since the Second World 
War, see Thomas Schreiber, "Les Relations de la France Avec 
les Pays de l'Est" (1944-1980), La Documentation Francaise, 
30 Avril, 1980.
53France signed an anti-German alliance with Stalin in 
1944, inspired by the belief "that co-operation with all big 
three powers was essential to French interest". Yet, in the 
subsequent five years, the assumptions of France's foreign 
policy were radically transformed. France joined NATO in 
1949, largely in response to the threat from the USSR and the 
need for US financial assistance. See John W. Young, France, 
the Cold War and the Western Alliance, London, Leicester 
University Press, 1990, quote on p. 222.
^The Fourth Republic was almost paralysed by the 
combined effect of the war in Indochina and the domestic 
instabilities of the regime, and did not have a very active 
foreign policy. See Alfred Grosser, La Ouatrieme Republique 
et sa Politique Exterieure. Paris, Librairie Armand Colin,
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However, once again, Eastern Europe was not an objective 
entirely in its own right, but was part of a larger vision of 
the balance of power and security in Europe and most
importantly, it was part of a vision of France's role in a
new European order.55
Europe without the United States, from the Atlantic to the 
Urals
De Gaulle's Ostpolitik was launched in the context of
superpower detente. For the first, and also the only time in 
post-war history, France was actually leading the way in 
East-West relations. De Gaulle's vision of a "Europe from the 
Atlantic to the Urals" was based on the principle of a
gradual disengagement of both superpowers in Europe and the 
expectation that West and East European countries would 
slowly converge, and thus the political divisions of the Cold 
War would be overcome. It was, as most aspects of de Gaulle's 
foreign policy, a non-ideological approach to East-West 
relations, inspired by a geopolitical vision of Europe, and 
underlining the importance of the historic links between 
France and Eastern Europe.
1961 .
55This is also the argument of Pierre Hassner, op. cit., 
p. 189 and Michel Tatu, Eux et Nous: les Relations Est-Ouest 
entre Deux Detentes, Paris, Fayard, 1985, p. 106-7.
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De Gaulle's policy was introduced gradually. The first steps 
of his policy were visits between Soviet and French officials 
in 1964. In November the same year de Gaulle received the 
foreign ministers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia 
to discuss the development of economic and cultural 
relations. The highpoints of the policy were the visits of de 
Gaulle to the Soviet Union in 1966, to Poland in 1967 and to 
Rumania in 1968.56
The vision of "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" was the 
last of several attempts by de Gaulle since his arrival in 
power in 1958 to reshape the post-war order in Europe and to 
increase French influence and prestige. De Gaulle's first 
attempt in this direction came in 1958, when he proposed a 
"Directoire des trois Grands", in a memorandum to the 
American President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister 
Macmillan.57 Having failed to achieve support for this
560n de Gaulle's visit to Poland see Jean Parandowski, 
"Les Polonais et de Gaulle", pp.30-33 and G. Boud'hors, "Le 
voyage du general de Gaulle en Pologne. 6 au 12 Septembre 
1967", pp.34-45 in Espoir. Revue de l'lnstitut Charles de 
Gaulle, March 1976, no 14.
57The main idea of his proposal was that NATO would be 
run by the three "Great powers", France, Britain and the 
United States. For a discussion of this proposal see Alfred 
Grosser, The Western Alliance: European-American Relations 
Since 1945, London, The Macmillan Press, 1980, pp.183-208. 
The text of de Gaulle's letter to Eisenhower and Macmillan is 
reprinted on p. 187. It was first published in Espoir. Revue 
de l'lnstitut Charles de Gaulle. no. 15, June 1976. For de 
Gaulle's Atlantic and European policies see also Guy de 
Carmoy, Les Politiaues Etranqeres de la France, 1944-66, 
Paris, La Table Ronde, 1967.
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scheme, he proceeded to attempt to transform the existing 
European Community into a forum for foreign policy 
coordination, in order to obtain greater independence from 
the United States. Yet he failed to get the "Fouchet plans" 
adopted by the other members of the European Community.58 
Essential both to the "Directoire a Trois" initiative and the 
Fouchet Plans, was the aim of enhancing French influence, and 
the idea that in order to achieve this, relative independence 
from the United States was necessary.59 These same ideas were 
an integral part of de Gaulle's diplomatic bid in Eastern 
Europe. According to French Prime Minister, Maurice Couve de 
Murville:
"Le voyage du general de Gaulle en URSS couronnait 
1'evolution qui s'etait produite depuis deux ou trois 
annees. II donnait sa marque finale aux rapports 
vraiment renouveles que la France avait voulu creer dans 
un contexte international qui rendait desormais possible 
une politique conforme au role qu'il lui appartenait de 
jouer en Europe et qui, a notre sens - c'est une autre 
fagon d'exprimer la meme pensee - servait au mieux les 
interets de la paix."60
^The Fouchet plans suggested a return to the principle 
of a "Europe of nation states" and the development of foreign 
policy co-operation as the most important task of the 
European Community. See Pierre Gerbet La Construction de 
1'Europe. Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1983, pp. 271-291.
59Perhaps paradoxically, de Gaulle was, at the same time 
conscious of the importance of the US commitment to the 
defence of Europe. Hence, in the Cuban crisis, he was the 
first West European leader to rally behind Kennedy. What this 
confirms most of all, is the importance of de Gaulle's 
geopolitical outlook on international politics.
60Couve de Murville, Une Politique Etrangere, 1958-1969, 
Plon, 1971, p.222, quoted in Thomas Schreiber, op. cit., p. 
62.
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This quotation serves to underline the point that attempts to 
enhance French prestige and influence were an integral part 
of de Gaulle's Ostpolitik. Furthermore, it emphasises the 
notion that France had a sense of being a country with a 
"mission": hence Couve de Murville assimilates France' role 
as a great power with the maintenance of peace in Europe.61 
However, as Kolodziej clearly underlines, the idea of a 
Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals was highly 
controversial. Its success depended on a large number of 
conditions, most of them unlikely to materialise:
"For de Gaulle, the conditions of European peace were as 
many as they were complex: liberalisation of the Russian 
regime and the East European empire, Germany's 
settlement of its frontiers and its agreement on 
armaments, West European economic integration and 
political union, including a common defence policy, and 
the establishment of a European system of states from 
the "Atlantic to the Urals in harmony and cooperation 
with a view to the development of her vast 
resources. "62
With the Soviet intervention in Prague in 1968, de Gaulle's 
strategy for overcoming the division of Europe failed. Events 
in Czechoslovakia made it clear that the Soviet Union would
61 According to Philip Cerny and Jolyon Howorth, French 
foreign policy in the Cold War associated "French national 
interest and the wider global interest with their own version 
of the European interest". See "National Independence and 
Atlanticism: the dialectic of French Politics", pp.198-221, 
in Kenneth Dyson (ed), European Detente, Pinter Publisher, 
1986, quote on p. 200.
62Edward A. Kolodziej, French International Policy Under 
de Gaulle and Pompidou, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and 
London, p.320.
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not tolerate a change in the status quo in Europe, neither 
would it tolerate a political evolution that might be 
interpreted as weakening Soviet control in Eastern Europe.63
The rise of the Ostpolitik and the decline of France's role 
in Eastern Europe
After Czechoslovakia in 1968 and after de Gaulle's 
resignation in 1969, French policy in Eastern Europe never 
really recovered. Under the new President, Georges Pompidou, 
France's European policy turned to focus on the West and, in 
particular, on the European Community. It continued to 
cultivate its relations with Eastern Europe, but West Germany 
took the lead in expanding relations with this region:
"De Gaulle's detente policy was not so much abandoned as 
it was subordinated to a newly manifested French 
interest in building and participating within a larger 
West European grouping. The shift,..., was logical 
enough since Germany and the United States assumed, not 
always in harmony with each other, Western leadership 
for the detente process."64
Officially France supported Brandt's new Ostpolitik, however, 
in private there was some irritation in Paris of being
63For the Czechoslovak crisis see Philip Windsor and Adam 
Roberts, Czechoslovakia 1968. London, Chatto & Windus for 
IISS, 1969; Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in 
Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision, Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins University, 1979;and Karen Dawisha, The Kremlin and 
the Prague Soring. Berkeley, University of California Press, 
1984.
64Kolodz jie j , op.cit., p. 440.
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bypassed by West Germany, and concern lest it be a more 
interesting interlocutor for the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe than France had been.65 What is more, the spectre of 
Rapallo, symbolising "Germany's historic propensity for 
maneuvering between East and West" had not completely 
vanished from Franco-German relations.66
There had been no attempt to coordinate de Gaulle1s 
initiatives towards Eastern Europe with West Germany. Indeed, 
the idea of "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" followed 
a different logic from West Germany's East European policy at 
the time. Also, the West Germans were suspicious of French 
intentions and concerned that they would lead to their 
exclusion from discussion on any future arrangements of the 
European order.67 In fact, the intervention in Prague in 1968
65Alfred Grosser, Affaires Exterieures: La Politique
Exterieure de la France. 1944-84. Paris, Flammarion, 1984, 
p.243-5.
66Timothy Garton Ash, The Uses of Adversity, Granta 
Books, Cambridge, 1983, quote on p. 64. For a discussion of 
the role of the Rapallo myth in France in the interwar period 
see Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, Rapallo: Naissance d'un Mvthe: 
La Politique de la Peur dans la France du Bloc National, 
Paris, A. Colin, 1974. See also Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, 
L'Allemaqne un Enieu Pour 1'Europe. Editions Complexe, 
Bruxelles, 1987. For the diplomatic manouvers leading to 
Rapallo see Stephen White, The Origins of Detente, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 147-168.
67Hanrieder and Auton argue that "Paris and Bonn were 
pursuing policies based on fundamentally different concepts 
of a desirable political order...", Wolfram Hanrieder and 
Graeme Auton, The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France 
and Britain. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1980, p. 129.
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had provoked a row between West Germany and France. De Gaulle 
blamed West Germany for the invasion, arguing that West 
Germany's economic policy and economic power had exercised a 
strong attraction on Czechoslovakia. Thus, France in fact 
backed the Soviet position which consisted in justifying its 
intervention by arguing that West German credits and 
favourable trade terms to Prague "...exerted an irresistible 
drawing power on an independent Czechoslovakia". West Germany 
in turn argued that de Gaulle's policy had encouraged 
diversity in Eastern Europe and was thus equally to blame.68
French leaders continued after de Gaulle to stress the 
importance of good relations with the Soviet Union and with 
Eastern Europe. Pompidou, for example, met Brezhnev five 
times during his presidency. This did not, however, as under 
de Gaulle, appear to be inspired by a specific vision of 
Europe. Also, these policies were not aimed specifically at 
Eastern Europe, but were rather part of a broader approach to 
East-West relations. Eastern Europe was also expected to 
benefit from the policy, although the objective was not 
Eastern Europe itself. The emphasis on relations with the 
Soviet Union continued after the election of Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing to the Presidency in 1974. Giscard is considered to 
have had a strong belief in the policy of detente and in
68Wolfram Hanrieder, Germany, America. Europe, New Haven 
and London, Yale University Press, 1989, p. 450, note 48.
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trade and economic relations as a means of maintaining peace 
and stability.69 In his memoirs, Giscard underlines in 
particular the importance of his good relations with the 
Polish Secretary General Edward Gierek, a personal friendship 
which was no doubt strengthened by the fact that Gierek, as 
the son of Polish immigrants, had spent his childhood in the 
north of France and received most of his education in 
French.70 It was also Gierek who acted as an intermediary in 
Giscard's much criticised meeting with Brezhnev in Warsaw in 
the spring of 1980, which apparently took place in an attempt 
to mediate in the conflict over Afghanistan. Still, France 
was no longer at the forefront of West European relations 
with Eastern Europe.
To summarise: historically, France entertained closer links 
with Poland and Eastern Europe than Britain did. Central to 
France's relations with Eastern Europe has been its concern 
with the German question. Furthermore, French initiatives 
towards Eastern Europe in the post-war period were influenced 
by a search for a Europe-wide settlement which would overcome 
Cold War divisions. France saw European independence from the
69See Michel Tatu, "Valery Giscard d'Estaing et la 
Detente", in Sarny Cohen and Marie-Claude Smouts (eds), La 
Politique Exterieure de Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Paris, 
Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 
1985, pp. 196-218.
70Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Le Pouvoir et la Vie. Paris, 
Compagnie 12, 1988, p. 169.
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US as a precondition for achieving this goal. In this respect 
its approach differed radically from both Britain's and West 
Germany's. Consequently, the close Franco-German cooperation 
in the post-war period, in particular in the context of the 
European Community, did not expand into coordination of 
French and West German approaches to Eastern Europe.
Germany
Germany distinguishes itself from the other Western states as 
the only country with close interests in Poland, as well as 
in the rest of Eastern Europe.71 A brief look at a map of 
Europe suffices to underline the importance of German-East 
European relations. Historically, to the extent that modern, 
post-1870 Germany can be considered as the successor state of 
Prussia, it was part of the group of countries traditionally 
referred to as Central European. It was only with the German 
defeat in 1945, and its subsequent partition, that Germany, 
or more precisely its Western half, the Federal Republic, 
became a "Western" power. Since then, West Germany's policy 
towards Eastern Europe has been closely intertwined with, and 
often determined by, its policy towards the other German 
state.72 Nonetheless, this has only been possible against the
71Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the 
Divided Continent. London, Vintage, 1994, p. 28.
72In the following "Ostpolitik" will be used to denote 
policy towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and 
"Deutschlandpolitik" to refer to policy towards East Germany 
and Berlin. According to Timothy Garton Ash, this division
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backdrop of a close partnership between West Germany and the 
Western alliance.
Between East and West
According to Josef Joffe,
"Germany is Central Europe....In the past 40 years the 
Federal Republic of Germany has been of the West, but in 
the flow of history this is a novel development."73
Closeness does not indicate that relations between Germany
and the Central/ East European states have always been of a
friendly nature. From the perspective of Poland in
particular, but also the other East European states, German
power and the fear of German/Prussian expansion goes back
several centuries:
"While the other West European states colonized beyond 
the seas, and Russia colonized Siberia, Germany 
colonized its immediate eastern neighbours".
between "Ostpolitik" and "Deutschlandpolitik" is not, 
however, entirely clear. Some issues, in particular that of 
the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, which was considered 
to be German territory, could, in principle, be both 
Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik simultaneously. See Garton 
Ash, 1994, op. cit., p. 37. Still, Joffe argues that 
Deutschlandpolitik was in practice used by West German 
policy-makers to refer to policy towards the German 
Democratic Republic (CJDR). Josef Joffe, "The view from Bonn: 
the tacit alliance", “"/pp. 129-1? in Gordon, op. cit. p. 133.
73Joffe in Gordon, op. cit, p. 129.
74William Griffith and Wolfgang Berner, "West German 
Policy Toward Central and Eastern Europe", in Griffith (ed),
pp.338-352, quotation on|p 339.
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At the end of the First World War, Germany contested the 
outcome of the Versailles treaty in which it lost territories 
in the east to Poland and Czechoslovakia. With the arrival of 
Hitler in power in 1933, expansion to the East became a 
primary goal in German foreign policy.75 The advent of the 
Cold War and the partition of Germany into two states, one 
tied to the West and the other to the Soviet Union and the 
East, radically altered the country's relations with Poland, 
as well as with the rest of Eastern Europe.76 Divided in two, 
and carrying the burden of its nazi past, West Germany was 
not a "normal" state. Most importantly perhaps, not being 
allowed an independent defence capability, it became 
dependent on its Western allies for protection against the 
perceived Soviet threat. According to Michael Sturmer:
"As there was no longer anything worthy, at least 
politically, of the name of Central Europe, West 
Germany's Western orientation came about almost as a 
matter of course. There was simply nothing there that 
the idea of a Central European identity could be built 
upon. There was only the dividing line."77
75For a study of this period in German history see, 
Michael Burleigh, Germany Turns Eastward: a Study of
Ostforschunq in the Third Reich, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1988.
76For the events leading to the division of Germany see 
for example Avi Shlaim, "The partition of Germany and the 
origins of the Cold War", Review of International Studies, 
1985, 11, pp. 123-137.
77Michael Sturmer, "The evolution of the contemporary 
German question", in Edwina Moreton (ed), Germany Between 
East and West, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, 
pp. 21-32, quotation on p. 25.
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"Westernisation" was, nevertheless, also a deliberate policy-
choice, made by the West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer,
who himself considered Germany's roots to be in Western
Europe.78 What is more, close co-operation with the other
Western states and active participation in Western
institutions were the means by which Adenauer's West Germany
sought to shed its past and re-insert itself into
international society. In the words of Reinhard Rummel:
"For reasons of legitimation and credibility, Germany 
needs Western partners and institutions to protect 
itself against political pressure and to operate 
internationally without being suspected - by proponents 
in the East as well as in the West- of renewed German 
hegemonical ambitions."79
With the partition of Germany at the end of the Second World 
War, and West Germany's inclusion in the Western camp, 
Germany's colonial ambitions in Eastern Europe were ended. 
West Germany's policy towards Eastern Europe became 
inextricably linked with the question of its relations with 
its East German counterpart, and, for a long time, 
subordinated to the goal of reunification.80
78William Griffith, The Ostpolitik of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Cambridge, MASS, The MIT Press, 1978, 
pp.43-8.
79Reinhard Rummel, "Germany's role in the CFSP: 
'Normalitat or 'Sonderweg'?", pp. 40-67 in Christopher Hill 
(ed), The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy. London, 
Routledge, 1996, quotation on p. 42.
80The declared goal of German unity as formulated in the 
Federal Republic's Basic Law. Until 1972, West Germany 
considered itself to be the only representative unit of the 
German people and refused to recognize the legitimacy of the
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Combining territorial claims and multilateral ties:
contradictions in Adenauer's "policy of strength1
In the first years after the creation of the Federal Republic
(in 1949) its policy towards Eastern Europe was, under the
leadership of Adenauer, centred around the explicit statement
of the goal of reunification and the refusal to accept the
existing borders in Europe. This policy was institutionalised
through the Hallstein doctrine of December 1955 in which the
West German Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that West
Germany would break its diplomatic relations with any country
(except the USSR), that recognized East Germany. During the
negotiations on the dismantling of the occupation regime of
the Western Zones of Germany and the entrance of the Federal
Republic into NATO in 1955, West Germany succeeded in
imposing its position on the German question also on its
Western Allies. This policy, often referred to as the "policy
of strength", was based on the following two assumptions:
" (1 ) that Washington and Moscow held the key to the 
German question, and (2) that with the passage of time 
the balance of power between the Cold War blocs would 
shift in favour of the West, thus allowing negotiations 
"on the basis of strength" that would induce the Soviet 
Union to settle the German question on Western 
terms."81
other German state. Until 1990, it refused to recognize its 
postwar borders. Garton Ash, op. cit. p.34; Joffe in Gordon, 
op. cit p.133; Hanrieder, 1989, op. cit. p. 196.
81Hanrieder and Auton, op. cit, p.51.
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The consequence of the agreement between West Germany and the 
Western allies on the Hallstein doctrine was twofold. 
Firstly, it led to a revisionist position of the West towards 
Eastern Europe, and secondly, it gave the key control, or the 
power of veto, on this policy to West Germany.82
West Germany's revisionist stand on Europe's borders also had 
important consequences for Poland. Poland was the country 
that had suffered most from German occupation. In the words 
of Wladislaw Kulski, "Poland and Germany emerged from the 
Second World War animated by mutual animosity".83 Relations 
were not improved by the fact that Poland inherited the 
territories of Eastern Prussia and proceeded with forced 
expulsion of ethnic Germans from the former German 
provinces.84 The roots of Polish-German animosity did, 
however, go even further back:
82Joffe, in Gordon, op. cit, p.141. Joffe also argues 
that Adenauer's main concern was to avoid a four power 
agreement on a neutral Germany being signed without West 
Germany's participation. Windsor also emphasises the West 
German government's ability to influence US foreign policy in 
this area: "...Germany's growing importance within the
Alliance forced certain modifications of policy on the 
Federal government as well as helping to shape the policies 
of the United States. But in return Germany acquired 
something of a veto over those aspects of American policy 
which involved her own interest", op. cit., p. 41.
83Wladislaw Kulski, "German-Polish relations since World 
War Two", pp. 64-69 in The Polish Review, vol 24, no 1, 1979.
84Garton Ash, 1994, op. cit, pp. 219-20, Norman Davies, 
God's Playground: A History of Poland in Two Volumes. Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1981, pp. 563-564.
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"Men and women of goodwill on both sides of the Oder- 
Neisse line have tried to evoke the happier moments of 
German-Polish relations. They recall the rich cultural 
and technological interchanges in the late middle ages 
and the period of German liberal enthusiasm for the 
cause of Polish independence in the 1830s ...yet the sad 
truth is that long before 1939 the German-Polish 
relationship was one of the most tense and difficult in 
Europe. "85
West Germany's refusal to recognise Poland's territorial 
integrity fuelled Polish fear of German imperialism. In turn, 
this allowed the Soviet Union to justify its presence in 
Poland, by presenting itself as the guarantor against future 
German claims on Polish territory.86 Although, on the face 
of it, the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956, and the 
Warsaw Pact intervention in Hungary, did not change anything 
in West Germany's Ostpolitik, they did signal that the Soviet 
Union's position was not weakening the way Adenauer had 
expected. Thus, the assumptions underlying the 'policy of 
strength' emerged as increasingly unrealistic:
"A Western policy of 'rollback' and liberation of 
Eastern Europe, or even of applying strong pressure on 
the Kremlin, became inconceivable in light of the 
retaliatory power the Soviet Union was acquiring - as 
demonstrated by events in Hungary in 1956. Adenauer's 
'policy of strength', encouraged by the rhetoric of the
85Garton Ash, 1994, op. cit., p.218.
86Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 69-70. 
Norman Davies argues that it was a deliberate policy on the 
part of the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War 
to insist that Poland be awarded former German territories 
"beyond anything the Poles considered Polish". The Soviets 
expected this would guarantee post-war German revanchism and 
a long term need for Soviet protection against Germany. 
Davies, op. cit, 1984, p. 32.
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first Eisenhower administration, had become illusory 
because the developing nuclear standoff was reflected in 
an East-West standoff on the German question."87
In addition to unrealistic expectations that the Soviet Union 
would accept to settle the German question on Western terms, 
there were several contradictions in West German policy 
during these years. Hanrieder points to "a certain 
anachronistic flavour" in Bonn's eastern policy, dominated by 
territorial claims and the aim of reversing existing 
political arrangements in Europe. He contrasts this with "the 
modernity of its [the Federal Republic's] Western diplomacy", 
which emphasised the importance of economic and political 
interdependence and multilateral cooperation.88 Windsor 
highlights the increasing contradictions not in West 
Germany's policy-style, but in its national interest. He 
argues that the success of Adenauer's policy was due to its 
ability to unite all West German interests into the 
overriding interest of integration into the Western camp. 
This was "based on the attempt to define Germany's immediate 
future in terms of overcoming its past".89 In turn, it was 
expected to prepare West Germany for reunification. Yet, in 
the early 1960s, it was becoming more and more difficult to
87Hanrieder and Auton, op. cit. p. 54.
88Hanrieder, op. cit. 1989, p. 148.
89Philip Windsor, Germany and the Management of Detente, 
London, Chatto and Windus for IISS, 1969. 1971, op. cit.
p . 34.
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contain the aspirations of German society within this one 
policy. West Germany’s allies, and the United States in 
particular, were becoming increasingly reluctant to support 
West Germany's revisionist stand on East Germany, thus the 
Westpolitik was no longer seen to forward the aim of 
reunification. Furthermore, the French-American disputes in 
the Atlantic alliance meant that there was no longer a one­
dimensional Westpolitik. In turn, this produced a domestic 
fragmentation of West Germany’s interest and contributed to 
provoking a gradual change in West Germany's policy towards 
Eastern Europe.
Continuity and change: the Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt 
The first steps towards a change in West German policy on 
Eastern Europe came with the so called ’’policy of movement", 
initiated by Gerhard Schroder, Foreign Minister during the 
last years of Adenauer's administration. It was continued 
under the new Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, from 1963, but the 
changes introduced were considered insufficient. West Germany 
did not abandon the Hallstein doctrine, nor did it accept the 
Oder Neisse line. It was only under the new leadership of the 
SPD and Willy Brandt that West Germany radically altered its 
Ostpolitik. With this change of policy, West Germany
89
successfully re-acquired its place at the heart of Western 
relations with Eastern Europe.90
According to Hanrieder, the Soviet intervention in
Czechoslovakia in 1968 was important in provoking change in
West Germany's policy.91 It has already been pointed out that
Czechoslovakia was the final blow to de Gaulle's policy of a
Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. At the same time then,
it marked the beginning of an active engagement of West
Germany in Eastern Europe:
"The invasion had proved that although what de Gaulle 
called 'la force des choses' in Eastern Europe - 
nationalism, liberalization, and economic reform - 
favoured the new Ostpolitik, 'la force sovietique' would 
block or reverse its gains. Moscow remained decisive for 
Eastern Europe."92
Brandt's new policy was based on the assumption that the 
split between East and West Germany could only be narrowed as 
a result of East-West accommodation. The new Ostpolitik 
represented a reversal of West Germany's previous policy in 
Eastern Europe, which had been that progress on the question
90For a discussion of the first years of Brandt's 
Ostpolitik, see Lawrence Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik. 
Oxford University Press, London, 1971.
91Hanrieder, 1989, op. cit. pp. 191-94.
92Griffith, 1978, op. cit. 1978, p.160. Josef Joffe and 
Philip Windsor identify the Berlin crisis of 1962 as the 
turning point for West Germany' position on East Germany, 
Josef Joffe The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United
States and the Burdens of the Alliance. Cambridge, Mass., 
Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987, p. xii; Windsor, 1969, 
op. cit. p. 45.
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of German reunification would have to precede a fundamental 
East-West accommodation on Europe. The goal of reunification 
was no longer explicitly mentioned. It was replaced by that 
of achieving a "rapprochement" between the two Germanies. 
Nevertheless, in the same sense that reunification was the 
ultimate aim of Adenauer's revisionist stand, improving 
relations with East Germany was at the centre of Brandt's new 
Ostpolitik. In other words, although the goal of 
reunification was no longer expressed, relations with the GDR 
continued to be the leitmotif of West Germany's Ostpolitik. 
The objective was to change the conditions in which relations 
with the GDR were developed, thus making reunification 
unnecessary.93
The Ostpolitik led to the signing of a number of treaties 
between West Germany and, firstly, the USSR, then Poland, the 
GDR and Czechoslovakia. Essential to these agreements was a 
declaration of mutual renunciation of the use of force, as 
well as a West German declaration that it regarded the 
existing borders in Europe, including the Oder-Neisse line 
and the border between the FRG and the GDR, as inviolable.94
93Joffe in Gordon, op. cit., p. 135.
94The treaty between the Soviet Union and West Germany 
was signed in August 1970, the Warsaw Treaty with Poland in 
December 1970 followed by the quadripartite treaty on Berlin 
and the Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR in 1972. A 
treaty with Czechoslovakia was signed in 1973. Griffith, 
1978, op. cit., chapter 5. For the two Germanies' relations 
with the Soviet Union, see Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, L 'Union 
Sovietiaue et les Deux Allemagnes. Paris, Presses de la
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Negotiations with Poland proved particularly difficult.
According to Haftendorn:
. .the difficulties that had accumulated between Poland 
and Germany as a result of a calamitous past 
necessitated laborious detailed work to produce 
solutions that were at once politically and morally 
convincing. . . "95
The border question was particularly sensitive, but the 
negotiations also raised Polish claims for indemnification 
for crimes of nazism, as well as the issue of the rights of 
remaining Germans to emigrate from Poland. The Warsaw Treaty, 
finally signed in 1970, stated that "the Oder Neisse line 
laid down in the Potsdam Agreement shall constitute the 
Western state frontier of the People's Republic of Poland."96 
Both Poland and West Germany committed themselves to 
respecting the others' territorial integrity and renounced 
territorial claims. In the aftermath of the Warsaw treaty, an 
agreement linking Polish compensation claims and the granting 
of emigration permits for Germans in Poland was negotiated.97
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1979.
95Haftendorn, op. cit, especially pp. 199-206, qoute on 
p. 204.
96Ibid, p. 203.
97The Federal Republic recognised the Oder-Neisse line as 
Germany's Eastern border in the Warsaw Treaty with Poland in 
1970 as well as in the Moscow Treaty of that same year. Yet, 
there was disagreement over the significance of this 
recognition. The Federal Republic argued that it had 
recognised the border only for the duration of the Federal 
Republic and that it was not binding on a future unified 
Germany. After German reunification, Chancellor Kohl delayed 
confirmation of the inviolability of Poland's western border
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Westpolitik and Ostpolitik: towards 'decoupling1?
It was pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, that
Western policies towards Eastern Europe cannot be seen in
isolation from East-West relations. This was particularly so
in the case of West Germany. The partition of Germany was
both a symbol and a consequence of the East-West division:
"The German problem was central to the outbreak of the 
cold War, central to its continuation and central to its 
decline. So close, in fact is the inter-connection 
between the German problem and the Cold War that it 
becomes difficult to distinguish cause and effect."98
Because the dividing line between East and West in Europe
went through Germany, West Germany's allies were also
particularly sensitive to events in intra-German relations
and in West Germany's Ostpolitik in general. At the same
time, West Germany's Ostpolitik was vulnerable to pressure
from the other Western states. In the words of David Marsh,
West Germany had had to
"...become an eminently humble partner: subsuming its 
interests to those of the Western alliance, eschewing 
independent use of military force, reassuring its allies 
that it was its destiny in European rather than national 
terms, ostentatiously playing down the practical 
possibilities for reunification."99
until March 1990. According to Ash, the delay was a tactical 
move aimed at curbing opposition to recognition from the 
nationalist right in Germany. Garton Ash, 1994, op. cit. p. 
230.
98Avi Shlaim, op. cit.p. 123.
"David Marsh, Germany and Europe: The Crisis of Unitv. 
London, Mandarin, 1994 p. 32.
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The changes in West Germany's position on relations with
Eastern Europe must be understood against the backdrop of
this fragile position in the Western alliance. In fact,
whenever West Germany's policy on Eastern Europe was seen as
evolving too far out of step with broad trends in the
Alliance, it encountered difficulties.lt has already been
pointed out that West Germany's abandonment of the Hallstein
doctrine, and the development of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik,
was not only a result of West Germany's realisation that its
strategy of negotiating with the Soviet Union from a position
of strength would not work. It came about most of all as a
result of pressure from West Germany's allies:
"It was not the loss of the tenuous hope of 
reunification which forced the FRG to adapt. It was the 
fact that its earlier policy towards Eastern Europe was 
producing stresses and contradictions in the Western 
alliance. . . "10°
As detente gained momentum in the late 1960s, the United 
States was increasingly reluctant to support West Germany's 
revisionism. West Germany had previously clashed with Britain 
over its efforts to develop "disengagement" with Eastern 
Europe. The potential for a conflict with the United States 
was far more serious. With the United States' declining 
support for German reunification, France's position on the 
issue increased in importance. Yet, France was, itself, 
developing a more active East European policy. Hence, West
100Windsor, 1971, op. cit, p. 46.
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Germany was facing pressure from its two most important 
allies to change its position on Eastern Europe. At the same 
time, it was presented with competing alternatives, both of 
which were unacceptable to it: the United States because it 
implicitly accepted the division of Europe, the French 
because although challenging the division of Europe, the West 
German government suspected the French project would lead to 
undermining the goal of German reunification. What is more, 
the French proposal sought to exclude the United States from 
a European settlement.101 This was still unacceptable to 
West Germany. As the section on France showed, Franco-German 
disagreements over policy in Eastern Europe came to a climax 
after the intervention in Prague in 1968, with each country 
blaming the other for the invasion.
West Germany's dilemmas were not resolved with the launch of 
Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik. In fact, although it fitted in 
with the overall climate of detente, West Germany's 
Ostpolitik did to a large extent follow its own logic. Thus, 
it sowed the seeds of future misunderstandings within the 
Western alliance about West Germany's "true" aims in Eastern 
Europe. It was not entirely clear to West Germany's allies to 
what extent the new Ostpolitik meant the abandonment of the 
objective of reunification and whether or not West Germany
101Hanreider, 1989, op. cit. p. 185.
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was still a revisionist power in Europe.102 According to
Joffe, reunification was still the main objective of the
Ostpolitik, what had changed was the way in which West
Germany went about achieving this aim.103 Pierre Hassner
appears to take a slightly different view:
"Ostpolitik meant adjustment to realities, including 
that of detente policies of other Western powers, and 
carried no expectations either of national reunification 
or ideological convergence with the East."104
In fact, although the partition of Germany and the
constraints this put on West Germany's foreign policy was the 
result of the Cold War, Western attachment to Germany's
partition was also a result of anxiety about the potential 
power of a unified Germany. Consequently, Germany's 
aspirations to overcome its division through a rapprochement 
with the East would almost inevitably provoke some disquiet 
amongst its Western allies, despite West Germany's assurances 
about its commitment to Western institutions. As West 
Germany's Ostpolitik accelerated in the 1970s, and global 
detente lost its momentum, West Germany's allies became
102According to Hanrieder, "There was always the question 
of whether Ostpolitik was merely a remnant of the former 
efforts at reunification or the beginning of an evolutionary 
process", Hanrieder, 1989, op. cit.p. 20.
103Joffe in Gordon op. cit., p. 149-150.
104Pierre Hassner, "Western perceptions of the USSR", 
Daedalus, Winter 1979, vol 108, no 1, pp. 113-150. Quote on
p. 1 2 6.
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increasingly concerned about its commitment to Western 
institutions.
In summary, West Germany was a central, perhaps the central, 
actor, in the Western alliance's relations with Central and 
Eastern Europe. Relations with Poland were particularly 
difficult for West Germany. Against the backdrop of centuries 
of Polish-German/Prussian conflict, as well as the legacy of 
the Second World War, efforts at reconciliation, symbolised 
by Willy Brandt's visit to Auswich in 1972, were important 
factors in the Ostpolitik. Nonetheless, the key issue in West 
Germany's relations with Eastern Europe remained that of its 
relations with the GDR. Because of the close interconnection 
between the German question and the East-West balance, as 
well as West German efforts to remain at the forefront of 
Western approaches to Eastern Europe, there were some 
disagreements, firstly with Britain, and later with France. 
These were, however, bilateral disagreements. They never 
amounted to an intra-mural crisis, mostly because, although 
there was tension, until the late 1970s, there was no direct 
clash between West Germany and the alliance hegemon, the 
United States, over Eastern Europe.
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USA
There is no long-term tradition of relations between the 
United States and Eastern Europe comparable to those of 
Germany or even France. Indeed, strategically, Central and 
Eastern Europe has virtually no importance for the United 
States. It was only with the United States' entry into the 
First World War that Eastern Europe appeared on its foreign 
policy agenda, and then again, it only stayed there for a 
brief period. Eastern Europe received US attention again with 
the advent of the Second World War, although it was not, as 
in the case of France and Britain, over Eastern Europe that 
the United States entered the War. After the Second World 
War, there was constant concern for Eastern Europe in the 
United States, usually, as a factor in the overall framework 
of US relations with the Soviet Union.
The United States and Eastern Europe: combining universal
principles and national foreign policy objectives 
An important theme running through most of the United States 1 
dealings with Central and Eastern Europe is the proclaimed 
concern for the principles of national self-determination and 
liberal democracy. The United States President Woodrow 
Wilson's actions were fundamental to the creation of the 
successor states in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of 
the First World War. His actions were not wholly the result
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of a specific concern for the fate of the Central and East 
European peoples, but rather, a result of what Northedge has 
called "the messianic ideals of Wilson".105 Wilson's 
position on this issue was made public in his address to the 
US Congress on 8 January 1918 where he presented the war aims 
of the United States in fourteen points. Wilson's Fourteen 
Points achieved status as a basic charter for freedom among 
the European peoples.106 Overall, however, the United States 
did not appear to have a clear design for Eastern Europe or 
any clear idea of what should take place or be done there at 
the end of the First World War. Furthermore, US foreign 
policy showed little knowledge or understanding of the 
geopolitical realities of Eastern Europe. Already at the 
peace conference in Versailles it proved difficult to 
reconcile Wilson's principles of national self-determination 
with ethnic disputes, as well as with economic and strategic 
considerations in Eastern Europe. As a consequence, the 
successor states to the defeated Empires, suffered both from 
internal and external fragilities.107 With the defeat of
105Fred Northedge, The Troubled Giant, London, Bell & 
Sons Ltd., 1966, p.33.
105See Alan Palmer, The Lands Between: A History of East- 
Central Europe since the Congress of Vienna. London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970, pp. 120-149.
107Christopher Coker argues that "At Versailles in 1919, 
President Wilson had insisted on an outdated nineteenth- 
century understanding of self-determination, which had 
condemned Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland to become 
economic satellites of either Germany or the Soviet Union.", 
Reflections on American Foreign Policy Since 1945, London,
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Wilson in the 1920 US Presidential election, and the 
subsequent refusal of the United States to enter the League 
of Nations, the United States was not in a position to 
support the survival of these states.
The discrepancy between ideals and practical political and
military commitment in the United States' relations with
Eastern Europe was also evident during and at the end of the
Second World War. According to Coker:
"In retrospect, the United States cut the unfortunate 
figure of a country which had severed itself from the 
outside world in the inter-war years and thus had cut 
itself off from reality. The US was essentially a one­
dimensional power which treated Eastern Europe as it had 
under Wilson, as raw material for its mission."108
The debate between historians about the importance attributed
to Poland and Eastern Europe in British policy at the end of
the Second World War is matched by a similar debate about US
foreign policy. The importance of this debate for US policy
towards Eastern Europe is underlined by Garrett:
"The Yalta controversy has shadowed the American policy 
process and the careers of individuals for some forty 
years now...Any discussion of future American policy 
options with respect to Eastern Europe presumably has to 
give at least some attention to the ghost of Yalta".109
Pinter Publishers, 1989, p. 42.
108Coker, op. cit. p. 44.
109Stephen Garrett, From Potsdam to Poland. New York, 
Praeger, 1986, p. 213.
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This issue is dealt with, indirectly, in the debate about the 
origins of the Cold War. Essentially, revisionists and 
traditionalists disagree on the degree of the United States' 
responsibility for the break-up of the war-time alliance and 
the onset of the Cold War. This debate casts light indirectly 
on the pretensions of the Superpowers in Eastern Europe at 
the end of the Second World War.110 Gaddis, in his effort to 
transcend the revisionist-traditionalist division, argues
110Traditionalist authors tend to argue that US 
initiatives in Eastern Europe came too late or were 
insufficient to "save" Eastern Europe. The revisionist 
argument considers US foreign policy as a deliberate effort 
to impose US hegemony on the rest of the world. Moving beyond 
the discussion of apportioning blame, the "post-revisionist" 
perspective, introduced by Gaddis, pitch their explanation in 
the complex interaction between US and Soviet policies. 
Halliday makes a further distinction between what he calls 
the argument amongst historians about the origins of the Cold 
War and the debate within international relations and the 
peace movement, which emphasise the "underlying dynamic of 
the conflict". Here he identifies four categories: the
realist, the subjectivist, the internalist and the inter- 
systemic. Arguably, however, there is an element of overlap 
between these two debates. The post-revisionists, for 
example, seem to a large extent to be inspired by the same 
motives as the "subjectivists", by emphasising elements such 
as misperception. Sections of the traditionalist literature 
would fit into the realist category. The difference between 
the two debates, then, would be that one emphasises theory 
more explicitly than the other, rather than that they present 
fundamentally different interpretations of the Cold War. Fred 
Halliday, Rethinking International Relations, London, 
Macmillan, 1994, pp. 171-7. Gaddis "post-revisionist" thesis 
is found in "The emerging post-revisionist synthesis on the 
origins of the Cold War", pp. 171-90 in Diplomatic History, 
vol. 7, summer 1983. For the revisionist perspective see Gar 
Alperovitz, Cold War Essavs. New York, 1970; William 
Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, New York, 1962; 
Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-67, 
New York, 1967. A critical view of the revisionist position 
in found in Charles Maier, "Revisionism and the 
interpretation of Cold War origins", Perspectives in American 
History IV, 1970, pp. 313-47.
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that Roosevelt did attempt to maintain the independence of 
the East European states. He underlines that Roosevelt's 
policy originated in a rejection of the idea of spheres of 
influence, and in the desire to continue the wartime alliance 
with the Soviet Union also after the end of the Second World 
War:
"Throughout the war he [Roosevelt] worked to convince 
the East Europeans that they had nothing to fear from 
Russia and that they could afford to choose governments 
acceptable to Moscow. Simultaneously he sought to 
persuade Stalin that the defeat and disarmament of 
Germany together with the maintenance of big-power unity 
into the postwar period, would do more to guarantee 
Soviet security than would territorial gains and spheres 
of influence in Eastern Europe."111
Lundestad agrees that there was a genuine concern for Eastern 
Europe in the United States, and that Roosevelt did attempt 
to achieve the setting up of democratic, independent regimes 
in Eastern Europe.112 However, he also argues that the
111 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins 
of the Cold War, 1941-47. New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1972, p.133-4. Gaddis' research also emphasises the 
domestic pressures on US foreign policy in the early years of 
the Cold War, and suggests that similar pressures were 
evident also in the Soviet Union. Thus, although leaders in 
both camps wanted peace, they failed to provide it.
112This is contested by Richard Lukas: "As this study has 
shown, the communization of Poland in the period 1945-47 was 
less the result of communist defensive reactions to American 
challenges than it was the consequence of Washington's having 
habituated the Kremlin to deal with political issues in 
Eastern Europe without the United States during the war 
years. Such was the bitter legacy for the US and Poland." 
Richard Lukas, Bitter Legacy: Polish-American Relations in 
the Wake of World War II, Lexington, Kentucky, The University 
Press of Kentucky, 1982, p.138.
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region was not essential to US foreign policy and that 
therefore, in the end, the United States reluctantly accepted 
Soviet power in Eastern Europe:
"The United States did work to set up democratic regimes 
and the principles of freer trade in Eastern Europe, as 
in many other regions in the world. ...[However] 
American policy-makers were forced to admit throughout 
that when it came to practical politics Eastern Europe 
could not be considered an absolutely crucial area to 
the United States".113
The final arbiter, according to Lundestad, was the Red Army,
which was in control of most of Eastern Europe at the end of
the Second World War. This is strongly disputed by Loth, who
emphasises the importance of political forces in the
emergence of bipolarity:
"The strategic military decisions of the war, the result 
of which was noted at Yalta, did not of course determine 
that the Soviet controlled territories would be governed 
according to the model of Stalinist Soviet Union; it was 
not yet certain that the frontiers of occupation in 
Europe would be consolidated into the frontiers of 
economic and miliary blocs; it was not yet certain that 
the joint administration of the European power vacuum 
left behind by Hitler would lead to worldwide East-West 
polarisation. For all this political forces which later 
declared themselves for the West bear a great degree of 
responsibility."114
The importance of "universalism" in US initiatives is 
underlined in most of this literature, although Lundestad 
considers "American universalism" to mean little more than
113Geir Lundestad, The American Non-Policv Toward Eastern 
Europe, 1943-47. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget and New York, 
Humanities Press, 1975, pp.34-5.
114Loth, op. cit. pp. 432-3.
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the universal implementation of American ideals and 
principles.115 It is possible then to argue that a 
distinguishing mark of the United States approach to Eastern 
Europe, compared to the West European approaches, was a 
greater emphasis on liberal ideals and difficulty in 
justifying a policy based on spheres of influence.116 In 
addition, it is often argued that US policies suffered from 
a general lack of knowledge about Eastern Europe:
"A general lack of interest and knowledge about 
conditions in Eastern Europe pervaded the American 
public and government. The remoteness and chaos of this 
region, combined with competing events and issues, led 
to little sustained interest. The individual questions 
in dispute in Eastern Europe never seemed terribly 
important. During the war, the events in Eastern Europe 
were not considered to be as crucial as from hindsight 
it might appear that they should have been.”117
115Lundestad also argues that "Most European observers 
have been rather sceptical about the American claim to 
uniqueness, particularly as it usually implied American 
superiority. To many Europeans, what was unique about America 
was its uncanny ability to make the most inspiring idealism 
coincide almost perfectly with rather ordinary national 
objectives", Geir Lundestad, The American "Empire". Oslo, 
Universitetsforlaget, 1990, p. 41.
116Yergin argues that these two were reconciled through 
the doctrine of "national security", which enabled 
"...America’s post-war leader to be democratic idealists and 
pragmatic realists at the same time. So emboldened, American 
leaders pursued a global, often crusading, foreign policy, 
convinced that it was made urgent by something more earthly 
than the missionary impulse of Woodrow Wilson", p. 13 in 
Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War 
and the National Security State, London, Andre Deutsch, 1978.
117Lynn Davis, The Cold War Begins: Soviet American
Conflict Over Eastern Europe. Princeton and London, Princeton 
University Press, 1974, p.378.
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"Containment" versus "liberation1 in Eastern Europe
Gradually, at the end of the Second World War, rather than 
multiplying its interventions on behalf of Eastern Europe, 
the United States turned to concentrate on strengthening its 
support for Western Europe. After the coup in Prague in 1948 
and the Berlin blockade, the US Senate endorsed the 
Vandenberg resolution, calling for an expansion of US 
military strength and military assistance to Western Europe, 
thus allowing for US participation in a military alliance 
with Western Europe.118 At this point, what emerges is the 
US concern with preventing the further expansion of Soviet 
communism into Western Europe through the policy of 
containment, rather than any attempt at changing the course 
of events in Eastern Europe, by that time considered a fait 
accompli.
The basic guidelines for US policy towards Eastern Europe in 
the Cold War were set out in 1949 in NSC 58 "United States 
Policy Towards the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern 
Europe".119 The objective of this document was to discuss
118DePorte, op. cit. p. 138.
119National Security Council "United States Policy Toward 
the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe", NSC 58, 
September 14, 1949. Quotes are from Thomas H. Etzold and John 
Lewis Gaddis (eds) Containment: Documents on American Policy 
and Strategy, 1945-1950, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1978, pp.211-223.
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"means ... to cause the elimination of dominant Soviet
influence in the satellite states of Albania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania"120 It argued
that overturning Soviet control in Eastern Europe was
principally a long-term objective:
"The ultimate aim must, of course, be the appearance in 
Eastern Europe of non-totalitarian administrations 
willing to accommodate themselves to, and participate 
in, the free world community. Strong tactical 
considerations,..., argue against setting up this goal 
as an immediate objective".
Hence, the recommended action was for the United States to
encourage the emergence of
"...schismatic Communist regimes... fostering a 
heretical drifting-away process on the part of the 
satellite states".
This establishes a direct link between the Cold War struggle 
between the United States and the Soviet Union and the role 
of the East European states. It was primarily as Soviet 
satellites that these countries were important for the United 
States:
"These states [Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland and Rumania] in the current two-world 
struggle . . . have meaning primarily because they are in 
varying degrees politico-military adjuncts of Soviet 
power and extend that power into the heart of 
Europe".123
120Ibid, p. 212
121Ibid, p.219.
122Ibid, p.220.
123Ibid, p.212.
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What is less clear in reading this document, is what kind of 
instruments the US government considered should be used to 
obtain the objective of encouraging "schismatic East European 
regimes". There is room for a relatively aggressive policy in 
the sense that the intention of the policy clearly goes 
beyond that of containing Soviet power and expresses the wish 
ultimately to remove the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. 
At the same time there is room for a more low key approach, 
using "carrots" instead of "sticks".
In the first years of the Cold War, US policy-makers were 
hesitating in their approach to Eastern Europe between a 
policy of 'containment' and one of 'liberation' or 'roll 
back'. The concept of containment, first expressed in George 
Kennan's article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" published in 
Foreign Affairs in 1947 under the pseudonym "X", consisted 
essentially of recommending a policy aimed at preventing 
further expansion of Soviet communism.124 As US-Soviet 
relations deteriorated and anti-communist sentiment increased 
in the United States, some elements, in particular in the 
right wing of the Republican Party, denounced the policy of 
containment as "too soft". The notion of a policy of
124Foreian Affairs. July 1947, pp. 566-582. It must be 
noted that Kennan himself, although considered the father of 
the concept, never approved of the policy of containment. He 
argued in retrospect that its aim should not have been to 
perpetuate conflict with the Soviet Union, but to encourage 
negotiation. Coker, op. cit pp. 56-63, DePorte, op. cit. p.
127.
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'liberation* or 'roll back', representing a more 'active'
alternative was advocated. During the 1952 electoral campaign
the debate over containment and liberation was an important
issue. According to Kovrig it is the only time that Eastern
Europe has been a subject of discussion under the
presidential elections.125 A prominent advocate of the
policy of liberation was then future Secretary of State, John
Foster Dulles. He argued that the Republicans should;
"...repudiate all commitments contained in secret 
understandings such as those of Yalta which aid 
Communist enslavements and replace the negative, futile 
and immoral policy of containment with a message of 
liberation that would set up strains and stresses within 
the captive world which will make the rulers impotent to 
continue in their monstrous ways and mark the beginning 
of the end."126
The theme of 'liberation' continued to be part of the foreign 
policy vocabulary after the election of Eisenhower and Dulles 
arrival in office. However, it is unclear what the exact 
content of this policy was supposed to be, and in what way it 
differed from the policy of containment.127 The emptiness of 
the concept of liberation was exposed for the first time
125Bennett Kovrig, Of Walls and Bridges: The United
States and Eastern Europe, New York University Press, New 
York and London, 1991, p. 48.
126Council on Foreign Relations, Documents on American 
Foreign Relations, 1952, New York, Harper, 1953, pp.80-83, 
quoted in Kovrig, 1991, op. cit., p.47.
127According to Garrett it is the potential for military 
involvement that distinguishes 'liberation theory' from 
containment, op. cit. p. 181.
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during the uprising in East Germany in 1953.128 During the
uprising the US government underlined that the aggressive
objective of liberation could only be obtained by "peaceful 
n 129means .
The liberation rhetoric received its final blow with the
Hungarian uprising in 1 956.130 In this instance it has been
argued that the United States contributed to the raising of
Hungarian expectations of military action against a Soviet
intervention in Hungary by its policy. The following words
from an essay by Istvan Bibo, a minister in the last Nagy
government, testifies to the expectations of the Hungarians:
"The Western world did not promise to start an atomic 
war in their [the Hungarian people] interest, nor did it 
call on them foolishly to take up arms. Their 
encouragements, however, did say that if ever the 
international political situation and the attitude of
128Still, assessments of the notion of 'liberation' vary. 
Coker refers to it as a dishonest and bankrupt policy, op. 
cit. p. 66. Garrett argues that it is ideally an attractive 
concept because of the absence of moral ambiguity, yet 
concludes that it was never a realistic policy option, op. 
cit. pp. 179-185. Yet surely, if the political rhetoric was 
not applicable in practice, it could not be devoid of moral 
ambiguity.
129Kovrig op. cit. 1991, p. 89-102.
130See Kovrig, 1991, op. cit, pp.99-100; House report, 
op. cit, p. 14 and Jiri Valenta "Soviet decision making and 
the Hungarian revolution" pp. 265-278, Bennett Kovrig, 
"Rolling back liberation: the United States and the Hungarian 
revolution", pp. 279-290 and Brian Me Cauley, "Hungary and 
Suez, 1956: the limits of Soviet and American power", pp. 
291-315, in Bela Kiraly, Barbara Lotze and Nandor Dreisziger 
(eds), War and Society in Central Europe, vol. XI, "The first 
war between socialist states: the Hungarian revolution of
1956 and its impact", New York, Brooklyn College Press, 1984.
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these peoples justify it, the Western world will use all 
its economic, political and moral weight to bring these 
issues up for consideration and satisfactory solution. 
The Hungarian Revolution brought about all the requisite 
conditions and legal claims. The gravest consequences 
the Western world must face as a result of the defeat of 
the Hungarian Revolution are that a ten year long policy 
and propaganda referring to principles and morals can 
now be contested not only in terms of its effectiveness 
and true meaning, but in terms of its honesty as 
well".131
Towards "differentiation"
After the Soviet intervention in Hungary the rhetoric of 
'roll-back' and 'liberation' in Eastern Europe disappeared 
from the foreign policy vocabulary of the United States.
The new approach to Eastern Europe became one of encouraging 
gradual pluralism within the Warsaw Pact. This new approach 
was first advocated by Zbigniew Brzezinski and William E. 
Griffith in an article in Foreign Affairs in 1961, entitled 
"Peaceful engagement in Eastern Europe". The authors 
suggested that this policy should:
"(1) aim at stimulating further diversity in the 
Communist bloc; (2) thus increasing the likelihood that 
the East European states can achieve a greater measure 
of political independence from Soviet domination; (3) 
thereby ultimately leading to the creation of a neutral 
belt of states which, like the Finnish, would enjoy 
genuine popular freedom of choice in internal policy
131Quoted in Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1973, p. 214-5. The 
quote is taken from Imre Kovacs (ed) Facts About Hungary: The 
Fight for Freedom. New York, 1966, pp.307-8.
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while not being hostile to the Soviet Union and not 
belonging to Western military alliances."132
Gordon and Kovrig argue that although presented under 
slightly different headings: 'peaceful engagement', 'bridge 
building' and 'differentiation', US foreign policy towards 
Eastern Europe did not change fundamentally after the early 
1960s. Although the limits to East European independence were 
illustrated by the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
according to Kovrig, the reason why there was no significant 
change in the policy towards Eastern Europe is that there 
were no alternative policy options.133 Following the logic 
of Brzezinski's and Griffith's article, the key features of 
the policy of 'differentiation' were:
"... that East European countries are not regarded as 
members of a monolithic Soviet bloc, like component 
republics of the Soviet Union itself, and that they are 
to be treated differently from each other. The grounds 
for favourable treatment have consistently been two: 
East European foreign policies at variance with those of 
the USSR and favourable to Western (or U.S.) interest, 
and measures of domestic economic, political and 
cultural liberalization"134
132Zbigniew Brzezinski and William Griffith, "Peaceful 
Engagement in Eastern Europe", pp. 642-654 in Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 39, no 4, July 1961, quote on p.644.
133Kovrig, 1973, op. cit. p. 285.
134Lincoln Gordon, "Interests and Policies in Eastern 
Europe: The View form Washington", pp. 67- 129 in Gordon
(ed), op. cit., p.74
111
Poland became a principal target for the policy of 
differentiation, which tended to rank the East European 
states according to their autonomy from the Soviet Union and 
the measure of internal liberalisation. In 1977 it became the 
only country of the Soviet bloc that Jimmy Carter visited 
during his time a President of the United States. In fact, 
economic aid to Poland in 1957 can be seen as an early 
manifestation of such a policy. US aid was a direct response 
to Wladyslaw Gomulka's successful defiance of the Soviet 
Union in the 1956 uprising.
The development of concepts such as 'differentiation' and 
'peaceful engagement' indicate an effort to develop a 
separate foreign policy approach to Eastern Europe. Still, 
there were several ambiguities in this strategy. Firstly, the 
implicit assumption that independence from the Soviet Union 
would also mean a more liberal domestic policy was challenged 
by the case of Rumania.135 As Garthoff has underlined:
"American policy towards the communist states of Eastern
Europe and differentiation in our policy and posture
towards each state, has been based to a significant
135Rumania received MFN status in 1975 as a reward for 
Ceausescu's independence from the Soviet Union in foreign 
policy and encouragement to continue this. Hungary only 
received the MNF status in 1978, in response to accomplished 
political reality. Garrett, op. cit. p. 88.
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extent on the relations of each country to the Soviet 
Union"136
Secondly, US policy in Eastern Europe cannot be seen as
independent from the policy towards the Soviet Union.
Garthoff points out that:
"With respect to the US, its largely abortive 
proclamation about stimulating peaceful engagement and 
bridge-building in the mid-1960s looked suspiciously 
like continuous attempts to curtail Soviet political 
influence in Eastern Europe and to introduce American 
influence as a counter."13'
Thirdly, the ambiguities in the US position on Eastern Europe 
and the difficulty US policymakers had in reconciling foreign 
policy ideals and political reality remained with the 
strategy of differentiation. The confusion on this issue was 
demonstrated by the uproar caused by a statement made by 
State Department Counsellor Helmut Sonnenfeldt in a private 
conference for American ambassadors in London in 1975. During 
this meeting Sonnenfeldt said the United States should 
"strive for an evolution that makes the relationship between 
the East Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one." 
Sonnenfeldt also said that the existing relationship was 
"unnatural" and that "our policy must be a policy of
136Raymond L. Garthoff "Eastern Europe in the context of 
US-Soviet relations", in Sarah Meiklejohn Terry (ed), Soviet 
Policy in Eastern Europe. New Haven and London, Yale 
University Press, 1984, pp. 315- 348. Quote on p. 320-21.
137Raymond Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American- 
Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Washington, DC, The 
Brookings Institution, 1994, p. 140.
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responding to the clearly visible aspirations in Eastern 
Europe for a more autonomous existence within the context of 
a strong Soviet geopolitical influence1'.138 His statement 
was widely interpreted to mean that the United States 
endorsed Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and accepted the 
principle of spheres of influence rejected by Roosevelt in 
the aftermath of the Second World War. In reality, however, 
most observers agree that Sonnenfeldt essentially restated 
what was in reality already US policy. In the words of 
Garrett the "doctrine" was "unexceptional".139 Garthoff 
argues that:
"The United States did not accept Soviet hegemony in 
Eastern Europe as a political right. At the same time, 
it did accept it as the prevailing political 
condition.1,140
It was on the basis of this prevailing political condition 
that US policy of differentiation had first developed.
Finally, although there was an effort to conceive a separate 
approach to Eastern Europe, the region remained a low 
priority for US policy-makers. In other words, although there
138Garthoff in Terry, op. cit., p. 323, quotes taken from 
"United States security policy vis-a-vis Eastern Europe (The 
'Sonnenfeldt Doctrine')", Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
International Security and Scientific Affairs of the 
Committee on International Relations. House of 
Representatives, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 12, 1976
(Washington, D.C.:GPO, 1976).
139Garrett, op. cit, p. 211.
140Garthoff, 1994, op. cit p. 551.
114
was a strategy, there was not a very active policy to follow 
it up. Lundestad argued that US policy towards Eastern Europe 
in the immediate post-war years was a "non-policy".141 
Arguably, this continued to be true throughout the postwar 
period. Symptomatic is the trend in writings about US 
relations with Poland and Eastern Europe which tend to stress 
what should be done by the United States instead of analysing 
the policy itself.142
Conclusions
Several conclusions can now be drawn regarding Poland's place 
in Western policies on East-West relations, about the 
differences and similarities between the Western states' 
approaches to Poland as well as about the interconnection 
between these policies and intra-alliance relations.
The onset of the Cold War and bipolarity changed the role of 
Poland in Europe. Politically, it became part of the Soviet
141Lundestad, 1975, op. cit.
142See for example Brzezinski and Griffith, op. cit; 
Charles Gati, "The Forgotten Region ", pp. 135-145 in Foreign 
Policy, no 19, Summer 1975,; Paul Marer and Wlodzimierz 
Siminski (eds), Creditworthiness and Reform in Poland, 
Bloomingdale and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 
1988, especially chapters by Brzezinski, "US Policy Towards 
Poland in a Global Perspective", pp. 323-334; Thomas W. 
Simons Jr, . "Strategy and Tactics in US Foreign Policy 
Towards Eastern Europe", pp. 305-314; Jerry Hough, The Polish 
Crisis: American Policy Options. Washington DC, The Brookings 
Institution, 1982.
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bloc, and thus no longer an object of dispute between the 
Western states. Western states shared an underlying set of 
guidelines and principles, determined by the Cold War context 
and by their membership in the Western alliance, which also 
influenced their policies towards Poland and Eastern Europe, 
this did not mean that their distinctive national approaches 
to Poland and Eastern Europe were completely wiped out by the 
Cold War. In fact, individual Western states were striking 
out with independent initiatives towards Eastern Europe at 
various points in the post-war period and with various 
degrees of success. There was little deliberate effort to 
develop a coherent political strategy amongst Western states 
towards Poland and Eastern Europe. Indeed, because Poland, as 
well as the rest of Eastern Europe, was essentially off 
limits politically, the West had never really needed to 
develop a coherent political strategy towards it, and this 
had its advantages. Thus, it is more useful to think of 
parallel national Western approaches to Poland, with the 
various states adopting different policy rhythms and having 
different priorities, than an overall "Western" policy. 
Britain, whose interest in Poland and Eastern Europe had 
traditionally been limited, played an important role in 
Eastern Europe through the Polish guarantee in 1939 and in 
the early post- war years. During the rest of the Cold War 
period, it is difficult to distinguish British policy towards 
Eastern Europe from its Soviet policy. France developed an
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active, although ultimately disappointing, policy towards 
Central and Eastern Europe in the 1960s, under de Gaulle. The 
failure of a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" was 
confirmed with the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
After this date, West Germany emerged as the most important 
actor in Western relations with Eastern Europe. Although West 
Germany’s Ostpolitik developed against the backdrop of 
Superpower detente, it followed its own logic and by the late 
1970s, it had acquired its own momentum.
Taken together, the West Europeans only had a limited 
interest in the ideological conflict with the Eastern bloc. 
The West European states, all by different means and in 
different phases of the Cold War, attempted to ensure some 
form of "peaceful coexistence" between East and West in 
Europe. In the United States, on the other hand, there was a 
stronger tendency to emphasise the ideological confrontation 
between the two blocs. Indeed, it was when the United States' 
policy swung most strongly in this direction, and engaged in 
a rhetoric of "liberation", such as in the 1950s, and again, 
as we shall see later in the thesis, in the early 1980s, that 
transatlantic disagreement over Eastern Europe became the 
strongest. Paradoxically, although the United States had a 
distinct foreign policy strategy towards Eastern Europe, with 
the principle of "differentiation", its relations with 
Eastern Europe tended to be dominated by the Superpower
relationship, and never reached the same level as West 
European relations with Eastern Europe.
There was a close connection between transatlantic relations 
and Western relations with Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, this 
interconnection took on a different pattern in each of the 
Western states. Britain emerges as the country that most 
explicitly linked its own policy towards Eastern Europe to 
that of the Western alliance and the United States. It 
considered that policies towards Eastern Europe had to be 
part of the Alliance’s East-West strategy. France took the 
opposite view. It regarded its ability to influence East-West 
relations as hampered by a close relationship with the United 
States. De Gaulle's attempt at building bridges between the 
two blocs in Europe also involved reducing European links 
with the United States. West Germany was most dependent on 
the approval of its allies for its own initiatives in Eastern 
Europe, and also more vulnerable to changes in its allies' 
policies towards the region. At the same time, concern about 
West Germany's position on Eastern Europe was an important 
factor, in particular in France's, policies towards the 
region. What this meant was that once West Germany's 
Ostpolitik gained momentum, it also represented a potential 
issue for Western disagreement. As the alliance hegemon, the 
United States' relations with Eastern Europe were much less 
affected by the positions of the West Europeans.
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Although sometimes in competition and even in conflict over 
Eastern Europe, an outright Western crisis was avoided. The 
findings of this chapter suggest that this was not due 
exclusively to the constraints of the Soviet threat, but also 
to the fact that Eastern Europe was never high on the list of 
Western priorities. Not enough was at stake in Eastern Europe 
for any one state to provoke a clash with its allies. It 
follows from this that, rather than a direct conflict of 
interest in Eastern Europe, the differences of approach to 
Poland and Eastern Europe amongst Western states had as much 
to do with conflicting perspectives about European order, or 
wider East-West relations.
This leads us to a final aspect of Western relations with 
Poland and Eastern Europe which has to do with an underlying 
ambiguity in Western policies towards this region. Although 
central to the strategic balance in Europe, or perhaps 
because of its centrality, it was rarely in a position to 
determine the course of its own history. According to Kundera 
the East Europeans:"... represent the
wrong side of this history; they are the victims and the 
outsiders."143 In the postwar world, this sense of Poland as 
the "underdog" was reinforced by the image of the West's 
betrayal at Yalta. Although Poland was a major cause of the 
onset of the Cold War, it was not its main object. Sympathy
143Kundera, op. cit., p. 36.
119
for Poland, and a corresponding criticism of Western policies
in Poland, is reflected in the writings of many western
historians. Norman Davies writes that:
"It is a curious phenomenon. But after two hundred years 
of 'tragic repetitions' the Poles have not yet learned 
how to lie down flat and avoid their periodic 
thrashings; and Western opinion in general has still not 
learned to give them credit for standing up to 
resist. "144
The main difficulty, shared by all Western states, in 
relations with Poland, was the need to combine an official 
posture of rejecting Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe with 
practical policies towards the region.
The interdependence between Western relations with Eastern 
Europe and the wider context of East-West relations points to 
the potential ability of specific events in Eastern Europe 
such as the Polish crisis to affect wider East-West issues on 
which the Western allies disagreed. What it also suggests is 
that if the general climate inside the Western alliance 
deteriorated, maintaining cohesion on relations with Eastern 
Europe would also be more difficult. Before examining how 
these long term trends found expression in Western responses 
to the Polish crisis, the institutional frameworks available 
to coordinate Western policies must be examined.
144Davies, 1984, op. cit. p. 431.
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CHAPTER THREE, THE WESTERN ALLIANCE: RUDIMENTS OF A
COORDINATION SYSTEM 
Introduction
Having looked at the different national traditions of the 
four major Western states in relation to Eastern Europe, 
we now turn to examine the framework available for 
coordinating the policies of these states and for enabling 
the Western allies to respond cohesively to tensions or 
crises in Eastern Europe.
Although the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is 
no doubt the dominant institution with regard to
coordinating Western policies, a study of the structures 
and processes of Western foreign policy coordination that 
looks at this organisation alone would be only of limited 
interest. As Sir Clive Rose, former British Ambassador to 
NATO, has pointed out:
"Consultation 'in the Alliance' is of course by no 
means confined to this [the NATO] machinery. 
Consultation between members takes place, not only in 
many other multilateral fora, but also continuously 
on a bilateral basis, as part of the normal 
diplomatic exchanges outside the formal network of 
the Alliance."1
The Western alliance is considered here to be a whole 
configuration of economic, trade, political and security
^ir Clive Rose, "Political consultation in the 
Alliance", pp. 1-5 in NATO Review, vol 31, no 1 , 1983,
quotation on p. 2.
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relationships. Indeed, the problems facing Western policy­
makers, in particular in relations with Eastern Europe, 
include economic, political and security issues, and these 
are dealt with inside different institutional frameworks. 
Consequently, in addition to NATO, this chapter looks at 
CoCom, the G7 group, the European Community (EC) and 
European Political Cooperation (EPC). This approach also 
makes sense bearing in mind that the main theme of the 
thesis is not the study of international institutions but 
the study of the process of coordination of foreign 
policies of allied states. Hence, our starting point was 
the states themselves, and this particular chapter looks 
at the main structures inside which the Western states 
interacted. It looks at the main institutions available to 
assist these states in an attempt to coordinate their 
policies in a situation of crisis or high tension in 
Eastern Europe.
Although the thesis does not study the role and efficiency 
of one Western institution in particular, it does not 
consider states to be the only actors of importance in 
international affairs. Neither does it reject the point 
that international institutions can develop a capacity to 
influence the foreign policies of its member states. 
Indeed, it has already been pointed out in chapter two that 
membership of the Alliance did constitute a constraint on 
Western policies in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the thesis 
does not subscribe to the notion that a common threat
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necessarily leads to a common policy, or that a divergence
of interest will necessarily lead to a breakdown of
coordination. As William Wallace has observed,
"There is no self-evident harmony of interests and 
understandings between France and Germany on the 
major issues of foreign policy. Indeed, on many 
issues, it has been easier to find common ground 
between London and Bonn, or even between London and 
Paris, than between Paris and Bonn. To the extent 
that foreign policy differences have been more 
successfully managed between Paris and Bonn than 
between Paris and London, that success must be 
attributed to the efforts made on both sides to 
mitigate conflict - or to the underlying commitments 
to collaborate in spite of their differences."2
Finally, the relationship between allied states is
considered to be qualitatively different from that between
states who do not share similar values, interdependent
economies and close political and security ties.3 As
Christopher Hill has argued,
"To neglect power is like neglecting to breathe, but 
to centre one's foreign policy on it is to take a 
very blinkered view of how constructive change is 
achieved at the international level. In all major 
areas of policy the individual actors (who are 
naturally self-regarding groups of separate 
interests) have to strike a balance between pursuing 
their own distinctive goals and ensuring that the 
fabric of international society is not endangered."4
2William Wallace, "Foreign policy: the management of 
distinctive interests", pp. 205-224, in Morgan and Bray 
(eds), Partners and Rivals in Western Europe: Britain.
France and Germany, Aldershot, Gower, 1986, quotation p. 
205.
3For this approach see Richard Neustadt, Alliance 
Politics, New York and London, Columbia University Press, 
1970 and Sheri Wassermann, The Neutron Bomb Controversy: 
A Study in Alliance Politics, New York, Praeger, 1983.
4Christopher Hill, "Against Power Politics: Commentary 
on 'Reflections on the Future of Western Europe', by Johan 
K. De Vree", pp. 19-31, in Johan K. De Vree, Towards a 
European Foreign Policy, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987,
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The importance of balancing national and collective 
interests is even stronger inside an alliance. 
Consequently, power politics assumptions are not entirely 
suitable when the aim is to understand the success or 
failure of the Western states to coordinate their policies.
Several issues and problems involving the framework of 
Western coordination will be discussed. Some of these are 
general concerns related to the alliance framework as such, 
which also have an impact on the process of coordinating 
policies towards Eastern Europe. Others are particular to 
the question of Eastern Europe and Poland. The main 
argument here is that despite the existence of a network 
of Western institutions or agencies, the Western 
institutional framework was not entirely appropriate in 
terms of providing mechanisms for coordinating a rapid and 
cohesive response to an East European crisis. In order to 
support this view, several interrelated themes will be 
highlighted. The first theme is that of the importance of 
Eastern Europe for the individual Western institutional 
frameworks. The second theme relates to the tendency 
towards institutional fragmentation. Western institutions 
or agencies are to a large extent compartmentalised. Each 
agency is specialised to deal with a specific issue area. 
The chapter examines the interaction between the different 
institutional networks and the links between them. It 
discusses whether or not, against the backdrop of this
quote on p. 23.
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fragmented institutional network, it is possible to achieve 
an overall approach to a crisis involving not only security 
issues, but also economic and political matters. As a 
result of the institutional multiplicity, the Western 
institutions sometimes inevitably overlap in their areas 
of activities. A third issue discussed is to what extent 
the coexistence of several institutions create frictions 
which would not be there in the case of a single 
overarching framework. Here, the question of relations 
between EPC and the United States, and also the role of EPC 
inside the broader Atlantic framework is particularly 
important. Fourthly, the extent to which the Western 
institutional framework provides opportunities not only for 
consultation, but also a basis for common action will be 
discussed. Rose has outlined five levels at which 
consultation takes place inside the context of the Western 
alliance:
1 . Exchange of views or information, with or without 
analysis;
2. Communication of actions or decisions which have already 
been taken or are imminent;
3. Advance warning of actions, or decisions, with a view 
to receiving the comments of allies and/or their 
endorsement;
4. Discussion with the aim of reaching a consensus on 
policies to be adopted or actions to be taken in parallel 
by all allies concerned;
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5. Consultation for the purpose of arriving at Alliance 
agreement on collective decision or action. Rose further 
argues that it is when something more than consultation is 
required that the NATO machinery encounters difficulties:
"Most of the problems arise when the Alliance is 
trying to agree on parallel policies or actions 
(Category 4.) The two subjects which have caused most 
trouble in recent years have been East-West relations 
and "out-of area" issues."5
Chapter two attempted to distinguish between general East- 
West relations on the one hand, and Western policies 
towards Eastern Europe on the other. When looking at the 
Western institutional framework it becomes virtually 
impossible to make such a distinction. The Western 
institutional framework was created in the context of the 
Cold War and as a result, looking at their approach to 
Eastern Europe becomes equal to looking at their policies 
with regard to East-West relations. Henceforth, the fifth 
and final issue discussed in this chapter is to what extent 
it would be reasonable to assume that a certain 
organisational predisposition would lead the Western 
institutions to perceive the particular aspect of events 
in Eastern Europe that corresponded to its area of interest 
as the most important (such as security in the case of 
NATO, economics in the case of the European Community).
One important reservation must be made with regard to the 
approach taken. As Helen Wallace has pointed out, the
5Rose, op. cit., p.4.
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institutional structures are only the most visible part of
relations between states and do not in themselves provide
an absolute view of these relations. They will always need
to be complemented by political factors:
"There is often a disjunction between structure and 
process - in other words formal structures are
sometimes empty of content and of supportive
attitudes - just as constructive cooperation may take 
place virtually without formalisation."6
Although we believe political factors to be more important 
for the success of coordination than institutional 
provisions, we consider that, by looking at the 
institutional structures, it is possible to evaluate to 
what extent there was a certain potential for cooperation. 
This is not only because the very existence of
institutional frameworks manifests a political commitment 
to cooperate, but because they also facilitate the process 
of coordination. Furthermore, the very existence of 
institutions such as NATO, or even more so the European 
Community, gradually, although not necessarily 
deliberately, strengthens ties between the member states 
and make coordination more likely.
The question of bilateral relations between France, 
Britain, the United States and the Federal Republic is not 
discussed. The importance of these in the process of
coordination should, however, not be underestimated. It is
6Helen Wallace, "The conduct of bilateral 
relationships by governments", pp. 136-155 in Morgan and 
Bray, op. cit., p. 137-8.
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clear that multilateral structures of consultation only 
reflect part of reality. Of the bilateral relationships 
between France, Britain, West Germany and the United 
States, the Franco-German relationship is perhaps the 
closest one, and the most institutionalised. Nonetheless, 
many authors also emphasise the importance of the 1 special 
relationship' between the United States and Britain.7
In an attempt to avoid being too descriptive and to stress 
certain general arguments, the chapter is organised 
thematically. The alternative would be to look at each 
institutional framework in turn. The different themes are 
however all closely interrelated, and making a clear 
distinction between them is difficult. As a result, there 
is a risk of creating an overlap between the different 
sections of the chapter. The first section looks at the 
extent to which the Western institutions have dealt with 
Eastern Europe. The next section discusses the provisions 
available for coordinating Western policies in times of 
tension or crisis in Eastern Europe. After this, the 
particular problem of relations between the United States 
and the European Community/ European Political Cooperation 
inside the Atlantic framework is examined and the extent 
to which the coexistence of EPC and NATO might make 
coordination difficult is discussed. Finally, before 
concluding, the suggestions that were made in the late
7See for example Donald C. Watt, Succeeding John Bull: 
America in Britain's Special Place. 1900-1975. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1984.
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1970s and early 1980s with regard to improving the 
weaknesses of the Western institutional framework, are 
examined, together with the attempts to use the G7 summits 
of the industrialised nations for this purpose.
Eastern Europe; a marginal preoccupation for Western 
institutions
There is no lack of institutional frameworks aimed at 
promoting cooperation between the Western states. A wide 
network of institutions deals with economic, political as 
well as military and security matters that are of common 
concern to the West. Some of these institutions are chiefly 
geared towards intra-Western cooperation, others have a 
more explicitly external purpose. The main objective here 
is to establish to what extent these agencies, each within 
their own area of competence, have dealt with coordinating 
Western policies towards Eastern Europe.
NATO
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has been the chief 
point of reference for Western solidarity since the end of 
the Second World War and the main institutional framework 
promoting political and security cooperation between the 
Western states. It is first and foremost a military 
alliance, created in the early days of the Cold War, with
129
the specific objective of countering the perceived Soviet 
military threat.8 NATO distinguishes itself from 
traditional military alliances by functioning also as a 
permanent forum for diplomatic exchanges and foreign policy 
consultations between the Western allies in times of peace 
as well as war. Its civilian structure developed gradually, 
starting at the summit in Lisbon in 1952, with the 
agreement to make the North Atlantic Council a permanent 
institution. Meeting either at the level of the Permanent 
Representatives or at Ministerial level, the North Atlantic 
Council is the chief forum for political consultation 
inside the alliance.9 It is assisted by the Political 
Committee which meets at least once a week to keep up with 
political developments of interest to NATO in all areas of 
the world. The Political Committee prepares studies of 
political problems for discussion by the Council and
8There are a vast number of books about NATO and its 
history, but this account is chiefly based on, Stanley 
Sloan, NATO's future: Towards a New Transatlantic Bargain. 
Washington DC, National Defence University Press, 1985; 
Robert Osgood, NATO: the Entangling Alliance, Chicago,
Chicago University Press, 1962; William Par, Defending the 
West: A History of NATQ^ Brighton. Wheatsheaf, 1986. See 
also Joseph Smith, The Origins of NATO. Exeter, Exeter 
University Press, 1990 on the first years of NATO.
9The general literature on NATO rarely discusses the 
framework for political cooperation in NATO, or indeed the 
structures or decision-making process of NATO. Two 
exceptions are Dan Smith, Pressure: How America Runs NATO. 
London, Bloomsbury, 1989 and Robert S. Jordan, Political 
Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multinational Diplomacy, 
Boulder, Westview Press, 1979. See also Fredo Dannenbring, 
"Consultation: the political lifeblood of the Alliance", 
NATO Review, no 6, Dec. 1985, vol 33, pp. 5-11; Macguigan, 
"Political Consultation and the Alliance", NATO Review, no. 
4, Aug. 1981, vol. 29, pp. 1-3; Frydenlund, "Thirty years 
of political cooperation", NATO Review, no. 6 December 
1986, vol. 34, pp. 1-5.
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submits reports to it.10 Ad hoc political working groups 
and regional expert groups also contribute to NATO's 
political activities.11
However, despite the political consultation procedures and 
the civilian structures of NATO, it remains essentially a 
military alliance. It was from the perspective of 
military/security and with the purpose of strengthening 
Western security that NATO policy and NATO interest in 
political issues developed. It is also chiefly from this 
perspective that NATO has dealt with Eastern Europe.
The role of Eastern Europe in NATO's strategy, has evolved
in the years since NATO's creation in 1949. Schweitzer
argues that in the 1950s, the political situation in
Eastern Europe was considered by NATO to be an important
cause of East-West conflict:
"Unlike today [the late 1980s], it was not the 
spiralling growth of armaments ... that was seen as 
responsible for the widening gulf between East and 
West but rather the actual policies pursued by the
10During the Polish crisis it was the Political 
Committee that issued statements on Poland and that 
coordinated the efforts of making contingency planning in 
case of a Soviet intervention in Poland.
^Emphasising the complexity of the NATO structure 
Smith argues that there are at least 435 committees in 
NATO: "...there is a forest of [NATO committees], creating 
a structure so complex that I would defy anybody to produce 
a comprehensive and comprehensible organisational chart of 
NATO on anything smaller than a pretty large wall." Thus, 
no doubt, there would be an ad hoc group dealing with 
Eastern Europe, but no standing group dealing with long­
term planning of policies towards this region in 
particular. Op. cit. p. 9.
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Soviet Union in Europe which had led to the arms
n o  "12
By 1968 this had changed. The intervention in Prague did 
not provoke an intensification of East-West conflict, but 
a continuation and even strengthening of detente.13 The 
Harmel Report of 1967 had codified a change of direction 
in NATO's approach to East-West relations, ensuring a 
continued concern at NATO level with protection of the 
military balance, yet, allowing member states individually 
and collectively to explore policies of detente with the 
Warsaw Pact.14
When seeking to determine to what extent NATO dealt with 
Eastern Europe, it might be interesting to make a 
comparison between NATO's policy on "out of area" issues. 
Although there were increased calls for more Atlantic 
cooperation in "out of area" policies in the early 1980s,
12Carl-Christoph Schweitzer (ed), The Changing Western 
Analysis of the Soviet Threat. London, Pinter, 1990, p. 52.
13This must, at some level have produced a dilemma, 
because although the peoples of Eastern Europe may not have 
chosen the military alliance with the Soviet Union, the 
armies of the East European states were part of the Warsaw 
Pact, and henceforth they also represented a security 
threat to the NATO allies. It is, however, a dilemma which 
can be reproduced at all levels of Western dealings with 
Eastern Europe during the Cold War, not only in NATO.
14For the Harmel report see David P. Calleo, Bevond 
American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance, New 
York, Basic Books, 1987, pp. 44-64.
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the Allies failed to provide a convincing common 
strategy.15 This was due in particular to divergent 
perspectives and interests, and the limited institutional 
guidance from the NATO structures on "out of area" issues. 
This limited ability of NATO to deal with the so-called 
"out of area" issues was considered one of the principal 
weaknesses on NATO in the early 1980s.16
It is clear that regions such as Africa or the Middle East 
must be seen as out of area. However, bearing in mind that 
Eastern Europe was considered to be inside the sphere of 
influence of the Soviet Union, in what category would it 
be placed? There is no clear definition in the Atlantic 
Charter as to what is outside and what is inside NATO's 
'area', apart from the territory of the members of the 
Alliance. According to article VI of the North Atlantic 
Treaty:
"...an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is
deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of
15Douglas Stuart and William Tow (eds), The Limits of 
Alliance: NATO Out-Of-Area Problems Since 1945. Baltimore 
and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990, p. 101.
16For a discussion of the out of area problem with 
regard the Middle East, see Joseph Coffey and Gianni 
Bonvicini, The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East. 
London, Macmillan Press, 1989. On the military aspects of 
the out of area issue see Christopher Coker, The Future of 
the Atlantic Alliance. London, Macmillan Press, 1984, pp. 
95-120. The problem is also raised in Reinhardt Rummel, 
"Coordination of the West's crisis-diplomacy", 
Aussenpolitik. vol 31, no 2, 1980, pp. 123-133 and in Karl 
Kaiser, Winston Lord, Thierry de Montbrial and David Watt, 
Western Security: What Has Changed? What Should Be Done?. 
The Royal Institute of International Affairs and the 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1981; and Stuart and Tow, op. 
cit.
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any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the 
occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the 
islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the 
North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or 
on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the 
Parties."17
Even though it might seem provocative to categorise Eastern 
Europe as "out of area", it is doubtful whether it fell, 
during the Cold War, within the category of 'genuine NATO 
cases'. The important point is that of the ambiguity of 
Eastern Europe's place in NATO's policies. Although 
politically out of reach, because inside the Soviet sphere 
of influence, events in Eastern Europe had the undoubted 
capacity for affecting the strategic balance in Europe. 
Thus, the East European question was both ring-fenced away 
from and integral to Western strategic concerns. As NATO 
states' political involvement in Eastern Europe increased 
in the context of detente, the dilemmas that this entailed 
for NATO were further exacerbated.
Another difficulty in NATO dealings with Eastern Europe 
emerges from the fact that NATO was firstly and foremostly 
structured in order to deal with military and security 
issues. Even political consultation in NATO is closely 
interlinked with security concerns. Events in Eastern 
Europe that do not automatically fall into the category of 
pure military or security issues, but would involve both
17The North Atlantic Treaty, April 1949, article VI. 
The full text of the Treaty is found in appendix 2: Jordan, 
op. cit. pp. 277-280.
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political and economic matters, would be difficult for the 
NATO structure to master.
Further, it may well be that there is an inherent 
'organisational reflex' to deal swiftly with such issues 
that fit into the traditional mould of NATO consultation, 
and that it is more difficult for the Alliance to gear 
itself into action on different issues. Most importantly, 
however, NATO's preoccupation with Eastern Europe emerges 
primarily in the broader context of East-West relations, 
and with reference to security issues.
CoCom (Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export 
Controls)
Complementing NATO, COCOM was the main economic arm of 
Western Cold War policies. Consequently, in the same way 
as NATO, it did not deal with Eastern Europe as an entity 
separate from the Soviet Union. COCOM's main task was to 
coordinate the control of Western exports to the member 
states of the Warsaw Pact (as well as China, Albania, 
Mongolia, Vietnam and North Korea). Its creation in 1949 
was a reflection of concern both in Western Europe and in 
the United States that the export of certain items to the 
Soviet Union and its allies might increase their war-
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potential and consequently threaten the security of the 
West.18
All NATO members, with the exception of Iceland, also 
became members of COCOM. Operating from a small annex to 
the US embassy in Paris, the organisation's primary 
activity consisted in agreeing, amongst the national 
delegations, on a list of products and technologies that 
would be controlled in their trade with the communist 
states. Three different lists were in operation: List I was 
composed of items to be embargoed unconditionally. List II 
included items for which members agreed they would restrict 
their exports to Eastern Europe to "reasonable quantities" 
and exchange information on what was actually exported. 
List III contained items still under consideration, for 
which agreement to control had not been reached. For items 
to be placed on or removed from the control lists, the 
unanimous consent of the member states was required. The 
enforcement and administration of controls were the
18There are few academic studies of Cocom itself, 
although the general issue of a trade embargo is dealt with 
in the literature on international economics. This account 
is based chiefly on Michael Mastanduno, Economic 
Containment: COCOM and the Politics of East-West Trade. 
Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1992. Stephen 
Woolcock also discusses COCOM in his book Western Policies 
on East-West Trade. The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, London, Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1982. See also 
Gunnar Adler Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967: 
A Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy. Stockholm, 
Almquist and Wisell, 1968. A chronology of the main 
initiatives taken in the context of COCOM is provided in 
Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberley Ann 
Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and
Current Policy, Washington DC, Institute for International 
Economics, pp. 125-130.
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responsibility of each member state itself. This sometimes 
led to allegations of disparities between the practice of 
the different states.
The same lists applied for all the communist states.19 In 
other words, in the same sense as NATO, COCOM's approach 
to Eastern Europe was to consider it as the 'enemy-camp', 
and to concentrate on the security-side of the 
relationship. On the other hand, COCOM was actively engaged 
in coordinating an aspect of Western economic policies 
towards the East European countries.
COCOM was a controversial institution from the start. Part 
of the compromise that led to its creation in 1949 were the 
principles of informality and confidentiality. This was 
requested chiefly for reasons of domestic politics, rather 
than as a precaution with regard to the Warsaw Pact. 
Participation in a system of economic discrimination 
targeted against Communist states was of dubious legality 
and potentially explosive politically. Some of the West 
European states, France and the Netherlands in particular, 
would only agree to participate in the framework if it was 
kept informal and confidential, so that, if necessary, they 
could deny its existence.20 As a result, Cocom's 
deliberations and decisions have not been made public:
19No doubt, a policy of 'differentiation' would soon 
lead to leakages throughout the Warsaw Pact area.
20Mastanduno, op. cit., p. 6.
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"The formulation of the framework of [CoCom]...is 
thus shrouded in secrecy. It is in fact doubtful 
whether any written understanding has ever existed; 
most likely a gentleman's agreement was undertaken, 
member agreeing to follow the licensing rules laid 
down by unanimous decisions amongst the group".21
Likewise, the Cocom list was not publicly announced. The 
member states did, however, publish their own guide to 
national firms.22 Another aspect of the compromise that 
allowed the creation of CoCom was its institutional 
separation from NATO. Despite obviously being part and 
parcel of the same East-West policy, NATO and Cocom had no 
formal relationship in the post-war era. What is more, 
different domestic ministries took the lead in different 
states in implementing CoCom restrictions.23
Although CoCom's activities provide an example of tangible 
coordination of one part of Western states' policies 
towards Eastern Europe, this did not take place without 
controversy, and it did provoke political disputes between 
the Western allies. The main dividing line was between the 
West European governments, who were strongly opposed to
21US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
"Technology and East West Trade", 1979, p. 153, quoted in 
Hufbauer et. al., op. cit. p. 133.
22For an example of such a list see Michael 
Mastanduno, "What is CoCom and how does it work?", in 
Robert Cullen (ed), The Post-Containment Handbook: Kev
Issues in US-Soviet Economic Relations. Boulder, Colo, 
Westview Press, 1990, pp.75-105.
23In the case of Britain, Customs and Excise were as 
active as the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office on control of strategic goods.
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applying any controls that suggested, either in appearance 
or in actuality, a strategy of economic warfare, and the 
United States, who at times seemed to favour this approach. 
There was a brief phase during the Korean war in the early 
1950s when items of general economic significance were 
actually added to the lists of embargoed items, thus in 
reality changing CoCom's policy from that of a selective 
embargo into economic warfare. However, by 1958 lists were 
reduced again to focus on items of military utility. This 
more restricted approach was maintained throughout the 
1960s and 70s. During the detente period the difference in 
US and West European views on East West trade increased. 
Pressure mounted from the United States to tighten controls 
of exports. After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
in December 1979, the United States tightened export 
licensing procedures for high technology products and 
adopted a policy of not requesting "exceptions" for sale 
of items on CoCom's "dual use" list to the Soviet Union. 
This was a significant change in US policy.24 Once Reagan 
was elected, a review of CoCom's controls was put high on 
the US foreign policy agenda. As we shall see later, this 
became an issue of great importance during the Polish 
crisis.
24Hufbauer op. cit. p. 127.
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European Political Cooperation (EPC)
Being part of the overall project of European integration, 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) is not, unlike NATO 
and CoCom, a Cold War institution. Emerging in the early 
1970s, the development of EPC must be seen as part of the 
wider movement towards increased European integration, and, 
as such, a natural extension of the EC's increasing 
influence in external trade into foreign policy. The 
creation of EPC was no doubt also a reflection of a 
perceived need for Europe to develop its own voice in 
international affairs, against the backdrop of increased 
concerns about developments in US foreign policy. Still, 
foreign policy cooperation developed on a purely voluntary 
basis, and aimed in the first instance to achieve 
consultation amongst member states of the EC on issues of 
common concern. Although the EPC machinery was gradually 
strengthened throughout the 1970s, cooperation continued 
to take place on an intergovernmental basis, outside the 
EC treaties, and imposed relatively few constraints on 
individual states' foreign policies.25
25The are numerous studies of EPC in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. See for example, David Allen, Reinhardt Rummel 
and Wolfgang Wessels (eds), European Political Cooperation: 
Toward a Foreign Policy for Western Europe, London, 
Butterworth, 1982; Philippe de Schoutheete, La Cooperation 
Politique Europeenne, Bruxelles, Editions Labor, 1980; 
Panayiotis Ifestos, European Political Cooperation: Toward 
a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy?. Aldershot, 
Averbury, 1987; Christopher Hill (ed), National Foreign 
Policies and European Political Cooperation, London, Allen 
and Unwin for RIIA, 1983; Simon Nuttall, European Political 
Cooperation, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992.
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Perhaps paradoxically, the coordination of policies towards 
Eastern Europe, through the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), was one of the early 
successes of EPC.26 It contributed considerably both to 
enhancing EPC's status on the international scene and to 
increasing the efficiency of the EPC machinery itself.27 
Throughout most of the Helsinki process, the Nine in EPC 
took the lead over NATO and provided a majority of the 
input on the Western side of the negotiating table. In 
order to agree on a common European position inside the 
alliance, the EPC states usually convened before a meeting 
in the context of NATO.
A special working group had already been set up by EPC in 
February 1971 to prepare for the Helsinki process. It was 
split into two groups in July the same year. In the two 
groups, respectively the 'Sous-Comite CSCE' and the 
1Groupe-ad hoc CSCE', the former dealt with the political 
issues, and was therefore composed of representatives from 
the member states, whereas the latter, which dealt with 
economic issues, had representatives both from the member
26The general issue of the CSCE has been dealt with in 
detail in Victor-Yves Ghebali, La Diplomatie de la Detente: 
La CSCE 1973-1989. Bruxelles, Emile Bruylant, 1989; John 
Maresca, To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 1973-1975. Durham, Duke University 
Press, 1985 and Vojitec Mastny, Helsinki, Human Rights and 
European Security. Durham, Duke University Press, 1986.
27For details on EPC and the CSCE in general see Von 
Groll, "The Nine at the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe", in Allen et. al. (eds), op. cit,
pp.60-68.
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states and from the European Commission. Later in the 
conference, the Europeans further expanded their 
coordination by agreeing also on a division of labour 
between the member states, giving each state the prime 
responsibility for a certain subject area (usually referred 
to as the "chef-de file system"). The responsibility of the 
"chef de file" included reporting on its particular subject 
to the other member states, making suggestions for common 
viewpoints and maintaining contacts with the other states 
participating in the conference. One of the main reasons 
why EPC was more successful than NATO in putting its 
personal mark on the CSCE was its institutional 
provisions.28 NATO coordination did not lead to the same 
extensive common preparations. It did not have the 
equivalent infrastructure enabling the drafting of common 
proposals and reports. As a result, NATO consultation took 
place chiefly in the conference itself and with very little 
participation from the NATO organs.29
EPC's role in the CSCE might, however, have had more to do 
with the particular characteristics of the CSCE-process and 
less to do with a specific EPC interest in Eastern Europe. 
The United States took little interest in the Conference,
28Alfred Pijpers, "European Political Cooperation and 
the CSCE process", Legal Issues of European Integration. 
(1984/1), pp. 135-184, p.140.
29The importance of EPC is also underlined by the 
leader of the Norwegian delegation to the CSCE from 1973 
to 1988, see Leif Mevik, Underveis Europa. Aventura Forlag 
AS, Oslo, 1990, p. 78.
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in particular in its earlier phases, thus giving more space 
for the Europeans to take charge on the Western side. At 
a later stage in the CSCE process, during the follow-up 
meeting in Belgrade and even more so in Madrid, the United 
States took much more interest in the process, and as a 
result, the role of EPC as initiator of Western proposals 
diminished to some extent.30 Furthermore, the issue areas 
of the Conference were particularly suitable for EPC 
because they concerned political and economic issues, and 
excluded the military aspects of security, which were not 
within EPC competence. In military matters, such as the 
negotiations on Confidence Building Measures, NATO took 
over as the dominant institution inside which preparations 
for the Western position were made. Also important in 
making the CSCE a suitable activity for EPC, was the fact 
that these subject-matters, "security, cooperation and the 
continuation of detente" were concerns not only shared by 
all the EPC states but also a priority for all of them, 
thus obviously facilitating close coordination.
Indeed, apart from the CSCE-conference, EPC activity in 
Eastern Europe was practically non-existent. Even though 
there had been an East European Working Group in existence 
since the early days of EPC, its activities were never 
allowed to develop into policy-initiatives.31 Hence, West
30Pijpers, op. cit. p. 144.
31Simon Nuttall, op. cit., 1992, p. 118 and pp. ISO-
51 .
Germany's Ostpolitik, for example, arguably the main West 
European initiative towards Eastern Europe in the 1970s, 
was very much a national one, conducted with the approval 
of the other Western states, but not as a common Western 
or EPC initiative. It must be noted, however, that EPC 
provided support for West Germany's Ostpolitik.32
In defence of EPC, it could perhaps be argued that the CSCE 
was, apart from the Ostpolitik, which was mostly concerned 
with the German question, the main vehicle of Western 
diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe in the 1970s. 
Furthermore, there had been few other occasions for EPC to 
manifest its interest in Eastern Europe since its creation 
in the early 1970s. The Polish crisis was in this sense to 
be the first "test" for EPC in terms of its ability to 
coordinate policies towards Eastern Europe. Finally, 
introducing a major policy-initiative similar to, for 
instance, the Euro-Arab dialogue, with Eastern Europe, 
would have been practically impossible because of the 
refusal of the Soviet bloc to recognise the existence of 
both of the EC and EPC.33
Still, the main reason for the limited EPC activity in 
East-West relations was the importance of the
32William Wallace, "Common Foreign and Security 
Policy", pp. 411-435 in Helen Wallace and William Wallace 
(eds), Policy-Making in the European Union. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1996.
33Soviet recognition of the European Community came 
only in 1988.
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military/security aspects of this issue. As Rummel has 
pointed out,
"So far, EPC's role in East-West relations remains 
selective. It is preoccupied with cooperation matters 
and excludes most of the antagonistic military 
issues, leaving them to NATO to deal with."34
But the fact that EPC was at a disadvantage to NATO in 
East-West relations, because security or military matters 
were not part of its area of competence, can not be a 
sufficient explanation for the absence of any discussion 
of these matters in EPC. Bearing in mind the international 
climate of the late 1970s, it is even more surprising that 
at least the political aspects of these relations were not 
on the EPC agenda. Not only was the process of detente, 
dear to most of the Nine, in rapid decline. Also, Euro- 
American relations were deteriorating under the leadership 
of Carter. In this context there must have been scope for 
a discussion of the basic principles of East-West relations 
despite the exclusion of military issues. EPC could have 
provided a useful forum for European discussions on 
relations with Eastern Europe. Nuttall attributes EPC's 
abdication on East-West relations to the general lack of 
dynamism in EPC after 1978, and to national resistance, in
■^Reinhardt Rummel, "Speaking with one voice - and 
beyond", pp. 118-142 in Alfred Pijpers, Elfriede
Regelsberger and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), European
Political Cooperation in the 1980s: a Common Foreign Policy 
for Western Europe? London, M. Nijhoff, 1988, quote on p. 
134.
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particular from France and Denmark, to promoting a common 
approach towards Eastern Europe.35
The European Community (EC)
As detente developed in the 1970s, economic and trade 
relations became important policy-instruments in Western 
relations with Eastern Europe. According to article 113 of 
the Treaty of Rome, these policies should be governed by 
the common external policy of the EC. It is therefore 
important to examine the European Community's role in 
Western relations with Eastern Europe.
In the early days of European integration, EC trade with 
the COMECON states was relatively low compared to trade 
with other states. Consequently, it was not given priority 
treatment by the European Commission or individual member 
states. With the considerable increase in trade between 
Western and Eastern Europe in the 1970s, the Commission 
turned its attention to this region and attempted to impose 
a common trade policy in accordance with the requirements
of the Treaty of Rome.36 The increased trade with Eastern
35Nuttall, 1992, op. cit. pp. 149-181.
36For an overview of the development of trade
relations between Eastern Europe and the Community in the 
1970s see Avi Shlaim and G.N Yannopoulos (eds), The EEC and 
Eastern Europe. London, Cambridge University Press, 1978, 
Shlaim and Yannopoulos, especially pp.1-23; Yannopoulos, 
"European Community External Commercial Policies and East 
West trade in Europe", Journal of Common Market Studies. 
no.1, Sept. 1985, Vol. XXIV, pp.21-38; Werner Feld, "The 
CMEA and the European Community: a troubled courtship",
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Europe had resulted in what Peter Marsh has called "a 
scramble to enter the communist market".37 The member 
states resisted the Commission's proposals for a common 
trade policy, and it was only when the United States and 
Japan also entered the competition for access to East 
European markets that they accepted to coordinate their 
trade policies towards Eastern Europe. By the end of 1974, 
a common commercial policy towards Eastern Europe was 
finally in place. From 1975 onwards, all new trade 
agreements with Eastern Europe had to be made with the 
European Community, and no longer with the individual 
member states.
There were, however, clear limits to the EC's common trade 
policy towards Eastern Europe. The transfer of control of 
trade policy was only partial, leaving Western Europe with 
coexisting national and EC controlled economic policies 
towards Eastern Europe. Firstly, the East European states 
did not recognise the authority of the European Commission. 
Consequently, the common commercial policy was based on a 
specimen agreement made by the Commission, and implemented 
unilaterally by the EC states. The Commission was still 
facing the task of convincing the East European states to 
negotiate directly with it instead of with individual
Journal of European Integration, 1984, VII, nos 2-3, pp. 
197-219.
37Peter Marsh, "The development of relations between 
the EEC and the CMEA", pp. 25-69, in Shlaim and 
Yannopoulos, op. cit., quotation on p. 38.
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states.38 Secondly, the scope of the common commercial 
policy was limited. It did give the Commission the power 
to control conventional trade activities such as import 
quotas, tariffs- and most favoured nation treatment. 
However, a majority of trade relations with Eastern Europe 
were ruled by so-called cooperation agreements or joint 
ventures in which the Western states supplied the capital, 
technology and know-how. These projects were often 
supported by credit guarantees provided by national 
governments. The European Community failed to take control 
of these policies. Despite a ruling by the European Court 
of Justice in November 1975 that the Community had the 
right according to article 113 of the Treaty of Rome to 
control export credit policy, the main Western states 
refused to comply and preferred to establish a so-called 
"gentleman's agreement" amongst themselves and with the 
United States and Japan in the context of the G7. The only 
commitment achieved at the EC level was for a preliminary 
consultation between member states before they entered into 
a cooperation agreement.39 John Pinder has argued that as
^For a detailed discussion on the problem of the 
recognition of the EEC by the Soviet and East European 
states and the development of institutional relations 
between the EEC and COMECON see for example Sophie Verny 
"CEE-CAEM: le probleme de la reconnaissance mutuelle",
Courrier des Pays de l'Est, no 305, avril 1986, pp.30-41; 
Robert M. Cutler, "Harmonizing EEC—CMEA relations: never 
the twain shall meet?", International Affairs, 63 (2),
Spring 1987, pp. 259-270; Branko Tomsa "Les relations de 
la CEE avec les pays de 1'Europe de l'Est", Etudes 
Internationales, 1978, no.1, pp. 87-105; Axel Lebahn,
"Alternatives in EC-CMEA Relations" , Aussenpolitik, vol. 31, 
no. 2, 1980, pp.147-165.
39Marsh, op. cit, p. 59.
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a result of this, the European Community's influence on 
East-West economic relations was negligible, or non­
existent :
"The crucial difficulty is that the common external 
tariff, which is the only major instrument of 
external economic policy that is unambiguously 
common, is no longer of much importance; and no 
member government seems ready to place other 
substantial instruments in the hands of the 
Community. But until they do so, the Community is 
condemned to play a minor role in East-West 
relations; "40
Still, the Community's capacity to contribute to an 
economic response to events in Eastern Europe should not 
be overlooked.41 What is more, the advantages of using the 
Community structure to support EPC declarations were slowly 
being recognised in the late 1970s. The CSCE provided the 
first indication of the potential for cooperation between 
the Community and EPC. The Commission had been closely 
involved with the activities of the second basket on 
economic cooperation, with its representatives conducting 
the negotiations on behalf of the Nine. Also, the Final Act 
and the Concluding Documents were adopted by both the 
individual member states and by the Commission. However, 
the CSCE was, in the 1970s, still the exception rather than 
the rule. In general, since EPC's creation, it had been 
kept clearly separated from the wider EC framework. The
40John Pinder, "A Community policy towards Eastern 
Europe", The World Today, vol 30, no. 3, March 1974, pp. 
119-128, quotation on p. 121.
41Indeed, in 1989 this capacity was to become 
recognised, when the G7 charged the European Commission 
with coordinating Western aid to Eastern Europe.
149
Commission was carefully excluded from EPC business and 
there were no explicit links between the commercial 
activities of the Community and EPC's foreign policy 
initiatives.42 Member states were concerned that the 
intergovernmental EPC might be 'contaminated' by the 
supranational characteristics of the Community framework 
if contact between the two was too close.43
In the late 1970s and early 1980s there were some signs of
change on this issue. At the same time, the question of
sanctions as a foreign policy instrument was becoming
increasingly important, and the utility of the EC structure
for EPC in this context was clear. As Hill has pointed out,
"What the Community can give, so the Community can 
take away ... Since the Ten are extensively linked to 
most areas of the world through commercial and aid 
agreements, so they have the capacity to break, slow 
down, re-interpret or simply ignore existing 
arrangements in a more or less delicate attempt to 
make political points."44
However, France and Denmark still opposed the use of 
Community instruments to support EPC, and only timid
42See Nuttall, "Where the Commission comes in", 
pp.104-117 in Pijpers et al., op cit. for details of when 
the Commission was included in EPC-work.
43Simon Nuttall, "Interaction between European 
Political Cooperation and the European Community", Yearbook 
of European Law. Oxford, Clarendon Press, no 7, 1987, pp. 
211-249, the point referred to here is on p. 212.
^Christopher Hill and James Mayall, "The sanctions 
problem: international and European perspectives", EUI
Working Paper, no. 59, Badia Fiesolana, San Domenico, July 
1983, p. 22.
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attempts had been made to change this.45 After the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, the Community/EPC 
acted negatively on the question of sanctions by making 
sure that Community trade did not interfere with United 
States action. They did not, however, take positive action 
themselves. A decision to impose sanctions against Iran 
after the taking of American hostages was made at the 
meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Naples in May 1980. 
Still, the measures were implemented through the national 
Parliaments, and not by the European Community.46 The 
utility of the European Community for the West in a 
situation of tension in Eastern Europe is clear. And as we 
shall see, with the imposition of martial law in Poland the 
Community members resolved to use the Community framework 
both for positive inducements and for imposing sanctions.
Before turning to the next section, one conclusion can be 
drawn and two questions must be raised. It can be concluded 
that Eastern Europe had not been a main concern for any of 
the Western agencies looked at in this chapter. None of 
these agencies were created with the aim of coordinating 
polices towards Eastern Europe, and to the extent to which 
they dealt with Eastern Europe, their approach and policies 
were influenced by the specific origins and purpose of the 
institution itself. In turn, this means that there was no
45Nuttall, 1992, p.262.
^Hill and Mayall, op. cit., pp.13-17; Nuttall, 1987, 
op. cit. pp. 222-225.
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provision for coordination of the economic, diplomatic and 
security aspects of Western policies in Eastern Europe. The 
Western security relationship with Eastern Europe was dealt 
with through NATO and CoCom. Attempts were made by the 
European Community to coordinate, or even control, trade 
relations with the East European states, but were not 
overwhelmingly successful. As for EPC, it provided a forum 
for some political/diplomatic discussions, yet, as with the 
EC proper, did not to any extensive degree concern itself 
with Eastern Europe.
Two questions also emerge as a result of this brief 
overview. Firstly, to what extent might these institutions 
be able to go beyond their activities of long term 
cooperation, to coordinating a Western reaction to an 
external crisis or situation of tension in Eastern Europe 
which involved economic, political as well as security 
issues. Secondly, to what extent was there an overlap in 
the activities of these institutions, in particular of the 
European Community/European Political Cooperation and NATO. 
And furthermore, would such an overlap lead to competition, 
and ultimately to a fragmentation, of Western cohesion and 
to a weakening of its ability to react efficiently and 
cohesively to an external crisis, or alternatively to an 
interlocking and strengthening of Western foreign policies?
The issue of coordination in a situation of crisis is 
addressed first, and then, the question of competition
1 52
between the European and the Atlantic frameworks is 
examined.
Consultation, coordination and crisis
The previous section looked at the general orientation of 
Western institutions and discussed the extent to which 
their activities had been geared towards Eastern Europe. 
This section examines whether or not there were specific 
institutional provisions in the West for situations of 
crises or high tension in Eastern Europe. It argues that 
although provisions for consulting about a crisis situation 
were ample, Western institutions did not provide a basis 
for agreeing on coordinated action towards a region such 
as Eastern Europe in times of crisis.
The obvious place for the Western states to coordinate 
their policies in a time of tension or crisis is NATO. The 
military aspects of NATO's operations are closely 
coordinated, with clearly defined responsibilities 
attributed to the SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), 
based in Brussels. According to official NATO documents, 
NATO arrangements for crisis-management are provided by the 
NATO situation centre (SITCEN) which operates on a 
continuous basis. The primary task of SITCEN is to 
assemble, collate and disseminate all intelligence and 
information made available by member states and by the NATO
1 53
Military Authorities with regard to developing situations. 
In other words, SITCEN is supposed to provide the technical 
means for effective and rapid consultation between NATO 
states. Yet, these crisis mechanisms are designed to keep 
NATO alert towards military risks. It remains an open 
question, however, how useful these mechanisms would be in 
the case of a crisis in Eastern Europe.47 It is quite 
clear that any disturbance in Eastern Europe, including a 
Warsaw Pact intervention, would not be justification enough 
for the NATO-military to be mobilised. As for the civilian 
aspects of NATO crisis-mechanisms, according to Smith, the 
principal characteristic of NATO is the unstructured way 
in which the organisation is structured. He describes 
NATO's policy-making process as an extended process of 
consultation which makes it extremely difficult to arrive 
at decisions quickly: "By the time the Council reflects on 
a crisis... the worst is over."48 He also emphasises the 
weaknesses of interaction between NATO's political 
institutions and its military structure.
In order to achieve a clear understanding of NATO's ability 
to respond to a crisis in Eastern Europe, it is useful to 
look at NATO's policy and activities during the crisis in 
Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The main 
point that emerges is that the crisis-mechanisms were
47See The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Facts 
and Figures. NATO Information Service, Brussels, 1989, 
pp .-1.94-1 95.
48Dan Smith, op. cit. p. 20.
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effective chiefly in the aftermath of the crisis, and 
mainly with the aim of evaluating the effect of the crises 
for Western security. In the early days of the crises, the 
NATO apparatus served only as a forum for consultation 
between the member states and did not provide a basis for 
coordinating policies.49
In the aftermath of the Hungarian crisis, a report from the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives
strongly condemned the United States for failing to be
prepared for events there, and for failing to provide
Western leadership in the crisis:
"The failure of the United States to have a plan or 
plans of action concerning the Hungarian events 
indicates either serious weakness in our intelligence 
service or a serious misapplication by the 
administrators of our foreign policy of facts 
reported. "50
By implication, this is also a criticism of NATO. If the 
United States had no contingency plans, it is unlikely that 
NATO had any either.
It was, however, not only in 1956 that NATO was unprepared. 
According to Kovrig, the Western response to the Prague 
spring "bordered on paralysis":
49It must of course be added that on their own, 
Western institutional mechanisms are not enough to ensure 
a coordinated response. There must also be a political will 
to coordinate.
50"Report of the special study mission to Europe on 
Policy toward the satellite nations", Committee of Foreign 
Affairs of the House of Representatives. 85th Congress, 1st 
session, June 1957, p. 7.
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"An early warning from West German intelligence of 
the Soviet decision to intervene had met with 
conditioned scepticism in Bonn and in NATO 
headquarters. American intelligence even managed to 
lose track of a Soviet combat group in Poland, only 
to discover it two weeks later in the invasion force. 
And when CIA Director Richard Helms belatedly tried 
to raise the alarm at a White House meeting shortly 
before the invasion, his attempts at persuasion were 
futile... "51
According to official NATO sources, the evolution of events
in Czechoslovakia were closely observed by NATO.52 It is
even more surprising then that the allies were taken aback
by the intervention in the same way as they were in 1956.
According to Schweitzer:
"Despite the warning signs and some hints by Moscow 
to Washington, the WTO action appears to have taken 
NATO by surprise."53
The surprise element of the Warsaw Pact intervention in 
Prague is also underlined by Harlan Cleveland.54
51Bennett Kovrig, Of Walls and Bridges: The United
States and Eastern Europe, New York, New York University 
Press, 1991, p. 114.
52NATO Sneakers1 notes, October 1968, "Czechoslovakia: 
some questions and answers".
53Schweitzer, op. cit., p. 37.
^Harlan Cleveland, "NATO after the invasion", Foreign 
Affairs, January 1969, vol. 47, no.2., pp.251-265, in 
particular p.253. Cleveland was the US Permanent 
Representative on the Atlantic Council at the time of the 
Czechoslovak crisis. The same point is made by Kaplan, who 
quotes the then SACEUR, Lemmitzer's description of the 
absence of political advice from the NATO Council on how 
to place allied installations and forces on alert in 1968 
without provoking the Warsaw Pact, as "one of the most 
serious breakdowns in the political-military mechanisms of 
the Alliance that occurred during my term as SACEUR". 
Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The
Enduring Alliance, New York, Twaine Publishers, Macmillan, 
1994, p. 105.
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Both interventions were publicly condemned by NATO. The
official reaction to Hungary was particularly strong:
"The Council Members have followed the course of 
events in Hungary with shock and revulsion. The 
brutal suppression of the heroic Hungarian people 
stands in stark contrast with Soviet public 
professions. The Council reaffirmed the conviction of 
its member governments that the United Nations should 
continue its efforts, through the pressure of world 
opinion, to induce their forces to withdraw their 
forces from Hungary and to right the wrongs done to 
the Hungarian people. The peoples of Eastern Europe 
have the right to chose their own government freely, 
unaffected by external pressure and the use or threat 
of force, and to decide for themselves the political 
and social order they prefer."55
After Prague, the Western Foreign Ministers, meeting in the 
North Atlantic Council, stressed that the Soviet Union had 
violated the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention. 
They also
"...urged the Soviet Union, in the interest of world 
peace, to refrain from using force and interfering in 
the affairs of other states. Determined to safeguard 
the freedom and independence of their countries, they 
[the NATO states] could not remain indifferent to any 
developments which endangers their security."56
When discussing the reasons for the limited Western 
preparation in the two crises a distinction must be made 
between 1956 and 1968. It is clear that in 1956 NATO was 
severely hampered by the Suez crisis. The British and the 
French no doubt had their attention on Suez rather than
55NATO Final Communiques. 1949-1974, NATO Information 
Service, Brussels, Paris, 11-14 December 1956, pp. 101-104, 
quote on p.102.
56NATO Press Communique. 16 November 1968, "Final 
Communique".
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Hungary. Furthermore, the Europeans and the United States 
were divided over Suez, making an effective NATO reaction 
to Hungary not only difficult, but probably altogether 
impossible. As Kovrig argues
"... any UN response to the Hungarian crisis was 
dependent on the political will of the Western 
allies, and their divisions over Suez undoubtedly 
weakened this will. When on November 2 Lodge reported 
that the British and French were pressing for a 
condemnation of the Soviet Union, Dulles retorted 
that 'it is a mockery for them to come in with bombs 
falling over Egypt and denounce the Soviet Union for 
perhaps doing something that is not quite as bad1."57
In addition, there were European misgivings over Dulles' 
roll-back policy of that same period. At their return from 
Europe, the Committee of the House of representatives 
reported a
"lack of comprehension in Europe of the statement by 
Secretary Dulles urging reliance on moral pressures 
to overcome the power of Soviet despotism and an 
inability to reconcile the statement with United 
States policy towards Formosa and the recent dispatch 
of the Sixth Fleet to the Middle East."58
Over Czechoslovakia, there appears on the other hand to
have been a NATO consensus on passivity59 (which is, of
course, also the easiest way to maintain cohesion):
"The first reaction of the North Atlantic Alliance to 
the mounting Czech crisis - before the invasion - was 
to watch carefully but lie low....the political
57Kovrig op. cit., p. 100.
^Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
House, op. cit. ,p. 7.
59However, in the aftermath the intervention led to 
mutual recriminations inside the alliance, as de Gaulle 
attributed American passivity to a pact to maintain the 
division of Europe. This is argued by Kovrig on p. 115.
158
judgement ...led to agreed Allied policy: 
scrupulously to avoid giving the Russians any Western 
excuse to move into Czechoslovakia. This restraint 
was not, as restraint so often is, the paralysis of 
timidity. It was a conscious policy consensus in the 
North Atlantic Council. It did not save the Czechs, 
of course; nor was it supposed to."60
It was really after the intervention that the NATO crisis- 
machinery was set to work. The intervention in 
Czechoslovakia had left the Alliance uncertain about the 
nature of Soviet intentions.61 The intervention was 
considered to challenge the assumptions on which Western 
policy was based.62 The purpose of the crisis machinery 
then was to evaluate the effect of the invasion on Western 
security.63 In the immediate aftermath of the invasion 
several reports were commissioned by the North Atlantic 
Council in order to assess the effects on Western 
security.64 Also, the end of year meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council was moved forward from mid-December in
60Cleveland, op. cit. p.257. With specific reference 
to the Brussels machinery, Smith puts it even more bluntly: 
"I was told that the Dutch government was informed by the 
Soviet embassy of the invasion a few hours in advance; one 
presumes other governments were also told. In any event, 
nobody in Den Haag or anywhere else thought to inform NATO 
HQ. The news was learned from the radio.", op. cit. p. 21.
61Cleveland, op. cit., p. 256.
62Anatole Shub, "Lessons of Czechoslovakia", Foreign 
Affairs, Jan. 1969, no. 2, vol. 47, pp. 266-280.
63Cleveland, op. cit. p. 258; NATO after 
Czechoslovakia, Center for Strategic International Studies, 
Georgetown University, Washington DC, Special Report 
Series, no 9, April 1969.
64NATO latest, 16 Nov. op. cit. and Cleveland, op. 
cit. p. 257-8.
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order to discuss the impact of events.65 The main outcome 
of these reports was an agreement on modest improvements 
in the quality, effectiveness and deployment of NATO forces 
both in terms of manpower and equipment.66 The invasion 
also put an end to speculations about the possibility of 
some members' withdrawal from the Alliance at its Twentieth 
anniversary in 1969 (at which point a member state could 
withdraw with a year's notice). Beyond this, there is 
little evidence of any 'soul-searching' at the level of 
NATO's approach to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as 
a result of the Prague spring. Chiefly, NATO policy 
continued as before. NATO's strategy, as it had been 
declared in the Harmel 'doctrine' a year earlier was 
maintained.67
NATO as a military alliance was institutionally 
"conditioned" to consider the security aspects of an East 
European crisis for the West and had limited capacity to 
coordinate a policy-response. EPC, which was chiefly 
concerned with foreign political issues, might produce a 
different perspective on such an issue. By the end of the
65NATO latest, no. 3, 4 October 1968, "NATO and
Czechoslovakia", NATO Information Service, Brussels.
66Ibid., and Thomas Cynkin, Soviet-American Signalling 
in the Polish Crisis, London, Macmillan Press, 1988, p. 38.
67For NATO reasoning on this, see Final Communique, 16 
November, op. cit.
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1970s, EPC had come to a turning point in its evolution.68
The EPC machinery and procedures had gradually been
strengthened throughout the 1970s. The level of cooperation
had reached a respectable stage and EPC had some
achievements to its credit. However, further steps,
building on the existing accomplishments were needed. Most
importantly for our purpose, EPC needed to improve its
procedures for dealing with external crises. The need for
such a procedure had been amply illustrated by the poor
performance of EPC in the Middle East War in 1973 and in
the Cyprus crisis in 1974. Nonetheless, it was the failure
of EPC to meet and react swiftly to the Soviet intervention
in Afghanistan in December 1979, which finally prompted a
decision to create a crisis mechanism in EPC. At the London
summit, in October 1981, (two months before martial law was
imposed in Poland) specific crisis-procedures were
introduced into the EPC framework. The Ten agreed that,
"The Political Committee or, if necessary, a 
Ministerial meeting will convene within 48 hours at 
the request of three member states. ... In order to 
improve the capacity of the Ten to react in an 
emergency Working Groups are encouraged to analyse 
areas of potential crisis and to prepare a range of 
possible reactions by the Ten."69
68For the changes in EPC in the early 1980s see 
Nuttall, op. cit. 1992, pp.149-181 and Christopher Hill 
"Changing gear in Political Cooperation", Political 
Quarterly. Jan-March 1982, pp.47-60.
69"Report on European Political Cooperation issued by 
the Foreign Ministers of the Ten on 1 3 October 1981 (London 
Report)", part 11.13, in European Political Cooperation 
(EPC). 5th ed., Bonn, Press and Information Office of the 
Federal Government, 1988, pp. 61-70.
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The creation of the crisis-mechanism, however, only partly 
solved the difficulties involved in promoting a rapid and 
efficient EPC response to an external crisis. According to 
Christopher Hill, the often considerable divergences in 
national position was an equally important hindrance for 
EPC crisis-management:
"...EPC is not particularly well-suited to handling 
international crises, even those in which the 
Europeans are themselves directly involved. There is 
a distinct tendency not to avoid crises, for that 
almost by definition cannot be done, but certainly to 
play down their significance...member states are 
often still forced into anodyne generalizations by 
their fundamental lack of the capacity to agree 
amongst themselves on international questions."70
Other problems with the EPC framework also contributed to 
weaken its capacity to coordinate an effective response to 
an external crisis. Firstly, EPC was hampered by its 
inability to deal with security issues. Secondly, EPC 
needed a secretariat to assist the overworked Presidency. 
Its creation had been delayed as a result of fear it might 
push EPC into evolving towards supranationality. An EPC 
secretariat was set up only after the signing of the Single 
European Act in 1986. Thirdly, as we shall see in the next 
section, the question of EPC's place in the overall 
framework of Western institutions, and in particular its 
relations with NATO, presented difficulties. Indeed, EPC 
prospered so long as it did not pose to great dilemmas for
70Christopher Hill, "EPC's performance in crises", pp. 
135-146, in Reinhardt Rummel (ed), Toward Political Union: 
Planning a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the 
European Community, Boulder, Westview Press, 1992, 
quotation on p. 145.
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Atlanticism, in other words, as long as it stayed away from 
defence.
Having looked at the Western institutional framework in 
terms of its general relations with Eastern Europe and in 
terms of its specific provisions for foreign policy 
coordination in times of tension or crisis, the next 
section turns to look at the issue of the multiplicity of 
Western institutions and the problems this might create for 
the efficiency of Western coordination. The main question 
under this general heading is that of whether or not the 
coexistence of an Atlantic and a European framework might 
lead to divisions and thus prevent effective Western 
coordination. Or, on the other hand, whether or not the 
very existence of a variety of institutional frameworks, 
and the wider choice this provided for the states in terms 
of where and how to interact, might increase the 
flexibility and efficiency of coordination.
Institutional multiplicity; fragmentation of flexibility?
When the Treaty of Rome, establishing the European 
Community, was negotiated, emphasis was put on organising 
relations amongst the member states themselves, rather than 
on how to establish a dialogue with third countries. 
Procedures of communication with third parties were
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invented ad hoc, rather than according to an established
philosophy. According to Nuttall:
"The pattern of dialogue remains ... a confusing 
patchwork, and presents one of the greatest 
organizational problems EPC has to face."71
It is, in particular, with regard to relations between EPC, 
the United States and the Atlantic Alliance that this issue 
has been problematic.72 The difficulties in this case run 
deeper than the technical consideration of communication 
between the two sides, and actually concerns the question 
of whether or not the Atlantic Alliance and the European 
Community/EPC are mutually incompatible. It shall be argued 
in the following that although, ideally, they do not need 
to be so, in practice, Atlantic and European solidarity had 
been on a collision course since the early 1970s, and, 
furthermore, that by the time of the Polish crisis, this 
presented serious difficulties for the effectiveness of a 
coordinated response to an external event.
The inherent contradiction between NATO and the EC/EPC is 
most clearly illustrated if one bears in mind that NATO had 
ambitions to become not only a military alliance, but an
71Nuttall, 1992, op. cit. p. 283. Still, at least in 
the early 1980s, the system had not yet started to suffer 
from overload.
72A detailed discussion of US -West European relations 
is provided in Michael Smith, Western Europe and the United 
States: The Uncertain Alliance. London, George alien and 
Unwin, 1984.
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actual "Atlantic Community".73 This dimension to NATO was
strongly emphasised in the "Report of the Committee of
Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO" in 1956.
Presenting an ambitious line of action for the North
Atlantic Alliance, the report argued that, accompanying its
overall objective of security, NATO should aim at creating
an "Atlantic Community whose roots are deeper even than the
necessity for common defence". The Report of the Three
argued that politics and security were interdependent and
also that the challenge to NATO was not exclusively
military. Consequently, it concluded that the success of
the military alliance depended on the political cohesion
of an Atlantic Community. When referring to the decision
to create NATO in 1949, it pointed out that
"... in a shrinking nuclear world it was wise and 
timely to bring about a closer association of kindred 
Atlantic and Western European nations for other than 
defence purposes alone; that a partial pooling of 
sovereignty for mutual protection should also promote 
progress and cooperation generally. There was a sense 
of Atlantic Community, alongside the realisation of 
an immediate common danger ... it gave birth to the 
hope that NATO would grow beyond and above the 
emergency which brought it into being."74
73For a discussion of the concept of Atlanticism and 
the Atlantic Community, see Michael Smith, "Atlanticism and 
North Atlantic Interdependence: The Widening Gap?", in
Barry Jones and Peter Willetts, Interdependence on Trial, 
London, Frances Pinter, 1984, pp. 167-229.
74"Selection from the Report of the Committee of Three 
on Nonmilitary Cooperation in NATO", December 1956, 
Appendix 3, pp. 281-293 in Jordan, op. cit. Quote on p. 
283.
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Nevertheless, referring to the Report of the Three, former 
British ambassador to NATO, Sir Clive Rose, has written 
that
"These are admirable guidelines. If they had been 
scrupulously followed by all members during the 
subsequent 26 years, the history of the Alliance 
would no doubt have looked different."75
Indeed, it is highly debatable to what extent the creation
of an Atlantic Community could succeed at all. It is clear,
however, that with the creation of the European Community
in 1958, an alternative identity to that of the Atlantic
one was established and might ultimately lead to divisions
inside NATO.76
In the early years of the European Community, coexistence 
with NATO did not produce too many problems. However, with 
the strengthening of the Community's economic power in the 
1970s and the creation of a European foreign political 
identity through EPC, this started to change. Similar 
trends indicating a European sense of nascent identity had 
already found expression inside NATO with the French 
decision to leave its military part in 1966. The formation 
of the Eurogroup in 1968, providing a means for the 
coordination of European defence efforts and a forum for
75Rose, op. cit. p. 2.
76For a persuasive presentation of the perspective 
that Europe can only be a meaningful reality if it is 
something distinct from America, see John Lukacs, Decline 
and Rise of Europe, Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1965, 
in particular pp. 201-254. It might be added that the 
aspirations to an Atlantic Community are still with us. For 
this, see
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harmonisation of European views on major political or 
strategic questions affecting the defence of NATO Europe, 
was further confirmation of this trend in NATO.77 Finally, 
the Harmel report was also an expression of early European 
discontent with the NATO structure and of European interest 
in developing detente with the Warsaw Pact.78 Still, the 
problem with the EC/EPC was different in the sense that it 
outlined the possibility of a competing institutional 
framework, rather than a "European pillar" inside NATO.79
The potential conflict between EPC and NATO was first 
addressed by Henry Kissinger during his time as Secretary 
of State for Richard Nixon. He was concerned about the 
potentially disruptive effects of the creation of European 
Political Cooperation on Atlantic cohesion, and proposed 
a reactivation of the Atlantic Treaty. According to 
Kissinger, this reactivation should lead to the negotiation 
of an agreement on the broader issue of defence, detente, 
as well as commercial and monetary issues. In the same 
context, Kissinger, in a speech in April 1973, declared
77Kaplan, op. cit. p. 108. Nonetheless Kaplan argues 
that the Eurogroup failed to provide a basis for a European 
voice within NATO and "...was more show than substance.".
78Jordan argues that the Harmel report also sought, 
and succeeded, in bringing France back into the mainstream 
alliance. See pp. 103-5. The text of the Harmel doctrine 
in published in Appendix 6, pp. 301-4.
79See Hedley Bull, "European self-reliance and the 
reform of NATO", Foreign Affairs. Spring 1983, pp. 874-892 
for an argument in favour of a European pillar inside the 
Atlantic Alliance.
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1973 the "Year of Europe".80 The European partners were 
not, however, overwhelmingly enthusiastic. Kissinger's 
initiative was generally, and probably rightly, interpreted 
as the result of concern about a weakening of the United 
States' influence in Europe and a wish to control EPC from 
the inside. The Europeans also disliked Kissinger's 
description of US responsibilities as global, whereas he 
considered European interests to be chiefly regional. 
Particularly sceptical was the French foreign minister 
Michel Jobert who denounced the 'condominium' between the 
United States and the Soviet Union and argued that what the 
United States really wanted was a partnership of 
unequals.81
As 1973 dragged on, the idea of a "Year of Europe" was to 
turn out a considerable failure. Kissinger himself refers 
to it as "the year that never was".82 In response, or in 
defiance, to the US proposal, the European Council, at 
their meeting in Copenhagen on 23 July, adopted the 
'Declaration of a European Identity', stressing both the 
importance of the United States' nuclear umbrella for
80For a discussion of the events of the "Year of 
Europe" see Pierre Melandri, Une Incertaine Alliance: Les 
Etats Unis et 1'Europe. 1973-1983. Paris, Publications de 
la Sorbonne, 1988 pp.79-120. Kissinger himself also gives 
a detailed account of the events of 1973 in Years of 
Upheaval. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1982, pp. 128- 
195 and 700-747.
81Pierre Gerbet, La Construction de 1'Europe. Paris,
Imprimerie Nationale, 1983, p. 426.
82Kissinger op. cit. p. 192.
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European security and the importance of equality between 
the United States and Europe. The Copenhagen declaration 
also underlined that relations between EPC and the United 
States should not affect the Nine's determination to 
establish themselves as a distinct and original entity.83 
In practice this amounted to a rejection of Kissinger's 
proposal. With the onset of the Yom Kippur war in October 
1973 and the subsequent oil embargo, the weakness of 
Atlantic cohesion was obvious.84
At the Atlantic Council in December 1973, Kissinger 
continued to pursue his aim of improving communication 
between the United States and EPC by suggesting regular 
meetings between the directors of the ministries of foreign 
affairs of NATO, and asking for a commitment on the part 
of EPC to consult the United States before taking any 
common decision of importance. The French President 
Pompidou refused. He did not want the United States to be 
consulted on foreign policy issues discussed in EPC until 
the Nine had already formed their opinion, otherwise, he 
considered, the United States would have too large an 
influence on European decisions.85
83For the full text of the ' Declaration of European
Identity', see European Political Cooperation, op. cit, 
pp.34-55.
^The oil embargo did, however, also show the 
weaknesses in intra-European solidarity.
85Gerbet, op. cit., p. 428.
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It was only by the end of April the next year that a 
compromise on how interaction between EPC and the United 
States should take place was found with the Ottawa 
Declaration on Atlantic Unity and the so-called Gymnich 
formula.86 The Gymnich formula was a pragmatic solution 
according to which consultations between EPC and the United 
States would be carried out by the Presidency on behalf of 
the Nine, when this was requested by one member state and 
agreed upon by the others. The US Ambassador in the capital 
of the Presidency would receive advance notice of the 
subjects likely to be discussed at meetings of the 
Political Committee or of the Foreign Ministers and the US 
Ambassador would forward the viewpoint of the State 
Department to the Presidency of EPC. After EPC meetings, 
the US Ambassador was debriefed separately. Other third 
countries usually received a collective briefing. The use 
made of input from the United States depended on the 
Presidency, however, according to Nuttall "circulation of 
the US papers as documentation was thought to be in poor 
taste".87
The second half of the compromise that followed the debacle 
of the 'Year of Europe' was the Ottawa declaration, adopted 
at the Atlantic Council in Ottawa in June 1974, in which
86Although most academic works on EPC-US relations
will refer to the Gymnich formula, there is apparently no 
written text documenting its existence, and some 
practitioners deny all knowledge of it.
87Nuttall, 1992, op. cit,, p. 284.
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the members of the Atlantic Alliance confirmed their 
commitment to strengthen the practice of political 
consultation and mutual information inside NATO.88
The above arrangement established a system of communication 
between EPC and the United States. According to Nuttall, 
the Gymnich formula turned out to function relatively 
well.89 They did, however, fail to address the underlying 
issue of the development of a European entity that might 
with time weaken the cohesion of NATO. It is clear that the 
exclusion of security matters from EPC's agenda was meant 
to avert a conflict between the two institutions. Also, the 
two organisations had been seen to function efficiently 
side by side for example in the CSCE process. 
Nevertheless, internal contradictions in the position of 
both sides contributed to the maintenance of the potential 
for divisions.
The ambiguity on the European side consisted chiefly in the 
fact that attempts at creating a European identity often 
involved opposing Europe to the United States. This was 
most clearly expressed in French policy, but it did also 
find expression in the European project overall. At the 
same time, and to a large extent in conflict with their 
quest for independence, the Europeans continued to
^For full text see NATO Facts and Figures, op. cit.
pp.405-7.
89Nuttall, 1992, op. cit. p.284.
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emphasise the importance of the United States' commitment 
to the defence of Europe. This was clearly illustrated by 
the Copenhagen declaration which stresses both European 
dependence on the US nuclear umbrella and the ambition of 
an "independent" Europe. Rummel has also pointed to this 
ambiguity:
"To the extent that EPC has dealt with NATO-related 
matters in recent years, its members have begun - not 
totally unwillingly - to form a political 'block' in 
the Western Alliance. This has caused some irritation 
in Washington. . . . the situation is somewhat 
ambivalent: when American views diverge, the
Europeans follow their own path; yet even at the same 
time, it continues to be a matter of survival for the 
Europeans that NATO should not be fundamentally 
questioned. "90
On the American side, contradictions were equally 
flourishing. Hence, the United States traditionally 
supported the creation of a European framework and 
occasionally also complained about an absence of a 
"European pillar" inside the Atlantic Alliance. At the same 
time the United States refused to relinquish the control 
of NATO policy and wished the Europeans to comply with 
American decisions. Stanley Hoffmann has argued that there 
is a vicious circle in the alliance, according to which the 
United States tended to act unilaterally, or to assume the 
monopoly in the political sphere, whereas the West 
Europeans restricted themselves to complaints and 
essentially negative reactions without taking any positive
90Rummel, 1988, op. cit. 122.
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action themselves.91 These difficulties with the links and 
contradictions inside the alliance in the late 1970s and 
the early 1980s, were often referred to in the academic 
literature on NATO at the time.92 They were also stressed 
by practitioners. Sir Clive Rose, British ambassador to 
NATO during the Polish crisis, for example, called for 
improvements in the relations between EPC and the Atlantic 
alliance.93
Finally, two points before concluding. Firstly, it must be 
underlined that this section has focused chiefly on the 
institutional issues related to United States-EPC 
relations. As the next chapters will indicate, what made 
the situation particularly difficult in the late 1970s was 
that these structural problems were further strengthened 
by political disagreements between the allies.94 As long
91Stanley Hoffmann, La nouvelle guerre froide, Paris, 
Berger-Levrault, 1983, p. 227.
92Raymond Aron, "La Communaute Atlantique, 1949-1982", 
Politique Etranqere. 1983, pp.827-839; Pierre Melandri, 
"L1Alliance Atlantique: incertitudes strategiques,
incertitudes diplomatiques", Relations Internationales, no. 
36, hiver 1983, pp.395-413; Josef Joffe, The limited 
partnership, Cambridge, Mass. Ballinger Publishing Company, 
1987; Stephen Gill (ed), Atlantic Relations, New York, St. 
Martin's Press, 1989; Gregory F. Treverton, Making the 
Alliance Work, London, Macmillan, 1985.
93Rose, op. cit. See also Lord Carrington, "Lack of 
consistent political strategy: a cause of friction", NATO 
Review, vol. 31, 1983, no. ,pp.1-17.
94For this see also Stanley Sloan, "Crisis in NATO: a 
problem of leadership?", NATO Review, no.3, 1982 pp.13-19; 
Josef Joffe, "European-American relations: the enduring
crisis", Foreign Affairs, vol 59, no 4, 1981, pp.835-852; 
Pierre Hassner, "The shifting foundation", Foreign Policy, 
Fall 1982, pp 13-20.
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as transatlantic disagreements persisted, these were likely
to reinforce solidarity and commitment to European
Political Cooperation. Hence, the institutional
fragmentation and the political disagreements could
mutually reinforce each other. This might create a vicious
circle, in which the existence of a European framework in
itself was a sign of disenchantment with the Atlantic
framework, and that this institutional fragmentation in
turn would contribute to strengthen transatlantic
disagreements. On the other hand, the opposite possibility
must not be neglected: institutional diversity provided
alternative agencies for coordination. By giving a larger
amount of flexibility and providing alternative agencies
for coordination, it could calm political disagreements.
As Hill has argued,
11 ... the very parallelism of national foreign
policies, European foreign policies, and global 
organisations provides a continual choice of 
strategies and methods for the Community partners. 
They will have to decide whether or not, as a matter 
of principle, to go for a common European position at 
the outset of any given international issue, or 
whether to take each as it comes so that alignments 
are dictated more by the 'merits' of the problem than 
by the demands of any particular solidarity."95
This might be particularly true in situations such as the 
Polish crisis which, because it raised economic and 
political issues as well as military ones, did not fall 
exclusively within the sphere of interest of NATO, or in 
situations where there was transatlantic disagreement over 
how to respond.
95Hill, 1982, op. cit, p. 57-8.
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Before concluding the chapter looks briefly at the 
activities of the G7 group, which was seen by some as a 
possible solution to some of the difficulties of the 
existing Western institutional framework in the late 1970s.
Summit meetings. The mirage of a new institutional order?
The creation of the G7 group may be interpreted on the one 
hand as a symptom of the structural changes in the Western 
alliance and of changes in the types of problems that the 
Western states were facing in their relations with each 
other in the 1970s, and, on the other hand, as an attempt 
to seek new solutions to deal with the new context. The 
need for new forms of Western cooperation were also 
pronounced by academic studies in this period.96 Putnam 
and Bayne argue that the G7 summits of the most 
industrialised nations showed a potential for effective 
action in the area of East West relations that no other 
international body could match.97 Its advantages over 
NATO, COCOM and, to some extent, also the European 
Community and European Political Cooperation, were two­
fold. Firstly, its very structure provided for a discussion 
of economic, political, as well as security matters.
96Kaiser et. al. op. cit.; "Summit meetings and 
collective leadership in the 1980s", The Atlantic Council 
of the United States, Working Group on Political Affairs, 
1980.
97Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, Hanging Together: 
Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits. 
London, Sage Publications Ltd, 1987.
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Secondly, difficult issues could be solved immediately 
because of the presence of the highest political authority 
from each state and did not need clearing from elsewhere 
before being implemented. However, G7 never wholly 
exploited this potential.
Broadly speaking, the summit-meetings were supposed to be 
a "private and personal event", giving the political 
leaders the opportunity to exchange views freely on matters 
concerning them all.98 There was, however, some 
disagreement as to the amount of organisation that should 
be put into the summit, to what extent the agenda should 
be prepared beforehand and to what extent the national 
bureaucracies ought to be involved in the process, as 
opposed to maintaining its characteristics as a summit 
regarding only the top level politicians. The Europeans 
tended to favour the informal, occasional summit, whereas 
the United States wished to establish the summit as a 
decision-making institution with its own preparatory and 
follow-up apparatus. The two first summits, at Rambouillet 
in 1975 and Puerto Rico in 1976 kept to a fairly 
spontaneous formula. With time, the summits became more 
institutionalised. More time was given to preparation by 
the summit leaders' personal representatives ('sherpas') 
and to following up the decisions. At a national level, 
most often a summit 'team' or 'task force' was established 
under the direction of the personal representative to the
98Putnam and Bayne, op. cit, p. 35.
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summit. Also, making the informal character of the summits
more difficult to r maintain, tvyo new participants, the
European Commission and Canada, were added to the original 
99six.
Five topics were regularly discussed at the summits:
macroeconomics, monetary issues, trade, energy and North-
r
South relations. They were, in other words, chiefly devoted 
to economic issues and, what is more, often "internal'1, 
Western economic issues. Foreign policy questions had 
always been discussed on an informal basis at the margins 
of the summit, but were only gradually, and with much
resistance from some states, introduced onto the official
f
agenda. The French, in particular, resisted the formal 
introduction of international political issues. They wished 
that such matters be discussed in a smaller grouping than 
what G7 had become. Two reasons in particular contributed 
to the introduction of political issues to the summit 
agenda proper. One was the deterioration of East West 
relations, the other was the reaction to the Guadeloupe 
meeting, where France, Britain, West Germany and the United 
States in January 1979 discussed the problem of the Euro- 
missiles. Its taking place caused protest from those not 
included at the meeting, ie. Japan, Italy and Canada, and 
led them to press for the inclusion of international 
political issues in the official agenda of the G7 summits.
"The original participants were France, the United 
States, Italy, Great Britain and Japan.
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With Canada as the host to the next summit, in Ottawa in 
1981, foreign policy issues were put on the agenda.100 Two 
themes were featured in these political discussions at the 
G7 summits: East West relations and terrorism. In addition, 
the summits dealt with international crises that had 
erupted in the period just before its meeting. This, 
however, was only meant to be short-term.
But even though non-economic issues took up more of the 
time at G7 summits from 1979,
"their handling was erratic and unpredictable. The 
foreign policy preparations never became as thorough 
as the work of the sherpas and were described at the 
time of the Venice summit (22-3 June 1980) as 
'furtive and improvised'. This ...would become a 
drawback should the leaders wish to have a more 
profound discussion of a complex and sensitive 
subject and to give public expression to any
consensus which they might reach."101
To a large extent, Putnam and Bayne blame the lack of
apparatus to prepare for these discussions for inhibiting 
in-depth discussions on international political issues.102
Despite the attempts at strengthening the role of G7 in 
coordinating Western policies, and despite its potential 
for overcoming the problem of fragmentation between
100Putnam and Bayne, op. cit, p. 102.
101Putnam and Bayne, op. cit., p. 106.
102Putnam and Bayne, op. cit. p. 245.
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economic, political and security issues, G7 could hardly 
be more than the tip of the iceberg of Western 
coordination. Most importantly for the purpose of this 
thesis, there is little to support the idea that it could 
play a decisive role in organising the Western response to 
a crisis in Eastern Europe.
Conclusions
The chapter has found four principal weaknesses in the 
Western institutional framework.
The first weakness is related to the coexistence of several 
separate institutional networks within the overall Western 
alliance. These institutional networks were to a large 
extent compartmentalised and had few links between them. 
Each institutional framework was specialised to deal with 
specific issue areas. NATO and CoCom have concerned 
themselves primarily with the security aspects of relations 
with Eastern Europe, while the European Community and 
European Political Cooperation have focused on trade 
relations and political/diplomatic exchanges. There was no 
overall institutional framework available to deal with all 
economic, political as well as security aspects of a 
particular crisis and ensure a coherent response in all 
these areas taken together. Closest to providing an 
overarching framework is NATO, yet its ability to
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effectively coordinate political, and even more so, 
economic, issues is questioned.
A further problem related to Western institutional
multiplicity is the existence of competing Atlantic and
European "identities" which are potentially damaging to
Western cohesion and to the ability of Western states to
coordinate policies. As William Wallace has argued, the
setting up of EPC had brought the foreign ministries of
France, West Germany and Britain closer together:
"The pattern of relations which obtained between the 
three capitals [Paris, Bonn and London] by the end 
of the 1970s was thus very different from that which 
had obtained some 20 years before. Working relations 
between the three foreign ministries were now 
extremely close...Bilateral summits between London 
and Bonn, and London and Paris, supplementing the 
well established link between Paris and Bonn, had 
intensified bilateral contacts between diplomats at 
lower levels; ... The three Foreign Ministers, their 
political directors and other senior officials saw 
each other almost every week, in the context of EC 
Council meetings, Political Cooperation meetings, 
bilateral summits, four power conversations on Berlin 
(which provided convenient cover for discussing wider 
issues with the Americans on a confidential basis), 
seven-power summits, and so on."103
This new closeness was to some extent perceived by the 
United States as a threat to Atlantic solidarity. 
Paradoxically, the US did, at the same time, express 
support for European integration. The creation and 
strengthening of European Political Cooperation also had 
the capacity for reinforcing already existing 
contradictions inside the Atlantic Alliance and thus for
103William Wallace, in Morgan and Bray, op. cit., p.
219.
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making effective Transatlantic coordination more difficult. 
Finally, because of the institutional multiplicity, there 
was a potential for an overlap between the activities of 
EPC, the European Community and NATO in the political 
sphere, although on East-West relations this kind of 
conflict was normally avoided by EPC taking a back seat and 
declining to deal with security issues. On the other hand, 
the coexistence of multiple institutional frameworks could 
also provide room for more flexibility for Western states 
in their efforts to coordinate policies with each other. 
Likewise, institutional overlaps could, in principle, be 
favourable in the sense that by linking together a larger 
number of states, it might further reduce inter-state 
tensions and ensure a more comprehensive policy.
The second set of problems, or weaknesses, arises in the 
particular context where states have to move beyond 
consulting with each other and provide rapid concrete 
responses, perhaps even ensure common action. Although the 
Western institutional framework provides ample 
opportunities for consultation between interested states 
on almost any foreign policy issue, it does not always 
provide a suitable basis for common action. This problem 
becomes even more acute in a situations of crisis, which 
requires states to react rapidly. The EPC crisis mechanism 
was the closest Western institutions came to established 
procedures for dealing with a crisis situation in the early 
1980s. NATO crisis mechanisms are geared towards military
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crises that represent a threat to the territory of member 
states, and are not particularly useful in other contexts. 
Indeed, the chapter found that NATO did not have the proper 
apparatus to coordinate a political response to the
interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Much of this 
problem inevitably stems from the intergovernmental nature 
of all Western institutions, with the exception of the EC 
proper. Essentially, the decision to act in a crisis
situation rests with national governments. In addition, in 
the case of NATO, its ability to coordinate political 
issues in a situation of crisis is hampered by an unwieldy 
bureaucracy. The NATO machinery works on the gradual 
building of a political consensus, and in a situation of 
crisis, this is not enough.
Thirdly, the system as a whole was beginning to show signs 
of age. Structural changes, such as the general 
strengthening of Western Europe, both economically and
politically, had neither led to equal adjustments at the 
institutional level, nor significantly transformed the
'transatlantic bargain' of the immediate post-war period. 
NATO remained essentially a hegemonic alliance. It depends, 
for its complex machinery to work efficiently, on US 
leadership. One of the difficulties in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s was that the legitimacy of US leadership, as 
well as the way in which the United States chose to 
exercise it, was questioned. As a result, the Atlantic
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alliance risked, at best, grinding to a halt, at worst 
breaking down altogether.
Fourthly, although each agency has dealt with some aspect 
of the West's relations with the region, Eastern Europe has 
been a chief objective for none. There were no provisions 
specifically for coordinating policies towards Eastern 
Europe in any of the Western institutional frameworks. 
Indeed, the Harmel report of 1967, opening up for detente 
in East-West relations, encouraged individual national 
approaches to Eastern Europe. In the case of NATO this 
stems from the fact that, during the Cold War, Eastern 
Europe held a peculiar position in Western strategic 
thinking. As chapter two pointed out, Eastern Europe was 
central to Western strategic concerns, yet, politically out 
of reach, and as such marginalised from intra-Western 
discussions. This absence of any tradition or established 
procedures for dealing specifically with Eastern Europe 
inside the Western institutional framework promised to 
increase the difficulties of coordinated action.
Finally, it must be stressed that the Western institutions 
provided the framework within which the Western states 
could coordinate their policies. But political factors, and 
the political commitment to coordination, must also be 
taken into consideration in order to understand why 
coordination succeeds or fails. Indeed, the difficulties 
in the Western alliance were not only the result of
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institutional weaknesses and changes in the distribution 
of power and influence between Western Europe and the 
United States. There were also individual issues and 
specific political differences, in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, which made the situation in the Alliance more tense.
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CHAPTER FOUR, DEVELOPMENT OF A CRISIS IN POLAND (JUNE-
DECEMBER 1980)
Introduction
The following chapter is the first of three, examining the 
process of coordinating the response of the Western allies to 
events in Poland, from the summer of 1980 and into 1983. The 
three chapters evaluate whether or not the Western states 
succeeded in presenting an active and cohesive policy in 
response to the Polish crisis, define how these policies were 
coordinated and identify any difficulties encountered in the 
process. They do not aim to assess the value of Western 
policies in terms of their effect on the situation in Poland 
or on the behaviour of the Soviet Union. In so far as the 
"value" of the policy is discussed, it is from the point of 
view of establishing whether or not cohesion was maintained 
amongst the Western allies. If there was cohesion, the policy 
will, from this perspective, be characterised as 
"successful".
It is argued that the attempt to establish a common policy 
presented the Western allies with serious difficulties. 
Nonetheless, until the imposition of martial law on December 
13 1981, coordination was relatively successful. After this 
event, the difficulties of coordination increased
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considerably, and led, by the summer of 1982, to one of the 
most serious crises in the history of the Western alliance.
The three chapters are divided chronologically. Chapter four 
looks at the crisis from the beginning of the strikes in 
Poland in the summer of 1980 until December 1980, when the 
Warsaw Pact intensified its campaign to prevent further 
political changes in Poland. It was a phase during which the 
West considered the crisis to be chiefly domestic and 
hopefully containable within Poland. Chapter five examines 
the period from December 1980 to the imposition of martial 
law in Poland on December 13, 1981. During this phase, the 
domestic Polish crisis spilt over into East-West relations. 
The Western alliance focused its attention increasingly on 
the threat of a Soviet intervention, and coordinated its 
response accordingly. Finally, chapter six looks at Western 
reactions to the imposition of martial law. It was at this 
point that the Western states found it most difficult to 
present a common front, and a crisis developed inside the 
Western camp.
This chapter examines the nature and origins of the crisis in 
Poland, and maps out the different issues it raised for the 
Western alliance. It also raised the question of whether or 
not the Polish crisis should be considered a foreign policy 
crisis for the West. The outbreak of strikes in Poland, and
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the subsequent establishment of the independent trades union, 
Solidarity, represented a severe blow to the Polish regime. 
As a workers' movement, Solidarity challenged the essence of 
Polish official ideology. There was also a risk of the crisis 
spreading to the rest of the Warsaw Pact and destabilising 
the Soviet bloc. According to Norman Davies:
"...the ramifications of the Polish crisis reach[ed]
into all the current problem of the USSR".1
It is suggested here that, partly as a result of a decade of 
detente, the domestic Polish crisis raised issues of an 
economic and political character for the Western states in 
addition to the traditional military/security issues. It is 
also argued that, although analytically separate from the 
problem of coordination, the complexity of these issues made 
coordination amongst the Western allies more difficult.
The Polish crisis emerged at a time when it was almost 
fashionable to talk about a "crisis" in NATO, and perhaps 
even the end of the alliance. Central to Western disagreement 
was the issue of detente. The chapter discusses the 
significance of detente for the Western allies and suggests 
that, at the end of the 1970s, "detente" had become a 
disguise for a variety of different approaches to East-West 
relations. The Polish crisis hit at the heart of these
1Norman Davies,. Heart of Europe: A Short History of
Poland. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 433.
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Western divergences. What is more, after the failed attempt 
to act together over Afghanistan, the Western allies were 
under pressure to respond cohesively and efficiently to any 
future external crisis. Successful coordination was important 
for the continued credibility of the Alliance, not only in 
relation to the outside world, but also in relation to allied 
governments1 domestic constituencies, who were increasingly 
challenging the legitimacy of NATO. It should also, in 
principle, enhance the Western states' ability to promote 
their own values and objectives.2 It is suggested that 
cohesion was maintained amongst the Western allies by a form 
of "muddling through" policy, in which Western states shared 
information on events in Poland and consulted each other 
regularly, without moving to make concrete, coordinated 
policy-initiatives, because there was concern that attempts 
at doing so would be divisive.3
The chapter starts with a discussion of the domestic origins 
of the Polish crisis. The two subsequent sections discuss the 
main issues the strikes in Poland raised for the Western
2It could of course be argued that attempts at 
coordination in the absence of common interests is unwise. 
Yet, this thesis will suggest that in the Polish crisis, 
there were both conflicting and shared interests amongst the 
Western states and, furthermore, that it is possible for 
states to agree on specific joint policies even if their 
interests are not always converging.
3Charles Lindblom, "The science of muddling through", 
pp.79-88, Public Administration Review. American Society for 
Public Administration, Washington D.C., vol. 19, spring 1959.
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states. Finally, the last section examines the ways in which 
the Western states responded to these issues.
Origins of the crisis in Poland
The Polish crisis was triggered, in July 1980, by a 
government decision to increase the prices of meat. This 
decision led to spontaneous and uncoordinated strikes at 
individual factories throughout Poland. In the beginning, the 
strikes were not reported by the Polish press. Thus, 
officially, political and economic life took its normal path 
in Poland. As the strikes spread and the workers became more 
organised, the Polish authorities were gradually forced to 
recognise the situation. On July 16, railway workers on the 
railway line from Lublin to the Soviet border laid down their 
work. Two days later a Lublin strike committee was formed.4 
In an attempt to calm the workers, local agreements were 
made. However, this only encouraged workers in other areas to 
follow suit. On 6 August, BBC's East European correspondent, 
Tim Sebastian, reported that irreversible changes had taken 
place in Polish politics as a result of the strikers' 
actions:
4Kevin Ruane, The Polish Challenge. London, British 
Broadcasting Corporation, 1982, p. 5.
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"There's every indication that the current series of 
strikes in Poland has brought about a minor industrial 
revolution. Even Polish sources admit that the new 
unofficial wage-bargaining, the open discussion of 
stoppages in the censored press, the tacit admission 
that strikes are acceptable - all this is bound to cause 
irreversible changes in Polish life. As one official 
here put it: 'After the last few weeks, there is just no 
way things could ever be the same again.' For a country 
firmly anchored in the Soviet bloc, that is a remarkable 
admission, but it reflects both the extent of the 
changes that have taken place and the realisation that 
a new economic structure can no longer be ordered by 
ideological requirements, but by the genuine 
requirements of the people themselves."5
It was not the first time that the Poles had taken to strikes 
in order to manifest their dissatisfaction with the political 
and economic situation in their country. Strikes had last 
occurred in 1976, and had at that time led the Secretary 
General of the Polish Communist Party, Edward Gierek, to an 
immediate withdrawal of his decision to increase prices. 
Gierek himself had become Secretary General in 1970 after his 
predecessor Wladyslaw Gomulka was ousted from power as a 
result of popular unrest related to the country's economic 
situation. And Gomulka, in turn, had been brought back to 
power after the unrest in 1956, by the same party that had 
dismissed him in 1948, and presented to the country as the 
"national saviour".
According to Timothy Garton Ash and George Schopflin, the 
outbreak of strikes in the summer of 1980 should be
5Ibid. p.9.
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understood in the context of Polish politics in the 1970s.6 
Two factors are considered particularly important. Firstly, 
the visit of the Polish Pope to Poland in 1979, and secondly 
the failure of Gierek's reform policy. When Gierek came to 
power in 1971, he promised to make a "new Poland". This "new 
Poland" would be a country with a regime based on political 
consultation and communication. Moreover, it would be a 
prosperous regime, with a modern economy. The modernisation 
would take place with the help of Western credits, enabling 
Poland to buy Western technology. It has already been pointed 
out that Gierek came to power in a situation of social 
unrest. His predecessor, Gomulka, having increased the prices 
of food, faced rioting workers and was forced to resign. By 
abolishing the increase in prices and presenting a project 
for reform, Gierek had succeeded in bringing things, 
temporarily, back in control.
By re-establishing order and by making the workers go back to 
their jobs in return for the promise of a "brighter future", 
particularly a brighter economic future, Gierek was 
considered to have made a "contract" with Polish society. 
Social peace was bought off with the promise of economic 
progress:
6Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity 
1980-81, London, Jonathan Cape, 1983 and George Schopflin, 
Poland: A Society in Crisis. Conflict Studies. No 112, Oct.
1979. See also Schopflin's book, Politics in Eastern Europe/ 
Oxford, Blackwell, 1993.
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"Basically he proposed to win the support of the 
majority of the population by bringing them a steadily 
rising material standard of living, visible in the shops 
as consumer goods, on top of the traditional socialist 
advantages of full employment, social security and 
stable prices."7
But Western credits were either consumed or lost in a corrupt 
economic system. In addition, Western markets for Polish 
goods disappeared after the oil shock in 1973. By 1980,
Poland faced severe economic difficulties. Gierek's program 
for a new Poland had failed. It was again necessary to
increase prices, yet, by doing so, Gierek would breach his 
contract with society. In the meantime, since Gierek had come 
to power, the workers' attitudes had changed through two 
experiences. Firstly, in 1970, they had learned that they 
were capable of achieving concrete goals through strikes. In 
1970, the price increase was taken back, and the party leader 
was removed as a direct result of the workers' protest. 
Secondly, the visit of the Pope in 1979, had given society 
self-confidence as well as trust in their ability to act 
responsibly and in an organised fashion, independently of the 
Party:
"John Paul II left thousands of human beings with a new
self-respect and renewed faith, a nation with a
rekindled pride, and a society with a new consciousness 
of its own essential unity. ... The Pope's visit 
probably marks the point at which the subjective reality
7Garton Ash, 1983, op. cit, p. 14.
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of social/national unity overtook the objective reality 
of social division.... the form the explosion took in
1980 ... (this) follows from the mass experience of that
fantastic pilgrimage in June 1979. It is hard to 
conceive of Solidarity without the Polish Pope."8
In other words, the characteristics of Polish politics as
well as the behaviour of its population, had changed during
the 1970s. This helps to explain both the extent of support 
for the workers and the confidence and responsibility with 
which they acted in the crisis that developed over the summer 
of 1980.
On 14 August 1980 the workers in Gdansk set up an Inter- 
Factory Strike Committee (MKS) to coordinate the actions and
demands of the workers in striking enterprises. Three days
later the MKS presented 21 Demands to the Government. The 
main points of these demands were the right to free trades 
unions, independent of the Party and employers; the right to 
strike; respect for the freedom of speech, print and
publication; release of all political prisoners; restoration 
of former rights to people dismissed from work after the 
strikes of 1970 and 1976 and to students expelled from
universities because of their convictions.9 The government, 
for its part, seemed committed to the idea that the problem
8Garton Ash, 1983, op. cit. p. 29-30.
9Garton Ash, 1983, op. cit. pp. 42-43.
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should be solved peacefully. Gradually, step by step, it 
started giving in to the workers' demands. Its retreat ended 
spectacularly with the negotiations between MKS and the 
government's representative, Mieczyslaw Jagielski, in the 
strikers' headquarters, the Lenin Shipyard. After two weeks 
of intense bargaining the ambiguous Gdansk agreement was 
signed on 31 August 1980.10 It was on the basis of the 
interpretation of this document that the Polish crisis was to 
develop, both sides claiming their interpretation to be the 
correct one.
Throughout the crisis, the strikers were supported by the 
dissident organisation KOR (Committee for the Defence of the 
Workers). KOR was founded after the workers' protest in 1976, 
in order to help the strikers who had been arrested. It 
continued to provide legal and financial assistance, and to 
advise people who were victims of government repression. It 
was also in the role of advisor that KOR took part in events 
in Poland in the summer of 1980. KOR helped the workers to 
draft and present their demands. But even though this support 
from the intellectuals was vital, the Polish "revolution" 
remained in essence a grassroot movement. Its origins were to 
be found in the workers' spontaneous protest, and it was
10Aqence Europe Bulletin 1/2.9.80. The full text of the 
Gdansk agreement is reprinted in "Documentation. Crisis in 
Poland", Survival, vol XXIII, no. 5, Sept/Oct. 1981, pp. 225- 
231 .
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driven forward by these same people. In this respect it was 
different from the two other East European crises that it is 
often compared with, the Hungarian crisis of 1956 and the 
Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. On both those occasions the 
movement of protest started, and to a large extent remained, 
with the intellectuals. For this reason the Polish 
"revolution" was likely to be even more explosive, and even 
more damaging to the communist regime. It was the workers 
themselves, those who were supposed to be the backbone of the 
Party, who protested. This hit at the very heart of the 
communist party’s ideology and self-legitimation, and 
threatened to cause irreparable damage to its position in 
Poland, as well as to Soviet-Polish relations.11
It was difficult, even impossible, at the time of the signing 
of the Gdansk agreement to give an accurate interpretation of 
the nature of events in Poland, and thus also of their 
significance for the outside world. The questions as to "what 
and why" in Poland were more numerous than the answers. The 
main difficulty was knowing whether or not the process of 
reform, initiated by the Gdansk agreement, would succeed, and
11According to Jiri Valenta, the Polish crisis 
constituted a three-fold challenge to the Soviet Union: 
strategic, politico-ideological and economic. He argues that: 
"A truly successful workers' revolution, originating from 
below, is even more threatening to the USSR than were the 
Czech intellectual reforms of 1968". Jiri Valenta, "Soviet 
options in Poland", pp. 50-59 in Survival, vol XXIII, no 2, 
March/April 1981, quote on p. 51.
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a workable compromise, acceptable to Polish protesters as 
well as to Polish authorities, be established. The 
uncertainty was strengthened by the fact that it was not 
clear how far the workers would go with their demands; what 
was happening inside the black box of the Polish government; 
and whether or not both parties were willing to search for a 
compromise. The creation of Solidarity represented a severe 
blow to the Polish regime and to its ideology. By 
association, even if Poland's role in the Warsaw Pact had not 
been questioned so far, there was a risk of contagion to 
other East European states and to the Soviet Union. This 
raised the question of whether or not Poland's allies would 
accept the outcome of a possible domestic compromise: Would 
the existence of a trades union, independent of the communist 
party, in the long term be acceptable to the Soviet Union? 
Finally, if reforms succeeded, how would this affect the 
Warsaw Pact, and conversely, in case of a failure to achieve 
a compromise, what would the effects of this be on Poland, on 
the Warsaw Pact and thus on the security balance in Europe?
The two-edaed sword of the Polish crisis
The news of the strikers' achievements in Poland were 
acclaimed by all sides, to the left and to the right of the
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political scale, in the West. It was hailed as a victory for 
human rights and for the principles of liberal democracy.12 
The positive aspect of the crisis was underlined by the 
comments of Western leaders after the signing of the Gdansk 
agreement. The French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing 
talked of:
"...1'attention avec laquelle les evenements en Pologne 
sont suivis en France, et la sympathie qui acceuille 
toute initiative repondant aux aspirations du peuple 
polonais.1,13
The American President Jimmy Carter said:
"The working men and women of Poland have set an example 
for all of those who cherish freedom and human dignity. 
They have shown the world not just how to win a victory 
for labour, but that the hunger for human rights is 
everywhere. "14
The creation of Solidarity corresponded to the aspirations 
the West claimed to have for Eastern Europe. It was a 
compromise of the sort that Western states considered both
12For a typical comment see Financial Times, 5.9.80: "Few 
world events of recent years have given such widespread 
pleasure in Britain as the winning by the Polish workers of 
the right to organise independent trade unions." Also Le 
Monde, 2.9.180, The Times. 1.9.1980, The Guardian 1.9.1980.
13Le Monde, 29.8.1980. See also the statement from the 
French Foreign Minister, Jean Frangois-Poncet to the French 
National Assembly, Debats Parlementaires de l'Assemblee 
Nationale, Premiere Session Ordinaire de 1980-81, 12 novembre
1980, "Loi des finances, deuxieme partie, pour 1981". Journal 
Officiel, 13.11.1980, pp. 3773-4.
14The Daily Telegraph, 2.9.80.
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the most realistic and the most "suitable", in terms of the 
prospects for political change in the East European 
countries. It opened up for the possibility of a gradual 
evolution of a communist regime towards more freedom for its 
citizens. At the same time it indicated, if it were to 
succeed, a certain independence for the East European states, 
along the lines of the Sonnenfeldt doctrine, or the aims of 
the United States' policy of 'differentiation'.
But if Western leaders were enthusiastic about the turn of 
events in Poland, they were also very cautious. In late 
October Andre Fontaine, the editor of Le Monde, wrote:
"L'enjeu est immense: les Polonais que l'on peut
rencontrer ces jours-ci parlent ouvertement de derniere 
chance. Ils veulent dire derniere chance pour leur pays, 
qui serait voue, en cas d'echec, a redevenir un simple 
objet de la politique internationale. Mais ils 
pourraient aussi bien parler de derniere chance de la 
detente, et du derniere chance du socialisme, au moins 
au sens que les leninistes donnent a ce mot."15
This comment, although not from a governmental source, gives 
an indication of the prevalent "mood" in the West at the 
time.16 Events in Poland represented a threat to the 
legitimacy of the Polish regime. A failure to keep the 
situation under control would menace the stability of the
15Andre Fontaine "Derniere chance pour la Pologne", Le 
Monde 18.10 80.
16Fontaine is also author of Un Seul Lit Pour Deux Reves: 
Histoire de la Detente. Paris, Fayard, 1981 and is one of 
France's foremost experts on East-West relations.
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Soviet system, and in turn might affect stability in Europe. 
In this sense, the Polish crisis was a two-edged sword for 
the Western allies. The strikes in Poland were discussed by 
the Western allies for the first time in mid-September, on 
the occasion of the visit of the US Deputy Secretary of 
State, Warren Christopher, to Europe. The meeting was pre­
arranged and was supposed to concern the question of the 
Euromissiles. While Christopher was in Bonn, the issue of 
Poland was also discussed.17 The Polish issue had also been 
considered in the context of the European Community and 
European Political Cooperation in August, and again in 
Echternach, as well as on the return of Lord Carrington from 
his visit to Poland on November 4.18 Lord Carrington 
confirmed in late November that exchanges of views had taken 
place on the issue of Poland:
"We have discussed Poland on a number of occasions in
political cooperation [of the European Community]".19
From the beginning of the strikes in Poland, the Western 
allies1 embassies in Warsaw also arranged special meetings to
17Aqence Europe Bulletin, 15.9.80.
18Aqence Europe Bulletin, 27.10.80 and 4.11.80. The 
meeting in Echternach was an informal EPC meeting. No
declaration was adopted.
19Le Ouotidien de Paris, 27.11.80.
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exchange information and assess the situation as it
developed.20
Although the content of these consultations between the 
allies was kept largely unknown to the public, the fact that 
they took place indicates that Western states were concerned 
about the situation and its possible impact in the West.
Events in Poland raised a complex set of problems for the
Western states. Although they provoked concern about the risk 
of a military intervention in Poland, the strikes also raised 
economic issues for the Western states and presented Western 
governments with political dilemmas, such as the question of 
how to deal with Western public opinion. Most importantly, an 
event of this sort raised expectations of concerted action 
from the Western allies. It will be suggested in the
following that such concerted action was particularly 
difficult because of the complexity of the issues raised by 
the Polish crisis.
Economic implications of the strikes in Poland 
It has already been pointed out that an important element of 
Gierek's policy in the 1970s had been to finance the recovery 
of the Polish economy by taking up credits in the West.21
20Interview Oslo, December 1992.
21As a result of this Poland had for example become the 
Federal Republic’s most important East European trading 
partner. See Constanze Ketterer, German liberalism and
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Gierek's policy developed against the backdrop of the new 
climate of detente and a political willingness of Western 
states to engage in economic relations with East European 
countries. There was a surplus of capital on the world market 
and on the basis of the "umbrella theory" Poland was 
considered a trustworthy creditor because the Soviet Union 
and the CMEA were seen as ultimate guarantors of its debt:
"East European borrowers have an impeccable record for 
punctual payment of debt obligations. Even if temporary 
cash-flow problems do arise, it is assumed that the 
Comecon "umbrella" would be raised to shield Poland from 
a rain of writs. ... Belief in the Comecon umbrella is 
an act of faith for Western bankers."22
By 1979 it was clear that Gierek's economic policy had failed 
dramatically. The Polish economy had not been modernised, 
foreign credits had been used almost exclusively for 
consumption and the market for Polish goods in the West had 
disappeared after the oil crisis of 1973. In August 1980, it 
was reported that Poland would need an additional credit of 
$ 7.1 bn to service its hard currency debt for 1980.23 Part 
of this debt was to private creditors and part to governments 
or government backed creditors, but the distribution between 
the two was unclear. Poland's debt crisis was not in itself
foreign policy: the FDP's Ostpolitik under Hans Dietrich
Genscher, 1974-1990. PhD dissertation, London School of 
Economics, November 1994, p. 59.
22Financial Times. 27.8.80.
23Financial Times, 9.8.80.
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a new issue. Piecemeal re-financing of Poland's debt had
already started in 1 979.24 But Poland's economic situation
and its ability to repay its debt was seriously aggravated as
a result of the social unrest.25 Poland's major creditors in
1977 were France, Britain, Austria, West Germany, Japan and
the USA. The share of the United States increased after 1977
but West European banks were still more heavily exposed than
their US counterparts.26 It was not only the Western
financial sector that risked being affected by the crisis in
Poland. According to Richard Portes, the crisis would also
have an impact on East-West trade more generally:
"Simple miscalculations in managing an extremely tight 
convertible-currency debt and payments position could 
lead to default, ... The creditworthiness of other CMEA 
states would be affected, and East-West trade could 
suffer greatly." 27
24Richard Portes, The Polish Crisis: Western Economic
Policy Options, London, RIIA, January 1981, p. 9. Portes 
defines "refinancing" as the issuing of "new loans to pay off 
the maturing principal obligation on an old loan". 
"Rescheduling" is defined as "the stretching out of 
maturities on existing loans, postponing repayments of 
principal and sometimes interest."
25Poland's total hard currency debt was, at the end of 
1979, estimated at $ 19.4 bn. Poland was one of the first 
countries in the 1980s to encounter problems with large 
foreign debts. By the mid-1980s the Polish debt was to look 
small in comparison with that of Mexico and other Latin 
American states, yet, at the time, it was unusually high.
26Portes, op. cit. p. 27.
27Portes, op. cit. p. 2.
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The West Europeans had a much larger share of East-West trade 
than the United States. In fact, the United States' share of 
OECD exports to Eastern Europe was only 9%. The Federal 
Republic's share, including intra-German trade, was 25%. The 
US' share of imports from Eastern Europe was even lower, 
with only three percent. In 1980, 1.7% of US exports went to 
the CMEA states and 0.6% of its imports came from these 
states. This is what has led Woolcock to conclude that East- 
West trade was essentially a European affair:
"It would ... be more accurate to see East-West trade as
an essentially European affair, rather than to refer to
Western Europe having a greater stake in it".28
What this meant in terms of the Polish crisis was that the 
West Europeans were likely to feel its economic effects more 
strongly than their American ally. This was particularly the 
case with the Federal Republic. Trade with Eastern Europe had 
in the 1970s become an important instrument of the 
Ostpolitik.29 Indeed, from 1971 to 1981 both intra-German 
trade and West German trade with Eastern Europe had grown 
approximately by a factor of four.30 West Germany's share of
28Stephen Woolcock Western Policies on East-West Trade. 
The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 
Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1982, p. 16.
29For the economic dimension to the FRG's Ostpolitik, see 
Angela Stent, From Embargo to Ostpolitik, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1981.
30It was no doubt helped along by the fact that the 
beginning of Ostpolitik coincided with the Budapest 
declaration of 1968 of the Warsaw Pact, which favoured 
increased trade with the West. Woolcock, op. cit., p.51.
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Poland's trade with the West grew to over 30% in the short 
period from 1970 to 1974.31 By 1984, West Germany's balance 
of trade with Eastern Europe was DM 34 billion. Although West 
Germany's exports to Eastern Europe were less than five 
percent of its total exports, specific economic sectors 
relied quite heavily on trade with Eastern Europe,32 thus 
making West Germany's economy sensitive to fluctuations in 
East-West trade.33
France's trade relations with Eastern Europe in the 1970s 
were relatively limited.34 Its share in East-West trade was 
approximately the same as its share in world trade, whereas 
for West Germany it was higher. In 1978, 4.5% of French
exports went to Eastern Europe and 3% of its imports came 
from that region. However, as in the case of West Germany, if 
one looks at specific economic sectors, the picture becomes
31This was partly the result of a trade and cooperation 
agreement between Poland and West Germany which was 
negotiated in parallel to the negotiations on the Warsaw 
Treaty between the two states. For this, see chapter two.
32These included some basic chemical products, 
intermediate metal products and machine tools.
33Woolcock, op. cit. pp.16-22 and Josef Joffe, "The view 
from Bonn: the tacit alliance", pp. 129-188 in Lincoln Gordon 
(ed), Eroding Empire: Western Relations With Eastern Europe, 
Washington DC, The Brookings Institutions, 1987, p.154.
^The following is based chiefly on Thomas Schreiber, Les 
Relations de la France avec les pays de l'Est (1944-1980) 
Annexe, "Les echanges commerciales de la France avec les pays 
de l'Est", pp. 93-101, La Documentation Frangaise, 30 Avril
1980.
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slightly different. In 1976-7, 13% of French exports in non­
electric machinery, 10% of steel and iron exports, 6% of 
exports in chemical products and 1 4% of paper exports went to 
Eastern Europe. Also, since the mid 1970s, the increase in 
exports to Eastern Europe had compensated for the stagnation 
of French exports towards the Western world. Without exports 
towards Eastern Europe, the French trade deficit would have 
been twice as high. Poland was France's second largest 
trading partner in the CMEA, following the Soviet Union.35
British trade relations with the Soviet bloc were less
important than those of France and Germany:
"...the economic links between Great Britain and the 
Eastern bloc ... are [not] important enough to have 
significant consequences, still less are they capable of 
changing East-West political structures."36
To take only the issue of trade with the Soviet Union, the 
British share of Soviet trade with OECD fell from 14% in 1970 
to just over 3.5% in 1982. West Germany's and France's share
35For an overview of French trade relations with Poland 
see, Assemblee Nationale, Premiere Session Ordinaire de 1979- 
1980, Rapport d 'information, no. 1520, 20.12.1979.
36Michael Clarke, "The debate on European security in the 
United Kingdom", pp. 121-140 in Ole Waever, Pierre Lemaitre 
and Elzbieta Tromer (eds), European Polyphony: Perspectives 
Beyond East-West Confrontation. London, Macmillan, 1989, 
p.130.
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of trade during the same period increased by a factor of 
five.37
Because of the increase in trade and financial relations 
between East and West in Europe in the 1970s, the strikes in 
Poland had economic consequences also for Western states. 
These consequences were not, however, evenly distributed 
amongst Western states. The West Europeans, and France and 
West Germany in particular, were more closely involved in 
economic exchanges with Poland, and thus more sensitive to 
the economic consequences of the crisis. This in turn 
promised to raise difficulties for Western coordination.
37Curtis Keeble, "The development of the relationship 
between the United Kingdom and the USSR", Appendix A, Part 
IV, "Trade relations", para 4.2. Second Report from the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, 1985-86, UK-Soviet Relations. Vol.
1, HC 28-1, HMSO, pp.lxxxc-cii. Two reasons are often put 
forward in order to explain the limited British trade with 
Eastern Europe: firstly, that in Britain trade was to a large 
extent subordinated to security interests and secondly, that 
the British government did not offer the same political and 
financial support to trade with the Soviet bloc as the other 
European countries. Yet, these can only be partial 
explanations. When, in 1975, in the context of the signing of 
an Anglo-Soviet Protocol on political consultation, the 
British Prime Minister Harold Wilson signed a long term 
credit agreement with the Soviet Union, only a small part of 
the credit was used. Furthermore, the areas covered by the 
COCOM rules represented only about five percent of trading 
potential with the Soviet Union. See Clarke in Waever, op. 
cit; Edwina Moreton, "The view from London", pp. 232-269 in 
Gordon, op. cit; Margot Light, "Anglo-Soviet relations: 
political and diplomatic", pp.120-146 in Alex Pravda and 
Peter Duncan, Soviet-British relations since the 1970s. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
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Polish strikers and Western political dilemmas
Events in Poland also presented Western governments with 
broader political dilemmas. They raised a moral or human 
dimension that went beyond the general sympathy usually 
expressed towards foreign countries in difficulties. Chapter 
two stressed the importance of the "myth of Yalta", 
symbolising the failure of the West to prevent the division 
of Europe, in Western policies towards Eastern Europe. It 
also argued that, with the onset of the Cold War, Western 
states continued, in principle, to support political change 
in Eastern Europe, although they could not be seen to 
interfere directly in the domestic affairs of East European 
states. Moreover, although political change in Eastern Europe 
was desirable in principle, it was perceived to entail risks 
for Western security, thus further limiting Western 
willingness to get involved in the political affairs of 
Eastern Europe.38
At the time of the strikes in Poland, these dilemmas in 
Western policies had been reinforced by a decade of East-West
^Sir Julian Bullard, Political Director at the Foreign 
Office at the time of the Polish crisis has argued that: "As 
the internal crisis in Poland built up during the summer of 
1980, the Nine were torn between a feeling that ’We cannot 
remain silent1 and a natural caution in the face of a 
situation so fraught with dangers.", in "European Political 
Cooperation 1970-1990: a tale of two decades", pp. 31-44 in 
Power and Plenty? From the Internal Market to Political and 
Security Cooperation in Europe, Jean Monnet Chair Papers, The 
European Policy Unit at the European University Institute, 
Florence, 1991, quote on p. 36.
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detente. Detente had driven some practical wedges into East- 
West divisions and encouraged the notion that, although part 
of the Soviet sphere of influence, Eastern Europe was no 
longer entirely out of reach politically. The signing of the 
Helsinki accords, for example, had brought political issues 
and human rights onto the East-West agenda. Detente had not 
only increased economic interaction, but also personal and 
cultural exchanges between East and West, as freedom of 
movement was relaxed between the two blocs in Europe. The 
changes brought about by detente did not amount to a military 
commitment of the West to Poland. Neither did they guarantee 
the West's ability to prevent a crackdown in Poland, but, 
they did make it more difficult for Western governments to 
stand idly by and do nothing about events in Poland.
It must be added that the economic, political and security 
issues raised as a result of the crisis did not necessarily 
point in the same direction. Arguably, Western governments 
(some perhaps more than others) had an even stronger vested 
interest in the continued maintenance of stability in Poland, 
not only in security terms, but for economic and political 
reasons. The Polish leader, Edward Gierek, was generally 
considered a liberal and trustworthy leader by Western 
governments. Chapter two pointed out that Giscard, for 
example, underlined his close relations with Gierek:
"Nous nous connaissions suffisamment pour situer nos
convictions et nos cultures respectives, sans avoir
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1'illusion de les influencer l'un chez 1'autre, mais 
nous avions la possibility de parler de systeme a 
systeme, de puissance a puissance, sans proces 
d'intention et sans aggression verbale, ce qui nous 
permettait d'acquerir une meilleure connaissance du 
point de vue adverse et de 1' apergevoir, en quelque 
sorte, de 1' interieur" .39
Poland had also been one of the main targets of the United 
States' policy of differentiation. For West Germany, detente 
had allowed for the return of ethnic Germans from Poland, as 
well as for the improvement of the freedom of movement for 
East and West Germans. Nonetheless, Western states were also 
committed to political change in Poland.
Events in Poland also presented Western governments with the 
possibility of a strong reaction from their own domestic 
population in case they where not seen as supportive enough 
of reforms in Poland. This phenomenon is recognised by 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to president 
Carter:
"In the afternoon meeting with Ambassador [Peter] Hermes 
of [West] Germany. He maintains that the Germans would 
adopt economic sanctions against the Soviets if the 
Soviets invade Poland. He says public opinion pressures 
would push them that way. I hope he is right because the 
official position is much more reticent".40
39Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Le Pouvoir et la Vie. Paris, 
Compagnie 12, 1988, p. 169.
40Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Documentation. White House 
Diary", pp. 32-48 in Orbis, Vol. 32, No. 1, Winter 1988, p. 
37.
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France and the United States, hosted a large number of Polish 
immigrants, thus reinforcing the interest in events in Poland 
at the level of society.41 Western trade unions also took an 
active interest in the Polish crisis. In fact, in the first 
phase of the crisis, while public opinion reactions at large 
were limited, the trade unions called for increased 
government action. First out was the American trade union 
AFL-CIO, which created a special assistance fund to help 
Polish workers financially.42 It was more open in its support 
for the Polish workers than the US government, and less 
concerned about being accused of interfering in Poland's 
domestic affairs. The United States' government did not 
approve of this financial aid, and was reported to have 
advised the trades unions not to go through with it. This
41The Polish-Americans are one of the largest ethnic 
groups in the United States, with an estimated 5.1 million 
Americans of Polish heritage in 1972. The Polish-American 
Congress was founded in 1944, with the aim of ensuring Polish 
independence in Europe. By coincidence, two leading policy­
makers in Carter's administration (Secretary of State Edmund 
Muskie and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski) 
happened to be of Polish origins. "Poles", Harvard 
Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MASS, 1980, pp. 787-803. For press coverage 
of the Polish-American links and the strikes in Poland see Le 
Monde 24.8.1980. Research does not confirm that the Poles 
constituted an irresistible pressure group for US foreign 
policy although their presence no doubt enhanced domestic 
interest in events in Poland. See Stephen Garrett, "Eastern 
European ethnic groups and American foreign policy", pp. 301- 
327 in Political Science Quarterly, no. 3., vol. 93., 1978. 
He argues that "...Americans of East European ethnic origins 
have not in fact had much influence on American diplomacy 
toward Eastern Europe." p. 321.
42Aqence Europe Bulletin, 6.9.80.
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action from the American government came after a complaint by 
the Polish government about the news of economic aid from 
A.F.L.-C.I. 0.43 European trades unions were also largely 
supporting the Polish workers both at a national and a 
European level. The attitude of the British TUC was the 
exception that confirmed the rule. Indeed the TUC provoked 
large scale public anger in Britain by refusing to cancel an 
official visit to the official Polish trades union after the 
creation of Solidarity. After a month of heated debate in the 
British press, the visit was finally cancelled on the 
initiative of the Poles.44 Apart from this, European trades 
unions sympathised with the Poles. Jon Ivar Nalsund, Deputy 
Secretary General of the ESC in a letter to the Presidents of 
the Council and of the Commission of the European Community, 
called for a coordinated European economic policy to assist 
Poland. The trades unions saw a direct link between the 
economic situation in Poland and the promotion of the right 
to free expression and to organise freely. Thus, by 
contributing to the creation of stable economic conditions in
43New York Times, 12.9.80 and 10.9.80.
^Britain was in the paradoxical situation during the 
Polish crisis of having, on the one hand, a government that 
defended the right to free trade unions in Poland, while 
seeking to crush them at home, and on the other hand, 
national trade unions fighting for their own survival, while 
at the same time remaining, for some time into the Polish 
crisis, reluctant to abandon support for the official trades 
unions in Poland. See The Times, 20.8.1980 and 6.9.80.
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Poland, they argued, the West would also contribute to 
securing the rights of the workers.45
There was a difference in the approach of the European and 
the American trades unions. The former had a greater trust in 
the Polish regime’s ability and willingness to reform the 
structures of Polish government, whereas the latter were 
giving their support directly to the workers.46 This is a 
distinction that was to become recognisable later in the 
crisis also at governmental level, in particular if one 
compares the attitude of the government of the Federal 
Republic with that of the United States. The target of West 
German policy was primarily the Polish government, which was 
still considered trustworthy and able, and not Polish 
society. The American government, on the other hand, was, 
later in the crisis, to shift its emphasis away from 
supporting the Polish government and towards supporting 
society as a separate entity. For the time being, however, 
these differences were not so obvious.
This section has argued that the strikes in Poland did not 
present themselves exclusively in terms of security, but 
raised a more complex set of economic as well as political 
issues for the Western states. The next section argues that
45Aqence Europe Bulletin. 14.11.80.
46As chapter two has argued, this reflects a long­
standing debate in Western states on how to deal with Eastern 
Europe.
the nature of these issues would make coordination more 
difficult for the Western allies, and that coordination would 
be further complicated by the growing tension within the 
Western camp over the continuation of detente. Events in 
Poland threatened to play directly into these existing 
transatlantic disagreements and to continue to undermine 
confidence in the Alliance.
The necessity and risks of a coordinated response
The strikes in Poland started at a time of general 
deterioration in East-West relations, as well as intra­
alliance relations. There was a strong feeling, in particular 
in the United States, that the Soviet Union had not played 
according to the rules of detente, that it had in fact been 
a "one-way street" which had only benefited the Soviet Union. 
The United States' disillusionment with the achievements of 
detente were mainly a result of Soviet activities in the 
third world.47 It received a final blow with the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979.48 The
47For an account of the Soviet Union's policy in the 
Third World in the 1970s, see Helene Carrere d'Encausse Ni 
Paix ni Guerre. France, Flammarion, 1986 and Fred Halliday, 
The Making of the Second Cold War, London, Verso, 1989.
^"The Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan a 
fortnight later, on 27 December 1979, which followed by a few 
weeks the humiliating occupation by Islamic radicals of the 
United States embassy in Teheran, precipitated a drastic and 
rapid deterioration of East-West relations. The Soviet action 
appeared to be taken in violation of the explicit and
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importance of Afghanistan for Carter's perception of the 
Soviet Union was underlined in his interview with ABC news on 
31 December 1979. During the interview he famously stated 
that:
"...this action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic 
change in my own opinion of what the Soviets1 ultimate 
goals are than anything they have done in the previous 
time I have been in office."49
After Afghanistan, the American government turned its back on 
the detente as an approach to East-West relations and called 
for a more confrontational approach to the Soviet Union.50
implicit rules of conduct agreed to in the June 1972 Nixon- 
Brezhnev understanding which was intended to distinguish 
between tolerable meddling and unacceptable expansion in the 
Third World." Carl-Christoph Schweitzer (ed) The Changing 
Western Analysis of the Soviet Threat, London, Pinter 
Publishers, 1990, p. 40.
49Excerpts of the interview are published in 
"Documentation. Crisis in Afghanistan. Interview with 
President Carter, 31 December 1979" Survival, vol XXII, no 2, 
March/April 1980, p. 68.
50US sanctions after Afghanistan included deferring the 
ratification of the SALT I treaty; limiting sales of high 
technology and strategic items to the USSR; embargo on 
delivery of 17 million tons of grain ordered by the USSR; and 
a boycott of the Olympic games in Moscow in 1980. See 
"Statement by President Carter, 4 January 1980", Survival. 
vol XXII, no 4 , July-August 1980, pp. 66-68. For an
assessment of the impact of Afghanistan on superpower 
relations, see William E. Griffith, "Superpower relations 
after Afghanistan", pp. 146-151; and Zalmay Khalilzad, 
"Afghanistan and the crisis in American Foreign Policy", pp. 
151-159, in Survival, vol. XXII. no 4, July/August 1980.
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The Europeans had benefitted more from detente than the
United States and were reluctant to follow the American lead
in abandoning it.51 As Sloan has argued:
"Europe has gained far more in tangible benefits, some 
of utmost importance, than has the United States from 
the period of detente. This fact makes Europeans more 
inclined to regard detente as 'divisible1, and want to 
protect the gains of detente for Europe. The United 
States, carrying the majority of Western global military 
burdens, has much greater interest in treating detente 
as 'indivisible1, with Soviet actions outside Europe 
seen as providing cause for Western responses within the 
European framework."52
The West Europeans considered their security to be based 
chiefly on the political and military balance in Europe. They 
did not consider the "global balance" that the Americans saw 
threatened, to be as important as it was in American eyes. 
Soviet activities in the Third World did not in their eyes 
constitute a security threat to Europe. The West Europeans
also disagreed with the US administration's analysis of the
wider implications of Afghanistan for the East-West balance:
"In the American view, Afghanistan could be a starting 
point for Soviet domination of the Persian Gulf;...Most 
European governments... refused to share this analysis. 
They were less concerned with the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan than fearing that the American reaction to
51See for example the French government's refusal to 
boycott the Olympic games in Moscow. Debats Parlementaires de 
l'Assemblee Nationale, seconde session ordinaire de 1979- 
1980, "Questions au Gouvernement", 28 mai 1980, Journal
Officiel, 29.5.1980, pp. 1334-1342.
52Stanley Sloan "Crisis in NATO: A Problem of
Leadership?" NATO Review no. 3, 1982, p. 15. See also his
book, NATO's Future: Toward a Transatlantic Bargain, London, 
Macmillan, 1986.
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Afghanistan could affect detente on the main East-West 
front, i.e. in Europe"53
It was argued in Europe that a return to a Cold War rhetoric 
might result in increased tension in Europe and thus, in 
turn, threaten Western Europe's security.54
It follows logically from this that the West Europeans were 
also more interested in maintaining a policy of detente with 
Eastern Europe than their American counterparts. It could be 
argued that Poland was "proof" that detente was successful 
and that agreements such as the CSCE-treaty, which was a 
product of detente, had given dissidents in Eastern Europe a 
concrete document to refer to in their protests against their 
governments' violations of human rights.55 By way of 
increased, although still of course restricted, economic and 
cultural exchanges, it had enabled Polish society to get a 
glance at how the other half of Europe lived and draw 
comparisons with conditions in Poland.
53Ernst van Der Beugel, "After Afghanistan", Survival, 
vol XXII, no 6, Nov/Dec 1980, pp. 242-247, quote on p. 247.
^For the French government's defence of continued East- 
West detente, see "Declaration du gouvernement sur sa 
politique etrangere" (Foreign Minister Jean Frangois-Poncet), 
Debats Parlementaires de l'Assemblee Nationale, Seconde 
Session Ordinaire de 1979-1980, 17 avril 1980, Journal
Officiel, 18.4.1980, pp. 476-7.
55Interview Glasgow, June 1996.
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Hence, after Afghanistan the West Europeans had continued to 
call for cooperation in East-West relations and underlined 
the importance of dealing with the Soviet Union in a business 
like manner, as opposed to the more ideological approach of 
the American leadership. The West Europeans emphasised issues 
such as confidence-building measures, economic cooperation, 
respect for the renunciation of force:
"Notwithstanding the setbacks which the efforts for a 
constructive East-West relationship have unquestionably 
suffered, the possibility for a new businesslike and 
sober start has not been destroyed." 56
Transatlantic disagreements had been further reinforced by 
personal conflicts, in particular between Carter and West 
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Gabriel Robin has pointed 
out in a discussion on Franco-American relations under 
Giscard that
"It is in fact after the election of Jimmy Carter that 
things started to deteriorate, and from the French 
perspective, for several different reasons. Maybe 
without being conscious of it, Carter’s ideology was 
extremely destabilising for the European governments. To 
profess that detente with the East was a "jeu des 
dupes", in which the "dupes" were the West European 
governments, there was nothing more efficient to 
discredit the political leaders who would have continued 
this policy indefinitely."57
56H-G Wieck, "The future of East-West relations". NATO 
Review No. 6, Dec. 1981. p.18.
57"Temoignages et interventions", pp. 63-67 in Sarny Cohen 
et Marie-Claude Smouts (eds) La Politique Exterieure de 
Valery Giscard d 1Estainq, Paris, Presses de la Fondation
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Giscard also points out in his memoirs that both Schmidt and 
himself had wished for the re-election of Gerald Ford in 
1976. This was hardly a factor likely to facilitate Euro- 
American relations under Carter.58 The often difficult 
character of relations are also confirmed by both Carter 
himself and Brzezinski.59 The Europeans were questioning 
Carter's ability as the leader of the West and criticised his 
foreign policy for being both naive and dogmatic.60 A typical 
example of these kinds of problems in the alliance under 
Carter was the controversy over the neutron bomb.61
Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1985. Gabriel Robin, La 
Diplomatie de Mitterrand. France, Editions la Bievre, 1985, 
p. 66. Robin was Conseiller Technique au Secretariat General 
de la Presidence de la Republique from 1974 to 79, and then 
Directeur des Affaires Politiques au Ministere des Affaires 
Etrangeres until 1981.
^Giscard d'Estaing, op. cit. p. 132-136.
59Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. 
London Collins, 1982, pp.112-3 and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power 
and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 
London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983, pp. 25-6.
60Phillippe Moreau Defarges, Les Relations
Internationales Dans le Monde d 'Auiourd'hui, Paris, Editions 
S.T.H, 1987, p.109.
61The neutron bomb controversy is also quoted by Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing as an important cause of distrust between 
Schmidt and Carter: "la perte de confiance d'Helmut Schmidt 
dans 1'administration Carter a ete definitive.", Le Pouvoir 
et la Vie. II. L' af frontement. Paris, Compagnie 12, 1991, pp. 
132-135. For a discussion of Alliance politics and the 
neutron bomb see Sherri Wassermann, The Neutron Bomb 
Controversy. New York, Praeger, 1983.
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Yet, the divergences in Western views did not stem only from 
a clash of personality or indeed from diverging perspectives 
on the implications of Afghanistan. Behind it was a deeper 
disagreement on East-West relations and on the view of the 
Soviet system, which could perhaps be described as a 
disagreement between those who believed in the possibility of 
co-existence between the two systems and those who believed 
that they were irreconcilable.
The difference between these two approaches had, to a large
extent, been disguised by the ambiguous function given to
detente policy.62 To some, detente was an objective in
itself. The aim was to create "peaceful co-existence" between
the two systems, allowing them to grow gradually closer. The
clearest example of this approach is no doubt Willy Brandt's
Ostpolitik, as outlined in chapter two. To others, detente
was an instrument in the continuous struggle against
communism. It was from this last perspective that Nixon and
Kissinger launched the policy of detente in the 1960s. The
president of the French National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs
Committee has summarised the differences in US and West
European perspectives on detente in the following way:
"Pour les Etats-Unis, la detente a ete essentiellement 
un code de conduite de la strategie nucleaire avec 
l'URRS. Pour les Europeens Occidentaux, elle a ete
62There were of course also differences in Soviet and 
American interpretation of detente. For this see Raymond 
Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet
Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Washington DC, Brookings 
Institution, 1994, in particular pp. 27-57.
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beaucoup plus humaine. Elle a consiste a multiplier les 
echanges de personnes, de marchandises, culturels, 
materiels, a essayer de faire changer les choses de 
l'interieur avec le temps, et de creer les condition 
d'une meilleure cohabitation".63
Together, the allies had managed to agree on the policy of 
detente itself without agreeing on the values behind it.64 
The United States' policy of detente, as it was launched in 
the late 1960s, was a strategy for managing their relations 
with the other superpower.65 It was not, essentially, 
expected to alter the nature of the relationship. In Europe 
and, in particular, with West Germany's Ostpolitik, detente 
took on a different meaning. It was not about managing 
adversarial power, but about improving relations between East 
and West in Europe, and, in particular, East and West
63"Discussion sur la declaration du gouvernement sur sa 
politique etrangere" (Maurice Faure, President of the 
National Assembly's Affairs Committee) Debats Parlementaires 
de l'Assemblee Nationale, Troisieme Session Extraordinaire de 
1981-2, 6 juillet 1982. Journal Officiel, 7.7.1982.
64See Lindblom, op. cit. He argues that we cannot 
distinguish between the means and ends in analysing the 
process of decision-making: "one chooses among values and 
among policies at one and the same time. Put a little more 
elaborately, one simultaneously chooses a policy to attain 
certain objectives and chooses the objectives themselves." 
The simultaneous choice of means and ends enables the 
decision-maker to establish an agreement between the 
different actors involved, even if these actors do not share 
the same interest. Because the agreement is made on the basis 
of a certain policy, on the action that should be taken, and 
the policy incorporates both the means and the ends. P. 48.
65For the Nixon-Kissinger strategy on detente see Robert 
S. Litwak, Detente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign 
Policy and the Pursuit of Stability. 1969-1976, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1984.
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Germany. Thus, for the United States, it was logical to 
change tactics once they proved inefficient in terms of 
achieving the downfall of communism. At the same time, this 
threatened to expose the diverging perspectives inside the 
Alliance. Consequently, the compromise that had been found 
for the last decade became difficult to maintain.
The principal effect of Afghanistan had been to highlight the 
issues on which there was disagreement amongst Western 
allies:
"This invasion [of Afghanistan] highlighted the 
differences, which had increased since the early 
seventies. in the way Europe and the US viewed 
detente.
After the failure of attempts to coordinate their action over 
Afghanistan, there was a determination to close ranks at the 
next crossroads.67 Throughout spring and summer of 1980, a 
number of meetings were held in the context of NATO and other 
Western institutional frameworks, aiming to solve the 
differences between the Western allies and to improve 
cooperation on foreign policy-issues. After a meeting of the 
"Eurogroup" countries in Brussels on May 12 and a subsequent 
meeting of the NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs on May 14, 
a declaration on political consultation was issued,
66Richard Woyke, "A Crisis in US/West European 
Relations?" NATO Review. No.5 October 1981. p. 15.
67Interview London, September 1994.
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confirming the determination of the member states to confront 
the international situation "post-Afghanistan" together.68 
During the month of June, there were three subsequent 
meetings of Western leaders, in different fora: the European 
Council in Venice on 12-13 June, the G7 summit in Venice on 
22-23 June and the Atlantic Council in Ankara on 25-26 June, 
where the issue of cooperation was discussed.69
Against this backdrop, the strikes in Poland presented a 
further serious problem of coordination for the West, and 
threatened to reopen the wounds created after Afghanistan. 
Arguably, because of the nature of the issues raised by the 
Polish crisis, it promised to be, at the same time, more 
important and more difficult to ensure a coordinated response 
than to Afghanistan. It has already been argued that the 
strikes in Poland raised issues of a political and economic 
character, and not only security issues. A comprehensive 
Western response would require coordination in all these 
areas. As chapters two and three showed, Western solidarity 
was initially based on the feeling of common threat from the 
Soviet Union and the Western institutional structures were
68The Eurogroup comprised the European members of NATO’s 
integrated military organisation. Thus France was not a 
member. Aqence Europe Bulletin 12.5.80 and 14.5.80.
69Aqence Europe Bulletin 25.6.80. For a discussion of the 
G7 summit in Venice see Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, 
Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power 
Summits, London, Sage Publications, 1987, pp. 221-126.
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constructed around the idea of a need for cooperation in the 
area of security. There were few institutional structures 
facilitating transatlantic cooperation in areas of foreign 
policy and foreign trade or finance. Furthermore, in the 
economic sphere, the cement of the "common enemy" did not 
exist to the same extent. Thus, in a situation like the one 
that the West faced with the strikes in Poland, cooperation 
was likely to be more difficult than in a "straightforward"
security crisis. As chapter three has shown, NATO was not
I
made for dealing with the type of problems raised by the 
strikes in Poland. It did not have specific structures to 
deal with political coordination or a crisis situation in 
Eastern Europe, unless these issues were subordinated to a 
common concern about Western security. Moreover, there was no 
other structure to compensate for the inadequacies of NATO. 
The basis for political cooperation between Europe and the 
USA, were,the "Gymnich agreement" of June 1974, that opened 
up the possibility of political consultations between the 
Presidency of the EEC and the American government, and the 
Ottawa declaration of the Atlantic Council, in which the 
allies declared their commitment to keep each other informed 
and to strengthen the practice of political consultations.70 
But both these texts were mainly declarations of intent and 
did not represent a sufficient and reliable structure for
70The Ottawa declaration was signed in Brussels on 26 
June 1974. Pierre Gerbet, La Construction de l1Europe. Paris, 
Imprimerie Nationale, 1983, p. 428.
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political coordination, and in particular for common action. 
The EC proper, CoCom or the G7 could not fill the gaps in 
NATO's provisions and, in addition, suffered from their own 
inadequacies. According to Rummel:
"The West had no uniform framework within which to 
formulate and safeguard overall Western interest in 
peripheral crises, i.e. in cases where NATO does not 
'grip1. Above all, coordination between West European 
and American crisis responses can by no means be 
regarded as ensured. But there are also a great number 
of specific shortcomings: lack of background sharing, 
great differences in the degree of crisis consciousness 
and national willingness to take risks, virtually no 
common attempts at crisis definition, fragmentation in 
the form of individual assessments according to specific 
events, no overview of the various management 
frameworks, lacking coordination of existing 
instruments, insecurity concerning actually available 
crisis capacities etc."71
A number of different issues were raised in the West as a 
result of the strikes in Poland, and a variety of interests,
sometimes cutting across national borders, were at stake. If 
the strikes in Poland continued, and the search for a 
compromise between the regime and the workers proved 
unattainable, Poland's Western creditors might find 
themselves in financial difficulties and East- West trade 
might be threatened. From the point of view of public 
opinion, the pressure on the West to "do something" was 
likely to increase if the situation in Poland deteriorated. 
The different issues raised as a result of strikes in Poland,
71Reinhardt Rummel "Coordination of the West's Crisis 
Diplomacy", pp. 123-133 in Aussenpolitik. vol 31, no 2, 1980, 
quotation on p. 124.
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did not necessarily all encourage the same policy-response. 
Economically, the primary interest of the West was the 
survival of the regime.72 In relation to public opinion, it 
was important for the West to be seen as an active and 
positive force, encouraging reform in Poland. Strategically, 
stability in Poland was a clear priority.73 But most 
importantly, there was concern that alliance cohesion be 
preserved. As a result of the strikes in Poland, the Western 
states were once again running the risk of exposing to the 
rest of the world in general, and to the Soviet Union in 
particular, the inefficiency of their political structures to 
provide a common policy. If forced to act, their differences 
on detente and their difficulties in dealing with the 
changing power structure in the alliance risked being 
exposed.
The main solution that the West brought to these challenges 
in the first phase of the crisis, was to do as little as 
possible. Thus, alliance cohesion was preserved, a lid was 
put on diverging interests, and separate perspectives were 
allowed to coexist.
72Financial Times 9.8.80.
73International Herald Tribune, 29.8.80.
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The ostrich method or how to solve problems bv ignoring them
In their comments on events in Poland, Western leaders made 
efforts to emphasise that this was essentially a domestic 
crisis which should be solved by Poland on its own. Although 
obviously also intended as a signal to the Soviet Union to 
stay out of Poland's affairs, it was, at the same time, the 
most convenient option for the Western alliance itself. The 
French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, in a comment on 
events in Poland, pointed out that:
"La France a pour principe constant de ne pas intervenir 
dans les affaires interieures des autres Etats. Elle 
souhaite que la Pologne puisse trouver en elle-meme les 
moyens de surmonter ses difficultes et de repondre aux 
aspirations de son peuple".74
Lord Carrington declared that:
"what is happening in Poland is a matter for the Poles. 
I hope that all other countries agree with that 
policy. "75
As for the US administration, its attitude in the first 
months also remained cautious, emphasising in particular its
74Le Monde. 29.8.1980.
75The Guardian, 30.10.80.
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concern about not doing anything which might lead to Soviet 
accusations of interference.76
As long as the crisis was defined as a domestic issue, it 
would not be necessary for the Western states to face up to 
their divergent views on detente and East-West relations. 
Moreover, they could continue with "business as usual" in 
areas such as East-West trade, and any possible 
inconsistencies in their interests in Eastern Europe need not 
come to the surface. In practical policy, this resulted in 
issues related to Poland being dealt with on a case by case 
basis, as they occurred, and not according to a coherent, 
overall strategy, unless the tendency to play down the 
significance of events so as to avoid publicity could be seen 
as a deliberate and calculated strategy.
The issue that the West dealt with most efficiently was that 
of Poland's debt, which also involved a number of Western 
banks and their financial survival. It is difficult to
achieve a clear picture of the size and distribution of
Polish debt among Western creditors in early 1980. The Polish 
government did for obvious reasons not seek publicity on the
issue and Western bankers and governments seem to a large
76New York Times, 4.9.1980, The Guardian 2.9.1980, Daily 
Telegraph 2.9.1980. See also the US administrations reactions 
to the activities of the AFL-CIO.
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extent to have complied with this wish.77 What is clear is 
that the strikes led the Polish government to launch a 
campaign for increased economic support from the West. Poland 
approached West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Britain and 
the United States for credits, as well as for help to 
reschedule its existing loans. The Poles were also reported 
to have warned their Western creditors that unless 
rescheduling was forthcoming, Poland might be forced to 
default on its loans.78 From early in the autumn, the Western 
leaders were reported to favour increased financial aid to 
Poland. In a message to British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and 
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, US President Carter 
proposed that they consider ways of helping Poland out of 
their economic difficulties. This was approved by the United 
States' allies.79 Throughout the autumn, new credits were 
being accorded to Poland by Western private and public 
sources. On September 6 the United States granted Poland 
credits of $ 675 m to support agriculture in 1981. This was
77Portes op cit., p. 34.
78The Guardian. 27.11.80.
79US Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Subcommittee on European Affairs, 97th Congress, second 
session, "The Polish Economy and Poland's International Debt: 
Implications for US Foreign Policy", January 1982; 
International Herald Tribune 4.9.80; Aqence Europe Bulletin 
9.9.80. See also Brzezinski in Orbis, op. cit. p. 32.
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an increase in $ 125 m compared to 1 980.80 A German banking 
consortium gave Poland $ 675 m in credit after pressure from 
the German government.81 And in late November, France opened 
a new credit line to Poland.82 Similar reports of increased 
credits came from British banks in late October.83 Finally, 
a series of meetings of different groups of Poland's 
creditors took place throughout the autumn of 1980 in an 
attempt to coordinate their activities.84 But apart from 
these fragmented attempts to save Poland's liquidity crisis, 
and by the same token, save European banks that had invested 
in Poland, much was not done to help Poland out of its 
economic difficulties. According to Richard Portes:
"the policies of Western governments are not very well 
defined, even behind the scenes. ... Everyone is more or 
less sympathetic to Polish needs, but no one has been 
willing to make long-run commitments"85
In general, the Western leaders were anxious that events in 
Poland should not interfere with their normal conduct of 
East-West relations. Hence, no new initiatives were taken as
80Aqence Europe Bulletin. 6.9.80.
81Aqence Europe Bulletin, 29.8.80.
82International Herald Tribune. 29/30.11.80.
83Financial Times. 21.10.80.
^Portes op. cit. p.28. See also, "Poland, the USSR and 
the West", Background Paper, House of Commons Library, 5 
December 1980, p. 10.
85Portes, op cit. p. 28.
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a direct result of the situation in Poland. Events in Poland 
did lead to some modifications of the East-West agenda. 
Anxious to preserve relations with its East German 
counterparts, the Federal Republic's Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt cancelled a visit to East Germany in order to prevent 
Poland from becoming an issue between the two Germanies.86 
But if the West Germans were discreet, the East Germans did 
not seem to consider the same strategy. The leader of the GDR 
was one of the strongest opponents of reform in Poland, 
letting his voice be heard early in the crisis. A fervent 
speech condemning recent events in Poland in mid-October 
appeared as a little-disguised warning to West Germany to 
remain neutral.87 The French President Giscard d'Estaing's 
planned visit to Poland was also postponed, and later 
cancelled, at the initiative of the Polish Secretary General 
Stanislaw Kania.88 This visit would have been his second in 
a short time, and was part of Giscard's effort to act as a 
bridge between East and West in a period of tension.89 The
86International Herald Tribune. 29.8.80.
87Aqence Europe Bulletin 15.10.80.
^Aqence Europe Bulletin 11.9.80.
89Giscard had, without consulting his allies, met with 
Brezhnev in Warsaw in May 1981, to discuss the situation in 
Afghanistan. The reasons for his visit are outlined by 
foreign minister Frangois-Poncet in "Declaration du 
gouvernement sur la rencontre de Varsovie", Debats 
Parlementaires de l'Assemblee Nationale, Seconde Session 
Ordinaire de 1979-1980, 21 may 1980, Journal Officiel,
22.5.1980, pp. 1124-1127.
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announced purpose of the visit had been to "keep the dialogue 
between various parts of Europe going".90 These highly 
independent initiatives were, nevertheless, not appreciated 
by France's allies, and, most of all, signalled disunity in 
the Western alliance over East-West relations.
Unlike Giscard's second visit to Poland, that of the British 
Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington was not cancelled. Lord 
Carrington was the first Western official to visit Poland 
after the signing of the Gdansk agreement.91 He met with 
Prime Minister Jozef Pinkowski and with the Secretary General 
Stanislaw Kania.92 It was known that Poland asked Great 
Britain for help with its large foreign debt, but apart from 
this, very little information came out about the nature of 
Lord Carrington's talks with Polish officials. The Poles 
clearly wanted to give the impression that business was 
continuing as usual in its relations with the West. Still, on 
the second day of Carrington's visit, Kania had to fly to 
Moscow for an emergency meeting with Soviet authorities.93
90Aqence Europe Bulletin 26.6.80.
91The Guardian 25.10.80.
92Edward Gierek was replaced by Stanislaw Kania in early 
September 1980.
93Aqence Europe Bulletin 29.10.80.
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The United Kingdom was particularly active in EPC at this 
time, and Lord Carrington was reported to be pressing hard 
for the Community to take a common foreign policy initiative 
towards Poland.94 Nonetheless, no concrete action was taken 
either at the European level or at the Atlantic level. There 
was, however, common monitoring of events, as well as 
continuous consultation amongst allies, but no concrete 
common policy-initiatives were taken.
At a national level, evidence leads us to suggest that the
United States was the only country to take specific action.
According to Brzezinski, the United States had already held 
its first Special Coordination Committee on Poland in October 
1980.95 There is no evidence that similar action was taken
at such an early stage by any of the West European states.
 \
Further, according to Brzezinski, in late October
"We went through the checklist of possible responses [to 
a Soviet intervention in Poland] and agreed that a
number of them should be raised in the course of the 
following week when consultations are held in Europe 
with our principal allies. I did not press for any
recommendations because that would not only be premature 
but probably divisive."96
94The Guardian. 22.11.80.
95Brzezinski in Orbis, op. cit. p. 33.
96Brzezinski in Orbis, op. cit. p. 33. Our emphasis.
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This indication that the US was reluctant to go very far in 
attempting to coordinate action confirms that there was no 
complete coherence of views amongst Western allies and that, 
thus, for the time being, it was more convenient for the 
Alliance to keep a low profile. Indeed, it was also at this 
point still possible to do so. Brzezinski also refers to such 
a disagreement:
"The Germans have told us at the Quad meeting [four- 
power conference with Britain, France, West-Germany and 
the United States] that detente should not be the victim 
of such intervention [by the Soviet Union]; in other 
words, the Germans are saying that in the event of a 
Soviet intervention the Germans would be prepared to 
continue with their East-West relationship".97
Thus^ there was a consensus in the West, but it was a 
negative consensus, simply consisting in continuing with 
business as usual and limiting the impact of events in Poland 
both on East-West relations and on intra-alliance relations.
Conclusions
The Western states successfully maintained a cohesive front 
during the first months of the Polish crisis. Lessons had 
been drawn from the failure to coordinate a response to the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and deliberate efforts
97Ibid, p.34.
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were made, both in Europe and in the United States, to 
consult and inform allies over Poland. At the same time, 
there were early warning signs of the risks that the Polish 
crisis involved for Western cohesion. The crisis emerged at 
a time when the Western alliance's diverging views on East- 
West relations were becoming increasingly pronounced, and it 
threatened to highlight sensitive issues in intra-alliance 
relations. Also, taking place in the heart of Europe, the 
Polish crisis was potentially a far more explosive issue for 
the Western allies than Afghanistan. Not only would military 
action by the Warsaw Pact in Poland be disastrous in human 
terms, and represent serious risks to East-West stability, a 
failure by the Western states to agree on policy at the 
strategic heart of Europe would also be far more damaging to 
the Alliance's credibility. Finally, Western disagreement 
over Poland would give fuel to those on both sides of the 
Atlantic who questioned, albeit for different reasons, the 
continued utility of the Alliance. For these reasons, 
coordination over Poland was important.
The considerable uncertainty generated by the situation in 
Poland about the intentions of the Warsaw Pact and Polish 
authorities, as well as the strikers themselves, created a 
situation close to Snyder's and Diesing's definition of a
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foreign policy crisis.98 Still, the Polish crisis was not a 
traditional foreign policy crisis for the West. It raised a 
more complex set of issues, of an economic and political, as 
well as military/security character. Poland was highly 
indebted to Western governments and private banks, creating 
a situation of economic interdependence and reinforcing 
Western interests in stability in Poland. More was also at 
stake in political terms than in previous East European 
crises. The 1970s detente had strengthened political links 
between Poland and Western Europe in particular, as well as 
committing both sides to the respect of human rights. 
Consequently, public opinion in the West was far more 
sensitised to events in Poland. These non-military aspects of 
the crisis were particularly visible in this first phase of 
the crisis. Although there was also speculation about Soviet 
intentions at this early stage, a Soviet military 
intervention was not considered imminent.
Although analytically separate from the problem of 
coordination, the complexity of the issues raised in the West 
by the Polish crisis threatened to make coordination more 
difficult. Chapter three showed that Western provisions for 
coordination in the economic and political spheres were weak. 
There was no forum where all economic, political and security
98Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 
Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1977, p.17.
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aspects of Western policies could be dealt with together. 
What is more, solidarity was likely to be less strong amongst 
Western allies in the economic sphere than in the security 
sphere, where the cement of the Soviet threat was less 
strong. Indeed, the crisis in Poland was a two-edged sword 
for the Western alliance. The West could not stand idly by 
and watch events in Poland. At the same time, it did not wish 
to provoke a further deepening of the crisis, to be seen to 
interfere in what essentially was the security zone of the 
Soviet Union, or to damage its own fragile intra-Western 
consensus on East-West relations.
The chapter has found that the Western states dealt with 
these challenges by a policy of "muddling through". The risks 
that the crisis represented to East-West relations were 
played down, the crisis was defined primarily as a domestic 
issue on which the West could not be expected to take 
substantial action, and it was deliberately decided not to go 
beyond the common monitoring of events in Poland. This 
enabled Western states to maintain an apparent consensus and 
to continue to keep a lid on increasingly diverging 
perspectives on East-West relations and detente. Poland was 
discussed both within NATO and EPC. There was an attempt from 
early on in the crisis to ensure that EPC responded to events 
in Poland. But, there were few signs that this was done to 
the exclusion of the United States or NATO. Most importantly,
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there were few signs at this stage, of an overall approach, 
in particular in the economic sphere.
It was still possible for the Western alliance to "muddle 
through" at this stage because it was still uncertain which 
direction events would take in Poland. The next chapter will 
show that in early December the West's strategy, at least on 
the official level, was to change quite drastically. The 
domestic Polish situation was not improving. The Polish 
Government was losing control over events and the Soviet 
Union was becoming visibly more impatient with its ally. As 
a result, the Western states became increasingly concerned 
that the Soviet Union might intervene militarily in Poland. 
The fear of a Soviet intervention was to become the 
centrepiece of Western policy up until the imposition of 
martial law.
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CHAPTER FIVE, DECEMBER 1980 TO DECEMBER 1981: SPILLOVER TO
EAST-WEST RELATIONS 
Introduction
By late November, early December, 1980 news about Soviet 
troop movements at Polish borders started coming through to 
the West. Western states had been concerned about Soviet 
reactions since the start of the strikes in the summer of 
1980. Nevertheless, as chapter four showed, in the first 
months they aimed to downplay the risk of a military 
intervention and to emphasise the domestic political 
character of reform in Poland. With reports of Soviet troop 
movements on Poland's borders in late November, as well as 
news about an emergency meeting of the Warsaw Pact in Moscow 
on 5 December, the possibility of a Warsaw Pact intervention 
became the main concern of Western states. Thus, a new phase 
developed in Western responses to the Polish crisis. As the 
West changed its tactics and openly and consistently warned 
against a Soviet or Warsaw Pact military intervention in 
Poland, the Polish crisis spilt over into East-West 
relations.
Western policies in this second phase could be seen, and were 
presented by Western policy-makers, as rationally defined and 
aiming at achieving clear objectives, in particular that of
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preventing a military intervention. Thomas C. Cynkin refers 
to American policy in this period as a "carrot and stick 
policy": threatening the Soviet Union that an intervention 
would have incalculable consequences for East-West detente, 
and encouraging change in Poland through economic aid.1
Aiming to establish the basis upon which coordination 
continued in this phase of the crisis, this chapter questions 
the perspective presented by Cynkin. It was pointed out in 
chapter four that a military intervention in Poland 
threatened to affect stability of the European continent. 
Such an intervention would also threaten the continuation of 
detente, and of crucial arms negotiations between the US and 
the Soviet Union. All of this gives credibility to Cynkin's 
perspective.2 Nonetheless, the understanding of the situation 
in Poland was uncertain, and accordingly, Western attempts at 
defining clear policy objectives haphazardous: It was still
Thomas C. Cynkin, Soviet and American Signalling in the 
Polish Crisis, London, Macmillan, 1988, p.68.
2The two-track decision in NATO was taken in 1979, at 
the request of the West Europeans (H. Schmidt was the first 
to alert attention to the implantation of Soviet SS20 
missiles in Eastern Europe in a speech at the IISS in 1977). 
The American 'zero option' was presented by President Reagan 
on November 18, 1981 as a part of his negotiating plan.
Negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States 
on reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe began in Geneva on 
November 30. Michel Tatu, La Bataille de Euromissiles, Paris, 
Ed. du Seuil, 1983; Diana Johnstone, The Politics of 
Euromissiles: Europe's Role in America's World. London,
Verso, 1984; Jeffrey Herf, War by Other Means: Soviet Power, 
German Resistance and the Battle of Euromissiles, New York, 
Free Press, 1991.
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uncertain in late 1980 which direction the changes in Poland 
would finally take, and whether or not reforms would succeed. 
Throughout 1981, the economic situation in Poland gradually 
deteriorated. Poland's national income dropped by 14%, meat 
rationing was introduced and the country was finding it 
increasingly difficult to service its foreign debt.3 Parallel 
to this, those on both sides of the political map in Poland 
favouring a compromise, were losing ground. Solidarity's 
demands became gradually more political, and Lech Walesa and 
the more moderate union leaders were less and less able to 
control the workers. Inside the government, the Minister of 
Defence, Wojciech Jaruzelski, became Prime Minister on 9 
February 1981. On 18 October he replaced Stanislaw Kania as 
leader of the Party.4 News of Soviet pressure on Poland and 
the PZPR came and went throughout 1981. Yet, at the same 
time, reforms continued to be introduced both inside the 
Polish communist party (PZPR) and in the country in general. 
Against this backdrop, Western observers disagreed on the 
prospects for continued reforms in Poland. Indeed, Western 
predictions on this issue changed from week to week. What is 
more, news did also simmer through to the West that a 
domestic "solution" might be imposed in Poland, rather than
3Strateqic Survey. 1981-2, p. 57.
4For an assessment of Jaruzelski and of his place within 
Polish politics, see Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish 
Revolution: Solidarity. London, Granta Books, 1991, pp. ISO- 
154.
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an external intervention. Defining Western objectives was 
further complicated by the need to ensure cohesion amongst 
allied states, as well as by the, to some extent, 
contradictory demands of Western economic, political and 
security aims in Poland outlined in chapter four.
Against this backdrop, the following pages question whether
or not the rationality perspective fully explains Western
policies.5 It is suggested that Western policies in this
phase can at best be seen as the result of a process of
"bounded rationality", that is, where
"the principle of 'satisficing' rather than 'optimizing' 
more realistically characterizes the process."6
The chapter continues to examine the overall Western response 
to events in Poland by looking at its economic as well as the 
political and strategic aspects. It also explores any linkage 
between Western responses to Poland and other issues on the 
Western agenda. Intra-alliance problems were still abundant,
5The rational actor model is defined in the following
way:
"The foreign policy-maker, like any rational individual, 
considers possible causes of action, and evaluates the likely 
consequences of each in terms of costs and benefits. The 
decision-maker then selects the cause of action most likely 
to achieve the desired goal". Brian White, "Analysing Foreign 
Policy: Problems and Approaches", pp. 1-26 in Michael Clarke 
and Brian White, (eds) Understanding Foreign Policy: The
Foreign Policy Systems Approach, Great Britain, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 1989, quote on p.12.
6Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behaviour, New York, 
Macmillan, 1959, quoted by White op. cit. p. 17.
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despite a brief "honeymoon" period after the election of 
Ronald Reagan as US president. There was strong popular 
opposition in Western Europe to NATO's planned deployment of 
Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles in Europe. Disagreement 
continued on the question of East-West economic trade and its 
potential threat to Western security. Finally, the 
efficiency of the Western institutional framework in dealing 
with coordination in response to events in Poland during this 
phase is examined.
The chapter starts by looking at the change of course in 
Western policies in late 1980. Subsequently, it turns to 
discuss, firstly, the rationale behind this policy, and 
secondly, any interconnection between the state of 
transatlantic relations and Western responses to events in 
Poland. The last section examines the differences between the 
West European and the American perspectives on the economic 
response to the crisis in Poland.
A change of direction in Western policy
From December 1980 the West's response to the crisis in 
Poland changed to focus increasingly on the risk of a Soviet 
military intervention. The change of policy is symbolised by 
Carter's public warning to the Soviet Union on 3 December:
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"The United States is watching with growing concern the 
unprecedented buildup of Soviet forces along the Polish 
border and the closing of certain frontier regions along 
the border. ... foreign military intervention in Poland 
would have most negative consequences for East-West 
relations in general and US-Soviet relations in 
particular ... I want all countries to know that the 
attitude and future policies of the United States 
towards the Soviet Union would be directly and very 
adversely affected by any Soviet use of force in 
Poland.
The increased tension in Poland and around its borders 
coincided with the European Council meeting in Luxembourg on 
2/3 December, as well as with the twice yearly meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council. In both meetings Poland became one of 
the main issues on the agenda, and resulted in stern warnings 
to the Soviet Union to let Poland solve its own problems. In 
the final statement of the European Council in Luxembourg on 
1-2 December, West European Heads of State and Government 
declared that
"The European Council expressed its sympathy for Poland 
and outlined the position of the nine as follows:
1. In their relations with Poland, the nine conform and 
will conform strictly to the United Nations charter and 
to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.
2. In this context, they would point out that in 
subscribing to these principles, the states signatory to 
the Final Act have undertaken in particular to:
- respect the right of every country to chose and freely 
develop its own political, social, economic and cultural 
system as well as to determine its own laws and 
regulations,
- refrain from any direct or indirect, individual or 
collective intervention in internal or external affairs
7New York Times. 4 December 1980 'Text of US statement 
on Poland', quoted in Cynkin, op. cit, p. 64.
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which fall within the national competence of another 
signatory state regardless of their mutual relations 
- recognise the right of all people to pursue their own 
political, economic, social and cultural development as 
they see fit and without external interference
3. The nine accordingly call upon all the signatory 
states to abide by these principles with regard to 
Poland and the Polish people. They emphasise that any 
other attitude would have very serious consequences for 
the future of international relations in Europe and 
throughout the world."8
Lord Carrington, in an interview with BBC TV and ITN on 2
December explicitly declared that the warning of the Nine was
directed to the Soviet Union. He further confirmed that the
declaration was meant to be a "very serious warning". As for
the consequences that an intervention would have for East-
West relations, he pointed out that
"The consequences for East-West relations would be 
incalculable in terms of arms talks, in terms of 
detente, in terms of the security conference in Madrid. 
... You would riot I think see any more discussion about 
arms limitation, I don't see how you could possibly go 
on with the Madrid conference... You would probably see 
other consequences, but those naturally would depend on 
what and how it happened."9
Equally, the final communique of the meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers of NATO resulted in a clear warning to the Soviet 
Union. The foreign ministers also pledged allegiance to what 
they called "genuine detente", and gave the Soviet Union the
8London Press Service, Verbatim service, 3 December 
1980. Text of the Presidency conclusions on East-West 
relations issued on 2 December 1980 after the European 
Council meeting in Luxembourg.
9London Press Service, Verbatim Service, 2 December
1980.
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full responsibility for the increased tension in East-West 
relations:
"Detente has brought appreciable benefits in the field 
of East-West co-operation and exchange. But it has been 
seriously damaged by Soviet actions. It could not 
survive if the Soviet Union were again to violate the 
basic rights of any state to territorial integrity and 
independence. Poland should be free to decide its own 
future. The Allies will respect the principle of non­
intervention and strongly urge others to do likewise. 
Any intervention would fundamentally alter the entire 
international situation. The Allies would be compelled 
to react in the manner which the gravity of this 
development would require."10
Parallel with the public clarification of the West’s common 
position on Poland, concrete steps were taken to ensure a 
common response if the Soviet Union intervened. NATO was the 
central organising institution in the process of negotiating 
and establishing the West's contingency planning. The 
decision to map out a common response to a potential Soviet 
intervention in Poland was taken during the meetings of the 
Defence Planning Committee of the North Atlantic Council on 
10 December and of the Foreign Ministers on 11 and 12 
December. The American Secretary of State Edmund Muskie 
arrived at the meeting with a list of possible political, 
economic and diplomatic sanctions that might be implemented 
in the case of a Soviet intervention. A committee of 
permanent representatives was set down to study the list and
10NATO Press Service, 12.12.1980.
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map out a contingency plan for NATO as a whole.11 The same 
committee would also meet every fortnight to monitor the 
situation in Poland.
The list of measures was deliberately not made public, out of
the belief that this would lead to a loss of leverage with
the Soviet Union. There are, however, certain indications of
what was included on it. The general point always made was
that an intervention would mean "the end of detente". Lord
Carrington pointed out in an interview that the measures
would be stronger than those taken after the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan.12 Cynkin refers to the following
items having been discussed at the first NATO meeting in
December 1980:
"The Allies considered a range of contingency steps to 
be taken in the event of an invasion: 1 ) increased
defense expenditures; 2) cessation of credits to Poland 
arid the USSR; 3) cancellation of high technology 
exchanges, such as the gas pipeline deal; 4) closure of 
Western ports to Soviet vessels; 5) cancellation of the 
Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks; 6) walkout on the 
ongoing conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) deliberations; 7) cessation of cultural 
exchanges; 8) recall of ambassadors and 9) reduction of 
Western missions in Moscow."13
^Financial Times, 15.12.80, Le Monde 14/15.12.80, Le 
Monde 13.12.80. Contingency planning in preparation for a 
Soviet intervention is confirmed by Lawrence Eagleburger in 
the US Congress, "US relations with Europe and the Soviet 
Union", US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, 
97th Congress, 2 and 10 June 1981, see in particular p. 48.
12The Japan Times 9.4.1981.
13Cynkin, op. cit. p. 74. Similar suggestions were made 
in interviews London, September 1994. See also Le Monde 
25.2.1981.
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The NATO Defence Ministers also decided to ask the United 
States to despatch four AWAC planes to Europe to observe the 
situation on Poland's borders. The planes, which are unarmed 
and advanced surveillance aircrafts, were expected to operate 
from West Germany.14 Finally, the NATO Defence Planning 
Committee concluded that NATO's Standard Naval Force should 
not be dispersed as was usual at Christmas time. The NATO 
communique, informing of this decision, underlined that the 
force was
"a symbol of Allied solidarity particularly in times of
tension".15
Although the situation in Poland was not officially quoted as 
the reason for this decision, it must be assumed that it was 
the direct cause.
Hence by December 1980, the West had mapped out a new 
direction in its response to the situation in Poland. There 
was a clear effort to signal that the West was not 
indifferent to the evolution of events in Poland and that
^International Herald Tribune 10.12.80. This must be 
considered an important diplomatic signal. AWACS were 
indispensable instruments in time of war and a US sale of 
AWACS to Saudi Arabia led to heated debate in the United 
States in 1981. For excerpts from this discussion, see 
Survival. vol XXIV, no 1, Jan/Feb 1982, "Documentation. The 
AWACS Debate", pp. 37-42. See also Arnold Lee Tessmer, 
Politics of Compromise: NATO and AWACS, Washington DC, 
National Defense University Press, 1988.
15NATO Press Service, 10.12.80.
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Soviet interference would not be taken lightly in the West.
The change of President in the United States in January 1981
did not have any immediate effect on the West's policy
towards the crisis in Poland. As Gordon has also pointed out
"Secretary of State Haig quickly secured President 
Reagan's agreement to a policy of discouraging Soviet 
military intervention, using public and diplomatic 
channels and allied consultations in the same pattern as 
the previous administration."16
Throughout 1981, Western leaders kept up the monitoring of
the situation in Poland and underlined at regular intervals
their concern that Poland be left to sort out its problems on
its own.17 Mrs Thatcher's statement in April is
characteristic:
"An external intervention in Poland would be a disaster 
for Poland, for Europe, for East-West relations, and for 
all peoples. I hope that the Soviet leaders realise that 
intervention would be a disaster for the Soviet Union as 
well."18
16Lincoln Gordon, "Interests and policies in Eastern 
Europe: the view from Washington", pp. 67-128 in Gordon (ed), 
Eroding Empire: Western relations with Eastern Europe,
Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1987, quote on p. 123.
17See for example Le Monde 12/13.4.81 (Jean Francois- 
Ponget, French foreign Minister under Giscard d'Estaing); Le 
Monde 9.6.81 (Claude Cheysson, French Foreign Minister under 
Mitterrand); International Herald Tribune 7.4.81 (Ronald 
Reagan); Financial Times 3.4.81 (US administration); 
Interview with Lord Carrington in National Public Radio in 
Washington on 27.2.81, text by London Press Service, 3.3.81;
"Declaration de politique generate du Gouvernement", (Prime 
Minister Pierre Mauroy), Debats Parlementaires de l'Assemblee 
Nationale, session de droit en application de 1'article 12 de 
la Constitution, quatrieme seance, 8 Juillet 1981, Journal 
Officiel. 9.9.1981, p. 54.
18The Guardian 9.4.1981.
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At the NATO summit in Rome in May 1981 Poland was again one 
of the main topics discussed. Soviet pressure against Poland 
was condemned as damaging to international security and 
stability:
MIn Europe, efforts to restore East-West co-operation 
and exchanges on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act 
cannot but be severely undermined by the use or threat 
of force for intervention in the affairs of other 
countries. Poland must be left free to resolve its own 
problems. Any outside intervention would have the 
gravest consequences for international relations as a 
whole and would fundamentally change the entire 
international situation. The Allies, for their part, 
will continue to adhere strictly to their policy of non­
intervention and they call on all other states to do the
The process of consultation between allies appeared to work 
satisfactorily in this phase. Carter, Brzezinski and Haig all 
underline the efforts they made to keep the Europeans 
informed, both of their knowledge of the situation in Poland
and of American diplomatic initiatives to warn the Soviet 
Union. The importance of consultations was also pointed out 
by West European leaders.20
19North Atlantic Council. Rome. 4-5 May 1981. Text 
published in NATO. Final Communiques, 1981-85. Brussels. NATO 
Information Service, pp. 25-29.
20The Japan Times 9.4.1981 (statement by Lord 
Carrington). See also Zbigniew Brzezinski "White House Diary, 
1980" pp.32-48 in Orbis. vol. 32, no 1, Winter 1988, p. 32; 
Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy, 
New York, Macmillan, 1984, pp. 241-2, Gordon, op. cit. p.119. 
Interviews London, September and December 1994.
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In the spring of 1981, most of the West European foreign 
ministers or heads of governments went to Washington to meet 
the new American President. On these occasions, the general 
consensus between West Europeans and Americans on the right 
of the Poles to sort out their problems without outside 
interference was constantly underlined, and appeared 
relatively convincing. The Italian Foreign Minister Colombo 
was first to report back to his European colleagues after 
such a visit. In his report to EPC on his return, he 
described the American attitude to Poland as "slightly less 
alarmist than a few months ago".21 Likewise, during the 
French Foreign Minister, Jean Francois-Ponget's visit, as 
well as that of Helmut Schmidt, who visited the United States 
at the end of March, Poland was an important issue, and the 
"complete coherence" between the West Europeans and President 
Reagan was underlined.22
Poland was also an important issue for EPC and intra-West 
European relations. It was discussed at the 37th Franco- 
German summit in Paris in February 1981, where it became the 
subject of a foreign policy-statement, despite the fact that 
the two political leaders were initially supposed to make a
21Aqence Europe Bulletin. 18.2.81. Also, Bulletin of the 
European Communities, no 2, 1981, vol 14, section 2.2.45.
22Financial Times 31 .3.1981 .
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statement only on cultural relations. Schmidt and Giscard 
stated that:
"La moderation s'impose, en premier lieu, dans les 
rapports entre les signataires de l'Acte final 
d'Helsinki qui a defini les regies. Elle signifie qu’il 
est essentiel que la Pologne puisse resoudre ses graves 
problemes elle-meme d ’une maniere pacifique et sans, 
hors d'Europe, comme en Europe, ingerence 
exterieure. "23
This confirms both a European wish to influence East-West 
relations, and the importance that the West Europeans 
attributed to the political situation in Poland.24 It is 
interesting to note that Great Britain also underlined the 
importance of cooperation inside the framework of European 
Political Cooperation on the Polish question. Mrs. Thatcher 
stated that the Polish crisis directly affected the European 
Community and that it demanded real and immediate 
coordination of EEC foreign policy.25
This section has shown that, at first sight, the Western 
states appeared successful in presenting a common front, and
23Le Monde 8/9.2.1981 .
24Le Monde 7.2.1981. See also "Declaration on Poland". 
Maastricht European Council. Bulletin of the European 
Communities. no 3, 1981, vol 14, section 1.1.13.
25The Guardian 9.4.1981. This corresponds with the view 
that Thatcher1 s government "... made EPC the main plank of 
its contribution to the European Community", Christopher 
Hill, "Britain: a convenient schizophrenia", pp. 19-33 in 
Hill (ed) National Foreign Policies and European Political 
Cooperation. London, George Allan and Unwin, 1983, quote on
p . 22.
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in pursuing a coherent and well defined policy, corresponding 
with clear objectives. However, several questions remain 
unanswered, the most important one being why the emphasis in 
Western policies was put almost exclusively on the role of 
the Soviet Union. The next section examines the Western 
states' understanding of the situation in Poland more 
closely.
Muddled perceptions, muddled objectives
Western policy initiatives in early December were apparently 
triggered by reports of Soviet troop movements at Poland's 
borders. Intelligence reports from the CIA, NATO and also 
some neutral countries, in particular Sweden, noting an 
increased activity of Soviet troops on Poland's borders 
started coming in to Western governments by late November 
early December 1980.26 According to Ascherson, State 
Department officials told journalists on 25 November that 
Soviet troops were on a high state of alert.27 And from this 
time the Western press attributed their headlines to the risk
26Neil Ascherson, The Polish August: The Self-Limiting 
Revolution, UK, Penguin books, 1982, p.211; Timothy Garton 
Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, London, Granta Books, 
1991, p.94.
27Ascherson, op. cit. p. 206.
252
of a Soviet military intervention.28 Brzezinski also refers 
to CIA reports from late November.29 Western concern was 
increased by the knowledge that an emergency meeting of the 
Warsaw Pact was held in Moscow on December 5, to discuss the 
situation in Poland.
These intelligence reports came at a time of relative calm
inside Poland itself. Solidarity had, throughout October and
early November, successfully fought for the registration of
the trades union. The so called 'Narozniak affair' in which
a Solidarity activist was arrested for having stolen a
confidential document issued by the prosecutor's office, was
solved by the release of the men in question and the threat
of a general strike was averted.30 As Western alarm grew, the
Central Committee of the PZPR was holding its Seventh Plenum
and this was the focus of most of the concern inside Poland.
After some days, however, the rumours of Soviet troop
movements had their impact also inside Poland itself
"This weekend [of 6-7 December] was by far the most
dangerous moment for Poland since the first strike wave
developed in July. For the first time, a realisation of
28See for example Financial Times 1.12.80, The Times 
3.12.80, New York Times 5.12.80
29Brzezinski, in ORBIS, op. cit, p.34 and Jimmy Carter, 
Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, London, Collins, 1982, 
p. 584.
30For details on the "Narozniak affair", see Ascherson, 
op. cit. pp. 204-208, Garton Ash, op. cit. pp. 88-93.
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the peril in which the nation stood seemed to flow over 
the population"31
Throughout 1981, the concern about the risks of invasion came 
and went in waves. It reached a second peak in early April 
when the Soviet military manoeuvres 'Soyuz 81' continued 
beyond the planned date.
However, it is not an easy task to establish with certainty 
the Western perception of the situation in Poland and of the 
risk of a Soviet military intervention. The situation in 
Poland was complex and rather unpredictable. Not only was it 
difficult to know which one of the three main actors, the 
Polish Communist Party, Solidarity or the Soviet Union would 
eventually force through its viewpoint. These actors were 
themselves influenced by several different factions and were 
thus not in total control of their own policy. The Soviet 
Union had to deal with pressure from the other East European 
states, Solidarity was finding it increasingly difficult to 
control its grassroot members and the PZPR was absorbed in an 
internal struggle over which attitude to take in the crisis. 
Indeed, these actors did not always have clear intentions, 
but, rather, were feeling their way and keeping several 
options open.
31Ascherson, op. cit. p. 216.
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Both Brzezinski and Carter are unclear as to whether they
were convinced of the inevitability of a Soviet move.
Brzezinski confirms that he had some doubts about the
accuracy of the CIA reports.32 Carter on the other hand,
appears to have been more certain about the Soviet threat.
According to his memoirs,
"Early in December ... we became convinced that their 
[the Soviets] military forces were preparing to move 
into Poland."33
Although the same detailed information is not available on 
the West European policy-makers' interpretations, it does not 
seem unreasonable to assume that there was no clear 
perception of the situation.34 In other words, not only were 
there differences between the Western countries, but there 
was also a general confusion about the situation in Poland, 
regardless of each Western state's interests or 
idiosyncrasies.
32Brzezinski in Orbis, op. cit., p. 34.
33Carter, op. cit. p. 584. It must be added here that the 
Carter administration was considerably weakened in the last 
year of his Presidency because of the Iranian hostage crisis. 
Although other foreign policy issues suffered more from the 
high priority given to the hostage crisis, there is no doubt 
that this event constituted a drain on resources and limited 
the time the Carter administration had available to deal with 
the Polish crisis. See Barry Rubin, Secrets of State: the
State Department and the Struggle over US Foreign Policy, 
Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1987, in 
particular p. 197.
^Interview Oslo, December 1992.
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Even today there is no clarity on the question of a "real" 
Soviet threat of intervention. We now know that plans had 
been made for a Warsaw Pact military intervention in 
Poland.35 Thus observers at the time were correct in arguing 
that the Soviet Union was "in a state of near readiness for 
intervention".35 However, the intelligence reports received 
at that time and which formed part of the information upon 
which the West made its decisions, were not accurate. Recent 
research confirms that the question of military intervention 
was discussed at the Warsaw Pact meeting of December 5, and 
that it was also rejected at the same meeting, after Polish 
guarantees that they were able to control the situation.37 
Secret documents from the archives of East Germany's
35Mark Kramer, "Poland, 1980-81 . Soviet policy during the 
Polish crisis", pp.1, 116-139 in Cold War International
History Project, Bulletin. Washington DC, Woodrow Wilson 
Center, Issue 5, Spring 1995. This article is based on 
documentation released from the former Soviet Union and the 
GDR after the end of the Cold War. See also International 
Herald Tribune 11.1.1993 for references to similar findings 
based on research into the archives of the Communist party of 
the GDR.
36Richard D. Anderson, "Soviet decision-making and 
Poland" pp. 22-36 in Problems of Communism. March-April 1982. 
Similar statements are presented in Minton F. Goldman "Soviet 
Policy towards the turmoil in Poland during the fall of 
1980", pp.335-357 in East European Quarterly, vol. XX, no. 3, 
September 1986; Andre Gerrits "Limits of influence: the
Kremlin and the Polish crisis 1980-81", pp.231-239 in 
Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol.19 no.2, 1988.
37See Kramer, op. cit. Also Keesinq's Contemporary 
Archives. February 20, 1981 pp. 30721-2; Goldman, op. cit. p. 
351 ; Richard Weitz "Soviet Decision-Making and the Polish 
Crisis", pp. 191-212, East European Quarterly. XXII, No. 2 
June 1988, p.193.
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Communist Party confirm this, as well as the point that the 
Soviet Union was under pressure from its East German ally to 
resort to military intervention.38 Yet, intelligence reports 
quoted by Brzezinski state that a decision to intervene was 
taken on that same meeting. On December 6, Brzezinski noted:
"...it is now the Agency conclusion that the Soviets 
will be ready to go within 48 hours. Moreover, it is the 
Agency conclusion that they will go into Poland on 
Monday or Tuesday [8,9 December]...
The day after, he recorded that
"A joint decision to invade was made on December 5 and 
can come as early as the morning or night of the 
7 th."40
Furthermore, on the estimations of Soviet troops in the area, 
there was some confusion. The International Herald Tribune 
referred in early December to sources in Brussels stating 
that between 30 and 35 Soviet divisions were ready to move 
into Poland.41 Carter and Brzezinski in their memoirs quote 
rather lower numbers.42 Valenta points out that 300 000 to
^International Herald Tribune, 11.1.93.
39Brzezinski in Orbis, op. cit. p. 39.
40Ibid. p . 41 .
^ International Herald Tribune, 10.12.1980. Also, The 
Guardian. 10.12.1980.
42Brzezinski in Orbis, op. cit. p. 39 and Carter op. cit. 
p. 584. Carter writes about "fifteen or twenty divisions" 
being ready to move into Poland. Brzezinski refers to a 
message from Stan Turner (CIA Director) that 18 Soviet 
divisions would enter Poland 7 December 1980.
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400 000 Soviet troops were ready to be deployed in Poland, 
although more divisions could be drawn from other 
districts.43
Most importantly, information that contradicted the
intelligence reports or indicated than an alternative course
of events was also possible, was received by the West. The
United States had received information on Polish plans to
impose martial law through Polish Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski.
Kuklinski served in the central Polish government apparatus
charged with organising the reimposition of communist
authority in Poland in 1980-81. He fled to the West just
before imposition of martial law in December 1981. He claims
that the idea of imposing martial law had already been
considered in August 1980 and that the United States had been
informed about this. According to Kuklinski, the plans to
impose martial law were completed in early November 1980, but
were temporarily shelved:
"To cozen the mutinous society, the Leadership Staff 
adopted the tactic of agreeing to sign a rather 
imprecisely worded social agreement in order to
43Jiri Valenta, "Soviet options in Poland", pp. 50-59 in 
Survival, vol. XXIII, no. 2, March/April 1981. Valenta also 
points to the following 'moves’ having been made by the 
Warsaw Pact: Soviet military commanders in Czechoslovakia
were recalled to Moscow in early December; a series of 
unannounced ad hoc bilateral meetings of Soviet officials 
took place over the Polish crisis; other Warsaw Pact 
countries, in particular East Germany, stepped up their 
public campaign against Solidarity. He further argues that 
these initiatives were similar to Warsaw Pact behaviour 
before the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
258
extinguish the conflagration of strikes... and in the 
resulting more favourable conditions to switch to a 
counter-offensive by means of administrative measures, 
including as a final resort the imposition of martial 
law."44
Finally, it should be added that historical precedents 
rendered the martial law alternative more likely than a 
military intervention. Indeed, the Soviet Union had never, 
during previous crises in Poland, chosen to intervene 
militarily. Recently published documents indicate that the 
decision not to use military force in 1956 was chiefly 
because of a Soviet fear of Polish military resistance.45
There was not only confusion in the West about the situation 
in Poland, there was a further confusion in the formulation 
of policy objectives. According to Brzezinski, the United 
States had four objectives at that time with its policy:
"On December 8, I wrote in my journal: 'I see four
objectives to what we are doing: one is to deprive the 
Soviets of surprise. . . . Two, perhaps encourage the
^"Documentation. Special Report: Poland in Crisis, 1980- 
81." pp.3-31 in Orbis. Vol.32, no.1 Winter 1988, quote on, 
p.14-15.
45Cold War International History Project. Bulletin. 
Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Spring 
1995, pp. 1, 50-56. Several other observers have argued that 
the Polish army could not be relied upon to remain passive in 
the face of an external intervention. See Valenta, op. cit, 
in particular p. 53; Dale R. Hesping and Ivan Volgyes, "How 
reliable are East European armies?", Survival. vol XXII, no 
5, Sept/Oct 1980, pp. 208-218; Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe. 
Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 100 and 106.
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Poles to resist if they are not taken by surprise, for 
this might somewhat deter the Soviets. The publicity is 
already doing that. Thirdly and paradoxically, to calm 
the situation in Poland by making the Poles more aware 
that the Soviets may, in fact, enter. The Poles have 
till now discounted this possibility and this may have 
emboldened them excessively. Here, in effect, we have a 
common interest with the Soviets, for they too may 
prefer to intimidate the Poles to a degree. And fourth, 
to deter the Soviets from coming in by intensifying 
international pressure and condemnation of the Soviet 
Union.1,46
This was more or less followed up by the Reagan
administration:
"American aims were simple: to keep Soviet troops out of 
Poland, and to preserve the reforms achieved by 
Solidarity" .47
However, both administrations at times claim to have
considered a Soviet intervention as inevitable. Hence, Haig
has stated that:
"There was never any question that the popular movement 
in Poland would be crushed by the U.S.S.R. The only 
questions were: when will this happen, and with what 
degree of brutality?"48
In Western Europe, there was the same element of confusion 
between pessimism on the prospects of Soviet respect for 
reforms, and, at the same time, a policy aimed at deterring 
the Soviet Union. The difficulty in formulating policy-
46Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of a 
National Security Adviser London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1983, p.467.
47Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign
Policy, New York, Macmillan, 1984, p.240.
^Haig op. cit. 239.
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objectives was further exacerbated by the to some extent 
contradictory and, indeed, even incompatible aims of the 
economic, political and security aspects of the crisis.
This debate on whether the Soviet Union would have intervened 
and, in our case, whether the West thought it was going to do 
so may, at a certain level, seem fruitless. The fact is that 
it did not intervene. Still, the question always lingers in 
the background of any discussion on Poland in the early 
1980s. From the perspective of Western coordination it is 
important because, as this chapter has shown, up until the 
imposition of martial law, the Western policies concentrated 
almost exclusively on the possibility of a Soviet military 
intervention in Poland, despite the fact that they had 
received information about Polish plans to impose martial 
law. The reasons for this focus are crucial to understanding 
Western policies. It has been argued here that several points 
in this respect remain unclear: Was a Soviet intervention 
considered inevitable, or was reform seen as possible? If 
Soviet intervention was seen as inevitable, then why try to 
discourage it? If it was not seen as inevitable then why 
focus only on this particular possibility and not other 
possibilities? Or, to put it differently, why in the context 
of general confusion about the evolution of events in Poland, 
did the West chose to focus its attention and contingency
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planning on the Soviet military intervention and ignore other 
possible development, in particular martial law?
Bounded rationality
The underlying tension between the Western allies is an 
important factor contributing to explain why the Western 
states chose to focus on the Soviet threat, despite the fact 
that they were not certain that this was the only possible 
evolution of events, and despite the fact that it did not 
appear to be the result of clearly defined Western 
objectives in Poland. As chapter four outlined, the Polish 
crisis erupted in the midst of a situation of considerable 
strain in Euro-American relations. This section suggests that 
by concentrating on the risk of a Soviet intervention, the 
Western states managed to remain cohesive.
The Europeans had questioned Carter's ability as leader of 
the Western alliance and criticised his foreign policy for 
being both naive and dogmatic.49 The election of Reagan in 
1981 did, temporarily, improve transatlantic relations. The 
European Council in Luxembourg expressed satisfaction with
49Philippe Moreau-Defarges, Les Relations Internationales 
dans le Monde d 'Auiourd'hui. Paris, Editions S.T.H., 1987, p. 
109.
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Reagan's declared intention of creating "a strong America".50 
Equally, the French president, in a televised interview on 
French foreign policy, acclaimed the US president's intention 
of creating a powerful America, which fully exercised its 
international responsibilities, and underlined the importance 
of consultation between the United States and the West 
Europeans.51 The optimism in Euro-American relations in early 
1981 was further reinforced by Reagan's emphasis, in his 
first official statement as president, on the importance of 
cooperation inside the alliance. In an interview on 20 
February Reagan pointed out that:
"Western Europe will be called to play a key and vital 
role in the organisation of our security over the next 
decade".52
He further declared that bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation was vital for the security of the Western 
alliance and underlined the importance of presenting an image 
of cooperation in face of adversaries.
However, the positive tune in Euro-American relations was not 
to last. As chapter four suggested, disagreement with Carter 
was not just a question of style of leadership or clash of
50Le Monde. 4.12.80.
51Aqence Europe Bulletin, 29 .1 .81 .
52Interview with Reagan in Fiqaro-Maqaz ine, 20.2.81,
quoted in Aqence Europe Bulletin 21.2.81.
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personalities, but the result of a disagreement on policy. In 
these terms Reagan's presidency did not signal an improvement 
of relations in the alliance. Reagan was as critical of 
detente as his predecessor. The virulent anti-communist 
discourse of his foreign policy speeches was not matched by 
a corresponding zeal in Western Europe despite the fact that 
West European politics were also shifting further towards the 
right of the political spectrum. In other words, the ideology 
of the Reagan administration was as far, or even further, 
apart from the West European position as Carter's had been, 
thus, if anything, promising to aggravate tension in the 
Alliance.53
With regard to the Polish crisis, the differences between the 
West Europeans and the Reagan administration manifested 
themselves first on the question of economic relations. 
Members of the American administration were critical of the 
idea of economic aid to Eastern Europe, considering that it 
would only ease the Soviet Union's economic burden of looking 
after its East European satellites. Economic aid to Poland
53In his first press conference Reagan stated that "So 
far, detente has been a one-way street that the Soviet Union 
has used to pursue its own aims ...the promotion of world 
revolution and a one world socialist or communist state..." 
He also argued that "...the Soviets reserve unto themselves 
the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat..." to 
further this cause. "Documentation. The Reagan administration 
and superpower relations", Survival, vol. XXIII, no. 3, 
May/June 1981, pp. 129-30.
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was from this perspective seen as a way of subsidising Soviet 
control.54 Taken to its extreme logic, this would mean that 
the Western states ought to stand by and let the Polish 
economy collapse, in order to create a heavy financial burden 
for the Soviet Union. This policy was recommended by some 
member of the Reagan administration:
"If the Soviet Union were on the verge of bankruptcy, 
would the United States offer its financial aid? Of 
course not; the collapse of the Soviet economy would be 
proof that Communism does not work, a realization 
devoutly to be wished. If Communist-run Poland were on 
the verge of bankruptcy, would the United States offer 
that nation financial aid? The obvious answer is again, 
of course not - let the Russians, who imposed the 
unworkable system on Poland, bail it out."55
This domestic US debate on economic aid to Poland was only to 
a limited extent matched by similar consideration in Western 
Europe.56 In fact, West Europe had, through the European 
Community, started its programme of food aid in December 
1980. The West Europeans saw food aid to Poland as the 
logical continuation of the West European conception of
detente, in which trade and economic relations played and
/
54Gordon op. cit. p. 123, also Haig op. cit. pp. 111-116.
55Quoted in the International Herald Tribune, 13.2.81.
56"The West Europeans did not view detente as a quid pro
quo formula, wherein trade is considered a concession
requiring political rewards. In Europe, the interlocking
East-West interdependence was designed to create a generally 
harmonious politico-military environment in which Polish 
liberation was not the crucial objective." David William 
Hunter, Western trade pressure on the Soviet Union: an
interdependence perspective on sanctions, PhD dissertation, 
London School of Economics, 1988, p. 142.
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important part. Food aid was given without political 
conditions. It presupposed the ability and the willingness of 
the Polish regime to negotiate with the workers and to make 
reforms. In a televised interview on January 27 the French 
President summarised France's attitude to events in Poland 
with the following three words "sympathie, non-ingerence, 
aide".57 Although the French position at the time was more 
positive to economic aid than some of the other West European 
countries, his words are indicative of the differences 
between the United States and West Europe. France, Giscard 
pointed out, was "l'amie de la Pologne et du peuple polonais 
depuis longtemps". However, he also underlined that "dans la 
solution de ses problemes, la Pologne doit tenir compte de sa 
situation geographique et strategique". Finally, he 
underlined that Poland needed and should be able to rely on 
Western aid in its effort to solve its domestic problems.58
The new United States' administration on the other hand, only 
started its aid program in April 1981. The Carter 
administration had decided in November 1980 to put off 
further action on Poland's request for economic assistance 
until the Reagan administration was in place.59 The Reagan
57Full text of the interview published in Le Monde 
29.1.1981 .
^See also his memoirs, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Le 
pouvoir et la vie. Paris, Compagnie 12, 1988, pp. 168- 172.
59Aqence Europe Bulletin. 22.1 1.80.
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administration's position on economic policy had remained 
uncertain for several months, chiefly as a result of the 
discussion inside the administration on the role of East-West 
trade. When US economic aid was restarted, the United States 
took a different approach from the West Europeans. It made an 
effort to extract guarantees from Poland and it was stressed 
that the aid was conditional on the continuation of political 
reforms.
The discussion on aid to Poland took place in the context of 
a wider debate within the alliance on the risks and 
advantages of East-West economic relations. Since the Ottawa 
summit of the G7 in 1981 the United States had pursued the 
aim of introducing curbs on high technology exports to the 
Soviet Union and restricting Western credits to the Soviet 
Union.60 This was part of an overall change of American 
policy towards the Soviet bloc, initiated by the Reagan 
administration. The new American administration was highly 
suspicious of West European economic relations with the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It rejected one of the 
central ideas of detente policy, that trade with the Soviet
60Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, Hanging Together: 
Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven Power Summits, London, 
Sage, 1987, p. 126-140. See also Jack Brougher, "1979-82: The 
US uses trade to penalize Soviet aggression and seeks to 
reorder Western policy", pp. 419-453, study prepared for the 
use of the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, December 31 
1982, 97th Congress.
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system might lead to more openness and less tension.61 It
emphasised the risk of West European dependency on the Soviet
Union and also stressed that the West, through trade with the
Soviet bloc, was actually helping to strengthen the Soviet
military machinery, partly by providing hard currency to the
Soviet economy, partly by making Western technology available
to the Soviet Union.62 American policy of the early 1980's:
"...marked a major shift in the logic which had 
underpinned American policy towards the Soviet Union for 
the past twenty years, and especially a sharp break with 
the period of detente. ... The Reagan administration's 
emerging focus [was] on changing the Soviet domestic 
situation - whether as a means to alter the Soviet 
external behaviour or as a way to accelerate the 
disintegration of the Soviet system and empire..."63
The American concern about the Soviet Union gaining military 
advantages from trade with the West received a certain echo 
with some of the West European governments, in particular the 
British and the French. However, the American proposals 
resembled a policy of economic warfare that the West
61See for example Samuel Pisar, Coexistence and Commerce: 
Guidelines for Transactions Between East and West. London, 
Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1970, whose work is said to 
have influenced the French president Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing's view for East-West trade.
62For a discussion on the question of East-West trade and 
the utility of sanctions in East-West relations see for 
example Philip Hanson, Western Economic Statecraft in East- 
West Relations, Chatham House Paper, London, Routledge, 1988; 
Stephen Woolcock, Western Policies on East-West Trade. 
Chatham House Paper, RIIA, 1982; Robert O'Neill (ed), The 
Conduct of East-West Relations in the 1980s, Macmillan, 
London, 1985.
63Strategic Survey 1982-1983, The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, London 1983, p.31.
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Europeans were highly suspicious of. Also, there was still a
strong belief in Western Europe in the beneficial effects of
East-West trade on East-West stability. In the words of
Stephen Woolcock:
"West European governments,..., despite having modified 
some of the views that they held at the height of the 
detente period, see trade as a means of stabilizing 
East-West relations. . .1,64
The Europeans remained reluctant, both for economic and
political reasons, to abandon trade relations with the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe.65 As chapter four showed, economic
leverage was an important part in particular of the Federal
Republic's Ostpolitik. As the political importance of East-
West trade increased in the late 1970s for the Federal
Republic, the United States became increasingly sceptical of
the value of East-West trade. By 1981:
"Bonn's aversion to utilising negative economic leverage 
against the Soviet Union clearly demonstrated that...the 
Federal Republic had developed its own trade policy 
towards Eastern Europe and no longer accepted US 
definitions of what was permissible in the area."66
64Woolcock, op. cit. p. 79.
65See for example Pierre Hassner, "Les mots et les 
choses", pp. 232-241 in Marie-Claude Smouts and Sarny Cohen 
(eds), La Politique Exterieure de Valery Giscard d'Estainq, 
Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences 
Politiques, 1985 on the French commitment to East-West trade.
66Constanze Ketterer, German liberalism and foreign 
policy: the FDP's Ostpolitik under Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 
1974-1990. PhD dissertation, London School of Economic, 1994, 
p. 59.
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It was further argued by the Europeans that the cost of such 
a policy would be carried by the West Europeans. This was 
even more likely because of the type of products the US 
administration sought to exclude from East-West trade. By 
excluding agricultural products from his policy, Reagan 
"shifted the burden of responsibility and costs of supporting 
the US embargo policy to the Europeans".67
This discussion on East-West trade and economic aid to poland 
illustrates that there were fundamental differences in the 
United States' and (broadly speaking) West European 
approaches to East-West relations, and consequently 
underlines the difficulties .in providing some form of 
coherent Western response to events in Poland. One issue on 
which all the Western allies could agree, however, was that 
of the need to warn against a Soviet intervention in Poland. 
This was a policy which enabled the United States to prove 
that it took a firm stand against the Soviet Union, and the 
West Europeans to signal their continued commitment to 
detente, and their concern about the risk of its destruction. 
Such agreement was not, on the other hand, readily available 
when it came to preparing for the possibility of martial law 
in Poland. Consequently, discussion on this issue, and how to 
respond to it, was set aside.68 The Western states have been
67Hunter, op. cit. p. 72.
68Interview London, September 1994.
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criticised for presenting an oversimplified picture of the 
situation in Poland, for over-emphasising the role of the 
Soviet Union and for using the Polish crisis in their 
ideological and political struggle with the Soviet Union. It 
was from this perspective that the party chairman of the 
ruling SPD in the Federal Republic, Willy Brandt, argued that 
"Poland has a great deal more to do with Poland than with the 
relationship between East and West."69 In the same vein, 
Kevin Ruane has argued that the West ignored the complexity 
of events in Poland, and did not appreciate the new Polish 
government's genuine efforts at reform.70 It is often argued 
that "more" should have been done to support the process of 
reform in Poland, in particular economically.71 Others 
considered the West to have been too complacent with the 
Polish regime and the Soviet Union and that the appropriate 
response would have been an economic embargo.72 The next
69Quoted in Josef Joffe, The Limited Partnership: Europe, 
the United States and the Burdens of Alliance. Cambridge, 
MASS, Ballinger, 1987, p. 19.
70Kevin Ruane, The Polish Challenge. London, British 
Broadcasting Corporation, 1982, pp.76-77.
71See for example Portes, op. cit, Garton Ash, op. cit. 
pp 338-345. Both argue that a concerted and coordinated 
Western programme of economic aid could have made a 
difference in Poland, contributing to ensure stability and 
thus providing a fertile ground for reforms in Poland.
72For this argument see the debates on poland in the US 
Congress, for example "Developments in Europe", US Congress, 
House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. 97th Congress, 
Second Session, February 9, 1982. Cynkin argues that the
United States should have used the threat of a Polish default
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section will look more closely at the economic initiatives 
taken by Western states. What may be concluded at this point 
is that the policy developed by the Western allies may not 
have been the best policy for Poland, but it was a policy 
that enabled the Western allies to present a common front. 
Thus, the emphasis on the risk of Soviet intervention may 
well have been simplistic, yet it was a feasible option from 
the perspective of alliance cohesion.73 All could agree, 
albeit for separate reasons, on warnings against a Soviet 
intervention.74 This approach also allowed the Polish crisis 
to be defined as a Cold War issue, in which the roles of the 
Western allies were the most clearly set out and where 
cohesion was strongest. The economic and political issues 
raised by events in Poland, where the cement of the Soviet 
threat was less strong, became secondary to the issue of a 
risk of a military intervention in Poland.
as a bargaining chip with the Soviet Union, op. cit. p. 221. 
Charles Gati takes a different perspective by criticising 
both the notion that a massive economic aid programme could 
have made a difference and arguing that an economic policy of 
complete denial was unrealistic. Still, he comes down on the 
side of those favouring a strengthening of US sanctions 
towards Eastern Europe "Polish futures, Western options", pp. 
292-309 in Foreign Affairs, vol. 61, no. 2, 1982.
73Interview London, September 1994.
74It must, of course, be added that if a Soviet or Warsaw 
Pact military intervention were to have taken place, it would 
not only have been a humanitarian disaster, but would have 
seriously destabilised the European continent.
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The Western states’ difficulties in agreeing on how to
prepare for martial law in Poland, and the consequent result,
which was to leave preparations for this eventuality out, are
confirmed by Haig's memoirs:
”We had expected that the suppression would come at the 
hands of internal Polish forces, but discussions with 
allied governments failed to develop a consensus on the 
actions that might be taken by the West in this 
contingency. We had known for many months what we would 
do in case of direct Soviet intervention; but there was 
no certain plan of action in the more ambiguous case of 
internal crackdown."75
The chapter now turns to look more closely at the economic 
response to events in Poland. Partly as a result of the 
divergence of views on East-West relations, partly as a 
result of a limited commitment to an economic initiative, the 
economic response to the situation in Poland was slow to 
develop and limited in its impact.
A reluctant economic response
Chapter four showed that it was already clear in autumn 1980 
that Poland would be facing serious difficulties in servicing 
its debt. In 1981, the lack of foreign currency to buy 
essential imports, together with the continued strikes, put 
additional strains on an already weak Polish economy. By the 
end of 1981, several basic goods were rationed and many key 
industries were estimated to run at half capacity or less. By
75Haig, op. cit. p. 247.
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the end of 1981, Poland's debt had reached $27 bn.76 The debt 
was not only severely hampering the restoration of economic 
prosperity in Poland, it had also become a serious liability 
for the Western banking system, in particular for the West 
European banks, notwithstanding the umbrella theory. 
Nonetheless, the West's economic response was put in place 
very slowly. This was due chiefly to the wider transatlantic 
disagreements on East-West economic relations discussed 
above. An outright crisis was avoided partly because 
different approaches developed inside different institutional 
frameworks.
Although discussions on the rescheduling of Poland's debt 
were for the most kept secret, it is clear that Western 
efforts to coordinate their responses to Polish demands for 
additional credits started in December 1980. In late February 
a press communique was published in which it was officially 
confirmed that such talks were taking place.77 There was no 
obvious institution to deal with the coordination of the 
rescheduling of Poland's debt. An ad hoc group was organised 
at the initiative of the French Government and negotiations 
with Poland were chaired by the French Directeur du Tresor,
76This figure is quoted by several sources. See London 
Press Service, Verbatim Service 3.12.80; Keesinq's 
Contemporary Archives February 20, 1981. p.30717; Strategic 
Survey: 1981-82. The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, London 1982, p. 58.
77Le Monde 27.2.81 .
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Jean-Yves Haberer.78 The negotiations involved 15 countries. 
Poland itself was also present.
Achieving agreement on rescheduling Poland's debt was not 
done overnight. A general agreement was only achieved in 
April 1981. Short-term bilateral refinancing measures were 
taken to compensate while waiting for a long term solution. 
West Germany, France and Britain all provided short term 
credit to Poland to permit normal commercial transactions to 
continue. The delay in agreement was caused by the hesitant 
attitude of the Reagan administration.79 By April 10 a 
document established by French, British, American and West 
German government officials provided a detailed assessment of 
Poland's financial situation, and on 27 April an agreement on 
principle was made to reschedule about $2.5 bn. worth of 
official government-backed debts due for payment in 1981. The 
main points of the agreement were:
- 90 % of all official Western credits to Poland falling due 
between May 1 and the end of 1981 would be rescheduled or 
refinanced (including both interest and principal payment)
78International Herald Tribune, 7.1.81.
79Progress on the debt negotiations was reported in 
Financial Times. 22.1.1981, 12.2.81, 24.2.1981, 31.3.81 and 
1.4.81. See also "Poland - the continuing crisis", Background 
paper, no. 97, House of Commons Library, 23 November 1981, 
pp. 4-7.
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- introduction of a four year grace period in which Poland 
would not be required to repay those debts, repayment would 
start in 1986 and run for the next four years.80
However, this agreement was only a first step. It was clear 
that Poland would also need to renegotiate its debt for 1982. 
Furthermore, there was the problem of new credits to bridge 
Poland's balance of payment gap and pay for essential imports 
as well as the question of the attitude of those creditors 
who had not been present at the discussions (Brazil, Spain 
and OPEC). The agreement was considered to be a basic formula 
that should also be applied by Poland's other creditors. Most 
importantly, the Paris agreement only covered half of 
Poland's hard currency debt. Agreement on rescheduling the 
other half, which was owed to private banks, still had to be 
negotiated.81 The commercial banks had been sitting on the 
fence, waiting for the outcome of the negotiations of the 
official debt before engaging themselves. Assessing the 
situation from a purely economic perspective, they were much 
more sceptical about Poland's economic prospects and more 
reluctant to give additional credits than their governments.
80US Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 
Subcommittee on European Affairs. 97th Congress, second 
session, "The Polish economy and Poland's international debt: 
implications for US foreign policy", January 27, 1982, pp.IT- 
12; Financial Times 28.4.81.
81Financial Times 30.4.1981.
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Negotiations on Poland’s commercial debt were dealt with by 
a task force of Western banks, the number varying from 15 to 
21. The task force would negotiate with Poland on behalf of 
all the country's commercial creditors. There were 
characteristics of the Polish debt that made it particularly 
difficult to find a solution.82 Firstly, there was more money 
at stake than usual in rescheduling negotiations. Poland 
requested rescheduling of $3.1 bn. Previous rescheduling 
agreements with Turkey and Bolivia had involved smaller 
amounts. Secondly, the loans were spread amongst a very large 
number of creditors - about 460 banks were said to be 
involved and approval on the agreement was needed from all of 
them. Finally, negotiations of this kind were usually led by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It has the necessary 
expertise to negotiate with governments and is also able to 
acquire the necessary information on a country's economic 
situation from the government in question. Yet, Poland was 
not a member of the IMF and a major stumbling block 
throughout the negotiations was Polish reluctance to give 
information to its creditors about its financial situation.
In addition to these technical difficulties, it was the 
considerable difference between the European and the American 
approach to the question of rescheduling, which slowed down
82Peter Montagnon "Rescheduling Polish debt. More than 
money at stake", Financial Times 22.6.1981.
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deliberations. American banks were dragging their feet in the 
search for a solution.83 The American position was that more 
time was needed to assess Poland's prospects for economic 
recovery before an agreement could be made. The European 
banks, who were more heavily exposed than their American 
counterparts, needed a faster agreement to protect themselves 
from a potential default. It was assumed that if one of the 
banks declared default it would make the whole block stumble. 
The Europeans further argued that a quick agreement was the 
only way to get the Polish economy back in working condition.
By the end of April there was pressure on both European and 
American banks to find a quick solution to the debt problem. 
Poland's economic situation and hence its ability to repay 
its debt was worsening. The West European governments were 
also pressuring their banks to do something.84 In early 
April, Poland was given a "moratorium" until July 1 , the 
delay then given to find a more long term solution to 
Poland's commercial debt.85 Finally on 25 June the commercial 
banks were reported to have reached an agreement on a 
programme of rescheduling.86 However, the agreement still had 
to be approved by Poland and certain of the conditions
83International Herald Tribune 22.5.81 .
^Financial Times, 6.3.81.
85Financial Times, 1.4.81 and Le Monde 17.4.81.
86Financial Times 26.6.81 .
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attached were difficult to accept. Essentially, the plan 
proposed that Poland’s debt for 1981 ($3bn falling due in
1981) would be deferred until 1988, provided that Poland 
supplied the banks with a detailed economic recovery 
programme. Poland had never before supplied this kind of 
economic information, which included details of its financial 
relationship with the Soviet Union, to Western commercial 
institutions.87 An "agreement in principle" for Poland's 1981 
debt, between Poland and its Western creditors was not 
reached until 30 September the same year.88 In early 
December, Poland was still threatening to declare default on 
some of its loans to the West.89 Further, there were still 
doubts in the West as to the ability and willingness of 
Polish authorities to follow up the agreement with Western 
bankers.90
In addition to the negotiations on rescheduling its debt, 
Poland was asking the West for additional credits, especially 
to import food. These matters were dealt with in different
87Financial Times 30.7.81, The Guardian 26.8.81.
^Financial Times 1.10.81. The agreement had also been 
delayed by the insistence of US banks that Poland should be 
charged penalty interest rates. "Poland. Foreign economic 
assistance", Keesings Contemporary Archives, December 4, 
1981, p. 3122.
89The Guardian 5.12.81 .
90International Herald Tribune 20.11.81. By the end of 
November it was reported that new negotiations were entered 
into for Poland's debt for 1982, Financial Times 21.11.81.
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fora from those dealing with the rescheduling of existing 
debt. Individual West European states had been approached by 
Poland on the question of food and general economic credits, 
but the EEC as such had not been asked for economic 
assistance.91 At the European Council in Luxembourg in late 
1980, the members of the European Community decided that they 
would provide food aid for Poland and that this would be done 
through the EC, rather than bilaterally.92
On December 8 Polish authorities gave the Commission specific 
details of what food aid they would like to receive.93 This 
was the first time that the Community offered food aid to a 
European country. The programme set out by the Commission 
involved complex interaction between EC institutions, 
national governments and Poland itself. The food was to be 
taken from existing Community stocks. Hence the Commission 
and the DG for agriculture was responsible for working out 
the details of the aid programme and for negotiating its 
contents with Polish authorities.94 This was done according
91Aqence Europe Bulletin. 3.12.80 and 4.12.80.
92Aqence Europe Bulletin 25.3.1981. Bulletin of the 
European Communities. Commission. No 12, 1980, vol. 13,
"Poland to receive food supplies from the Community", 
sections 1.2.1-1.26.
93Aqence Europe Bulletin 8/9.12.80, p.5.
94It is interesting to note that the Polish government 
was dealing directly with the EC despite the fact that it had 
not officially recognised its existence. Official recognition 
of the EC by the COMECON countries only came in 1988.
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to the guidelines given by the European Council in 
Luxembourg. It was thus the Commissioner for Agriculture, Mr. 
Villain, who negotiated with Polish officials about the 
conditions for the aid package. According to the Commission's 
plan, the food was to be delivered to Poland at prices 10% 
below the world rate for sugar and 15% below for other goods. 
The price difference between Community prices and the price 
at which the foodstuff was sold to Poland was to be covered 
by the Community budget. The cost for the EAGGF (European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund) was estimated to be 
approximately 30 million Ecus.95 The member states were 
responsible for providing credits in order for Poland to be 
able to pay for the foodstuff originating in their country. 
The program established in December 1980 was maintained as a 
'model' throughout 1981.
The Commission's proposal was confirmed by the EEC Council of 
Foreign Ministers on 17 December. By the end of February it 
was reported that the Polish government was preparing a 
demand for a second batch of food aid from the European 
Community.96 The Polish demand was finally submitted on 23 
March, thus coinciding with the European Council in
95This estimation depended on the world market prices at
the time of payment.
96Aqence Europe Bulletin. 23/4.2.81.
281
Maastricht.97 The European Council again recognised Poland's 
need for economic support and instructed the Council and the 
Commission "in agreement with the partner countries which 
were already taking part in the Paris discussion, to examine 
these wishes as soon as possible."98 The plan for the second 
tranche of food supplies was ready by early April and was 
estimated to cost the European Community's budget 33 million 
ECU. The conditions were the same as for the first tranche. 
By early September Poland prepared to ask for a third lot of 
food aid to be delivered in the last part of 1981. The first 
consignment of the third aid package was agreed upon by the 
Ten in early October and was to be sent under the same 
conditions as aid produced throughout 1981. The third aid 
package altogether was estimated at a cost of 52 million ECU 
for the EAGGF.99
The production of a list of supplies available from Community 
stocks was the easiest part to settle. Providing national 
credits for Poland to enable it to buy this food was more 
complicated. Delays were encountered in the negotiations 
between Poland and some of the EC member states. The first
97Aqence Europe Bulletin, 25.3.81.
98Aqence Europe Bulletin 25.3.81. See also, "Supply of 
agricultural products to Poland", Bulletin of the European 
Communities, no. 5, 1981, vol 14, section 2.1.62.
99Aqence Europe Bulletin 3.10.81. Also, "Supply of food 
products to Poland", Bulletin of the European Communities, no 
10, 1981, vol 14, section 2.1.94.
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batch of food aid was delayed because agreement on credit was 
not achieved at the time planned.100 Only by the beginning 
of March were these negotiations coming to an end.101 As the 
second and third batches were negotiated, hesitant voices 
were expressing doubt about certain aspects of the food aid 
project. Member states were reported as having difficulties 
in organising enough credit to cover the Polish purchases. 
The German government was quoted as being reticent, whereas 
France was positive to the project.102 In the second tranche 
of aid France proposed increases to the Commission's program. 
In addition, France proposed to sell additional wheat, 
financed on an autonomous basis.103 On the whole, France's 
position on food and economic aid in this period was 
"lenient" and France was playing an important role in 
ensuring the continuation of the Community's program as well 
as the discussion on the rescheduling of Poland's debt.
It has already been pointed out that the new United States' 
administration took longer to decide on a program of food aid 
to Poland. Its aid program did not start until April 1981 . In
100Aqence Europe Bulletin, 2.4.81. See also the European 
Parliament's resolution, urging member states to eliminate 
the problems hampering rapid supply of food aid to Poland. 
Bulletin of the European Communities, no.4, 1981, vol 14,
section 2.3.13.
101Aqence Europe Bulletin. 5.3.81.
102Aqence Europe Bulletin 18.9.81 .
103Aqence Europe Bulletin 16.4.81 and 15.5.81.
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late October the United States declared that it was ready to 
supply Poland with additional basic foodstuff worth 29 
million $.104
Several conclusions can be drawn with regard to the economic 
aspects of the Western response to events in Poland. The 
Western states did not have a coherent, overall approach on 
economic policy towards the Polish crisis. There was no forum 
to provide overall coordination of all aspects of the 
economic response to Poland, and no one country or 
institution took the lead and ensured a dynamic response in 
the economic sphere. The Europeans coordinated their food aid 
through the European Community and the United States acted 
directly with Poland. In this area, the EC emerged as an 
important actor, yet the EC's programme of food aid, was far 
from super-efficient. The food aid was only delivered to 
Poland after considerable delay, confirming a reluctant 
attitude amongst some of the West European governments. 
Furthermore, it must be underlined that what was called food 
aid was, in effect, increasing Poland's long term debt, 
because Poland was at some point in the future expected to 
repay the credits given in the early 1980s to buy the food. 
By early December it was decided that the Community, as a 
"Christmas gift" to Poland, would deliver 8 000 tonnes of 
beef. It would be the first food "aid" given for free to
104Aqence Europe Bulletin 29.10.81.
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Poland since the beginning of the crisis.105 As for the debt 
issue, it was dealt with through separate channels, outside 
Western institutional frameworks. Agreeing on the debt 
rescheduling was a lengthy process. The decision to 
reschedule Poland's commercial debt for 1981 was only reached 
in early December 1981, and was jeopardised by the imposition 
of martial law. Both Poland's commercial and public debt for 
the following years were still left unresolved. The delays 
were not only the result of a lack of interest in the West, 
and of genuine disagreement over its legitimacy, but also 
demonstrated the difficulties in coordinating policies 
outside established structures. In addition, economic aid was 
not closely integrated with the overall response to the 
crisis.
Conclusions
Assessments of Western policies towards Poland in this period 
vary greatly. On the one hand, Western policies have been 
seen as successful in the sense that they contributed to 
deterring the Soviet Union from intervening militarily in 
Poland. The Western states managed, in a way that they did 
not in 1956 and 1968, to signal to the Soviet Union that a 
military intervention would not be taken lightly. On the 
other hand, it is often pointed out that more could have been
105Aqence Europe Bulletin 5.12.81.
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done, in particular in the economic area, to support the 
reform process in Poland. The Western approach to events in 
Poland has also been accused of being blinkered, because of 
focusing only on the conflict with the Soviet Union.
What this chapter has showed is that the Western responses to 
Poland must be understood against the backdrop of intra­
alliance relations. The policy developed was a feasible 
policy from the perspective of alliance cohesion, although 
not necessarily the "best" policy in terms of the situation 
in Poland. In other words, a form of bureaucratic politics 
was taking place at the level of the alliance. Defining the 
Polish crisis in terms, of East-West relations (in other 
words, concentrating on the risks of a military 
intervention), was the easiest option for the Western 
alliance. By focusing on the role of the Soviet Union, a lid 
was kept on diverging perspectives on detente. This approach 
also allowed the United States to present itself as a the 
defender of human rights and democracy in Poland, and the 
West Europeans to express their commitment to the 
continuation of detente. It allowed Western states to be seen 
to be "doing something" and at the same time to maintain 
cohesion in the Alliance. So, the Western allies were 
successful in coordinating their responses to events in 
Poland, in so far as they avoided direct clashes. Yet, 
cohesion over Poland was built on a fragile edifice, which
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excluded important policy-options and slowed down economic 
initiatives, contributed to dragging out debt negotiations 
and to slowing down the process of food aid to Poland. Most 
importantly, despite the fact that the possibility of martial 
law in Poland was known to Western states, no common 
contingency plans were made for this possibility, because the 
Western states could not agree on how to react to it.
With regard to the role of the Western institutional 
frameworks, conclusions are not clear cut. On the one hand, 
the suggestions made in chapter three, that the large number 
of Western institutions might make coordination more 
difficult, have only been partly confirmed here. If there 
were no direct clashes on economic policy, this was partly 
because the economic responses were not dealt with within the 
Atlantic framework. The West Europeans used the instrument of 
the EC to coordinate their food aid to Poland, whereas the US 
continued bilateral negotiations with Poland on this issue. 
The existence of the EC also enabled the West European states 
to move ahead with economic aid to Poland without waiting for 
the United States.
On the other hand, no one single state or institution took an 
overall view and provided leadership in the Western response 
to Poland. The leadership role traditionally played by the 
United States worked well when exercised in the traditional
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alliance sphere, in other words, in making contingency 
planning for a Soviet intervention within the context of 
NATO. The US failed to provide dynamism and direction for the 
Western states in the economic sphere, and there were no 
institutional structures or other actors taking the United 
States' place. Debt rescheduling, food aid, and contingency 
planning were dealt with by separate institutional networks 
with few links between them.
The emergence of the European Community as an active 
participant in the Western response to Poland was unusual. 
The decision to use the EC instruments followed logically 
from the setting up of a common trade policy towards Eastern 
Europe, however, as described in chapter three, member states 
had been reluctant to allow the EC to play an active role in 
East-West trade. What is more, the linking of EPC aims in 
Poland and the provisions for food aid through the European 
Community structures, was unorthodox.106 Still, the EC's 
efforts were this time round only partially successful. The 
EC's policy on food aid suffered from divisions and 
disagreements amongst member states, as well as from delays 
in the implementation process. Thus, although breaking new 
ground, the EC failed to emerge as an entirely efficient 
economic actor in East-West relations. Furthermore, it is
106It must be added that the EC's activities in Poland in 
the early 1980s contributed to lay the foundations for its 
role in Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War.
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important to underline that Western states put a considerable 
effort into avoiding unnecessary strains on the Alliance. 
Thus, EPC remained in the background as long as the political 
aspects of the crisis were dealt with by NATO.
During the phase examined in this chapter, the Polish crisis 
became an important issue in East-West relations. As a 
consequence of this, one would perhaps have expected an 
effort to link it to the ongoing arms negotiations in Europe. 
There is little indication that this was attempted, although 
it must be assumed that withdrawing from arms negotiations 
was one of the items on the list of contingencies in case of 
a Soviet intervention. There was, however, a spillover from 
Western discussions on East-West trade and control of 
strategic exports in the sense that the Polish crisis 
provided the US administration with additional ammunition in 
its campaign to tighten CoCom rules on exports to the Soviet 
bloc. This will be dealt with in more detail in chapter six.
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CHAPTER SIX. AFTER THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW. A CRISIS IN 
THE WESTERN CAMP
Introduction
With the imposition of martial law in Poland on 13 December 
1981, the carefully built Western consensus on Poland broke 
down, leading to one of the most serious crises in the 
history of the Western alliance. As the two previous chapters 
have shown, Western policy-makers started out defining the 
Polish crisis as a domestic Polish issue. From December 1980, 
it became impossible to define the Polish crisis purely in 
domestic terms. Western policies concentrated increasingly on 
the risk of a Soviet military intervention, and the crisis 
spilt over into East-West relations. This chapter shows that 
with the imposition of martial law, a second spillover took 
place from the Polish crisis, into intra- Western relations, 
provoking what Coral Bell has called an intra-mural crisis in 
the Western alliance.1
In his speech to the Polish nation, announcing the imposition 
of martial law and the creation of a "Military Council of 
National Salvation", General Jaruzelski defined the 
objectives of martial law to be to restore the rule of law,
^oral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis, Oxford 
University Press, 1971, p.7.
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order and discipline and to create guarantees for the normal 
working of the State administration.2 As a result of martial 
law, Poland’s borders were closed, internal and external 
lines of communication were closed down, basic civil rights 
were suspended and members of Solidarity and dissidents were 
interned. Despite the high level of repression, there was 
resistance to the authorities. Strikes and sit-ins were 
reported in several areas in Poland. By the end of the year, 
however, the military appeared to have succeeded in breaking 
most of the resistance. The Polish authorities reported that 
eight people were dead and approximately 5000 interned.3
Polish authorities claimed martial law was only a temporary 
measure aimed at ’’restoring order", and not the end of the 
reform process altogether. Gradually, however, all the 
independent unions established since August 1980 were banned. 
On 8 October 1982 the Sejm also banned Solidarity itself, 
thus confirming that the initial hopes for a restoration of 
the process of reform were misleading. By the time martial
2Kevin Ruane, The Polish Challenge, London, BBC, 1982, 
p. 277.
3Ruane, op. cit. p.288. Although the Polish authorities 
might not be a totally reliable source on the question, it 
must be assumed that the number of dead and arrested was not 
lower than what the officials were ready to admit.
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law was lifted, in July 1983, all its measures had been 
incorporated into the legal system.4
Restoring and maintaining order was the simplest of the tasks 
facing Jaruzelski. Regaining the political confidence of the 
population, and getting the economy back in shape, proved to 
be more difficult. By the end of 1982, the authority of the 
Communist Party was still fragile, and the army, rather than 
the Party, appeared to constitute the backbone of Poland's 
administration.5 The regime's inability to mobilise society 
also affected the economic situation in Poland, making 
economic reform difficult. Food supplies remained low, 
industrial production remained in slump and there was a 
shortage of hard currency for the import of vital goods.
Chapters four and five found a strong element of 
bureaucratic politics in the Western alliance. The imposition 
of martial law provoked a turning point in the crisis and 
placed Western policy-makers in a situation where explicit 
choices had to be made and 'muddling through' was no longer 
an option. They had to clarify, both at a national level and
4It must be underlined, however, that even so, in 
comparison with other East-European countries, the Polish 
regime was relatively liberal. See for example Karen Dawisha, 
Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
5George Sanford, Military Rule in Poland: The Rebuilding 
of Communist Power. 1981-3. London, Croom Helm, 1986.
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at the alliance level, their objectives with regard to 
Poland, as well as identify the appropriate means to achieve 
these objectives. Against this backdrop, the role of Western 
coordination mechanisms and the extent to which the breakdown 
of Western coordination can be seen as the result of 
insufficient institutional or structural support is 
discussed. Furthermore, the importance of policy- 
disagreements as a result of martial law is examined. Indeed, 
as chapter four pointed out, although detente had raised the 
Western "stakes" in Poland, these "stakes" were not 
distributed equally amongst Western allies. This made 
agreement on how to react to martial law difficult. The 
Western states struggled not only with defining a common 
response to martial law, but in agreeing on its significance 
for the Western alliance. Finally, the significance of this 
crisis for the Western alliance and the roles, not only of 
individual states, but of the EC/EPC within it are examined. 
It is suggested that the crisis after martial law was not 
exclusively about Poland but about the nature of the Western 
alliance.
The chapter is organised chronologically. It starts out by 
looking at the immediate Western reactions to the imposition 
of martial law, as well as the main issues it raised for the 
Western allies. Subsequently, it outlines the Western 
responses, as they were formulated by individual states, and
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examines the attempts made at coordinating these reactions. 
Following from this, the links between Western disagreements 
over martial law and pre-existing disputes inside the 
alliance are explored. Finally, the last section discusses 
the efforts made to patch up transatlantic differences after 
the G7 summit in June 1982.
Confusion in the Western camp
The immediate reaction in the West to the imposition of 
martial law can best be characterised as dominated by 
surprise, confusion and a certain embarrassment. Surprise, 
because there was no Soviet military intervention; confusion, 
because it was difficult to know what was really happening in 
Poland, and what the West could do about it; embarrassment, 
because of the lack of Western preparedness and because of 
the fragility of the Western consensus. With the imposition 
of martial law, the West risked being exposed as divided and 
indecisive. Jaruzelski's "domestic solution" highlighted the 
contradictions and confusions of Western interests and 
objectives, not only with regard to the Polish crisis but in 
Eastern Europe in general.
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As chapter five has showed, the West had prepared itself for, 
and was probably expecting, a Soviet or Warsaw Pact military 
intervention in Poland. It was not prepared for a domestic 
crackdown: NATO's contingency-planning restricted itself to 
the possibility of a Soviet military intervention. 
Furthermore, although the possibility of martial law was 
known to Western governments, its timing also took Western 
states by surprise:
"The timing of this action [the imposition of martial 
law], which obviously had been meticulously prepared - 
and which we knew had been planned in minute detail in 
the USSR - came without forewarning to the United 
States.1,6
Most importantly, martial law did not fit in with Western 
contingency planning and created chaos in the Western 
alliance.7 There was an urgent need for a reassessment of 
Western policies and for a re-evaluation of the situation in 
Poland. This reassessment was, however, not a simple task. It 
would, for several reasons, be hazardous both for the 
alliance and for individual Western governments. A Soviet 
military intervention would have been easier to deal with for
6Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign
Policy, New York, Macmillan, 1984, p.247. This is also 
confirmed in interviews in Oslo December 1992 and London, 
September 1994.
7See for example International Herald Tribune 
19/20.12.81 which underlines the press' view that there was 
no agreement in the alliance on what should be done about a 
Polish scenario in which the Soviet role was ambiguous.
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the Western alliance. It would have produced a clear-cut 
situation in which the Soviet Union could have been singled 
out as the main responsible party. With the imposition of 
martial law, the West was obliged to enter a "grey” area, 
created largely by the policy of detente, where it was less 
easy to attribute responsibility, and where there was room 
for various different interpretations of the situation and 
various different solutions as to how one should react. As 
Hill has argued:
"This development [the imposition of martial law] was 
the worst possible from the Western viewpoint of seeking 
to make an effective response to the suppression of 
Solidarity. It neatly divided the United States from the 
Europeans by playing on the latter's hopes for a 
reconstructed Poland, rather than the 'liberation' which 
President Reagan's rhetoric increasingly yearned for."8
Further Complicating the task of reassessing Western policies 
was the fact that, as a result of a total news blackout in 
the first ten days of martial law, it was almost impossible 
to get an accurate picture of the political situation inside 
Poland. It was not clear whether or not martial law had 
succeeded, how widespread resistance was to the military 
takeover, or how widespread the political repression was. It 
was still unsure to what extent martial law really was only 
a short term measure, as the Polish authorities claimed, and
8Christopher Hill and James Mayall, The Sanctions 
Problem: International and European Perspectives. EUI Working 
Paper, Florence, July 1983, p. 17.
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whether or not there was still a risk of Soviet military 
action.
One issue in particular divided the West in the aftermath of 
martial law: that of the role of the Soviet Union and the 
degree to which it was responsible for the imposition of 
martial law. Western policy-makers also diverged on the 
question of whether or not marital law had been unavoidable, 
although they did not dwell on this in public. The way in 
which Western policy-makers at the time assessed the role and 
responsibility of the Soviet Union for martial law, had more 
to do with their pre-existing position on East-West 
relations, than with the political situation in Poland. 
Pierre Hassner has emphasised these paradoxes in the Western 
debate:
"Ceux qui proclament le plus fort que la crise polonaise 
marque la fin de la detente et reclament des sanctions, 
la suspensions ou la reduction radicale des rapports 
economiques Est-Ouest, un rearmement intensif face a la 
menace militaire sovietique, - sont ceux pour qui les 
evenements de Pologne n’ont en realite rien change. ... 
Ceux pour qui le 13 decembre devrait poser un probleme, 
ceux qui devraient s'interroger sur leur interpretation 
de l'Est et sur les paris qui servaient de fondement a 
leur politique, ce sont precisement les autres, ceux qui 
croyaient a la detente, ..., aux 1armes de la paix'... 
Or,... [ils] maintiennent que le rapprochement est plus 
necessaire que jamais".9
9Pierre Hassner,"Le Deuil sied a 1'Europe", pp.11-25 in 
Esprit, April 1982, p.12.
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It must be emphasised, though, that this tendency was
facilitated by the fact that information on events in Poland
was limited. The fundamental disagreement about the
significance of martial law, and the role of the Soviet
Union, is reflected in the literature on the Polish crisis.
Some have argued that the decision to impose martial law had
been taken by Moscow, and that Jaruzelski was merely a Soviet
puppet. Hence, Thomas M. Cynkin, assuming perfect rationality
in the Soviet approach to Poland, for instance argues that:
"The final phase of the Polish crisis of 1980/81 saw the 
fruition of Moscow's strategy: the reaffirmation, beyond 
any doubt, of Soviet domination of the state of Poland. 
Pressure by Moscow . . . galvanised the PUWP leadership 
and led to the ascendance of General Wojiech Jaruzelski, 
the man chosen to serve as the Petain of Poland."10
Jaruzelski1s own account of events is carefully balanced 
between emphasising the importance of the independence of the
Polish government in preparing and deciding on martial law, 
and stressing the threats emerging from the Soviet Union. He 
argues that the plans for martial law were made by Poland 
itself, and not by the Soviet Union.11 He also underlines 
that continuous reform was impossible in Poland because 
Solidarity had, by December 1981, gone too far. After news of
10Thomas M. Cynkin, Soviet and American Signalling in the 
Polish Crisis. London, Macmillan Press, 1988, p.181.
11"Das war psychische Folter", Per Spiegel, 11 May 1992, 
pp. 181-194. Interestingly, Jaruzelski appears to have been 
relatively successful in convincing his compatriots of his 
position. An opinion poll conducted in October 1992 indicated 
that 59% of Poles then thought the imposition of martial law 
was a "patriotic act". Aftenposten, 29.8.1993.
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a planned mass demonstration of Solidarity supporters on 17 
December, he feared a situation similar to Budapest in 1956, 
arguing that Poland found itself at the brink of internal 
anarchy, with members of Solidarity barricading the streets 
and seeking to overthrow the Party. At the same time, he 
confirms the crucial role of the Soviet Union. He has 
consistently presented himself as a Polish patriot, under 
constant pressure from Soviet authorities, imposing martial 
law in order to save Poland from a Soviet military 
intervention. He points out that the final decision to impose 
martial law came after a straight ultimatum from the Soviet 
Union.
Jaruzelski1s position has been contradicted by documents 
brought to Poland by Boris Yeltsin during his state visit to 
Poland, in August 1993. According to these documents, 
Jaruzelski personally requested "fraternal aid" from the 
Soviet Union, but was refused by the Soviet leadership.12 The 
validity of these statements must be questioned, bearing in 
mind the overwhelming evidence of Soviet political and 
military pressure on Poland towards the end of 1980 and
12Le Monde. 30 August 1993, "Les Sovietiques ont refuse 
d'intervenir en Pologne en decembre 1981"; Newsweek. 
September 6, 1993 "Uncle Boris big surprise"; Aftenposten. 
29.8.1993. Similar arguments have been put forward by Soviet 
general Gribkov as well as Soviet Foreign Minister during the 
Polish crisis, Ustinov. See Spiegel op. cit.
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during most of 1981. The context in which this request is 
supposed to have been made is also insufficiently outlined.
Geoffrey Stern's position is close to Jaruzelski1s. He has 
argued that the decision to impose martial law was not taken 
as a result of pressure from Poland's neighbours, but in 
order to bring Poland back from the brink of domestic 
political and economic chaos:
"...it seems to me that having shrugged off Soviet and 
allied pressures before, for example in August and 
September 1980, in December 1980 ... the Polish
authorities could conceivably have shrugged off Soviet 
and Eastern European pressures again.[...] I would 
maintain that a Soviet military intervention in December 
1981 was extremely unlikely and that hence fear of it is 
unlikely to have precipitated martial law. What I think 
may have tipped the scales, ..., was the catastrophic 
economic, social and political impact of the 
revolutionary impulse inside Poland itself."13
The independence of the Polish regime, and the decision to 
impose martial law as a Polish one, has also been underlined 
by Kevin Ruane:
"Towards the end of the year Pravda in Moscow reported 
problems inside the Polish Communist Party itself. Not 
all its members or organisations, it said, had withstood 
the test of acute political struggle. Now the Party had 
to strengthen its militant ranks. Such expressions of 
concern will probably be interpreted differently by 
different people, but to this writer, at least, they did 
not suggest the sort of certainty or confidence one 
might have expected from the Kremlin if it had indeed
13Geoffrey Stern "Poland: the confrontation continues" 
lecture given to the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 28.1.1981. quotes on p. 5 and 6 taken from 
transcript of lecture.
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imposed martial law on the Poles. And if there has been 
little mention of Moscow in this book since the 
beginning of November 1981 it is because it was Warsaw 
that was making all the running and Moscow was 
following.1,14
Taking a different perspective, Garton Ash has argued that
Polish authorities had, at no point, intended to reach a
compromise with the workers, and that they had, on the 
contrary, stalled reforms, thus ultimately provoking a crisis 
in Poland. Furthermore, he describes Solidarity's demands as 
reasonable and realistic, on condition that the Polish 
authorities were willing to cooperate.15 As chapter five 
argued, we now know that plans had been made for a Warsaw 
Pact military intervention in Poland if martial law failed, 
and that in parallel, from the autumn of 1980, plans were
laid down in Poland for the imposition of martial law. What
remains unclear is precisely under which circumstances a 
Soviet intervention would have taken place. Nevertheless, on 
this basis, to exclude totally Soviet responsibility and
14Kevin Ruane op. cit.,p.293. See also Andre Gerrits 
"Limits of Influence: The Kremlin and the Polish Crisis. 
1980-81", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1988, 
pp. 231-239 for a similar perspective. It must be added here, 
however, that as the mouthpiece of Soviet authorities, a 
comment in Pravda could easily be a policy instrument aimed 
at encouraging certain perceptions of Soviet intentions in 
the West.
15He writes that: "That the experiment would fail was, 
from the outset, probable, but not inevitable", Timothy 
Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity. London, Granta 
Books, p. 299. He also points to the inconsistency in the 
position of those who considered Solidarity to have gone "too 
far", and points out that they also often tended to argue 
that change in Poland was, from the outset, impossible.
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involvement from marital law seems unrealistic. Furthermore, 
information about the early planning of martial law lends 
some credit to the idea that the Polish government did not 
really intend to compromise with workers, and that the 
negotiations in Poland after August 1980 were mostly about 
stalling the protesters.
The first official Western reactions confirm the discomfort 
of Western governments and the idea that reassessing the 
policy was difficult both at the national level and at the 
level of the alliance as a whole. Characteristic are the 
contradictory statements from the French government in the 
aftermath of martial law. French Foreign Minister Claude 
Cheysson, in reply to a question on what France would do 
about martial law said: "Of course we will do nothing".16 A 
few days later, on December 16, President Mitterrand declared 
that whether the loss of freedom was the result of internal 
oppression or external pressure, it should be "clearly, 
vigorously and constantly denounced".17 Mitterrand's 
statement came after strong pressure from his own party and
16Quoted in Gabriel Robin, La Diplomatie de Mitterrand, 
editions la Bievre, France, 1985, p. 38; and in Pierre 
Hassner, "The View from Paris", pp.188-231 in Lincoln Gordon 
(ed), Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe. 
The Brookings Institutions, Washington DC, 1987, p.208.
17Mitterrand is quoted by Mauroy in Debats Parlementaires 
de l'Assemblee Nationale, Premiere Session Ordinaire de 1981- 
82, seconde seance de 16 decembre 1981, Journal Officiel,
17.12.1981, p. 4991. Also Financial Times 17.12.81.
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from the non-communist trades unions, who had found 
Cheysson's initial official reaction to martial law 
inadequate.18
Overall, the West Europeans avoided a hardline position in 
the immediate aftermath of martial law. Speaking to the 
European Parliament, as President of the Council of 
Ministers, British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, 
condemned the imposition of martial law, but indicated at the 
same time that the West was unsure about what was happening 
in Poland:
MWe are familiar with natural disasters, but here in the 
heart of our continent is a manmade disaster on a 
colossal scale. Although news is censored, 
communications cut and diplomatic facilities suspended, 
we read of arrest, detention and evictions. There has 
almost certainly been some loss of life. There is an 
ominous silence about the fate of Lech Walesa."19
Margaret Thatcher also initially avoided a very hardline
position. The British government's statements to the House of
Commons discussion on the issue underlined that the immediate 
priority of the British government was to ensure food
supplies for the Polish people.20 As for the West German
18See Le Monde 15.12.1981 and Financial Times. 15.12.1981 
for evidence of domestic protest over the French government's 
position.
19Financial Times 18.12.81.
20"Government statement on Poland", Hansard. 14 December 
1981, cols. 19-25 and Hansard, 22 December 1981, cols 933- 
961. See also Financial Times 23.12.81.
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Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, he found himself in East Germany 
when martial law was imposed. This, in itself, symbolises the 
difficulties of the West German government with regard to 
Poland. Not wanting to jeopardise his visit, and the positive 
effect it was expected to have on intra-German relations, he 
declared that the Federal Republic was "holding strictly to 
the basic principles of not interfering".21 By the end of the 
first week of martial law, when news came out that repression 
in Poland was widespread, the West German government further 
clarified its position, still, however, underlining that 
martial law was an internal Polish affair.22 The West German 
government, in other words, appeared to accept the Polish 
argument that marital law was a temporary measure. It also 
stressed that it was a lesser evil than Soviet military 
intervention and that a Western response should take this 
into consideration.23
NATO ambassadors, as well as EC foreign ministers, consulted 
in the immediate aftermath of the imposition of martial law. 
The American Secretary of State who, by coincidence, was in 
Brussels on December 13, attended a special meeting of NATO
21Financial Times 14.12.81.
22Le Monde. 20/21.12.81.
23Schmidt also underlines in his memoirs his relief that 
the turning point in Poland came with martial law rather than 
a military intervention. Helmut Schmidt, Die Deutschen und 
ihre Nachbarn: Menschen und Machte II. Berlin, Siedler, 1990.
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on December 15 to discuss developments in Poland.24 Equally, 
the EC Foreign Ministers were due to meet in London on 
December 15, thus providing a context in which Poland could 
be discussed.25 After this, however, a meeting explicitly to 
discuss Poland was not called either by NATO or by the EC 
until after Christmas. Allegedly, the reason for Western 
"discretion" was that Western governments did not wish to 
dramatise the situation.26 However, in all likeliness, and 
as later events also confirm, Western governments preferred 
to define their national objectives first, before engaging in 
an attempt at policy-coordination with allied countries. 
Apart from the American decision on 15 December to suspend 
further government food assistance to Poland while it 
assessed the situation, private shipments of food were 
allowed to continue.27 The European Community, as well as 
individual West European states, continued with their 
shipments of food.
24The Guardian 14.12.81 .
25The foreign ministers issued a statement on Poland 
following their meeting, yet this contained little new, 
beyond stating that they were greatly concerned about the 
situation. Bulletin of the European Communities, no. 12,
1981, vol 14, section 1.4.1-1.4.6. Nuttall argues that it was 
unfortunate that an EPC meeting was scheduled so soon after 
martial law, because it left foreign ministers with virtually 
no time to prepare for their discussion. Simon Nuttall, 
European Political Cooperation, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1992, p. 200.
^ International Herald Tribune, 18.12.81 and 1 9/20 .1 2 .81 .
27International Herald Tribune. 15.12.81.
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Towards the end of December the American Under Secretary of 
State for European Affairs, Lawrence Eagleburger, left on a 
mission to the European capitals, to discuss how to respond 
to martial law. His visit took him first to Rome, then to 
Bonn, Brussels, London and Paris.28 Eagleburger brought with 
him a list of possible sanctions to be imposed against Poland 
and the Soviet Union. Amongst the possible sanctions that 
were discussed, were the suspension of economic and financial 
aid to Poland, the imposition of strict conditions for 
provision of food, suspension of negotiations on Polish 
membership of the IMF, freezing trade relations and cutting 
exports to Poland and reducing diplomatic relations.29 Full 
trade sanctions against the Soviet Union, as well as the 
suspension of negotiations on the reduction of intermediate- 
range nuclear weapons in Europe, were also under 
discussion.30 However, from the perspective of cohesion, the 
outcome of these discussions were far from satisfactory.
Martial law took the Western alliance by surprise, not so 
much because it was, in itself, a totally unexpected event, 
but because the Western states had not managed to agree on
28The Guardian 22.12.81, Financial Times 22.12.81.
29The Guardian 22.12.81, Le Monde 23.12.81. See also 
"Developments in Europe", US Congress. House of 
Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East. 97th Congress, Second Session, 
February 9, 1982, in particular p. 34.
30Financial Times 22.12.81 and 23.12.81.
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how to respond to such an outcome. There was an urgent need 
for a reassessment both of individual national positions on 
Poland, and of the overall Western stand. Yet, in the 
immediate aftermath of the news of martial law, Western 
states sent confusing and contradictory signals about their 
position, due partly to the uncertainty about the 
significance of martial law, but mostly due to the fact that 
it did not correspond to the pre-planned strategy of the 
Western alliance.
Towards an intramural crisis
By the second week of martial law, the divergences between 
the Western governments on the interpretation of events in 
Poland and on the preferences for policy responses were
confirmed. Drawing a line from a "weak" to a "strong"
reaction, the United States and West Germany placed
themselves on opposite sides, with Britain closer to the
United States, and France in between Britain and West 
Germany. There were attempts at reconciliation amongst the 
allies, but they were successful only in the short term. The 
situation was rapidly approaching the condition of an intra­
mural crisis.
The United States was first out to define its position on 
martial law and to outline a policy-response. On December 23,
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while Eagleburger was still in Europe, Reagan announced 
without consulting with the West Europeans, that the United 
States was imposing sanctions against Poland. The sanctions 
announced by Reagan included the suspension of the US Export- 
Import Bank's export credit insurance; the prohibition of 
Polish planes from landing in the United States; the 
suspension of fishing allocation for Polish fishermen in 
American waters; the beginning of a "no-exceptions" policy 
restricting export licensing of high technology to Poland and 
a request to the US allies to restrict sales of high- 
technology goods to Poland. Sanctions against the Soviet 
Union were not mentioned at this point, although the 
responsibility for martial law was not attributed to Poland 
alone.31 However, on December 29 Reagan announced that 
sanctions would also be introduced against the Soviet Union. 
He stated that:
"The Soviet Union bears a heavy and direct 
responsibility for the repression in Poland. For many 
months the Soviets publicly and privately demanded such 
a crackdown. They brought major pressures to bear 
through now public letters to the Polish leadership, 
military manouvers and other forms of intimidation. They 
now openly endorse the suppression which has ensued."
31US Congress. House of Representatives, 9 February 1982, 
op. cit, Appendix 4 "Summary of US Measures vis-a-vis Poland 
and the USSR.", pp. 42-3.
32"The US and Poland: A report on the current situation 
in Poland after the declaration of martial law." Appendix D, 
Presidential statement. US Congress. House of 
Representatives, Committee on the Budget. 97th Congress, 
second session, April 1982, p. 19. Reagan's speech on 23
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Sanctions included
- suspension of landing rights in the US for the Soviet 
airline Aeroflot;
- closure of the Soviet Purchasing Commission (a New York 
offshoot of the Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry which arranged 
purchases of some non-agricultural goods in the United 
States);
- suspension of the issue or renewal of licences for export 
of electronic equipment, computers and other high-technology 
materials to the Soviet Union. These sanctions also included 
suspension of export licences for American equipment to be 
used in constructing the pipeline to carry Soviet natural gas 
to Western Europe;
- postponement of negotiations on a new long term grain 
agreement. US administration officials had been preparing for 
the negotiations that were expected to start in mid-February, 
although no specific date had been announced;
- suspension of negotiations on a new US-Soviet maritime 
agreement. A new regime of port-access controls was to be put 
into effect for all Soviet ships when the current agreement 
was to expire the next day;
- non-renewal of US-Soviet exchange agreements expiring in 
the near future, including agreements on energy and science 
and technology;
December is found in Appendix C, pp. 16-18. See also Le Monde 
31.12.81 for the United States' reaction to martial law.
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- suspension of issue of licences for an expanded list of oil 
and gas equipment, including pipelayers for any use in the 
USSR.33
The West European governments' positions were evolving in a 
different direction from that of the United States. By the 
time Eagleburger returned from Europe, differences between 
the Americans and their European allies on the question of 
the role of the Soviet Union and on the choice of policy, 
were no longer a secret. There was, in particular, very 
little, if any, support in Western Europe for sanctions 
against the Soviet Union. Eagleburger had only succeeded in 
achieving European support in three limited fields:
- a halt to further Western government export credits to 
Poland;
- a halt in the negotiations of the rescheduling of Poland's 
official debt (a planned meeting of Poland's Western 
creditors for 14-15 January would go ahead in order to assess 
the general situation, but not to discuss rescheduling for 
1982);
- continuation of humanitarian or food aid, provided that 
this could be monitored in order to ensure that shipments
33Appendix 4. US Congress. House of Representatives, 9 
February 1982, op. cit. Also, Financial Times 30.12.81.
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were not taken by the army or used as a political tool by the 
Polish government.34
The strongest opposition to American initiatives came from 
the West German government. It was openly hostile to any form 
of sanctions against the Soviet Union.35 The West German 
government was also at this point still reluctant to 
attribute any responsibility for martial law to the Soviet 
Union, and continued to consider it as an independent Polish 
decision. The extent to which West Germany and the United 
States held diverging views on the situation in Poland and on 
how to deal with it, was illustrated by the visit of the 
Polish deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski to West 
Germany. The West German government had, in a letter to 
Jaruzelski, asked that his government give some clear signal 
that the process of reforms would not be broken despite 
martial law. Rakowski was expected to confirm this position 
during his visit.36 This visit took place at the time that
^US Congress. House of Representatives, 9 February 1982. 
op. cit. Appendix 5, "Allied Measures in Response to US 
Sanctions", pp. 44-5.
35Financial Times 29.12.81.
36Rakowski met with foreign minister Hans Dietrich 
Genscher in Bonn. Genscher refers to this meeting in his 
memoirs, but his account of it gives no indication of 
Rakowski bringing any new light to the Polish government's 
intentions. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerunqen, Berlin, 
Siedler Verlag, 1995, p. 267. See also International Herald 
Tribune 30.12.81 and Le Monde 31.12.81 for references to 
Rakowski1s visit.
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the United States announced its sanctions against the Soviet 
Union.37
The other West Europeans were, however, also upset by 
American sanctions and considered, in addition, that they had 
been inadequately warned before Reagan’s announcement.38 The 
French government's position was outlined to the French 
National Assembly by Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy on 23 
December 1981. Mauroy stressed the French commitment to a 
continuation of food aid to Poland and called for a cautious 
approach to Poland:
"... il est facile de brandir des sabres de bois quand
on n'est pas soi-meme expose..."39
37This contrasts with the situation after Afghanistan. It 
was then the French President Giscard who was the principal 
dissenter in the Alliance. He took off for a meeting with 
Brezhnev in Warsaw, with little prior consultation with his 
allies. Schmidt, on the other hand, before his meeting with 
Brezhnev in Moscow in June 1980, ensured that his allies, in 
particular the USA, were well informed and in agreement with 
his actions. For excerpts of Schmidt's comments on 
Afghanistan, see Survival, vol XXII, no 5, Sept/Oct 1980, p. 
223, "Speech by Chancellor Schmidt, Moscow 30 June 1980".
^Haig, op. cit, p. 254. The lack of consultation is 
confirmed by Eagleburger in Congress on February 9, 1982. op. 
cit: "...if we had decided to consult in detail in advance of 
the decision, I suspect that we would still be at it...There 
was warning. There was not, in the classical sense of the 
term, consultation.", pp. 33-4.
39Debats Parlementaires de l'Assemblee Nationale, 
Premiere Session Extraordinaire de 1981-2, troisieme seance, 
23 decembre 1981, Journal Officiel, 24.12.1981, pp. 5403- 
5406, quote on p. 5403.
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Interestingly, Mauroy claimed that the US did not intend to 
take any action beyond the suppression of food aid to Poland, 
thus confirming lack of allied consultation before the US 
decision to impose sanctions.
The Foreign Ministers of the European Community (EPC) met on 
4 January to discuss how to respond to martial law. It was 
decided not to comply with American demands for sanctions 
against the Soviet Union. The Europeans merely took note of 
the American decision and vowed not to take any action to 
hinder American sanctions. Still, the French and the British 
were closer to the United States in their interpretation of 
events in Poland and in their choice of rhetoric, than to 
West Germany.40 Neither the French nor the British 
governments disputed that the influence of the Soviet Union 
was crucial to the imposition of martial law. Hence, in the 
declaration issued after the EPC meeting, the military 
crackdown in Poland was strongly condemned and, as had the 
United States, EPC called for the Polish government to lift 
martial law, free all those arrested and restore the dialogue
40The French President, Mitterrand, was in general taking 
a more confrontational approach on East-West relations than 
his predecessor Giscard d'Estaing. See, for example, his 
speech to the German Bundestag in January 1983, where he 
stated that "Les missiles sont a l'Est et les pacifistes a 
l'Ouest", Diana Johnstone, The Politics of Euromissiles. 
London, Verso, 1984, p. 84. Mitterrand’s support for the 0- 
option is also outlined in Frangois Mitterrand, Reflexions 
sur la Politique Exterieure de la France. Paris, Fayard, 
1986, p. 234 and in Ici et Maintenant: Conversations avec Guv 
Clarisse, Paris, Fayard, 1980.
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with Solidarity. In addition to the strong criticism of the 
Jaruzelski regime, the Ten also attributed a share of the 
responsibility to the Soviet Union:
"La signification de ces evenements dramatiques depasse 
le cadre de la seule Pologne. L'incapacite des systemes 
totalitaires, tels ceux de 1'Europe de l'Est, a accepter 
les adaptations necessaires pour faire face aux 
aspirations les plus legitimes de la population est de 
nature a mettre en cause la confiance des opinions 
publiques dans la possibility des rapports de 
cooperation avec les pays de l'Est et a porter par la 
une grave atteinte aux relations internationales. A ce 
sujet les Dix notent avec preoccupation et reprobation 
les graves pressions exterieures et la campagne menee 
par l'URSS et d'autres pays de l’Est contre 1'effort de 
renouveau en Pologne."
The Ten agreed to suspend economic and financial aid to 
Poland and to discontinue the Community programme of sale of 
food at reduced prices, as long as their political demands 
were not respected by the Polish government. They also agreed 
to suggest to the OECD to move the USSR from category II of 
relatively rich states, to category I, thus raising the rates 
of interest on export credits to the country. Finally, the 
foreign ministers decided to raise the issue of martial law 
at the reopening of the CSCE conference in Madrid on February 
9 as well as in the United Nations.42
41 Le Monde 6.1.82.
42"The Community and Poland", Bulletin of the European 
Communities, no. 12, 1981, vol 14, section 1.4.1-1.4.6
(includes text of the final communique of the foreign 
Ministers' meeting on 4 January 1981.
314
It is clear then, that, despite the focus of attention on the 
Euro-American differences, there was also divergence between 
the West Europeans. The American decision to impose sanctions 
put the Europeans in an embarrassing situation not only 
because the West Europeans disagreed with this policy, but 
also because the Europeans had not yet clarified their own 
national positions, and because there was intra-European 
divergence. It took two weeks before the European foreign 
ministers actually met on January 4 1984, specifically to 
discuss Poland. Great Britain had tried to call for an 
earlier meeting of the Foreign Ministers to discuss a 
reaction to the crisis, but that initiative was blocked by 
France.43 Furthermore, during the meeting on 4 January, a 
proposal to send the Belgian Foreign Minister Mr. Leo 
Tindemans, who had taken over the Presidency after Britain, 
to Warsaw and Moscow to express the Community's condemnation 
of the situation in Poland was rejected. The proposal was 
backed by the British and the Germans, but rejected by both 
France and Greece. The French foreign minister Cheysson 
argued that one had to leave it up to each state to take the 
initiatives and make contacts that it considered appropriate, 
and that the political integration of the Community members 
had not yet reached a stage where one representative could
43International Herald Tribune 30.12.81, The Guardian 
30.12.81. As a compromise solution, an informal meeting of 
Political Directors accompanied by economic advisers was held 
on 30 December. Nuttall op. cit, p. 201.
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speak for all Ten. The incident demonstrates most of all the 
limitations to French willingness to subordinate its foreign 
policy to that of the rest of the EC, rather than a 
disagreement on substance of sanction and the role of the 
USSR.44 France was also at odds with the other Community 
members by arguing in favour of continuing the provision of 
food for Poland through the Community framework.45
Despite the fact that the EPC statement criticised the role 
of the Soviet Union, West Germany was still reluctant to 
consider martial law as irreversible and to condemn the 
Soviet Union. It wanted to give Poland more time to fulfil 
its assurances that reforms would continue and that trades 
union rights would be re-established. This more reluctant 
West German position led to difficulties for the otherwise 
traditionally strong Franco-German axis. Both France and West 
Germany were subject to strong domestic pressures on martial 
law which took them in opposite directions. The imposition of 
martial law provoked a public outcry in France, and
M In the case of Greece there was disagreement on 
substance. Greece also refused to adhere to the NATO 
declaration on Poland on 11 January 1982.
45Le Monde 6.1.82 and Financial Times 5.1.82. Also Robin 
op.cit., p.36-7. In fact, the French continued bilateral 
credits for purchase of food after martial law. The French 
commitment to food aid and refusal to impose sanction against 
Poland is confirmed in a response to a parliamentary question 
in April 1982. Debats Parlementaires de l'Assemblee 
Nationale. Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1981-2. "Questions 
orales au gouvernement", 16 avril 1982, Journal Officiel,
17.4.1981, pp. 1180-82.
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Mitterrand's strong condemnation was in part a result of 
pressure from public opinion. West German policy was also 
heavily criticised in the French press, thus putting further 
strain on Franco-German relations. In West Germany, on the 
other hand, public opinion reacted less strongly to martial 
law.
Several attempts were made at narrowing the gap both between 
the positions of the Europeans themselves and between the 
Europeans and the Americans. However, they were not 
altogether convincing. The day after the meeting of European 
foreign ministers in Brussels, the West German Chancellor had 
a highly publicized meeting with president Reagan in 
Washington. Despite considerable efforts from the American 
administration to claim that the meeting was successful, 
Reagan did not manage to convince his West German counterpart 
to change the essence of his analysis of the situation in 
Poland.46 On the contrary, the United States was beginning 
to realise that convincing the West Europeans to follow its 
lead, in particular on the question of sanctions, would be 
difficult, and that it might have to settle for less than it 
had initially hoped for.47 By the end of the meeting the West
46Helmut Schmidt confirms his fundamental disagreement 
with Reagan over sanctions in Men and Power: A Political
Retrospective. London, Jonathan Cape, 1990, pp. 251-262.
47See quotes of Haig after his meeting with Schmidt, The 
Guardian 7.1.82.
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German Chancellor had moved slightly closer to accepting that 
the Soviet Union had a share of responsibility for martial 
law. However, he was still opposed to economic sanctions 
against Moscow.
In an attempt at reconciliation, an emergency meeting of 
NATO's foreign ministers was called to discuss the response 
to Poland, on January 11 1982. The NATO communique published 
after the meeting was a carefully drafted document in which 
each alternative paragraph deliberately referred respectively 
to Poland's and the Soviet Union's responsibility for martial 
law.48 On the question of sanctions there was an "agreement 
to disagree". No commitment was made by the West Europeans to 
impose sanctions against the Soviet Union, and against Poland 
they only agreed to freeze further credits and to stop 
negotiations on the rescheduling of the debt. These were the 
issues that Eagleburger had achieved European support for 
during his visit to Europe in December. Beyond this, each 
member, in accordance with its own situation, would study 
which measures it would be appropriate to take:
"11. Each ally will, in accordance with its own 
situation and legislation, identify appropriate national 
possibilities for action in the following fields:
(a) further restrictions on the movements of Soviet and 
Polish diplomats, and other restrictions on Soviet and 
Polish diplomatic missions and organizations;
^Interviews, London September 1994.
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(b) reduction of scientific and technical activities or 
non-renewal of exchange agreements.
14. In the current situation in Poland, economic 
relations with Poland and the Soviet Union are bound to 
be affected. Soviet actions towards Poland make it 
necessary for the Allies to examine the course of future 
economic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union. 
Recognising that each of the Allies will act in
accordance with its own situation and laws, they will 
examine measures which could involve arrangement
regarding imports from the Soviet Union, maritime 
agreements, air services agreements, the size of Soviet 
commercial representation and the conditions surrounding 
export credits."49
The January 11 meeting led to follow-up discussions in NATO's 
North Atlantic Council in which the parallel steps the allies 
could take against Poland and the USSR were discussed. 
Meetings were held on January 23 and February 3. Continuing 
the efforts to resolve Alliance differences and to present a 
common front to the outside world, a visit by Schmidt to 
France on January 13 was added to an already busy Franco- 
German schedule.50 The meeting was arranged at the initiative 
of the West German government and is in itself a signal of 
its great concern about the effect the Polish crisis was
having on Franco-German relations.51 However, after the
meeting, doubts were still raised, particularly in France,
49"Special Ministerial session of the North Atlantic 
Council 11th January, 1982. Declaration on events in Poland." 
NATO Press Service, press release M-1(82)1, 11 January 1982.
50The Guardian 13.12.82 and Le Monde 13.12.82.
51For Schmidt's own account of the meeting see Helmut 
Schmidt, Die Deutschen, op. cit. p. 295. He underlines the 
fundamental convergence of his own and Mitterrand's 
perspectives on martial law and on sanctions.
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over the extent to which the two countries' position had 
actually come closer together, despite efforts on both sides 
to deny any disagreement.
After the NATO-summit on January 11 some sanctions were 
imposed by the West Europeans against Poland and the Soviet 
Union. These were, however, limited, and served mostly to 
underline the persistence of disagreement between the allies. 
On 1 February the West German Government banned the Polish 
state airline LOT from landing in West Germany. It also 
tightened restrictions on the movement of Soviet and Polish 
diplomats.52 The British government restricted Polish 
officials to within 25 miles of their consulates in London 
and Glasgow and increased BBC Polish language broadcasts. 
Restrictions were also placed on the movement of Soviet 
diplomats in Britain, Anglo-Soviet technical co-operation, as 
well as the licensing of Soviet factory ships buying fish 
caught in British waters, were reduced.53 As for the European 
Community, it decided in late February to impose restrictions 
on Soviet imports to signal its criticism of Soviet
52Financial Times 1.2.82 and 2.2.82. Further sanctions 
were introduced on 1 7 February. They included postponement of 
negotiations on a Science and Technological Agreement and 
more restrictive interpretations of cooperation agreements 
between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union.
53Financial Times 6.2.1982. The full list of British 
sanctions is published in US Congress, House of 
Representatives, 9 February 1982, Appendix 5, op. cit..
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involvement in the crackdown in Poland.54 The EC underlined 
that this was to be considered as a symbolic measure rather 
than one that was expected to have a large economic impact.55 
The measures were not voted on in the Council until 23 March, 
because of the Danish government's objection to the Council 
taking what it considered in essence a foreign policy 
decision, as opposed to Ministers meeting as a "Conference" 
in EPC.
The most important sanctions, and the ones most likely to 
have any impact on Poland, were the suspension of 
negotiations on Poland's official debt and the freezing of 
officially guaranteed credits to Poland, as well as the 
refusal of further credits. These sanctions were confirmed in 
a meeting of Poland's official creditors in Paris on 14 
January.56 Further, cheap EC sales of food to the Polish 
government were also ended and negotiations on Poland's 
membership in the IMF were suspended. Finally, a ban was put 
on all high level political contacts with Poland.
^Bulletin of the European Communities, no 3, vol 15, 
1982. A regulation on limiting imports from the Soviet Union 
into the EC was imposed on 15 March 1982. 60 products,
covering 8 % of EC imports from the Soviet Union, would be 
reduced by 25 or 50%, para. 2.2.52.
55International Herald Tribune. 12.3.1982.
56Financial Times 15.1 .82, International Herald Tribune
13.1.82.
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As argued above, the United States and the West Europeans 
were on a collision course with regard to how to respond to 
martial law, and, in particular, on the issue of sanctions. 
What is more, there was divergence amongst the West 
Europeans, with the Federal Republic's preference for 
defining the Polish crackdown as a "domestic Polish matter", 
thus feeding into the "fear in France of German political 
drift".57 The NATO emergency meeting on January 11 confirmed 
the seriousness with which the Western allies treated the 
imposition of martial law and the tension it provoked in the 
Alliance. It has been argued that the failure to call such a 
meeting after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, was one 
of the reasons for the crisis in the Alliance.58 Indeed, for 
some time, it looked as if the Western allies had succeeded, 
through the January meeting, in patching up their
differences. Yet, the compromise hammered out at the summit
provided only temporary respite.
A widening of the Western crisis
Throughout spring and into the summer of 1982 a "dialogue des 
sourds" developed between the West Europeans and their
57Henrik Larsen, Discourse analysis and foreign policy: 
the impact of the concents of Europe, nation/state, security 
and the nature of International Relations on French and 
British policies toward Europe in the 1980s. PhD
dissertation, London School of Economics, 1993, p. 287.
^Interview London, September 1994.
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American allies. The United States continued to press for 
further sanctions in response to martial law, and several US 
missions went to Europe with the purpose of convincing the 
Europeans to follow the American line. However, the West 
Europeans remained sceptical of the utility of further 
restrictive measures. The crisis came to a head at the G7 
summit in Versailles in June 1982, yet, by this time, the 
question of how to deal with the Polish crisis had gradually 
become intermingled with, and in the end superseded by, other 
Western disputes. Poland, the original subject of Western 
disagreement was almost ignored.
In its attempts to convince the West Europeans to increase 
the pressure on the Soviet Union and Poland in response to 
martial law, the United States focused on two areas in
particular. Firstly, on the question of Poland's debt, and
the possibility of introducing sanctions on credit relations
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; and secondly, on 
the question of sanctions on the Siberian gas pipeline. 
Poland, as chapter three showed, signed an agreement with 
Western governments in April 1981 to reschedule its official 
debt for the rest of that year (approximately $2.3bn).59
59As for the signing of Poland's agreement with the
commercial banks for 1981, it should have taken place on 29 
December. It was delayed when Poland failed to pay off all 
the outstanding interest arrears (ca. $250 m. ) on its 1981 
debt, which was a condition for the signature of the 
agreement deferring repayment of the principal. Poland, 
however, gradually paid back this interest. See "The Polish
323
Negotiations on the rescheduling of the public debt for 1982 
had started in November 1981, but were, as it has already 
been pointed out, suspended as a result of a decision at the 
NATO summit on January 11. In the meantime, Poland had not 
been paying anything on its 1981 agreement, which meant that 
in practice the country was in default, although it was not 
officially declared. However, to the great concern of West 
European governments, it became known that the American 
Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger was trying to convince 
Reagan to declare Poland officially in default. Furthermore, 
he also wanted to disrupt Western credit relations with the 
Soviet Union and the other East European countries.60
The Europeans considered that a Polish default would have 
disastrous consequences for the Western banking system and 
also for East-West trade in general. Furthermore, as chapter 
four showed, the West Europeans had a much greater share in
economy and Poland's international debt: implications for US 
foreign policy", US Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations. Subcommittee on European Affairs. 97th Congress, 
Second Session, January 27, 1982, p. 11. Also, Le Monde
9.1.82, Financial Times 23.12.81.
60International Herald Tribune 5.2.1982. The option of 
declaring Poland in default was discussed on a number of 
occasions in the United States Congress, as well as in the 
American press, over the winter and spring of 1982. See in 
particular "The Polish Debt Crisis". US Congress. Senate, 
Foreign Assistance and Related Programmes. Appropriations for 
Fiscal Year 1983. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations, 97th Congress, Second Session, February 9, March 
6 and 16, April 21, 1982. The Washington Post, 7.2.1982, The 
Wall Street Journal 7.1.1982, New York Times, 3/4.2.1982.
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the trade with Eastern Europe than the United States, and
considered that they would have to pay a much higher price
for any interruption in East-West trade that would follow
from disrupting credit relations, than the United States.61
Even the British government, which is traditionally closer to
the United States, sided with the Europeans on this question.
Haig has referred to a discussion with British prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher on this subject:
"...she [Mrs. Thatcher] told me at once that she was 
uncertain of American intentions with regard to the 
sanctions and worried over rumours of even stronger 
action to come. The Prime Minister had heard alarming 
reports that some in the United States wanted to put 
Poland in default with consequences for the Germans and 
the rest of the Western banking system that could not be 
calculated. The cost . . . would be far greater to the 
West than to the Soviet Union."62
The second area in which the United States wanted to 
strengthen sanctions was on the Siberian gas pipeline 
agreement.63 Negotiations on the pipeline had started in
61The Guardian 30.3.82, International Herald Tribune
16.12.82. The unequal distribution of cost of a disruption of 
East-West trade was well known to the US government. It is 
confirmed throughout the Congressional Hearings on Poland's 
debt. See for example Robert Hormats, Assistant Secretary of 
State in the US Senate, February 9, 1982, p. 132. op. cit.
62Haig, op.cit. pp. 255-256.
63For a study of the pipeline dispute see Antony J. 
Blinken, Ally Versus Ally: America, Europe and the Siberian 
Pipeline Crisis. Praeger, New York, 1987; Stan Woods Pipeline 
Politics: the Allies at Odds. Centrepieces, No 5, Spring
1983, Centre for Defence Studies, Aberdeen; Bruce W. 
Jentleson, Pipeline Politics: the Complex Political Economy 
of East-West Energy Trade. Ithaca, New York, Cornell 
University Press, 1986.
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1980, and the contracts were signed in 1981 and 1982, in 
other words in the middle of the Polish crisis. France for 
example, much to American dislike, signed its contract on 22
January 1982.64 Adding insult to injury, when being
criticised for signing the agreement, the French Prime
Minister, Pierre Mauroy, replied that:
"II ne servirait a rien d'ajouter au drame polonais le
drame supplementaire pour les Frangais de ne pas etre
approvisionnes en gaz".65
As a result of this agreement, Soviet natural gas exports 
would increase from 27 billion cubic metres to 60 billion 
cubic metres by the late 1980s.66 The pipeline agreement was 
an extremely important agreement for the West Europeans. It 
was expected to introduce a degree of diversity into Western 
Europe's supply of energy and to alleviate its dependence on 
OPEC. It also gave prospects for creation of new jobs in 
Western Europe, and West European companies were expected to 
earn from $7 to $10 billion from sales of equipment to the 
agreement.67 The United States had from the beginning of the 
negotiations on the pipeline agreement been highly critical
64Robin, op. cit. p. 37.
65For Mauroy's justification of his position, see 
"Discussions et vote sur la motion de censure", Debats 
Parlementaires de l'Assemblee Nationale, seconde session 
extraordinaire de 1981-2, , 28 janvier 1982, Journal
Officiel, 29.1.1982, pp. 643-668. The Prime Minister's
statement is quoted on p. 646.
66Strateaic Survey, 1982-83, The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, London 1983, p. 52.
67Blinken, op. cit, p. 4.
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of the project, arguing that relying on supply of vital 
resources such as oil from the Soviet Union would create a 
situation of dependency that might ultimately threaten West 
European independence and security. The agreement was seen by 
some in the United States as a confirmation of suspicions 
that the West Europeans were becoming "soft" on the 
Russians.68
The imposition of martial law provided the United States with 
an opportunity to reopen the debate with its allies on the 
pipeline agreement. It has already been pointed out that part 
of the sanctions package against the Soviet Union announced 
on 29 December, were export controls on oil and gas 
transmission, as well as refinement equipment and technology. 
In other words, equipment and technology destined for the 
pipeline project. At first, this decision appeared largely 
symbolic, because American firms affected by the embargo had 
only a minor share in the pipeline. The main suppliers were 
West German, French, British and Italian companies, and the 
American measures did not affect these firms. However, doubts 
were raised relatively quickly about the scope of these
68For an examination of the risks involved for West 
European security in the pipeline agreement which sides with 
the US perspective, see Thomas Blan and Joseph Kircheimer, 
"European dependence and Soviet leverage: the Yamal
pipeline", pp. 209-214 in Survival, vol. XXIII, no 5, 
Sept/Oct 1981. They argue that "...the Yamal project raises 
serious issues of Soviet leverage; the project could enable 
the Soviet Union to achieve political concessions as well as 
economic benefits", p. 211.
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sanctions. Firstly, it was unclear whether or not they were 
retroactive, in other words, whether they would apply to 
contracts already signed, or only to new contracts. According 
to Haig, Reagan did not intend them to be retroactive, yet in 
the process of implementing the sanctions, the Commerce 
Department interpreted them as being so, thus aggravating 
their effect on the pipeline project.69 Secondly, it soon 
emerged that some members of the Reagan administration were 
seeking to convince the American president that these 
sanctions should also cover sales by American-owned or 
controlled companies in Western Europe, as well as sales by 
independent European companies using American produced parts 
or technologies.70 If this idea were to be put into practice, 
it would jeopardise the whole pipeline project.
By spring it became clear that the US administration had 
abandoned the idea of declaring Poland in default, despite 
the fact that some members of the administration continued to 
argue that it was still not taken off the agenda.71 On two 
occasions, the United States' government reimbursed American
69Haig, op.cit. p.254.
70The Guardian 1.2.82, The Washington Post 2.1.1982. The 
issue of the sanction on the pipeline is also discussed in 
"The Polish Debt crisis", US Congress. Senate, op. cit. and 
"Developments in Europe", US Congress. House of 
Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East, April 29, 1982 (pp.3-6 in
particular) and July 21, 1982 (pp. 20-21 in particular).
71"The Polish Debt Crisis", US Congress. Senate, op. cit.
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banks for Polish overdue loans that had a federal guarantee, 
rather than declare Poland in default. The first time, in 
early February, the US government paid $71 million, and the 
second time, in the second half of April, $138 million.72 
However, uncertainty continued to linger both over the 
pipeline sanctions and the broader question of credits to the 
Warsaw Pact countries. On 17 March, Under Secretary of State 
for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, James 
Buckley, was sent to Europe, apparently at the initiative of 
Haig. It is clear that the purpose of the visit was to 
discuss the question of sanctions, yet, it is not entirely 
clear exactly which issues Buckley was supposed to discuss 
with the Europeans, or what kind of proposals he brought with 
him. Some sources indicate that he was not to discuss the 
pipeline, but the broader issue of credit policy towards the 
Soviet bloc, and that Reagan had abandoned the idea of 
extending pipeline sanctions to European firms.73 According 
to Blinken, this is also what Buckley himself claims was his 
mandate. Blinken also maintains that Buckley was told to
72Le Monde 3.2.82 and International Herald Tribune
21.4.82. Confirmed by Haig in Congress. "Statement by 
Alexander Haig", US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, 97th Congress, February 2, 1982, p. 8. The House of 
Representatives had also by this time rejected a proposal to 
force the US administration to declare Poland in default. See 
also Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberley Ann 
Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current 
Policy, Washington DC, Institute for International Economics, 
1990, p. 192.
73The Guardian 4.3.82; International Herald Tribune
22.2.82.
329
threaten the Europeans with an extension of the pipeline
sanctions unless they complied with American requirements of
limiting credits.74 Other sources, however, argue that a
decision on pipeline sanctions was not abandoned, only
deferred until after Buckley's return.75 A statement by
Eagleburger quoted in Le Monde shows the ambiguity of the
United States aims:
"M. Buckley a discute du pipeline dans toutes les 
capitales visitees. Notre position est claire: le
gasoduc constitue une imprudence, il peut rendre les 
Europeens trop dependants de l'URSS en matiere 
energetique et amener a une exportation massive de 
devises. [Mais] nous sommes realistes. Nous savons que 
le projet est en cours depuis longtemps, qu'il est 
important pour plusieurs economies occidentaux. La 
question aurait du etre reglee il y a cinq ans 
environs. . .1176
Regardless of the precise purpose and strategy of the
American administration, the mission was highly unsuccessful.
The American mission did not manage to convince the West
Europeans to strengthen sanctions against the Soviet Union by
reducing or eliminating credits and credit guarantees for
East-West trade. As for the pipeline sanctions:
"The Europeans reacted with all the bewilderment and 
vexation that such an invasion of their sovereignty 
might have been expected to produce."77
74Blinken op. cit., p. 99.
75Financial Times 4.3.82.
76Le Monde 1.4.1982.
77Haig, op. cit. p. 255.
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The United Kingdom, who was in favour of taking a strong line 
against Moscow, rallied with the other West Europeans both on 
the pipeline issue and on the extension of sanctions against 
the Soviet Union by restricting credits and credit guarantees 
for East-West trade. Lord Carrington said that:
"I am personally not in favour of taking more measures 
against the Soviet Union with the aim of bringing about 
a Soviet change of heart. For one thing one must keep 
things in reserve in case the situation worsens, and for 
another, I do not believe this is the right moment for 
further countermeasures".78
Another US mission headed by George Shultz went to Europe in 
May, without any more success.79 All in all, the West 
Europeans were critical of what they considered the slightly 
hypocritical attitude of the United States. The Europeans 
argued that whereas they had to pay a high price for 
introducing the sanctions proposed by the United States, the 
Americans themselves had very little to lose. As chapter 
three has shown, West European stakes in East-West trade were 
much higher than those of the United States. West European 
trade with the Soviet Union had a value of $41 billion in 
1982, whereas American trade only amounted to $2.5 billion.80 
Furthermore, much of West European export competitiveness, 
relied heavily on such subsidised credit that the Reagan
78The Guardian 17.3.82. See also, Financial Times
18.3.82.
79Haig, op.cit, p. 304-305.
80Blinken, op.cit p. 8.
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administration wanted to get rid of.81 The United States on 
the other hand, had not, in 1982, had any concessionary 
credit system for US-Soviet trade for eight years. Finally, 
the Europeans argue that one of the few measures that was 
likely to hurt the Soviet Union was a US grain embargo.82 
However, it was also a measure that would be costly for 
American farmers, and hence, the West Europeans argued, the 
United States expected the West Europeans to pay the costs of 
US policy.83
81Another element that should not be ignored in this 
context, is that of economic competition between Europeans 
and, in particular, between France and West Germany for 
exports to the Soviet Union. This did at least in the French 
case make them even more reluctant to restrict official 
credits.
82The US grain embargo against the Soviet Union imposed 
by Carter after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 
December 1979, was lifted by Reagan in April 1981 . It must be 
added in this context that the effectiveness of a grain 
embargo is disputed. It failed to influence Soviet policy in 
Afghanistan. See Joseph Hajda, "The Soviet grain embargo", 
Survival, vol XXII, no 6, Nov/Dec 1980, pp. 253-258.
83For this viewpoint see for example the statement of 
Maurice Faure, president of the French National Assembly’s 
Foreign Affairs Committee: "[Les Etats-Unis]...ont demande
aux Europeens de manier 1'arme economique, tout en se gardant 
bien de le faire elle-meme puisqu'elle continue a vendre du 
ble a 1'Union Sovietique. Elle a done incite les Europeens a 
livrer dans une large mesure le combat a sa place." 
"Discussion sur la Declaration du Gouvernement sur sa 
Politique Etrangere" p. 4228, Debats Parlementaires de 
l'Assemblee Nationale, troisieme session extraordinaire de 
1981-82, 6 juillet 1982, Journal Officiel, 7.7.1982. The text 
of the French government's declaration on foreign policy is 
found in "Declaration du gouvernement sur sa politique 
etrangere (Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson) Documents de 
l'Assemblee Nationale, No. 1014. Troiseme session 
extraordinaire de 1981-82.
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The crisis in the Alliance came to a head at the G7 summit in 
Versailles on 4-6 June. At the summit, an attempt was made to 
establish a compromise between the American demands for 
restrictions on East-West trade credits, and the West 
European concern about collective management of exchange 
rates. The French in particular, but also the other 
Europeans, were concerned about the high interest rates and 
the strong dollar, and wanted the United States to intervene 
in order to stabilise the international monetary system. The 
American pipeline sanctions were not explicitly mentioned in 
this bargain, but it was implicitly understood that they 
would be abandoned if an agreement was achieved on the other 
two issues. The diplomats appeared to have arrived at a 
suitable compromise involving a US intervention in the 
foreign exchange market and credit policy towards the Soviet 
Union, yet this fell apart at the last minute. Angry at what 
he considered European reneging of an agreement, President 
Reagan unilaterally announced the extraterritorial extension 
of the US sanctions on pipeline equipment to American owned 
or controlled companies in Western Europe and to American 
licences on 18 June. The American announcement was met with 
a storm of protest in Europe:
"The German government expressed 'dismay' at what it 
termed 'a contradiction to what was agreed and discussed 
at the world economic summit'. Mitterrand said, 'We 
wonder what concept the United States has of summit 
meetings when it becomes a matter of agreements made and 
not respected.' Privately, he reportedly told one 
visitor that after long efforts to establish rapport
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with Reagan, he had concluded that there was not a 
single issue on which he could trust the American 
president. ... Thatcher ..told the Commons that 'it is 
wrong [for] one very powerful nation' to try to prevent 
the fulfilment of existing contracts'."84
The Europeans declared the American move illegal and 
instructed the European companies to ignore the American 
ban.85 The contracted deliveries with the Soviet Union were 
fulfilled despite the American penalisation of European firms 
in the form of forbidding export of American products or 
technology to them in the future.
In his statement about the pipeline sanctions, Reagan 
maintained that they were introduced in order to "advance 
reconciliation in Poland".86 However, by this time, the issue 
of Poland under martial law was, in reality, marginalised. 
The imposition of martial law had essentially been a useful 
pretext for the United States to re-open the pipeline issue,
^Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, Hanging Together: 
Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits. London, 
Sage Publications Ltd, 1987, p. 138.
85The French government ordered French companies to 
honour their contracts for the pipeline on 22 July; invoking 
the protection of trading interests Act, the British 
government followed suit on 2 August; the West German 
government informed the US government on 25 August that its 
initiative was illegal under international law and violated 
German sovereignty. Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, op. cit. p. 
207.
86"Statement on Extension of U.S. Sanctions on the Export 
of Oil and Gas Equipment to the Soviet Union" Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 18, June 18, 
1982, quoted in Blinken, op. cit., p.103.
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and to justify its calls for restrictions on East-West trade. 
As Philip Hanson argues
"The relationship of this episode [the discussion on the 
pipeline] to martial law in Poland, however, was slight. 
The Polish events served as an occasion for pursuing 
policies which the US administration favoured on the 
grounds that had nothing to do with the state of affairs 
in Poland."87
The deal in Versailles fell through partly as a result of 
profound disagreement amongst allies on the issues at hand, 
partly as a result of a lack of communication between 
political leaders at the summit. Furthermore, as Putnam and 
Bayne have pointed out, the sort of package deal attempted in 
Versailles usually works best if the two sides are not 
equally interested in both subjects. This was not the case at 
the Versailles summit, where all sides put a lot of 
importance both on monetary policy and on East-West trade 
policy.88 Finally, there was an important domestic dimension 
to the US position on the pipeline. In fact, the West 
Europeans had become party to an internal struggle for 
control over American foreign policy, which ended with the 
resignation of Alexander Haig a few days after Reagan had 
announced the pipeline sanctions. The "Atlanticists" led by 
Secretary of State Haig, although critical of the pipeline
87Philip Hanson, Western Economic Statecraft in East-West 
Relations, Chatham House Papers, London, Routledge, 1988. p. 
47.
^Putnam and Bayne, op. cit. p.139.
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agreement, had stressed the importance of maintaining good 
relations with the West European allies. The compromise 
worked out in Versailles was a product of the 
"Atlanticists" .89
This chapter has showed that the domestic Polish crisis had 
a spillover effect into West-West relations. A policy-debate 
that had initially started because of Western disapproval of 
events in the Soviet bloc, led to a crisis, not for the
Soviet bloc, or even for East-West relations, but for the
West itself. The irony being that Poland, in the end, turned 
out to be the trigger of events rather than the cause itself, 
thus strengthening the argument that Poland had not been the
reason for these sanctions in the first place. The United 
States abandoned the extraterritorial claim and rescinded its 
punitive countersanctions in November 1982, five months after 
they had been imposed. Western diplomats had worked at 
finding a way for the United States to lift the sanctions 
without losing face. Finally, an agreement was achieved 
producing a joint study, reviewing East-West trade relations, 
in return for which the United States promised to lift the 
pipeline sanctions. There was, however, no concrete 
commitment from the West Europeans to change their policy on
89The domestic political dimension will be examined more 
closely in chapter seven.
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East West trade.90 The lifting of the sanctions also 
coincided with the death of Leonid Brezhnev and the 
nomination of Yuri Andropov as his successor. Although this 
was probably not the cause of the lifting of the sanctions, 
it certainly presented the US President with a convenient 
opportunity for a new start in relations with the Soviet 
Union.
By the end of 1982 calm had returned to the Alliance, even if 
only on the surface.
Muddling together
By the end of 1982 the political situation in Poland remained 
virtually unchanged. The likeliness of the Polish government 
consenting to Western demands of lifting martial law, 
releasing all political prisoners and reopening negotiations 
with the Church and Solidarity was rapidly decreasing. Hence, 
a debate developed over the continued utility of sanctions 
and also over the initial rationale for imposing them.91 It
"strategic Survey,1982-83, op. cit. p.55.
91The most important economic sanctions were the block on 
negotiations to reschedule Poland's debt, the freeze on 
credits to Poland, the American abolition of the most 
favoured nation status to Poland and the blocking of the 
negotiations on Poland's membership of the IMF. Poland had 
also been politically isolated since the imposition of 
martial law. All high level visits from the West to Poland 
had been banned.
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became clear that the West Europeans, arguing that the 
sanctions had outlived their purpose, favoured an early 
lifting.92 The United States, on the other hand, favoured a 
continuation of sanctions. Partly accepting that not much 
could be done without the United States, partly recognising 
that other issues were higher on their list of priorities, 
the West Europeans accepted the continued freeze on relations 
with Poland, and maintained , for longer than they ideally 
would have wanted, a policy of inaction.
On 21 July 1982 the Polish government announced that some 
steps would be taken to ease martial law. Two-thirds of 
internees were freed and General Jaruzelski also hinted that 
martial law might be lifted by the end of the year. This news 
was not greeted with much enthusiasm in the West, which still 
considered that the demands put forward in January 1982 had 
to be fulfilled.93 NATO stated that the steps in Poland
92The Danish Folketing voted in February to withdraw its 
support for EC sanctions against the Soviet Union. Although 
provoked by the Danish Parliament's claim that the European 
Community was not a reasonable forum for foreign policy 
decisions, the decision cannot be considered wholly unrelated
from the issue itself. It is unlikely that the Danes would 
have taken this initiative purely on a matter of principle. 
For a discussion on the link between the EC proper and EPC 
over Polish sanctions see Simon Nuttall "interaction between 
European Political Cooperation and the European Community", 
Yearbook of European Law, 1987, No. 7. pp. 211-249.
93Le Monde 23.7.82 and 23.7.82.
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"fall short of fulfilling the declared intentions of 
the Polish leadership and the three criteria set out by 
the alliance on January 11, 1982.1,94
As a reaction to the dissolution of Solidarity by the Sejm 
(the Polish parliament) in October 1982, the American 
President even imposed further sanctions by lifting the Most 
Favoured Nation status awarded to Poland. Poland had been the 
first communist country to achieve the Most Favoured Nation 
status in 1960. It was followed only by Rumania in 1975 and 
by Hungary in 1979. The US decision referred to manufactured 
products, which represented approximately two-thirds of 
Poland's exports to the United States. Polish textiles, for 
instance, would be subject to tariff increases of 35 to 50 
percent. Some argued, however, that in the short term the 
measure would not have a very strong impact because trade 
between the two countries was already heavily reduced as a 
result of the restrictions on credits to Poland.95 Reagan 
also indicated that further sanctions were a possibility that 
would be discussed between the Western allies.96 However, 
even though the French and British foreign offices also 
condemned the vote in the Sejm, there is no indication that
94Financial Times 30.7.82.
95Le Monde 23.7.82.
96United States Information Service, Tuesday October 
12th, 1982. "Reagan acts to end Poland's MNF status".
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the West Europeans were considering tougher sanctions and no 
further measures were announced.97
In December 1982 martial law was held in suspension but not 
lifted. The military government retained special powers to 
deal with any economic or political disruption.98 It was 
impossible to know concretely what the effect of the latest 
measures in Poland would be or what restrictive measures 
would be maintained. Thus, again, the West took a "wait and 
see" attitude. The American President greeted the Polish 
measures, and underlined his willingness to restore economic 
aid to Poland and to lift sanctions, but stressed that this 
would only happen when Western conditions were fulfilled.99 
The European Community also decided in December 1982 to 
prolong the measures restricting the import of Soviet goods 
for another year.100
97The French government repeated to the French National 
Assembly that although it condemned the abolition of 
Solidarity, it did not consider more sanctions a purposeful 
response. Debats Parlementaires de l'Assemblee Nationale, 
Premiere Session Ordinaire de 1982-3, "Questions au 
Government" (Andree Chandernagor, Ministre Delegue, Charge 
des Affaires Europeennes), 13 octobre 1982, Journal Officiel, 
14.10.1982, pp. 5727-29. See also Le Monde 10/11.10.1982.
98Financial Times 14.12.82.
99Le Monde 12/13.12.82.
100Le Monde 25.12.82.
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In July 1983 martial law was finally lifted and a limited 
amnesty was introduced for political and other offenders. 
However, most of the measures taken under martial law had 
been introduced into Polish legislation, and the lifting of 
martial law did not, therefore, have a large impact on 
conditions in Poland. In November 1983, Jaruzelski was still 
threatening to put the 11 most prominent prisoners from 
Solidarity and KOR on trial for treason. At the beginning of 
1984 Poland was said still to hold about two hundred 
political prisoners, and there were no prospects of 
restarting talks about independent trades unions.101
Despite the inability of the Polish regime to return to the 
reform process, it became clear in the first months of 1983 
that the West Europeans were beginning to question the 
continued purpose and utility of sanctions, and that they 
wished to normalise relations with Poland.102 Behind closed 
doors they tried to convince the United States of their 
viewpoint. Exploratory talks were apparently held on several 
occasions but without any decision being made. For instance, 
the new German Chancellor Helmut Kohl urged larger American 
flexibility on the question of sanctions against the Soviet
101 An amnesty for "almost all" prisoners, including 652 
political prisoners, was approved by the Sejm only in July
1984. Hufbauer, op. cit. Also, The Times, 23 July 1984.
102See for example The Guardian 1.12.82; 19.2.83; 
Financial Times 4.5.83; International Herald Tribune 1 5.4.83.
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Union in discussions with Reagan in May 1 983.103 In June 
1983 the United States again declared that it would not lift 
sanctions unless it was satisfied that its three conditions 
were fulfilled.104
At first the objectives of sanctions had appeared to be
clear. Philip Hanson for example, has argued that
"The purposes of the sanctions against Poland itself 
were . . . straightforward. They were intended to 
demonstrate US displeasure over the crushing of 
Solidarity, and to create pressure for its reversal: the 
aims of ending martial law, effecting an amnesty for 
political prisoners and allowing a resumption of 
dialogue between government and opposition were 
specifically stated."105
However, even if the objectives of sanctions appeared to be 
clearly defined, the effectiveness of the sanctions in 
achieving these objectives, as well as the realism of the 
objectives themselves, were put in doubt.105 In other words, 
as so often before in Western relations with Poland, there 
may have been an unrealistic gap between the stated 
objectives of the West and the instruments at their disposal 
to achieve these objectives (Or was it just that they were
103International Herald Tribune 23.5.83.
104International Herald Tribune 29.6.83.
105Hanson op. cit. p. 47.
106Nicholas G. Andrews, "The effectiveness of US 
sanctions against Poland", pp. 323-333 in Paul Marer and 
Wlodzimierz Siwinski (eds) Creditworthiness and Reform in 
Poland: Western and Polish Perspectives, Indianapolis,
Indiana University Press, 1988.
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not really a sufficiently high priority?). The United States 
may have overestimated its leverage to force the Soviet Union 
into disagreeable concessions in Poland when it imposed 
sanctions.107 It was also argued that sanctions are only 
useful if the target country can be isolated and in the case 
of a Warsaw Pact country that is virtually impossible. And 
finally, bearing in mind that the independent trades union 
was what most deeply challenged the Soviet political system, 
the demand for a re-establishment of Solidarity appeared less 
and less unlikely.108
With regard to Poland, Western bankers were amongst those 
arguing that the principal consequence of sanctions had been 
to drive Poland still further into the Kremlin's arms by 
increasing its economic dependence on the Soviet Union. Most 
agreed that Western sanctions, in particular the restrictions 
on credits, had a damaging effect on Polish economy.109
107For a discussion of the degrees of vulnerability of 
states to economic sanctions see Margaret P. Doxey, 
International Sanctions in Contemporary perspective, London, 
Macmillan, 1996, especially pp. 95-110.
108For a negative assessment of sanctions see John Edwin 
Mroz, "Aider la Pologne", pp. 129-155 in Politique 
Internationale, 26, 1, ete 1983. See also Yves Laulan
"L1Occident put-il utiliser 1'arme economique et financiere? 
L'example polonais", pp. 38-43 in Commentaire. no 5, vol 17, 
printemps 1982. He argues that sanctions against Poland were 
mostly symbolic and had little impact on policies themselves.
109M.S. Daoudi and M.S. Dajani, "Poland: the politactics 
of sanctions", pp. 149-166, The Polish Review, vol XXX, no 2,
1985.
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Trade between Poland and the West had fallen drastically in 
the first six months of 1982.110 This, in a sense, was also 
the argument of the Polish government, which was accusing the 
West of destroying any hope of recovery in Polish economy.
Finally, there was a sensation, in particular in Western 
Europe, that, politically, the West was playing itself out of 
the Polish game; that by refusing any form of dialogue with 
the Polish government the West was losing all form of 
leverage in Poland. In this context it was also argued that 
some of the sanctions, such as the refusal to reschedule, was 
hurting the West more than Poland because Poland had 
effectively for two years got away with not paying anything 
on its debt.111 The link between the rescheduling of 
Poland's private and public debt had been "broken". Before 
martial law Western banks had been reluctant to make any 
rescheduling deals with Poland without their governments 
taking the lead. However, with the continued blocking of the 
discussions on the public debt, an agreement to reschedule
110Polish imports from the United States declined with 
33% from 1981 to 1982, exports declined 84%. The respective 
figures for West Germany were - 13% and -18%; France, +6% and 
-30%, Britain, +4% and -21%. Hufbauer, op. cit. p. 200. See 
also International Herald Tribune 24.6.82.
^ Financial Times 15.9.1983. There was, however, a 
situation of interdependence here. Poland needed the 
reopening of the discussions because this was the only way to 
obtain new Western trade and commodity credits.
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the private debt for 1982 was reached in early November 
1982.112 And by March 1983 it was ready for a third round of 
debt rescheduling discussions.113 Hence, while Poland had 
not paid anything on its official debt since the imposition 
of martial law, all the country's foreign currency went into 
the pockets of private banks and none to Western 
governments.114
The Vatican, which had also clearly condemned the imposition 
of martial law, and supported the sanctions, also revised its 
position in 1983, and considered dialogue more important than 
confrontation. The Vatican also considered that the economic 
isolation of Poland did more harm and would not provoke 
change in Poland.115 Hence, a visit by the Pope to Poland
112International Herald Tribune 4.11.82.
113It must be added, however, that by 1983, the size of 
the Polish debt looked small in comparison with the debt of 
Mexico, Chile, Peru and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, because of 
the high value of the US $ at the time, the part of the 
Polish debt that had been taken in European currencies had 
depreciated considerably, hence providing a further easing of 
the burden. See Financial Times 21.3.1983.
114The Times 7.12.83. An agreement to reschedule the 1983 
debt was reached in August 1983, see Financial Times 19.8.83.
115Cardinal Glemp had, for some time before the Pope's 
visit to Poland, advocated the idea of creating a foundation 
to channel money to Polish farmers. In other words, the 
Church, and the Pope had accepted to enter into a dialogue 
with the Polish regime. The fund to the farmers should be 
financed by private Western aid, in particular, through 
Western Catholic Churches and was to be controlled by the 
Polish church. This project was, however, in the end 
abandoned. See, International Herald Tribune 29.6.1983 and 
6.8.1983; The Guardian 28.9.1983.
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was scheduled for the summer of 1983. The West Europeans 
appeared to hope that this would also pressure the United 
States to change its position. However, neither the visit of 
the Pope nor the lifting of martial law was considered 
sufficient by the United States.
The discussion on whether and under what conditions to lift 
sanctions coincided with crucial negotiations with the Soviet 
Union in Geneva on intermediate nuclear forces. These 
negotiations were a priority both for the United States and 
for Western Europe. There was concern that any public 
disagreement between the allies on Poland or any other issue 
would play into the hands of the Soviet Union. Hence, the 
West Europeans generally accepted the American position, in 
order to avoid an open confrontation, and decisions that 
threatened to be divisive were postponed.116 In practice 
however, after the lifting of martial law, sanctions were 
gradually lifted, although an outright and overall decision 
at Alliance level to do so, or to how it should be done, was 
not taken.
116Interestingly, the United States did not suggest a 
linkage between Poland and the INF negotiations. Before 
martial law Reagan had hinted that the possibility of such a 
linkage could not be ignored, "interview with President­
elect, Ronald Reagan, 19 January 1981", p. 131, in Survival, 
vol XXIII, no 3, May/June 1981. See for example Reagan's 
speech to Eureka College, May 1982. "Documentation. Nuclear 
weapons and arms control", Survival, vol XXIV, Sept/Oct 1982, 
pp. 229-230.
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At a meeting in Paris in September 1983 between 
representatives from the foreign ministries of Poland's 
largest Western creditors117 a decision was taken "in 
principle" to re-open negotiations on the rescheduling of 
Poland's official debt. In practice this did actually amount 
to a major erosion of NATO's sanctions. It was expected that 
it might also ultimately lead to the lifting of the freeze on 
new Western export credits. However, there was still 
uncertainty as to the American position. So far, the United 
States had only let it be known that they were not opposed to 
re-establishing contact with Warsaw on the debt question.118 
As a result, the Paris club was, in practice, only marking 
time for several months, waiting for the United States to 
make up their minds as to whether negotiations could actually 
open.119 Finally, the United States' decision to join in 
talks on rescheduling Poland's official debt was taken on 3 
November 1983.120 Still, there was disagreement over how to 
proceed. The American proposal was to re-negotiate Poland's 
debt year by year, starting with the broken agreement of 
1982, then continuing with 1982 and 1983. The West Europeans
117West Germany, France, the United States, Great 
Britain, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, Finland, 
Italy, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Switzerland.
118Le Monde 31.7/1.8.1983.
119The Guardian 11.1.1984.
120Financial Times 3.11.83.
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considered this to be too long a process. At Christmas 1983 
the European Community's sanctions against the Soviet Union 
were allowed to lapse, as they expired on 31 December. The 
question was not discussed in the Council of Foreign 
Ministers, and no formal announcement was made with respect 
to this.121
In January 1984 NATO's permanent council was convened to 
review the Polish situation. Western Europe on this occasion 
led by West Germany and supported also by the United Kingdom, 
argued that it was time to normalise relations with Poland. 
Neither the EEC or individual West European countries were 
applying sanctions against Poland on their own, but US 
support was considered necessary to create effective moves to 
ease economic and political relations with Poland. Hence, the 
United States was, for example, delaying negotiations on the 
Polish application for IMF membership.
It was only in autumn 1984 that the US position started 
changing. The political amnesty was announced in Poland in 
August 1984, when 652 political prisoners were released. The 
suspension of scientific exchanges between Poland and the 
United States was lifted, and a ban on landing rights for 
regularly scheduled flights by the Polish airline LOT was
121Financial Times 23.12.83. (1.4% of Soviet exports to
the EC had been covered by the sanctions, it amounted to a 
total of $140 million per year).
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ended. (However, new agreements had to be negotiated in the 
two areas and by October this had only just started on the 
question of scientific exchanges.) This appears to have given 
the Europeans the spur finally to bring relations with Poland 
back to normal. The diplomatic quarantine imposed on Poland 
after the NATO meeting of 11 January 1982 was lifted only in 
the autumn of 1984122, although a year earlier the EEC had 
already come to the view that time had come to re-open 
dialogue with Poland.123 The United States was quoted as not 
being very pleased with the European decision to normalise 
diplomatic relations with Poland.124
By early December 1983 it became clear that the Solidarity 
leader Lech Walesa also favoured an end to sanctions.125 
Solidarity had favoured the imposition of Western sanctions 
after martial law, but argued that the time had now come to
122Financial Times 3.8.1984.
123For speculation that the US would ease some of the 
sanctions against Poland, see for example Financial Times 
2.11.83; International Herald Tribune 1 .11 .83 and 2.11.83; Le 
Monde 3.11.83.
124The first West European higher official to visit 
Poland was British Minister of State Malcolm Rifkind, whose 
job in the Foreign Office was to oversee East-West relations. 
His visit to Warsaw was planned for 4 November. He was 
expected to be followed by German Foreign Minister Hans- 
Dietrich Genscher and Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti 
before the end of 1984. International Herald Tribune 
12.10.1984 and Financial Times 9.10.1984.
125For the official Polish reaction to sanctions, see 
Hufbauer, et al. op. cit. pp. 197-8.
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lift them, because they no longer served their purpose and 
could not be expected to achieve much more.126 Lech Walesa 
reiterated his position in his Nobel peace Prize lecture in 
Oslo later the same month127 and in December the United 
States decided to lift its veto on IMF membership.128
The strongest American sanctions, however, were still in 
place: that of withholding the Most Favoured Nation status 
from Poland and also the ban on new credits, which hampered 
Polish trade. It was only on 19 February 1987, that the 
United States lifted the remaining sanctions against Poland 
and restored the Most Favoured Nation trading status to 
Poland.129
Hence, in practice sanctions were lifted little by little, 
without much coordination or overall strategy, but rather 
with the aim of creating as little tension in the alliance as 
possible. One may argue that the alliance returned in this 
last phase to its usual approach of "muddling together".
126Financial Times 9.12.83.
127International Herald Tribune 14.12.83 and Financial 
Times 9.12.83. The lecture was given by Walesa's wife, Lech 
Walesa himself was not allowed to leave Poland.
128Financial Times 15.12.1984.
129Hufbauer et al, op. cit p. 195.
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Conclusion
Although not an entirely unexpected turn of events, martial 
law caught the Western alliance unprepared, and neatly 
divided the increasingly hardline United States' 
administration from the West Europeans, who were still 
committed to detente. Chapters four and five showed that 
until the imposition of martial law, the Western allies had 
succeeded in maintaining cohesion and in coordinating their 
policies towards Poland. Crucially though, they had failed to 
agree on how to react to the possibility of martial law, and 
once it was imposed, the divergences in their perspectives 
soon came to the surface, and led to one of the most serious 
crises in the history of the Alliance.
The findings of this chapter confirm that Western 
institutional structures were not strong enough to guarantee 
cohesion. Martial law required a quick reaction. It was no 
longer possible, as it had been up to martial law, for the 
Western states to continue to "muddle through" and although 
Western institutional structures provided extensive 
opportunities for consultation, their limited ability to 
ensure rapid coordinated action was amply illustrated after 
martial law.
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The limited utility of Western institutional structures was 
a result of Poland's ambiguous place in Western foreign and 
strategic policies, as well as the nature of the issues 
raised by martial law in Poland. As chapter three showed, 
NATO is essentially a military alliance charged, in article 
V in the North Atlantic Treaty, with the task of providing 
collective defence for its member states.130 The Polish 
crisis did not fall within the parameters of article V, and, 
with the risk of a Soviet or Warsaw Pact military 
intervention practically ruled out after martial law, NATO's 
"grip" on the crisis was loosened even more than in the two 
previous phases of the crisis. NATO's ability to function 
effectively and to ensure close coordination amongst the 
Western allies was closely tied up with military/strategic 
issues. This was obviously partly for political reasons, in 
other words, when the security of member states were seen to 
be at risk, the willingness to compromise grew stronger, 
nonetheless there was also an important institutional 
dimension to this. The structure and organisation of NATO was 
such that although consultation was easy enough to achieve on
130According to article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more 
of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an 
attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if 
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the 
right of individual or collective self defence..., will 
assist the Party or Parties so attacked...to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area". "The North 
Atlantic Treaty", pp. 376-378 in The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation: Facts and Figures, Brussels, NATO Information 
Service, 1989.
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political issues, there were few instruments for promoting 
common political initiatives.
Other Western institutional networks were not in any way 
capable of taking NATO's place and ensuring transatlantic 
coordination over martial law. In fact, the European 
institutions were not entirely successful in promoting an 
active cohesive response at the European level. It is 
important to bear in mind that although the principal 
division was between the United States and the West 
Europeans, there were also divergencies within Western 
Europe. EPC was important in the sense that it facilitated, 
and to a certain extent legitimised, individual European 
states', and in particular West Germany's, opposition to the 
United States. By the same token it became a useful tool for 
French foreign policy, as France no longer stood alone as the 
sole dissenter in the Alliance on East-West relations. Still, 
EPC did little beyond providing a common umbrella for West 
European opposition to the US. It did not generate a European 
initiative after martial law. The newly invented crisis 
consultation mechanisms did not make a great deal of 
difference to EPC. Ultimately, the Franco-German differences 
were dealt with bilaterally and not in the framework of EPC. 
The impression of the limited importance of EPC is further 
reinforced by the fact that, although the West Europeans won 
the short term battle over the pipeline, they lost the longer
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term battle over detente. EPC failed to transform itself into 
an effective actor on East-West relations.
Although perhaps logical in terms of the developments of the 
Ostpolitik in the 1970s, the West German position was unusual 
in terms of its position in the Atlantic Alliance. After the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, West Germany acted as 
intermediary between France and the United States. This time, 
West Germany was the internal dissenter, abandoning its role 
as a loyal ally to the United States, while the French 
President was closer to Reagan's perception of events, 
although he disagreed with the means employed in reaction to 
martial law. It was pointed out in chapter two that the role 
of the United States was one of the principal issues on which 
West Germany and France differed with regard to Western 
policies towards Eastern Europe. After martial law, this 
divergence was no longer there.
So, the situation in Poland fell outside the area where NATO 
had a firm grip. Although the defence aspects of NATO had 
tighter provisions for coordination, in situations where 
military security was not directly involved it was very 
difficult for NATO to generate coordination. At the same 
time, no other Western institutional framework was able 
"replace" NATO.
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Poland was also an area where there was no long tradition for 
a common Western strategy. As chapter two showed, there had 
not really been a need for strong coordination of Western 
policies towards Eastern Europe. The Western alliance had 
taken a "laissez-faire" attitude, allowing, and even 
encouraging in the Harmel report, individual national 
approaches to Poland and Eastern Europe, within the overall 
framework of Western approaches to East-West relations. This 
approach had, in the 1970s got increasingly out of hand from 
a cohesion perspective, as the West Europeans developed a far 
stronger interest in the continuation of these national 
approaches to Eastern Europe. The difficulties with the 
"laissez faire" approach were further strengthened by the 
fact that the cement of the East-West problematique and the 
notion of two separate blocs in Europe was weakening. In 
other words, the fundamentals of the East-West relationship 
were increasingly questioned, and came to the forefront in 
the context of the Polish crisis. There was no common Western 
strategy towards Poland once it "came loose" from the logic 
of bipolarity or the Cold War. As chapter three pointed out, 
although Poland was geographically at the heart of the 
strategic balance in Europe, and thus had the ability to 
affect security within NATO, it was politically out of reach. 
As relations with Poland became increasingly "politicised" 
and "de-militarised" during detente, the grip of NATO over 
coordination towards this country loosened. Also, the gradual
politicisation had taken place along national lines, rather 
than collective lines.
The fragmentation of the political, economic and security 
elements in the Western response continued in this phase. 
Nowhere was this better illustrated than in the parallel and 
uncoordinated US delegations taking to Europe in the spring 
of 1982, all dealing with issues related to the Polish 
crisis, yet, failing to bring all its aspects together. As 
for the G7, which was, from some quarters, promoted as a 
forum that would enable discussion at the highest political 
level of economic, political and strategic issues, its 
inadequacies were amply illustrated at the Versailles summit. 
The advantages of informality were overshadowed by its 
inconveniences, as important participants at the summit were 
left unaware of vital decisions. Its inefficiency was further 
reinforced by the absence of provisions allowing for 
preparations of the discussions held at the summit.
Finally, disagreement amongst allies was not related 
exclusively to events in Poland. Arguably, martial law was 
the cause of the crisis, but it was not its only object. The 
issue of how to react to martial law became embroiled in 
wider transatlantic disputes over East-West trade and the use 
of economic sanctions in the early 1980s. These were issues 
on which there had always been stronger disagreement amongst
356
the allies. They were particularly sensitive at the time of 
the Polish crisis. It has been argued that the Western 
crisis, in the long run, was a good thing for the alliance, 
because it signalled weak links in its structure and called 
to account different perceptions of detente.131 This chapter 
has found that, rather than resolving or confronting their 
disagreements, they were at best covered up, if not 
reinforced after martial law. Individual Western states' 
perception of events in Poland were to a large extent 
determined by their overall view of detente and East-West 
relations. Rather than enhancing understanding between the 
United States and Western Europe, it strengthened suspicions 
on both sides. By late 1982, the Western allies returned to 
a deliberate policy of "muddling through" without having 
resolved their fundamental differences and without having 
moved towards a new transatlantic bargain. This was 
considered the most feasible approach in terms of alliance 
cohesion.
The breakdown of coordination cannot be seen as a result of 
a misperception of what was at stake for the other allies. 
This chapter has shown that US policy-makers were aware of 
the West European reluctance to sanctions, both in December 
1981 and after the G7 summit in June 1982. They admit fairly
131David William Hunter, Western trade pressure on the 
Soviet Union: an interdependence perspective on sanctions. 
PhD thesis, London School of Economics, 1988, p. 143.
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openly that they wished to pursue sanctions despite European 
opposition. If there was misperception, then it was in the 
form of the US overestimating its influence in the alliance. 
The institutional structures had in this sense created their 
own problems of coordination. Interaction in NATO had 
developed a certain pattern of expectations on both sides of 
the Atlantic. As the alliance hegemon, the US was conditioned 
to expect that, under pressure, the West Europeans would 
follow its lead. The West Europeans, on the other hand, 
expected to be consulted before US initiatives. They did not 
accept that Alliance ties would infringe on what they 
considered their rights as sovereign states.
The crisis that developed in the Western alliance after 
martial law was a crisis of Western unity, rather than a 
foreign policy crisis for one, some, or all of the Western 
states taken together. The three criteria for a foreign 
policy crisis outlined by Brecher: change in the external 
environment, high probability of war and a finite time for 
response, are not directly applicable.132 In fact, 
paradoxically, martial law defused the potential for a 
classic foreign policy crisis (in the shape of an East-West 
crisis) and in turn triggered an intramural crisis, in other
132Michael Brecher, "A theoretical approach to 
international crisis behaviour", pp. 5-24 in Brecher (ed), 
Studies in crisis behaviour. New Brunswick, Transaction 
Books, 1978.
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words a crisis of Western cohesion. Arguably, any external 
crisis has the capacity to affect an Alliance, but it does 
not necessarily have to provoke a crisis of unity. It will 
however do so when it is perceived differently by different 
member states, or when member states have different views on 
how, or whether or not, the external crisis affects the 
Alliance. To some, martial law was an issue that required a 
strong Western reaction. Others chose to define it as a 
domestic political issue with few implications for the 
Western allies. In turn, this raised questions about the 
purpose of the Alliance, thus further reinforcing the image 
of the crisis as a crisis of Western unity, rather than a 
specific foreign policy crisis for some or all of the Western 
states. In the longer term, this crisis damaged the 
alliance's credibility, not only in the eyes of the outside 
world, but also in the eyes of the member states' domestic 
constituencies, who were already sceptical about its 
legitimacy.
Although the breakdown of cohesion was no doubt facilitated 
by the absence of established common procedures on Western 
policies towards Eastern Europe, as well as by poor 
institutional support for coordination on issues that fell 
outside the Cold War problematique, institutional weaknesses 
cannot fully explain the breakdown in coordination. 
Ultimately, the breakdown of coordination was the result of
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diverging national perspectives. With the end of the Cold War 
it has often been argued that "old" conflicts would return to 
Europe.133 As chapter two showed, part of these "old" 
conflicts were diverging Western aims in Poland. Following 
the logic of this perspective, the breakdown of Western 
coordination after martial law would then be the result of 
the reemergence of longer term disagreement over Poland as 
detente had loosened the grip of bipolarity. This chapter has 
found that the problem was more complex. Firstly, from this 
long-term perspective, the principal dividing line should 
have been between France and West Germany and not between 
West Germany and the United States. Thus, it would seem that 
the considerable changes that had taken place in intra- 
European relations after the Second World War were important 
for relations with the outside world and that lifting the 
"lid" of the Cold War does not necessarily lead to a return 
of pre-Cold War conflicts. Secondly, the emphasis given to 
coordination up until marital law, as well as the NATO 
meeting in January 11 1982, indicate that there was a
continued commitment to NATO, and to intra-West European 
coordination in parallel with the development of increasingly 
independent national approaches to Eastern Europe. In other 
words, although the grip of bipolarity had loosened, the grip 
of the Cold War institutions was still to some extent
133John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future", 
International Security, Summer 1990, vol 15, no 1, pp. 5-56.
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present. This would suggest that intergovernmental relations 
are not entirely innocent: in the long term they do bind
states closer together. These more complex relations between 
allied states did not prevent conflict between them, but they 
do establish an image of inter-state interaction which is 
less simple than that of nation states pursuing one­
dimensional national interests. It is against the backdrop of 
these paradoxes in intra-Western relations that chapter seven 
turns to examine the perspectives of the individual state 
actors, in order to determine how their positions were 
defined after the imposition of martial law in Poland.
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CHAPTER 7. REVISITING THE WESTERN CRISIS
Introduction
This chapter returns to the question of the breakdown of 
Western cohesion, from the perspective of the national 
actors. Coordination is the outcome of interaction between 
the nation-states and the institutional structures in which 
they interact. Still, it is clear from previous chapters 
that the imposition of martial law led to a variety of 
different national reactions, and that these ultimately 
triggered the crisis in the Western camp. Consequently, in 
order to understand the breakdown in coordination, it is 
necessary to examine more closely how and why these 
national reactions came about. The emphasis will be on the 
analyses of the external and domestic constraints facing 
individual states in the aftermath of martial law. Before 
looking at the individual actors, however, the wider 
political context of the Atlantic alliance must be 
discussed. It was suggested in chapter four that this wider 
crisis made coordination over Poland more difficult. Hence, 
it could perhaps be argued that the response of the 
individual Western states was determined by this broader 
crisis within the Alliance. It is important to examine the 
extent to which this is a sufficient explanation of the 
breakdown of coordination after martial law.
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The traditional perspective on alliance politics suggests 
that what keeps Alliances together is a sense of a common 
threat, and that, when the threat disappears, the Alliance 
is likely to fall apart. The underlying assumption is that 
the state is a "billiard-ball" unitary actor and its 
participation in an Alliance is the result of a rational 
pursuit of the state’s "national interest". Although the 
starting point, and the main focus, of this thesis (as well 
as this particular chapter) is the states themselves, 
rather than a specific Western institutional framework, and 
although we consider the crisis in the Alliance to have 
been the result, in the end, chiefly of a conflict between 
different national policies, we take the process by which 
this disagreement came about to have been more complex than 
that assumed by the traditional alliance theories. 
Consequently, we also regard it as insufficient to explain 
the breakdown of coordination as resulting exclusively from 
the collision of clearly distinguishable national policies. 
In fact, the national perspectives after martial law were 
not always clearly in contradiction with each other. What 
is more, each national policy taken on its own, was not 
clear cut. There was no unified perception of events in 
Poland inside each state, nor was there always a clear 
definition of national policy objectives. In the same vein, 
there was often a discrepancy between the perceptions of 
events in Poland, the diplomatic statements of the 
government, and the practical initiatives of that same 
government. In other words, each national response was
defined in response to a variety of domestic as well as 
external pressures and not in respect of clearly defined 
objectives. Most importantly, the position of the other 
allied governments was an important factor in defining each 
state’s position. It is in the context of this network of 
conflicting priorities that the maintenance and subsequent 
breakdown of coordination has to be understood. Thus, this 
chapter will pay particular attention to the way in which 
the Allied states chose to navigate within their domestic, 
external and alliance priorities.
The chapter starts by discussing the link between the 
crisis over Poland and the wider Atlantic crisis in the 
early 1980s. It suggests that although the wider Atlantic 
crisis contributed to the difficulties of coordination 
after martial law, it is not, on its own, sufficient as an 
explanation of why coordination broke down. Thus, the 
chapter turns to look at the individual positions of the 
four major Western states. It starts by looking at West 
Germany, then turns to France, Britain and finally the 
United States. It discusses the importance of domestic, as 
well as external influences on each individual state’s 
position after martial law. It pays particular attention 
to the influence of domestic consideration upon the outcome 
of allied coordination after martial law.
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Polish and Atlantic crises
The decision of the United States to impose sanctions 
against the Soviet Union and Poland without consulting with 
its allies must be set within the broader context of deeper 
uncertainties and more wide-reaching difficulties within 
the Western alliance in the early 1980s. The US action 
followed a series of controversies in NATO, most recently 
over the neutron bomb and over how to react to the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan. Demonstrations of 
disenchantment with the alliance in public opinion on both 
sides of the Atlantic were becoming more and more frequent 
in the early 1980s.
Some have pointed to structural changes in the relationship 
between the United States and Western Europe as an 
important cause of the crisis. The 'relative decline' of 
the United States and the relative strengthening of the 
economic and political independence of the West Europeans 
in comparison is an underlying theme in many discussions 
of the Atlantic crisis in the 1980s.1 Sloan wrote that,
^he best known example of the argument of US decline 
is probably found in Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the 
Great Powers, London, Fontana Press, 1989. See also Joseph 
Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, 
New York, Basic Books, 1990 and Henry Nau, The Myth of 
America's Decline, New York and Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1990 both argue, from different perspectives, 
against Kennedy's thesis of the inevitable decline of US 
power.
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"There is a crisis of confidence in the alliance, a 
crisis rooted in NATO's structural imbalance and 
exacerbated by the deterioration in West-West 
political and economic relations as well as by 
differences over East-West relations and nuclear 
weapons policies. ... The allies must find a new 
consensus that reflects the shifts in relative power 
which have occurred over the last 30 years". 2
Stephen Gill has also emphasised the importance of
structural changes in the Alliance in the early 1980s:
"... the American-centred transatlantic system, is, 
in Gramscian terms, undergoing a 'crisis of 
hegemony', involving, at the political level, a shift 
away from the post-war transatlantic consensus on 
East-West relations and from accepted domestic 
formulas for governing the Atlantic political 
economies. This crisis involves both elements of 
decay of the old order and elements of change and 
innovation."3
There was disagreement, however, as to the significance of 
the Atlantic crisis of the late 1970s/early 1980s. Those 
who stressed the structural changes in the Atlantic 
Alliance also tended to argue that the 1980 crisis was far 
more serious than previous crises, and to see it as the 
'beginning of the end' of Atlanticism. For Melandri, the 
economic decline of the United States made the Atlantic 
crisis of the early 1980s more serious than previous 
crises:
"Une interpretation strictement cyclique des crises 
qui secouent episodiquement le monde atlantique court 
le risque de se reveler exagerement optimiste. La
2Stanley Sloan, NATO's Future: Towards a New
Transatlantic Bargain, London, Macmillan, 1986, p.123.
3Stephen Gill (ed), Atlantic Relations: Beyond the
Reagan Area, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1989, p.11.
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crise actuelle se situe dans le contexte d'une 
evidente mutation industrielle qui met a mal les 
structures heritees du passe et parce que, 
malheureusement les problemes loin de seulement se 
perpetuer, tendent avec le temps a s'approfondir et 
a s'accumuler."4
Also, before the end of the Cold War, Gill predicted that:
"...the decade of the 1990s would probably be a 
period of significant transition in Atlantic 
relations, and (that) the label 1Atlanticist' would, 
as we approach the end of the century, become 
increasingly anachronistic".5
To others, the crisis was part of the normal cycle of 
periodic crises in NATO, and was an unavoidable 
characteristic of any Alliance of sovereign states. The 
history of the alliance is indeed riddled with crises, and 
journalists and politicians have with regular intervals 
predicted its demise. The Suez crisis in 1956 and the 
French departure from the military part of the alliance in 
1966 are examples of upheavals that were in many ways more 
dramatic than the one in the early 1980s.
Still, the crisis in the Western alliance in the early 
1980s was, no doubt, serious, and also different from 
previous crises. It involved all the major West European 
states, and not only France.6 Furthermore, it did not end 
with the West Europeans backing down, but rather with a US
4Pierre Melandri, Une Incertaine Alliance, Paris, 
Publications de la Sorbonne, 1988, p.408.
5Gill, op. cit, p.12.
6See also Josef Joffe, The Limited Partnership, 
Cambridge, Mass, Ballinger, 1987.
367
retreat, thus indicating a shift in the distribution of 
influence and allegiances within the Alliance. Finally, the 
crisis was more serious because of the existence of EPC and 
the European Community, providing a forum for the West 
European consultation and legitimisation of purely European 
positions. Still, the significance of the crisis in the 
early 1980s was highly ambiguous. On some issues, such as 
East-West economic relations, or on the evolution of 
domestic debates about foreign policy, the Western states 
seemed to be moving in different directions. At the same 
time, efforts also emerged to strengthen cooperation 
between the allied states. In fact, the very paradox of the 
crisis in the alliance in the early 1980s was that although 
there was structural change in the relationship between the 
member states, these same states did not show much 
willingness to change the basic political agreement upon 
which their relations were based. This point has also been 
stressed by other studies of Euro-American relations:
"There is no doubt that East-West relations during 
the 1980s have given rise to open competition and 
important divergences of view between Americans and 
west Europeans. Nonetheless, the structure within 
which competition and divergence has taken place 
remains fundamentally the same as in the 1970s, and 
Europeans show no material desire to overthrow it."7
This ambiguity could be seen in the West European embrace 
of the Reagan adminstration in the first half of 1981, when
7"Western Europe in the Atlantic system of the 1980s", 
David Allen and Michael Smith, pp. 88-110, in Stephen Gill 
(ed), op. cit, quotation p. 106.
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they enthusiastically expressed their support for Reagan's 
claims to a strong American leadership of NATO. It could 
also be seen in that alternatives to NATO, such as a 
European pillar inside the Alliance or an independent 
European defence, were purely theoretical possibilities. 
During the Polish crisis, up until the imposition of 
martial law there was no deliberate effort to promote a 
separate European response to the Polish crisis, as opposed 
to an Atlantic one. Contingency planning took place inside 
the framework of NATO, not inside EPC. EPC did follow 
events in Poland closely and issued declarations with 
respect to the threat to detente in case of a Soviet 
intervention. However, the language of these statements did 
not diverge dramatically from the NATO statements.8 
Finally, after the imposition of martial law, a 
considerable attempt was made to manage the differences at 
the Atlantic level, at the NATO meeting on January 11 1982. 
The fact that the meeting was held at all, as well as the 
careful drafting of the end communique, confirm that there 
was a willingness to cooperate and a common sense of a need 
to maintain NATO as a viable organisation. Why, in this 
case, did coordination not work?
8With regard to the economic aspects of the Western 
response to the Polish crisis, the West Europeans used the 
European Community instruments to provide food aid to 
Poland, and there is little evidence of coordination with 
the United States. Most likely, however, this was because 
there were no transatlantic institutions designed to deal 
with this type of problem, rather than the result of a 
desire to promote a separate European response to Poland.
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It was principally the specific initiatives taken by the 
United States after martial law, and, in particular, the 
US decision to impose sanctions without consulting its 
allies, that triggered the breakdown of coordination. In 
addition to the West European dissatisfaction with the lack 
of US consultation before the imposition of sanctions, the 
main grievances of the Europeans were the lifting of the 
American grain embargo against the Soviet Union in April 
1981, the subsequent signature of a new agreement to export 
US agricultural products to the Soviet Union in the summer 
of 1982, and the parallel sanctions on the gas pipeline, 
that the United States imposed on Western Europe.9 The 
Europeans considered that they were, in effect, expected 
to pay the price for the policy that the United States 
wished to implement.10 The importance of the American 
lifting of the grain embargo, in the West European 
perspective, is underlined not only by Attali, but also in
9Nau, op. cit. p. 314, points out that in the summer 
of 1982, the United States authorised a one year renewal 
of a long term grain agreement with the Soviet Union which 
expired in September 1982. In August 1983 a new long term 
agreement was signed between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. For a European perspective on the pipeline 
sanctions, see "Soviet pipeline sanctions: the European
perspective", US Congress, Hearings before the Joint 
Economic Committee, 97th Congress, September 22, 1982
(Andre Fontaine, Thierry de Montbrial, Andrew Knight).
10In fact the United States' exports to the Soviet 
Union were so limited that in practice a US 'embargo' would 
have no chance of succeeding. Hence, the United States 
needed West Europe whose exports to the Eastern bloc were 
far more important the those of the US, to implement 
American policy. A different view is presented by Nau, who 
argues that American firms suffered more than European 
firms for the US sanctions, op. cit. p. 307.
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Thatcher's memoirs.11 Sir Nicholas Henderson describes 
Mrs. Thatcher’s reaction to Reagan's efforts to explain the 
reasons behind the United States' embargo on the gas 
pipeline in the following way:
"Mrs. T's eyes blazed and she launched into a fierce 
attack on the President's decision, pointing out that 
American exports to the USSR would grow this year 
because of the lifting of the grain embargo."12
The following quote from Attali further confirms the
'dialogue des sourds' between the two sides of the Atlantic
over the winter of 1982:
"Dejeuner, prevu de longue date, du President avec 
1'ambassadeur americain, Evan Galbraith. On parle 
encore du gazoduc:
Frangois Mitterrand: 'vous leur vendez bien du ble.
Nous leur vendons des equipements pour un gazoduc'. 
Evan Galbraith: 'si vous leur achetez du gaz, vous
leur donnez des devises, c'est mal! Quand nous leur
vendons du ble, nous leur prenons des devises: c'est 
bien! ' "13
Beyond their shared annoyance with the United States over 
what ultimately came to be seen as an infringement of their 
sovereignty, the West Europeans, and, in particular, the 
West German, positions on Poland were shaped by different 
sets of concerns. Nonetheless, although they did, to some
11Jacques Attali Verbatim. Tome 1 : Chronique des
annees 1981-86, Paris, Librarie Artheme, Fayard, 1993, pp. 
252-3 and Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years. 
London, Harper Collins, 1993, p. 256.
12Nicholas Henderson, Mandarin: The Diaries of an
Ambassador. 1969-1982, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1994, p.479.
13Attali, op. cit. p. 156, see also page 188.
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extent disagree with each other, they agreed to disagree 
with the United States. In this context, the existence of 
European institutional frameworks was important. Still, 
this wider context of change and of a sense of crisis in 
the Atlantic Alliance is not enough on its own to explain 
the breakdown of coordination. The particular circumstances 
of the individual states, and the interaction between their 
domestic and external commitments must be taken into 
consideration.
West European responses to martial law 
Old and new in Europe: Martial law and the German problem
West Germany distinguished itself from the other Western 
states during the Polish crisis not only because of its 
muted reaction to the imposition of martial law, but also, 
and most importantly, because events in Poland had more 
serious implications for West Germany's foreign and 
domestic politics than for the policies of the other 
Western states. West Germany's dilemmas over martial law 
were well symbolised by Helmut Schmidt's presence in East 
Berlin, in meeting with his East German counterpart Erick 
Honecker on 13 December, and were further strengthened by 
the history of German imperialism in Poland.14 During
14Schmidt himself also discusses the dilemmas that the 
particular history of German-Polish relations presented for 
West Germany's reaction to martial law. See in particular 
pp. 254-5, Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective.
London, Jonathan Cape, 1990 : "No other nation, no other
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their common press conference the morning after the 
imposition of martial law, Schmidt commented that both 
Honecker and himself were concerned about the fact that 
imposition of martial law had been "necessary".15 His 
unfortunate comment was met with a storm of protest in 
Western media. Against this backdrop, the objectives and 
interests of West Germany after martial law are still 
disputed.
In his impressive study of Germany's role in Europe, 
Timothy Garton Ash contends that West Germany's position 
on martial law was entirely self-serving. He argues that 
the West Germans expected that:
"... the Poles (must) curb their claim to freedom in 
order that the Germans might continue to pursue their 
claim to unity."16
people had suffered more from German military occupation 
[during the Hitler period] than Poland". Also "Hitler, 
Himmler and the so-called governor general of occupied 
Poland, Hans Franck, had taken the anti-Polish sentiment 
then prevalent in Germany and raised it to unimaginable 
horror."
15Schmidt argues in his memoirs that what he had meant 
was that he was concerned that Jaruzelski had considered 
it necessary to impose martial law in order to prevent a 
Soviet intervention. See Helmut Schmidt Die Deutschen und 
ihre Nachbarn: Menschen und Mechte II, Berlin, Siedler, 
1990, p. 85.
16Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and
the Divided Continent. London, Vintage, 1994, p. 292.
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|Ash considers West German policy to have been inspired 
purely by national interest, although it was not officially 
recognised as such:
"The singular feature of this crisis was not the 
clash of Polish and German national interest. It was 
rather the reluctance to admit - or perhaps the 
inability to see - that it was national interests 
that were clashing. This reluctance - or inability - 
took two forms. On the one hand, the German national 
interest (stability as permissive function) was 
conflated with a general human interest (stability as 
world peace), a European interest (stability as 
precondition for detente), and even an alleged Polish 
interest (stability as condition for reform). 
Political, analytical and moral arguments were rolled 
into one. On the other hand, Solidarity's claim to 
represent the Polish national interest was 
questioned. After all, Jaruzelski said he had imposed 
martial law in the national interest."17
In his own explanation of his policies on martial law, 
Schmidt pleads for a rational assessment of the situation 
in Poland, as well as of West Germany's policy and the 
abilities of the West German and the Western governments 
to improve the situation in the country.18 He argues that 
Jaruzelski was first and foremost a Polish patriot, whose 
main concerns were to prevent a Soviet or Warsaw Pact 
military intervention in Poland, and to stop Poland from
17Garton Ash, op. cit. p.292.
18The considerable space devoted to the Polish crisis 
in both volumes of Schmidt's memoirs is in itself a sign 
of the concern with which events in Poland were received 
by the West German government, and perhaps also of a sense 
of need to explain and justify an episode in the Federal 
Republic's foreign policy which has been severely 
criticised. For criticism of the West German position, in 
addition to the numerous press comments and Garton Ash, op. 
cit. see also Pierre Hassner, "The shifting foundation", 
Foreign Affairs, no 48, Fall 1982, pp. 3-20.
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sliding into political and economic anarchy.19 He also 
suggests that Solidarity went too far in its demands for 
change and thus in part brought martial law on itself. He 
considers martial law to have been a lesser evil compared 
to the possibility of a Soviet military intervention, and 
that short of provoking a third world war, there was little 
the West could do to break down the division of Europe:
"At present it is impossible to see how the morally 
and historically untenable situation of the division 
of Europe can be ameliorated. Every attempt to use 
the will to freedom of the Poles, Hungarians, Czech 
or Germans as a lever to force restriction of Soviet 
controlled territory will run the risk of provoking 
violent intervention by Moscow; in the end there are 
the threats of civil war and international war."20
Deploring what he refers to as the over-emotional response, 
in particular of the American public but also of American 
policy-makers to martial law, Schmidt describes the mood 
in the United States during his visit to Washington in 
January 1982 as being "close to hysteria". He also points 
to the discrepancy between Reagan's rhetoric and the 
American sanctions which "remained so limited in scope that 
they were merely of a pseudopolitical, symbolic nature".21
The key to Ash's interpretation of Schmidt's policy is 
perhaps found in Schmidt's suggestion that, because of West
19Schmidt, Die Deutschen, op. cit. p. 505.
20Schmidt, Men and Powers, op. cit. p. 260.
21Schmidt, Men and powers, op. cit. p. 252.
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Germany's own experience, it was well placed to understand 
Poland's predicament, and that both countries had to 
'accept their fate':
"Germany, as the instigator and loser of the Second 
World War, had no choice but to accept the partition, 
under which it had been suffering for forty years; 
for the sake of peace, the Germans had also made the 
boundaries forced on them the subject of non­
aggression pacts. In a different way, the Poles, too, 
suffer from the partition of Europe, which made them 
subject to Soviet sovereignty; they have also been 
forced to cede large tracts of their country to the 
Soviet Union."22
The conceptual difficulties in explaining West German 
policy in the crisis, as Ash does, through the use of a 
concept as ambiguous as the 'national interest', are 
several. This is particularly so when the national interest 
is seen to exist, as it does in Garton Ash's argument, 
'objectively', as a given, which does not require further 
definition. On the other hand, it is difficult to consider 
West German policy to have been the outcome, as Schmidt 
argues, of a perfectly rational, objective assessment of 
the situation in Poland. There can be little doubt that 
vital interests were at stake for West Germany in the 
Polish crisis. The outcome of events in Poland would 
interfere directly with the Ostpolitik and the 
Deutschlandpolitik, the discussion on how to react to 
martial law had a direct impact on the domestic political 
debate in West Germany in the early 1980s and it exposed 
the difficulties of the West German role in the Western
22Helmut Schmidt, Men and Powers. op. cit. p.260-1.
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alliance. Hence, it might be more useful to think about 
West Germany’s policy as the outcome of a variety of 
domestic and external pressures. In other words, although 
concern about protecting the "national interest", defined 
implicitly by Ash as the ability to continue the 
Ostpolitik, must no doubt have been high on the agenda, it 
can hardly be seen as the only priority of West German 
policy-makers.
The Polish crisis emerged at a time of increased
disagreement on the fundamentals of West German foreign
policy, and the imposition of martial law and the question
of how to react to it, fed directly into this debate.
Schmidt was facing an increasingly strong opposition from
the left wing of the SPD, which advocated West German
disengagement from NATO, rejected the double track decision
of 1979 and promoted the notion of a "security partnership"
between East and West in Europe. Indeed, after Schmidt's
resignation as Chancellor in the autumn of 1982,23 the new
SPD leadership called for:
"...what they called 'the second phase of
Ostpolitik', which featured party-to party contacts
with the SED and the Soviet and other East European
communist parties. The purpose was to draw up, in 
advance of the SPD returning to power and in the hope 
of influencing the Bonn government's policies, a
23Schmidt resigned when the FDP withdrew from the SDP- 
FDP coalition after a disagreement on budgetary issues. 
Still, Griffith argues that, "It was unlikely that he 
[Schmidt] could have maintained support for INF deployment 
and therefore would have fallen on that issue eventually", 
p. 56, William E. Griffith, "The American view", pp. 49-63 
in Edwina Moreton (ed), Germany between East and West, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987.
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series of agreements on such issues as nuclear and 
chemical weapons-free zones".24
As the continued electoral success of the CDLJ after 1982 
confirms, the left wing of the SPD did not speak for a 
majority of the West Germans. Nevertheless, their position 
is significant in that it constituted a considerable 
constraint on Helmut Schmidt’s foreign policy while in 
government and meant that it was difficult for Schmidt to 
follow the hardline position taken by the Reagan 
administration. The domestic political debate on martial 
law was further complicated by the fact that the CDU joined 
the Western allies in criticising Schmidt's position. In 
a debate on martial law in the Bundestag on 18 December 
1982, Helmut Kohl accused Schmidt of being insensitive to 
the concerns of the Polish people.25
24Griffith, in Moreton, op. cit. Quotation on p. 57. 
It should perhaps be noted that this discussion was by no 
means limited to West Germany. See for example, Martin
Saeter, Europa me 1 lorn supermaktene . Oslo,
Universitetsforlaget, 1984, in which the author advocates 
an "all-European peace solution" for Europe.
25For Kohl’s position on martial law see, Bundestag 
Plenarprotokolle, 9/74, pp.4294-4301, 18 December 1981.
Once in power, however, Kohl did not in any way change West 
German policy on the issue, nor on East-West relations in 
general. In a statement to the Bundestag on 13 October 
1982, describing the main elements of his foreign policy, 
he confirmed West Germany's conception of trade with the 
Soviet Union as an important part of West Germany's East- 
West relations, while at the same time expressing his 
sympathy for the situation in Poland. "Documentation. West 
Germany's foreign and security policy. Chancellor Kohl's 
policy statement." 13 October 1982, pp. 35-36 in Survival. 
vol XXV, no 1, January/February 1983.
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This hitherto unprecedented polarisation of the country's
foreign policy debate is a clear sign of the extreme unease
within West German society in the early 1980s and linked
indirectly to the issue of relations with East Germany.
According to Morgan:
"...the underlying issue [in the domestic West German 
debate] was the paradox of West Germany's combination 
of economic strength, political maturity, high 
international prestige, and total inability to make 
real progress in solving the fundamental problem of 
national division."26
Martial law also raised the issue of Ostpolitik directly, 
and pointed to the long term history of German-Polish 
antagonism.
Recently published documents confirm that East German 
troops were expected to take part in a possible Warsaw Pact 
intervention.27 Against the backdrop of German-Polish 
history, there is no doubt that such a scenario would not 
only have given the Ostpolitik a severe blow, it would also 
have brought renewed focus on the highly sensitive issue 
of Polish -German relations. Schmidt also mentions in his 
memoirs that one of his main fears during the Polish crisis
26Roger Morgan, "West Germany's foreign and security 
interests", pp. 97-107 in Moreton, op. cit. Quotation on 
p.100.
27Mark Kramer, "Poland, 1980-81. Soviet policy during 
the Polish crisis",pp. 1, 116-139 in Cold War International 
History Project, Bulletin, Washington DC, Woodrow Wilson 
International Center, Issue 5, Spring 1995, especially p. 
120. The article reviews new archive materials and memoirs 
made public after 1989, from Russia, Poland, Germany and 
Czechoslovakia. For the role of East Germany, see also a 
forthcoming multi-volume collection of documents from the 
former East German communist party and Stasi archives SED- 
Politburo und Polnische Krise 1980/1982, in preparation by 
Manfred Wilke et al.
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was the possibility of seeing East German troops involved 
in an intervention in Poland.28
Schmidt's interpretation of East Germany's position on 
martial law is nevertheless surprising. Referring to his 
thoughts on the issue, Schmidt indicates that he considered 
it important not to incriminate the DDR for events in 
Poland.29 This perspective contrasts sharply with what has 
since emerged about Honecker's position on Solidarity and 
the Polish crisis. It is now reasonably well documented 
that Honecker was one of the most determined advocates of 
a Warsaw Pact military intervention in Poland. From very 
early on in the Polish crisis (as early as the autumn of 
1980) Honecker tried to convince the Soviet Union that 
"fraternal aid" against Polish counter-revolutionary forces 
was necessary.30 It would appear that Honecker's main fear 
was the risk that the movement of protest might spread from 
Poland to East Germany itself. In a situation where issues 
can only with difficulty be painted in black and white, 
there is little doubt that martial law was better than a 
full scale military intervention. At the same time, the
28Schmidt, Die Deutschen, op. cit. p. 256. According 
to Valenta, Polish generals were said to have signed a 
document stating that if East German troops crossed the 
Polish borders this would be viewed as an act of war. Jiri 
Valenta, "Soviet options in Poland", pp. 50-59 in Survival, 
vol. XXIII, no. 2, March/April 1981, p. 58.
29Schmidt, Die Deutschen, op. cit. p. 87.
30See Kramer, op. cit. p. 118, in particular 
Honecker's letter to Brezhnev, 28 November 1980, in English 
translation on p. 124.
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West German government was, at best, the victim of wishful 
thinking on the issue of East Germany's role in Poland.31 
Most importantly for our argument, the recent information 
about the role of the GDR and Honecker in the imposition 
of martial law reinforces the image of the West German 
government as trapped in a series of domestic and external 
constraints over the Polish crisis.
Martial law was not, however, only a problem for West 
German domestic politics, and for West Germany's relations 
with East Germany, it also highlighted the ambiguities in 
the country's relations with its Western allies. The 
importance of its links with the West, through its 
membership in NATO and the EC, as well as the importance 
of the continued support of the United States and France, 
is often pointed out. Philip Windsor has stressed that "it 
is hard to exaggerate the importance of France at almost 
any level of German political perception."32 Roger Morgan 
argues that:
"...the Ostpolitik has been firmly rooted in 
Westpolitik; neither Brandt nor Schmidt allowed the 
Federal Republic's involvement with the Soviet bloc
31Hassner, op. cit. On p. 13, referring to Schmidt's 
statement that he felt Honecker was sharing his hopes for 
an agreement in Poland, Hassner argues "This is a serious 
blemish on the record of one of the few Western statesmen 
who deserve respect and support, particularly since he made 
the statement during a visit to East Germany." See also the 
debate in the Bundestag, Bundestag Plenarprotokolle, op. 
cit.
32Philip Windsor, Germany and the Western Alliance: 
Lessons from the 1980 Crises. Adelphi papers, no 170, The 
IISS, London, Autumn 1981, p.15.
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to grow to a point at which it threatened their 
country's fundamental commitment to Nato."33
Still, it was becoming increasingly difficult for the West 
German government to balance the domestic dissatisfaction 
with the shift away from detente, with the concern of its 
allies about its 'loyalty' to the West.34 Thus, Joffe has 
argued that:
"In stark contrast to France, where the legitimacy of 
a conservative regime is not tied to relations with 
the East, the diplomatic flexibility of the West 
German government is tightly circumscribed by the 
imperatives of domestic control."35
Because of the history of Polish-German relations, and 
because the role of East Germany was directly involved, the 
West German reaction to martial law raised the alarm not 
only inside the Reagan adminstration, but also in France, 
thus indicating that the spectre of Rapallo still loomed 
large in the minds of French policy-makers. As Renata 
Fritsch-Bournazel points out:
"Except for the fear of a German finger on the 
nuclear trigger, no other political issue in the 
Franco-German partnership weighs so heavily 
psychologically as the Federal Republic's attitude 
towards the East."36
33Morgan in Moreton, op. cit, p. 105.
Windsor, op. cit p. 18-20 and Hassner, op. cit, p. 
19-20.
35Josef Joffe, "European-American relations: the
enduring crisis", Foreign Affairs, vol 59, no 4, 1981, pp. 
835-852, quotation on p. 845.
36Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, "The French view", pp. 
64- 82, in Moreton op. cit., quotation p. 74.
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Essentially, the imposition of martial law highlighted in 
a particularly acute way West Germany's enduring dilemma 
of reconciling the necessity to constantly reconfirm its 
loyalty to the West with the desire to maintain the 
dialogue with East Germany.
Over the winter of 1982, West Germany gradually modified 
its position on martial law. It associated itself with the 
alliance compromise hammered out on January 11 1982. Also, 
in terms of the sanctions, West Germany followed the same 
line as the other West European states.37 Most 
importantly, as the crossfire over the Atlantic 
intensified, despite the NATO compromise of January 11, the 
ghost of the "German problem" was superseded by the 
imperatives of transatlantic relations. Thus, by the end 
of June 1982, after the clash between Mitterrand and Reagan 
at the Versailles summit, Helmut Schmidt notes in his 
memoirs that France, finally aligned with the West German 
position.38
France and Britain, a matter of sovereignty?
Turning to the position of West Germany's West European 
allies, it is clear first of all that less was at stake
37Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, "Les reactions allemandes a 
la crise polonaise", pp. 3-13 in Documents. Revue des 
Questions Allemandes, Mars 1982, no. 1.
^Schmidt, Men and Power, op. cit, p. 260.
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both for France and for Britain as a result of events in 
Poland. Although it would be highly exaggerated to think 
in terms of an 'entente cordiale1 between France and 
Britain after martial law, it is worth noting that the 
positions and interests of these two states were closer to 
each other than to West Germany. Both states were more 
openly critical of the role of the Soviet Union than the 
West Germans had been, and clearly gave the Soviet Union 
a large share of the responsibility for martial law. Thus, 
when both states turned their backs on the United States, 
it had less to do with a different assessment of events in 
Poland and of the role of the Soviet Union, and more to do 
with divergent views on how to handle this particular 
event. This, in turn, reflected highly divergent views on 
how East-West relations should be conducted more generally. 
But most importantly, the breakdown of coordination was 
triggered by British and French discomfort with the 
unilateral initiatives of the United States.
France
What is perhaps most striking about the French position on 
martial law is its elusiveness, or rather, its ambiguity. 
On the one hand, Mitterrand was amongst those of the 
Western leaders who most strongly condemned martial law in 
Poland. The impression of a vigorous and negative French 
reaction to martial law was strengthened by the number of 
French people who descended into the streets to protest
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against the abolition of civil liberties in Poland. Such 
manifestations of outrage were not observed in neighbouring 
West Germany, neither, in fact, in the UK. On the other 
hand, French policy-makers made statements that were, if 
anything, as insensitive to the fate of Poland as those 
made by Helmut Schmidt in East Berlin. Chapter six showed 
that Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy defended the French 
signing of the gas pipeline agreement only weeks after 
martial law by arguing that one should not, on top of the 
suffering of the Polish people, add the suffering of French 
people by depriving them of heating.39 Likewise, chapter 
six quoted Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson declaring the 
day after martial law, that "naturally we shall do nothing" 
about the situation in Poland.40 Furthermore, in terms of 
the substance of policy, France did not do much more than 
West Germany. In essence, the French position consisted in 
adhering to existing economic agreements with Poland, but 
refusing to negotiate new commercial contracts, and also, 
halting the debt negotiations with Poland. There is no 
indication that the French government at any point 
considered imposing economic sanctions against the Soviet 
Union or Poland in response to martial law.
The more confrontational rhetoric of the French government 
after martial law corresponded with a general re­
39See chapter six.
40Cheysson made this declaration at the French radio 
station 'Europe 11 on December 13. It was widely quoted in 
the aftermath, see for example Le Monde. 16. 12.1981, "Les 
paroles imprudentes de M. Cheysson". See also Attali, op. 
cit p. 1981 .
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orientation of French foreign policy after the election of 
Mitterrand in May 1981. During his electoral campaign, 
Mitterrand had criticised Giscard for being too soft on the 
Soviet Union. Giscard was particularly ridiculed for his 
meeting with Brezhnev in Warsaw in the summer of 1980, 
which was supposed to lead to some form of "solution" to 
the question of Afghanistan, and which earned him the 
nickname 'petit telegraphiste' (the messenger boy) during 
the Presidential election campaign.41 Once in power, 
Mitterrand continued this line, taking a less conciliatory 
tone on East-West relations than Giscard. He expressed 
concern, in particular, about the arms build-up in Eastern 
Europe and acknowledged the need to restrict exports of 
strategic goods to the Warsaw Pact. According to Moisi:
"Giscard d'Estaing was anti-communist at home and 
soft on the Soviet Union. Mitterrand has brought 
Communist ministers into his government for a mixture 
of historical and tactical reasons but is firmly 
anti-Soviet.1,42
One of the most often quoted statements of Mitterrand, is 
that from his state visit to West Germany in 1983, at the 
height of the German debate on the deployment of Cruise and
41For a discussion of Giscard's motivation for the 
Warsaw meeting see Michel Tatu, "Valery Giscard d'Estaing 
et la detente", pp. 196-217 in Sarny Cohen and Marie-Claude 
Smouts (eds), La Politique Exterieure de Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing. Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des 
Sciences Politiques, 1985, especially pp. 209-214.
42Dominique Moisi "Mitterrand's foreign policy: the
limits of continuity", Foreign Affairs, vol. 60, no. 2 
1981, pp. 347-358, quotation, p.348-9.
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Pershing II missiles, where he told the German Bundestag 
that, Mles missiles sont a l'est, les pacifistes a 
1'ouest".43
Yet this change of direction in French foreign policy does 
not mean that Mitterrand became an Atlanticist. 
Mitterrand's policy after martial law can probably best be
seen as inspired by a concern for the balance of forces in
Europe, a concern for the effect that events in Poland 
might have on France's relations with West Germany and by 
a concern for the continued independence not only of French 
foreign policy, but also for French domestic economic 
policy.44 It follows from this that the French 
government's position on martial law had less to do with
a specific view on Poland, and more to do with concern
about the consequences of events in Poland for France's
43See for example Bruno Racine, "La France et les 
FNI", pp. 79-91 in Politique Etranqere, no. 1, 1988;
Melandri, op. cit, p 373. For the text of Mitterrand's 
speech see Reflexions sur la politique exterieure de la 
France, Paris, Fayard, 1986, pp. 183-208. See also Jolyon 
Howorth, "Foreign and defence policy: from independence to 
interdependence", pp. 201-217 in Peter A Hall, Jack Hayward 
and Howard Machin (eds), Developments in French Politics, 
London, MacMillan, 1994. For reference to Mitterrand's 
position on the Euromissiles see p.208.
^The support for stronger American leadership in the 
Alliance and for the deployment of Cruise and Pershing II 
missiles in Europe, may be seen as motivated less by a 
specific Atlantic perspective and more by a recognition 
that the Soviet SS20 missiles made the French nuclear force 
de frappe extremely vulnerable. A strengthening of NATO 
would make sense also from an economic perspective, in that 
it would take some of the pressure off the need to 
reinforce France's own nuclear arsenal.
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position in Europe and its other, and more important, 
foreign policy relationships.45
The French assessment of what could be done about Poland 
was essentially pragmatic, and summed up in the following 
statement from Mauroy:
"Compte tenu de la situation geopolitique dans 
laquelle se trouve la Pologne depuis la fin de la 
deuxieme guerre mondiale, chacun sait que 1'Union 
Sovietique est impliquee par tout ce qui touche a 
1'Europe de l1Est. C'est le resultat des rapports de 
force sanctionnes par les accords de Yalta. La 
diplomatie frangaise ne mettra pas un terme a cette 
situation. . . "46
In other words, the French reaction to martial law seems 
to fit well into what Hassner calls France’s "triangular 
games with Germany, the Soviet Union and the United 
States".47 As chapter two showed, the preoccupation with 
the "German problem" had been an almost permanent feature 
of French foreign policy throughout the Twentieth Century.
45See for example Stanley Hoffmann, "Mitterrand's 
foreign policy, or Gaullism by any other name", pp. 294- 
305, in George Ross, Stanley Hoffmann and Sylvia Malzacher 
(eds), The Mitterrand Experiment: Continuity and Change in 
Modern France, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987 and Michael 
Harrison, "Mitterrand's France in the Atlantic system: a 
foreign policy of accommodation", Political Science 
Quarterly, vol. 99, no 2, summer 1984, pp. 219-246, in 
particular pp.219-226.
46Debats Parlementaires de l'Assemblee Nationale, 
Premiere Session Extraordinaire de 1981-82. Troisieme 
Seance, 23 decembre 1981. Journal Officiel, 24.12.1981, p. 
5403. See also Le Monde, 25.12.1981.
47Pierre Hassner, "Western European perceptions of the 
USSR", Daedalus, Winter 1979, volume 108, no 1, pp. 113- 
ISO, quote on p.124.
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The strength of the West German peace movement and the 
internal developments inside the SPD, as well as the 
reluctance of the Schmidt government to condemn the role 
of the Soviet Union in martial law, all fuelled France's 
concern about the position of West Germany on relations 
with its Eastern neighbours and the political and strategic 
balance in Europe.
There was, also, an important domestic dimension to French 
policy after martial law in Poland. On the one hand, French 
public opinion reacted strongly against the imposition of 
martial law and the French media criticised their own 
government, as well as the West German, for not reacting 
strongly enough to martial law.48 In fact, France did not, 
like its northern European counterparts have a strong 
pacifist, anti-nuclear movement in the early 1980s. On the 
contrary, there was a shift in French public opinion, and 
in particular amongst French intellectuals (who 
traditionally intervene actively in the French political 
debate), which went in a different direction: The so-called 
' nouveaux philosophies' rejected Sartre's and his 
generation's intellectual dominance in France, criticised
^For a criticism of Mitterrand's policy under martial 
law from one of Giscard's former associates see Gabriel 
Robin, La Diplomatie de Mitterrand. France, Editions la 
Bievre, 1985, pp. 34-40.
389
Soviet totalitarianism, and called for a "stronger" Western 
reaction to its consequences in Eastern Europe.49
The protest in public opinion was supported not only by the 
right-wing political parties and by the non-communist 
trades unions, in particular the CFDT, but also by the 
Rocard wing of the Socialist party. Thus, it reached inside 
the French government, where the Rocard was arguing for a 
stronger response to martial law.50 Attali has noted the 
following lines from a discussion on martial law in the 
French Council of ministers on 16 December 1981:
"Michel Rocard attaque violemment Claude Cheysson:
1II y a devoir d ’assistance a personne en danger. II 
faut agir.
Robert Badinter intervient dans le meme sens: II faut 
reagir et ne pas s1 aligner sur la prudence des 
autres. II faut interrompre les credits a la 
Pologne.1,51
49See Bernard Henry-Levy, La barbarie a visage humain, 
Paris, Grasset, 1977; Andre Glucksmann, La cuisiniere et 
le manqeur d 1hommes, Paris, Seuil, 1975; Andre Glucksmann, 
Cvnisme et passion. Paris, Grasset, 1981; Pierre Clastres 
La societe contre l'Etat, Paris, Minuit, 1975.
50For an overview of the different factions inside the 
French socialist party see Vincent Wright, The government 
and politics of France, London, Routledge, 1992, pp. 218- 
232.
51 Attali, op. cit. p. 145. Although the exact detail 
of the quotes is obviously difficult to verify, what 
emerges from these paragraphs is the tension within the 
French administration on the question of how to react to 
martial law.
390
Divergence inside the government was strengthened by the 
presence of four communist minsters who were reluctant to 
express criticism over events in Poland.
The dilemmas that these differences presented for the 
French government over Poland, were indicated by the 
holding of a so-called "conseil restraint" on Poland, on 
January 12 1982, the day after the NATO declaration on 
martial law in Poland. After the "Conseil", the French 
foreign minister, Cheysson, was criticised by Mitterrand 
for the 'tone' of his declaration on the Soviet Union 
during the NATO meeting on January 11. The President's 
concern apparently referred to two declarations by the 
Foreign Minister in which he was considered to have been 
"inutilement provoquant pour les ministres communistes".52 
A general statement to the fact that the President was 
personally responsible for French foreign policy and that 
it was important that France spoke with one voice on the 
subject of Poland was issued at the same time. The essence 
of French policy on martial law had not, however, changed, 
at all. Indeed, this incident would appear most of all to 
have been an exercise in bridge-building and an effort to 
assert the authority of the President over foreign policy.
52Le Monde. 14 January 1982. Cheysson's statement and 
the reaction of Charles Fiterman, the communist minister 
is also referred to by Attali, op. cit, p. 153. It is 
ironic that the same Foreign Minister had, one month 
earlier been rebuked by Mitterrand for his 'naturally we 
shall do nothing' remark on martial law.
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Internal disputes on foreign policy rarely become as 
obstructive in France as, for example, in the United 
States. The privilege of conducting foreign policy is safe 
in the hands of the President and his Elysee staff. 
Likewise, the input of other actors, such as parliamentary 
and public opinion is, in general, relatively limited.53 
It is difficult to assess the direct impact of the various 
domestic concerns over martial law on French policy. It 
can, however, be assumed that the criticism that the French 
government suffered, combined with the essentially 
pragmatic position of the President, can account for the 
ambiguities, and the sometimes wide gap between rhetoric 
and policy-initiatives in the French position after martial 
law. The domestic debate on martial law does not detract 
from the essential analysis of French policy as motivated 
by a concern for the West German position and by a 
"pragmatic" assessment of the role of the Soviet Union in 
Eastern Europe and the West's capacity to change it, 
combined with an unwillingness to risk the economic and 
political cost of alienating the Polish regime and the 
Soviet Union. Indeed, the following quote captures the 
essence of the French President's position:
53The foreign policy-making process in France is to a 
large extent a closed book. For insights into its 
functioning see, most importantly, Sarny Cohen, La Monarchie 
Nucleaire, Paris, Hachette, 1986; see also J.E.S. Hayward, 
Governing France: The One and Indivisible Republic, London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983, chapter 8, "National 
independence and international mission", pp. 241-277; 
Alistair Cole, Francois Mitterrand: A Study in Political 
Leadership. London and New York, Routledge, 1994, chapter 
9 "The world leader", pp. 133-150; Jolyon Howorth, op. cit.
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"Frangois Mitterrand: 'Jamais l'URSS n'acceptera que 
la Pologne sorte de son orbite. Le monde occidental 
ne bougera pas. Nous n1 abandonnerons pas les 
Polonais, mais il n'est pas dans notre pouvoir de les 
sauver. Peut-etre dira-t-on un jour que Jaruzelski a 
agi de fagon intelligente, au prix de la perte 
provisoire des libertes? Je pense que tout le monde 
est d'accord pour qu'on n'envoie pas de divisions en 
Pologne?"'54
More important, in terms of the domestic influences on the 
policy after martial law, are the economic concerns of the 
French government in the early 1980s.55 There are two 
aspects to this, firstly, from an economic perspective, it 
was not in France's interest to do much about martial law. 
Although not a major trading partner for France, the 
importance of trade with the Soviet bloc for some of the 
French industries, as well as for the overall balance of 
payments in France should not be ignored. This was 
particularly so in the early 1980s, when France was 
experiencing increasing difficulties with is balance of 
payments and its economic reform programme.56
The second aspect is not directly linked to martial law, 
but became important as a result of the United States' 
policies. In fact, French irritation with the United 
States' position, as well as of the United States' demands 
for West European sanctions, did not grow only out of the
^Attali, op. cit., p.145.
55The importance of the economic dimension for 
Mitterrand's foreign policy is also stressed, in a more 
general sense by Harrison, op. cit.
56See annex for French trade relations with Poland.
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disagreement over martial law. It was further reinforced 
by the disagreement between the two governments over 
economic policy. Mitterrand's programme of economic reform 
was, by 1982, running into serious difficulties, and a 
radical deterioration of the French balance of payments was 
blamed partly on the US policy of high budgetary spending, 
which pushed up the value of the dollar. Thus, when 
Mitterrand and Reagan openly clashed at the Versailles 
summit, it was after a failed attempt at bringing the issue 
of economic policy-making into a wider compromise including 
East-West trade and sanctions over Poland.57
Britain
Against the backdrop of Margaret Thatcher's declared 
affection for her American counterpart, the British 
opposition to the initiatives of the United States was more 
surprising than the French. However, Britain shared with 
France a concern about protecting its national sovereignty, 
even from the intrusion of the United States.
Despite the relatively special position of Poland in 
British foreign policy, compared to other Central and 
Eastern European states, Britain, of the three major West 
European states, had the least interest in, and probably 
the least to lose from, any specific outcome of the Polish
57Putnam and Bayne, Hanging Together: Cooperation and 
Conflict in the Seven Power Summits, London, Sage, 1987, 
p. 137, Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: Cocom and 
the Politics of East-West Trade, Ithaca and London, Cornell 
University Press, 1992, p. 255.
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crisis. It is from this perspective that Neil Winn argues 
that Carrington wanted to use the Polish crisis in order 
to further British influence in the development of EPC at 
the time when London held the Presidency of EPC (from July 
to December 1981 ).58 Indeed, throughout the Polish crisis, 
the British government underlined the importance of
maintaining a cohesive EPC position on Poland. However, 
British policy on martial law cannot be properly understood 
in the context of EPC alone. Chapter two showed that 
British policy towards Poland and Eastern Europe has
traditionally been formulated as part of its Alliance 
strategy. The Thatcher government continued to stress the 
importance of maintaining close coordination across the 
Atlantic during the Polish crisis.59 British foreign 
policy was still to a large extent operating on the
assumption of a special relationship between the United
States and Britain.60 If little was at stake for the UK
after martial law in terms of its relations with Poland or 
the Soviet Union, the same was not entirely true with
regard to British relations with its main ally, the United
^Neil Winn, "European crisis management in the
1980s", paper presented to the BISA Conference, York,
December 1994, p. 13.
59Thatcher, op. cit. p. 251 .
60For a general discussion of the 'special 
relationship' see, Donald C. Watt, Succeeding John Bull: 
America in Britain's Place. 1900-1975. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1984; John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence 
Relations. 1939-1989, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1981; 
Henry Kissinger, "Reflections on a partnership: British and 
American attitudes to postwar foreign policy", 
International Affairs, vol 58, no 4, Autumn 1982, pp. 571— 
587.
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States. During Thatcher's time in office, particular 
importance was given to this "special relationship", which 
was seen to be fortified by the close personal relations 
between Reagan and Thatcher. Reynolds and Dimbleby argue 
that for Mrs. Thatcher the special relationship was "an 
article of faith".61 Sir Anthony Parsons, Mrs. Thatcher's 
special foreign policy adviser from 1982-83, has pointed 
out that:
"It is many years since there was such ideological 
compatibility between an American president and a 
British Prime Minister as there was between Mrs 
Thatcher and President Reagan; both leaders made the 
most of this nexus."62
Finally, as the war in the Falklands developed, it is 
reasonable to assume that it was in Britain's interest to 
maintain good relations with its American ally.63
British foreign policy in the first Thatcher administration 
is often considered to have taken on a more ideological
61David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart: 
The Relationship Between Britain and America in the 
Twentieth Century. London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1988, p. 
309.
62Sir Anthony Parsons, "Britain and the world", pp. 
154-165 in D. Kavanagh and A. Seldon, The Thatcher Effect, 
Oxford, Oxford University press, 1989, quote on p. 161.
63Although he recognises that changes have taken place 
both in British and American politics since Churchill first 
developed the notion of the special relationship, Michael 
Howard has also argued that the special relationship still 
existed in the early 1980s and that it should be valued. 
Sir Michael Howard, "Afterword: The 'Special
Relationship'", pp. 387-392, in Hedley Bull and Roger Louis 
(eds), The 'Special Relationship' : Anglo-American Relations 
Since 1945, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986.
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colour than previous administrations, thus bringing it 
closer to the United States' foreign policy.64 As a flag- 
bearer of the "new right", Mrs. Thatcher displayed a strong 
distaste for the Soviet regime, and her view of detente as 
"just another Soviet tactic to gain influence over the 
West", corresponded with that of the Reagan 
administration.65 As Sir Julian Bullard has argued:
"...In her total rejection of all that the Soviet 
Union stands for, its moral basis as well as its 
visible activity, its claimed achievements no less 
than its evident failures, Mrs. Thatcher did strike 
a note which was qualitatively different from the 
language of her post-war predecessors."66
It must be pointed out that despite the expressed
preference of Thatcher for a more ideological approach to
East-West relations, and despite the importance she
attributed to maintaining close relations with the United
States, the British position on martial law fell within the
category of what Saeter has called the "Atlanticist policy
of containment" rather than the policy of "liberation"
64For a general discussion of British foreign policy 
under Thatcher see Peter Byrd, British Foreign Policy under 
Thatcher. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1988; Peter 
Riddell, The Thatcher Government. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1985, chapter 10 "Foreign Affairs and Defence".
65Michael Clarke, "The Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe", pp. 54-75 in Byrd, p. 60.
66Julian Bullard "Perceptions of the Soviet threat: 
Britain in the 1980s", pp. 136-150 in Carl-Christoph 
Schweitzer (ed) The Changing Western Analysis of the Soviet 
Threat. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1989, 
quotation on p. 143.
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advocated by Reagan.67 Also, Clarke argues that there was,
overall, a difference between Thatcher's discourse on
relations with the Soviet Union and her practical policy,
which was far more pragmatic and in tune with her
predecessors' policies.68 As Ullmann points out:
"... in their approaches towards the Soviet Union, 
... all (British governments) have pursued detente 
and all have defined the issues in contention between 
Moscow and the West in fairly specific and 
circumscribed rather than global terms. Even the 
Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher - much 
the most right wing government in twentieth century 
British history - has eschewed the globalist anti- 
Soviet rhetoric that has been the hallmark of the 
Reagan Administration's foreign policy."69
No doubt contributing to reducing the impact of Thatcher's 
own 'ideological leanings' in policy towards the Soviet 
Union, was the limited influence she had in her first, and 
divided cabinet. What is more, with little experience in 
the area of foreign policy, it is reasonable to assume that
67See categories employed by Martin Saeter op. cit., in 
particular pp. 93-101. Saeter distinguishes between three 
directions in Western policy: (i) "the Atlanticist policy 
of containment" (atlantisk styrkepolitikk); (ii) the 
"isolationist policy" of the right wing in the United 
States: (iii) the West European "policy of detente", (den 
vesteuropeiske avspenningslinjen) which is seen by Saeter 
to aim for a gradual movement towards an "all-European" 
model (hence it is different from Ullmann's definition of 
detente policy). There are several problems with applying 
these categories to Western policies, and most importantly 
with the third category. Saeter's definition of a detente 
policy does not correspond to the policy of any of the 
Western governments and seems most of all to represent the 
author's own view of what kind of policy the West ought to 
lead in East-West relations. Still, in the case of Britain, 
the "atlantisk styrkepolitikk" is applicable.
68Clarke op. cit. in Byrd, p. 64.
69Richard H. Ullmann, "America, Britain, and the 
Soviet threat", pp. 103-114 in Louis and Bull, op. cit. 
quote on p. 108.
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Thatcher's personal views were dampened by the Foreign 
Office and Foreign Secretary Carrington. As one 
representative of the FCO has pointed out, "foreign policy 
was made by Carrington". Although the FCO recognised the 
role of the Soviet Union in martial law, it was not 
supportive of Reagan's liberation rhetoric.70
Nevertheless, of the three West European governments 
studied here, Britain went furthest in supporting the 
American interpretation of events in Poland. British 
statements in the aftermath of martial law clearly stressed 
the responsibility of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, 
Britain was the country that most openly declared the 
necessity for maintaining good relations with the United 
States. Likewise, British efforts to ensure EPC cohesion 
as well as Atlantic cohesion cannot be seen as 
contradictory. Rather, it was part and parcel of the same 
perspective. Thus, British policy in general was based on 
the idea that there was no contradiction between Atlantic 
and European policy. Up until martial law this bargain 
functioned well.
It was only really when British sovereignty was seen to be 
at stake, in the summer of 1982, that Britain drew the full 
consequences of its position and rallied with the West 
Europeans. What eventually triggered the British break with 
the United states was a concern for the sovereignty of
70Interview London, September 1994.
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Britain rather than a concern about Poland or about loyalty 
towards the West Europeans. Thatcher sums up her position 
on the issue in the following way:
"My view was that ultimately we must support American 
leadership: but that did not mean that the Americans 
could pursue their interest regardless of the opinion 
of their European allies. ... What I found irritating 
and on occasion quite unjustified was the way in 
which the actions the Americans preferred inflicted 
a good deal more pain on their allies than on, 
themselves and, one might argue, the communists in 
Poland and the Soviet Union."7'
The outcome of the Polish crisis is indicative of the fact 
that by the end of the 1970s, British and American 
interests and perspectives had grown wide apart, not only 
in the area of economic relations, but also over political 
and security issues. Consequently, as Christopher Hill 
argues, the structural difficulties in the relationship 
between Britain and the United States could not be overcome 
despite the positive personal relations between Thatcher 
and Reagan:
"... there are strict limits to what can be achieved 
through personal relationship of the two heads of 
government in London and Washington, however 
clubby..there is a tendency on both sides to indulge 
in wishful thinking about the many tests which 
foreign policy throws up."72
According to David Watt,
71Thatcher, op. cit. p. 252-3.
72Christopher Hill, "Reagan and Thatcher: The
Sentimental Alliance", World Outlook. Dartmouth College, 
Winter 1986, pp. 2-18, quotation from p. 11.
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"...the 'special relationship' in the broad sense 
ceased to exist in the early 1960s and perhaps even 
earlier. "73
Still, it must have been a particularly rude awakening for 
the British Prime Minister to be reminded of the limits to 
the 'special relationship'. Thus, British policy after 
martial law illustrates the difficulty of what Reynolds has 
referred to as the British preference for "having the cake 
and eating it".74
A principal argument of this chapter is that the United 
States' initiatives triggered unity in Western Europe and 
disagreement across the Atlantic. It is therefore important 
to examine why the United States was willing to risk a 
clash with its Western allies over Poland.
73David Watt, "Introduction: the Anglo-American
relationship", pp. 1-14 in Louis and Bull, op. cit. quote 
on p. 4.
74See David Reynolds, "A 'special relationship'? 
America, Britain and the international order since the 
Second World War", pp. 1-20 in International Affairs, vol. 
62, no 1, Winter 1985-86, especially p. 19. Reynolds also 
considers the relationship between the United States and 
Britain still to be qualitatively different from other 
alliance relationships in the 1980s despite the fact that 
it has undergone changes since 1945, and, in particular, 
during the 1970s. This difficulty or unwillingness of 
Britain to choose between the United States and Europe is 
alluded to also by Ullmann, op. cit, p.114, Watt, op. cit. 
p. 13 and Christopher Hill "Britain a convenient 
schizophrenia", pp. 19-33, in Hill (ed), National Foreign 
Policies and European Political Cooperation. London, George 
Allen and Unwin for RIIA, 1983.
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Europe's American pacifier?75
The official version of US policy towards Poland after 
martial law consists in arguing that US initiatives were 
clear and logical and successfully contributed to the 
process of democratisation in Poland in the late 1980s. 
This section questions this perspective. It points out in 
particular that such an interpretation ignores the complex 
interaction between Western allies, as well as the domestic 
political context of US foreign policy. It suggests that 
without taking these elements into consideration, it is 
difficult to understand the inconsistencies in US policy- 
initiatives.
According to Arthur Rachwald, whose account of the Reagan 
administration's policy towards Poland corresponds closely 
to the way in which Reagan himself presented his policy, 
the United States' President had two clearly defined 
objectives in mind when he imposed sanctions against Poland 
and the Soviet Union. The first objective was to apply 
economic pressure on the Soviet bloc as a whole, in order 
to force what was considered to be an already economically 
fragile Soviet Union to "assume full economic 
responsibility for its satellite". The second objective of
75The title is taken from Josef Joffe, "Europe's 
American Pacifier", pp. 64-82 in Foreign Policy, vol. 54, 
1984. He argues that "NATO's detractors ignore the central 
role America has played in pacifying a state system that 
almost consumed itself in two world wars.", quote on p. 81 .
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the United States, was to pressure Jaruzelski's government 
to move "towards moderation and dialogue".76
In fact, these two objectives, as they are outlined by 
Rachwald, mutually contradict each other: If the imposition 
of martial law was the result of Polish dependence on the 
Soviet Union, reinforcing this dependence by forcing the 
Soviet Union to take financial responsibility for Poland 
could not be expected to lead to moderation by the Polish 
government, but rather to the continuation, or even 
strengthening, of the measures taken in the wake of martial 
law. Furthermore, even assuming that the objectives were 
consistent, there is very little evidence to support the 
view that the sanctions imposed by the United States were 
in any way sufficient to compel the Polish, not to mention 
the Soviet, government to modify their policies.77 In 
addition, the commitment to the policy of sanctions was 
erratic; indeed, the determination of the United States to 
apply economic pressure on the Soviet bloc could only be 
seen as half-hearted in the light of the lifting of the 
grain embargo and the signing of the new contract for the
76Arthur Rachwald, In Search of Poland: The
Superpowers1 Response to Solidarity, Stanford, California, 
Hoover Institution Press, 1990, p. 64.
77For a negative view of the feasibility of an 
economic warfare policy, see Jerry Hough, The Polish 
Crisis: American Policy Options, Washington DC, The
Brookings Institution, 1982.
in particular pp. 64-69. See also the IIIS annual 
conference papers published in Robert O ’Neill (ed) The 
Conduct of East-West Relations in the 1980s. London, 
Macmillan, 1985.
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export of grain to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1982. 
This point was raised not only by the West Europeans but 
also by some of the so-called "hardliners" in the United 
States itself, thus further reinforcing the image of 
inconsistency.78 Most importantly for our purpose, the 
Alliance dimension to the United States’ policy, and the 
effect that the United States' initiatives had on relations 
inside NATO, is not at all discussed by Rachwald. It could 
be argued that the United States’ sanctions on the pipeline 
were directed against the West Europeans, as an attempt to 
force a change in Alliance policy overall, rather than 
against the Soviet Union and Poland. Certainly, this was 
the West European interpretation. What is not clear in 
Rachwald's account is why the United States was willing to 
risk a serious rift with the West Europeans, or indeed, 
whether or not the United States realised that this might 
be the outcome of its initiatives.
One might suggest that the United States, at best, had 
sought three different objectives at the same time after 
martial law. Firstly, to punish the Soviet Union for its 
complicity with martial law in Poland. Secondly, to use
78See previous quotes from Helmut Schmidt's memoirs. 
For a hard-line criticism of Reagan's initiatives see Henry 
Kissinger, "Poland's lessons for Mr Reagan", The New York 
Times, January 17, 1982. For an opposite view see Robert 
Osgood, "The revitalisation of containment", Foreign 
Affairs, vol 60, no 3, 1982, pp. 465-752. He points out that 
the lifting of the grain embargo was a deliberate decision 
from the United States (an expression of Realpolitik), and 
also that the Reagan administration was sceptical to the 
utility of economic sanctions.
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martial law in Poland as a pretext for launching a campaign
of economic warfare against the Soviet Union. Thirdly, to
reintroduce the pipeline issue on the Western alliance’s
agenda. What this means is that, as Hough has pointed out,
it is unclear,
"...to what extent [the United States was] seeking to 
promote a gradual increase in freedom and autonomy in 
Poland and to what extent it was simply using Poland 
as a pawn in its policy towards the Soviet Union".79
The Reagan administration's view is that there was no 
contradiction between these two objectives: the demise of 
the Soviet Union would also "liberate" Poland. Thus, 
according to the Reagan entourage, the United States policy 
towards Poland under martial law has to be understood in 
the context of the overall foreign policy project of the 
Reagan administration.80 The United States' policy after 
martial law was, in the words of one of Reagan's close 
political advisors, Edwin Meese III, part of "a clear, 
coherent, and comprehensive Cold War strategy".81 In 
Reagan's own words, the United States' relations with the 
Soviet Union should be seen as that of a "struggle between 
right and wrong, good and evil." The Soviet Union was an
79Hough, op. cit., p. 64.
80Discussing the different American approaches to 
dealing with the Soviet Union, Garthoff argues that Reagan 
belonged to "the 'essentialist' school of policy, which 
became dominant in the United States in the early 1980s for 
the first time since the 1950s". Raymond Garthoff, The 
Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of 
the Cold War, Washington DC, The Brookings Institution, 
1994, p.767
81Edwin Meese III, With Reagan: The Inside Story,
Washington DC, Regnery Gateway, 1992, p.168.
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"evil empire" and "the focus of evil in the modern 
world."82 It was Reagan's conviction that as a consequence 
of his policies:
"...the Soviets would have to come to terms on 
authentically peaceable agreements, not because they were 
trustworthy, but because they had no other choice. The 
'objective factors', to use a communist phrase, would
lead inexorably to a stand down from the Cold War."83
The underlying assumption of the United States' policy 
after martial law, then, was that it was possible for the 
West to provoke the breakdown of the Soviet regime by means 
of economic, political and military pressure, designed to 
overstretch the Soviet economy and encourage domestic 
dissent.84 As Gordon points out
"One substantial group [in the Reagan administration] 
believed that a policy of rigorous economic denial 
could bring the Soviets to their knees. They opposed 
any economic concessions to Eastern Europe, including 
Poland, arguing that the USSR would be forced to 
replace any resulting losses, thus adding to the 
costs of empire. There was also a small minority,
82Reagan's speech about the empire of evil was made at 
a meeting of Christian evangelists in Florida in March 
1983. Quotation from Robert Dallek, Ronald Reagan: The
Politics of Symbolism, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University 
Press, 1984, p. 192.
83Meese, op. cit. p. 170. See also Ronald Reagan, An 
American Life, London, Hutchinson, 1990, pp. 265-268.
^See Richard Pipes, Survival Is Not Enough: Soviet 
Realities and America's Future, New York, Simon and 
Schuster, 1984, and his article, "Can the Soviet Union 
reform?", Foreign Affairs, vol 63, Fall 1984, pp.47-61. 
Richard Pipes was Director of East European and Soviet 
Affairs at the National Security Council during the Polish 
crisis.
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. . ., that positively welcomed the idea of a Soviet 
invasion [in Poland]."85
It could be argued that the interpretation of Reagan's 
policy on martial law as logical and consistent has been 
further confirmed with the official recognition of United 
States' covert actions in Poland from June 1982 onwards. 
According to journalist Carl Bernstein, the Reagan 
adminstration, in close cooperation with the Vatican, 
undertook a clandestine campaign "destined to hasten the 
dissolution of the communist empire."86 The main focus of 
the campaign was Poland, and Bernstein argues that Reagan 
and the Pope were both convinced that Poland could be 
broken out of the Soviet orbit if they committed resources 
to destabilise the Polish government and to keeping 
Solidarity alive. The principal policy architect of the 
cooperation on the American side was the head of the CIA, 
William Casey. Reagan did, however, receive daily briefings
85Lincoln Gordon, "Interests and policies in Eastern 
Europe: the view from Washington", pp. 67-128 in Gordon 
(ed), Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern
Europe, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1987, p.123.
86"The Holy Alliance", Time Magazine. February 24, 
1992, pp. 10-19. The existence of the US-Vatican Alliance 
has since been confirmed by Meese, op. cit.; Garthoff, op. 
cit.p. 31; Bennett Kovrig, Of Walls and Bridges: The United 
States and Eastern Europe, New York, New York University 
Press, 1991, p. 182; Richard Pipes, "Misinterpreting the 
Cold War: the hardliners had it right", pp. 154-160 in 
Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1995, no 1. Meese, Garthoff and 
Kovrig all base their comments on Bernstein. Pipes was 
himself a participant in the 'operation'.
407
on these activities by Casey and by National Security 
Advisor William Clark. He was also personally in contact 
with the Pope. Funds aimed at keeping Solidarity alive came 
from the CIA, the National Endowment for Democracy, secret 
accounts in the Vatican and Western trades unions.87 
Intelligence of both military and political issues was 
shared openly between the Vatican and the United States, 
and the United States' adminstration benefited greatly from 
the well-informed sources of the Vatican. Only a handful 
of the members of the Reagan administration were informed 
of this cooperation with the Vatican, and most of the 
activity was handled outside normal state Department 
channels.88
There is no doubt that this "Holy Alliance" actually 
existed. Still, its significance, both in terms of its 
effect on the situation in Poland and in terms of its scope 
is uncertain. Consequently, its value in terms of 
presenting US policy after martial law as logical and 
consistent is also debatable. No doubt, the financial and 
logistical support contributed to keeping Solidarity alive. 
Whether or not it was the main reason why Solidarity 
survived, is more questionable. Indeed, dissident movements 
in Eastern Europe, such as Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia
87Bernstein does not indicate which trade unions took 
part, apart from the American AFL-CIO, and whether or not 
their link with the CIA was explicit.
^Bernstein's findings are based on interviews with 
the main participants in this operation.
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survived, seemingly without the same scale of external 
support. Most importantly, it is questionable whether or 
not these facts produce satisfactory confirmation of the 
thesis that the United States' policy after martial law was 
clear and consistent, and thus enables us to ignore the 
debate about the effects of US policy in the Western 
alliance. The assumption of the US adminstration is that 
because the United States did "the right thing", the West 
European position was not legitimate and the United States 
ultimately succeeded in rallying the West Europeans behind 
their cause.
Ultimately, the official view of the Reagan 
administration's policy on martial law hinges upon the 
interpretation of the end of the Cold War. Pipes argues 
that it was Reagan's "hardline" policy which provoked the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union.89 An opposite view is 
presented by Halliday,
"...the collapse of communism came not through the 
conventional mechanism of inter-state conflict, nor 
through the erosion of the Soviet bloc's territory by 
Western military of commercial pressure, but rather 
with the undermining of the system via the
89Pipes in Foreign Affairs, 1995, op. cit. John Lewis 
Gaddis The United States and the End of the Cold War, New 
York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, although 
taking a more critical view of the Reagan administration 
still attributes importance to the initiatives taken by 
Reagan in the 1980s.
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demonstration effect of Western success in the
social, economic and political fields;"90
The discussion about the end of the Cold War will preoccupy 
historians and political scientists for many years, and is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Still, it is important to 
point out the connection between this debate and the logic 
of US policy over Poland because both Meese's and 
Rachwald's, as well as Reagan's own, accounts of the Polish 
crisis argue that there is a direct link between US policy 
after martial law and the later development of democracy 
in Poland. This can be little more than an attempt at post­
rationalisation of US foreign policy. Although the last US 
sanctions were lifted when the round table negotiations 
opened in Poland, this does not have to mean that the 
liberalisation process in Poland came about as a result of 
US sanctions. Indeed, by 1987, the context of East-West 
relations as well as the political situation inside the 
Soviet bloc had radically changed as a result of the 
arrival of Gorbachev in power in the Soviet Union. Thus, 
the link between the development of democracy in Poland and 
Reagan's policy is tenuous. It glosses over the most 
difficult aspects of US policy and, most importantly,
90Fred Halliday, Rethinking International Relations, 
London, Macmillan 1994, p. 190. See also Raymond Garthoff, 
Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from 
Nixon to Reagan, Washington, DC, The Brookings institution, 
1994 (revised edition), pp. 1147-1180; and Garthoff, The 
Great Transition, op. cit.: "US actions from 1981 through 
1983 were not sufficiently aggressive to be described as 
a policy of confrontation. Yet the Reagan policy was too 
gratuitously hostile to serve usefully in an effective 
competition.", p. 758.
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ignores the important domestic political struggle over US 
foreign policy, as well as its intra-alliance dimension.91 
In fact, the links between the sanctions, martial law in 
Poland and the overall US policy on East-West trade, do not 
appear at the time to have been clear even to the US 
administration itself.92
The conflicting accounts of the purpose of the so-called 
Buckley commission, which was dispatched to Europe in the 
winter of 1982, illustrate the considerable confusion over 
US aims and objectives after martial law. The objectives
91These internal disputes are no secret and were 
directly relevant to the policy toward Poland. They led to 
the resignation of the National Security Adviser Richard 
Allen (succeeded by William Clarke) in January 1982, and 
to Secretary of State, Alexander Haig's resignation in July 
1982. According to Dallek, Allen's resignation was due to 
disagreement with Haig over the control of foreign policy. 
For a systematic analysis of the intra-bureaucratic 
struggle within the Reagan administration see Barry Rubin, 
Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle 
over U.S. Foreign Policy. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1985, pp. 203-231. He argues, with reference to the Reagan 
administration, that "While the trend toward leadership by 
any particular individual or agency creates shortcomings, 
an even worse problem is the trend toward anarchy - the 
absence of a clear chain of command and the persistence of 
internal conflict among decision makers. The result is a 
growing discontinuity of policy, ...and an inability to 
pursue any consistent strategy.... Clearly then, the 
machinery involved in the foreign policy process actively 
shapes the outcome." P. 231.
92Mastanduno emphasises the importance of the domestic 
factors in the imposition of these sanctions: "in part, 
these sanctions reflected public pressure on the President 
to do "something" in response to the Soviet role in polish 
repression. At the same time, they served the purpose of 
those in the administration who believed US export controls 
should have been made even more restrictive in 1981...The 
Polish crisis resolved that debate in the administration 
in favour of a maximally restrictive stance on industrial 
exports.", p. 245 in Mastanduno. op. cit.
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of the commission are described differently by different 
actors inside the Reagan administration.93 The confusion 
relates in particular to the sanctions on the pipeline 
project, which were imposed in three stages after martial 
law in Poland.94 From the perspective of Reagan, the 
pipeline sanctions had been imposed as a direct response 
to the imposition of martial law in Poland.95 The 
objective of the Buckley commission then, had been to 
convince the West European allies to support the sanctions 
imposed by the United States in December 1981, and to make 
them follow suit by imposing their own sanctions. In 
addition, the Buckley commission was to seek agreement on 
a reform of the Western credit policies towards the Warsaw 
Pact overall. If the West Europeans did not agree to this, 
the United States would introduce the clause of 
extraterritoriality on the pipeline products. Thus, if
93For discussions of the US' aims, see Nau, op. cit. 
Nau was on the National Security Council in the White House 
from 1981 to 1983. See also Putnam and Bayne, op. cit.; 
Mastanduno, op. cit.; Bruce Jentleson, Pipeline Politics: 
The Complex Political Economy of East-West Energy Trade, 
Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1986; Hyland, 
"US-Soviet relations: the long road back", America and the 
World, Foreign Affairs, vol 60, no 3, 1982, pp. 525-551.
94The first stage was Reagan's declaration of 
sanctions against the Soviet Union on 29 December 1981. 
Sanctions on the pipeline here involved the suspension of 
issuance of licences or oil and gas equipment including 
pipelayers. When these sanctions were implemented, they 
proved to be retroactive, in other words to cover not only
future contracts, but also contracts already signed. The 
third stage came after the G7 summit, with the imposition 
of the clause of extraterritoriality, which prevented 
European companies from using American produced parts or 
technologies on the pipeline project.
95Reagan, op. cit. p. 306.
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there was no agreement on a new credit policy, the existing 
pipeline sanctions would be extended to cover US 
affiliations abroad. There was, for Reagan, no question of 
lifting the existing sanctions, as this depended only on 
events in Poland, and not on relations with the West 
Europeans. There was only a threat of further sanctions.
Buckley himself has argued that his aim was to find a 
compromise which would achieve the lifting of the existing 
pipeline sanctions and replace these with a tighter Western 
credit policy towards the Soviet Union.96 Thus Buckley was 
to use the promise lifting of the pipeline sanctions as 
leverage in order to achieve West European agreement on the 
credit issue. He was not to threaten to impose further 
sanctions. Haig presents a different perspective again. He 
argues that the second "stage" of the pipeline sanctions, 
of blocking existing contracts as well as denying future 
ones, was imposed not as a result of a Presidential 
decision but as a result of bureaucratic procedures.97 Nau 
denies this and points out that the President agreed with
96Buckley argues that he had two main objectives: "i) 
to work with the allies to achieve restrictions in official 
credit guarantees to the Soviet Union; ii) to express 
concern over the potential for an excessive dependence of 
Western Europe on Soviet natural gas." He further argues 
that his objective was not "to cut off trade with the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; to address the Polish debt 
question; to seek an imposition or extension of sanctions 
against Poland and the Soviet Union; to block the Yamal 
pipeline." See "Polish Debt Crisis", US Congress. Senate, 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 97th Congress, Second 
Session, 21 April 1982, pp. 209-210.
97Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign 
Policy, New York, Macmillan, 1984, p. 254.
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the decision to extend the decision to already existing 
contracts.98
The confusion over the purpose of the sanctions continued 
at the Versailles summit. Haig and his assistant Secretary 
of State for Economics and Business, Roger Hormats, who 
also served as Reagan's personal representative operated 
on a different set of assumptions from officials in the 
White House and members of the National Security Council 
staff.99 As chapter six showed, Haig claims to have 
achieved an agreement on a compromise involving credit 
policy towards the Soviet bloc and a US intervention in the 
foreign exchange market. The pipeline sanctions were not 
explicitly mentioned in this bargain, but it was implicitly 
understood that they would be abandoned if an agreement was 
achieved on the other two issues.100 Other American 
policy-makers claim this compromise never existed. It was 
after this failed summit that Reagan invoked the clause of 
extra-territoriality. Some members of the adminstration
98Nau, op. cit. p.309. The coexistence of conflicting 
goals in US foreign policy in this phase is also emphasised 
by Mastanduno: "Clearly the pipeline dispute threatened to 
have broader alliance ramifications. For multilateralists 
in both the United States and Western Europe it became 
imperative to search for a solution that would both placate 
US hard-liners and enable West Europeans to act in 
accordance with their own conceptions of their vital 
interests. Haig sought such a compromise in March 1982 by 
shifting the focus of US pressure on the allies from the 
pipeline to export credits.", p. 252.
"Nau, op. cit p.308.
100Haig, op. cit. p. 309. See also Putnam and Bayne for 
this, op. cit. p.138.
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argue that this was what he had threatened to do all along
if the Europeans did not comply with US policy on credits
towards the Soviet Union. Others have argued that the
sanctions were imposed by Reagan in an act of retribution:
"Reagan imposed the sanctions in a fit of anger when 
he could not reach French president Mitterrand. 
Reagan's decision occurred after Mitterrand had 
spoken out, implying that the United States was 
acceding to a European position".101
Quite apart from the serious doubts about the feasibility 
of the declared US aims towards Poland and the Soviet Union 
that have already been outlined, this confusion over the 
objectives of the policy of the United States strengthens 
the doubts about the suggestion that US policy in the first 
half of 1982 were the result of clear-cut rational choices, 
and of an overall strategy aimed at subverting the Soviet 
Union. It suggests that the link between the domestic 
political situation in the United States was important for 
the content of US foreign policy, and that, in particular 
the decision to extend of the pipeline sanctions, which 
caused such a serious rift with the West Europeans, was 
influenced by intra bureaucratic struggles in the United 
States.102 The lifting of the grain embargo further
101Garthoff, The Great Transition, op. cit. p. 549. 
Garthoff quotes "a member of the White House staff". The 
European position he refers to was on the issue of a change 
in the United States policy in interest rates.
102Rubin argues that the decision-making process under 
the Reagan administration was "...even more mangled than 
before." He highlights in particular the weak position of 
Haig: "Haig was a non-Reaganaut and a Kissinger disciple 
whose politics, style and methods were unacceptable to the 
President's men. The arrangement was doomed from the 
start." Rubin also points to the absence of clear decision­
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reinforces the importance of domestic factors in US foreign 
policy and contrasts with the stated aim of "bringing the 
Soviet Union to its knees".
Michael Smith stresses the close link between domestic and 
foreign policy under Reagan:
"The essential concomitant of this position [the 
’Reagan doctrine'] was the need to regenerate 
American power, both through the acquisition of new 
military muscle and through the unleashing of 
economic growth in the USA itself. Here, as 
elsewhere, there was a close link between the 
domestic and the foreign policy programmes of the 
administration: economic strength and national morale 
would provide the sinews for international 
assertiveness. ”103
The link between domestic and foreign policy also worked
the other way around, in that the policy positions taken
on martial law in Poland were part of the wider "project"
to boost national morale, by presenting the United States
as actively pursuing the goal of "freedom and democracy".
A similar perspective has been put forward by Dallek. He
has argued that Reagan's external crusade was in fact
closely connected to his battle against what he considered
making channels within the administration, and argues that 
as a result there "..was confusion, rapidly shifting 
factions, and burgeoning suspicions...Everything was a 
fight." Op. cit. p. 204
103Michael Smith, "The Reagan presidency and foreign 
policy", pp. 259-285, in Joseph Hogan (ed), The Reagan 
Years, Manchester and New York, Manchester University 
Press, quote on p. 265. See also John Peterson, Europe and 
America: Prospects for Partnership. London, Routledge,
1996, pp. 79-105, for the importance of domestic 
constraints on US foreign policy.
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similar trends which endangered conservative values in
domestic American society:
"For Ronald Reagan the world outside the United 
States is little more than an extension of the world 
within: the struggle to defend freedom and morality 
abroad is a more intense version of the battle to 
preserve these virtues at home. In the eyes of Reagan 
and other conservatives, the communism of the Soviet 
Union represents the end point, the logical 
culmination of dangerous currents-big government, 
atheism, and relaxed moral standards -that they see 
so powerfully in America."104
It must be added, however, that, rather than a cynically 
calculated strategy aimed at enhancing the power of the 
United States, Reagan's policy must be seen to have been 
inspired by a deep rooted conviction that the values 
promoted by the United States were ultimately beneficial 
to the rest of the world.105 This recalls the importance 
of the "Wilsonian principles" in US policy towards Eastern 
Europe, as outlined in chapter two. Bernstein's suggestion 
that Reagan and the Pope believed that it was possible to 
remove Poland from the Warsaw Pact also reinforces this 
image.
Nevertheless, even this policy of "liberation" was the 
subject of domestic disputes. The conviction that the 
United States was capable of undermining the Soviet Union
104Dallek, op. cit, p. 129-130.
105One might agree with Aron, who argues that Reagan's 
foreign policy could best be characterised as an ideology 
in search of a foreign policy, Raymond Aron "An ideology 
in search of a foreign policy", Foreign Affairs, vol 60, 
no 3, 1982, pp. 503-525.
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was not universally shared by all members of the Reagan
administration. According to Nau:
"The tug of war within the administration - 
particularly between the State Department and some 
elements of the Commerce Department (the trade 
promotion officers), on the one hand, and the NSC, 
Defense Department, and export control offices in the 
Commerce Department, on the other - was at least as 
intense as it was within the alliance. The tug of war 
even reached inside the White House, where public 
relations and policy officials clashed repeatedly 
over the next several months on the handling of the 
pipeline and East-West trade issues."106
The domestic political disputes are important in their own 
right, because they enable us to understand the 
inconsistencies in US initiatives after martial law. In 
turn, they also clarify US relations with Western Europe, 
and the failure of coordination.107 It is clear that the 
sanctions on Poland and the Soviet Union, as well as allied 
coordination surrounding these, were caught up in a 
domestic US dispute about the control of foreign policy. 
Although the key posts in Reagan’s first foreign policy 
team were all filled by representatives from the 
traditional East coast, the same was not the case for 
Reagan's personal advisers. A number of Reagan's personal 
entourage was outsiders to the traditional Europhile East-
106Nau, op. cit. p. 315.
107It is interesting in this context to note that Nau, 
when looking at the economic aspects of the Reagan's 
administration's initiatives in the early 1980s, sees the 
United States' leadership in this period as a messy but 
ultimately successful attempt at changing the overall 
Western approach to East-West trade. In other words, the 
consequences for alliance relations are considered less 
important. Consequently, he also implies that the change 
in Western trade policies would not have been achieved 
without unilateral US initiatives. Op. cit. p. 321.
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coast elite. As representatives of "sunbelt capitalism" 
they were sceptical of the value of the Alliance with 
Europe and more interested in developing the United States' 
links towards Latin America and the Pacific.108 Haig, who 
made himself the spokesman for consultation with the West 
Europeans inside the adminstration was too isolated to make 
his voice heard.109 According to Rubin:
"When Haig warned that sanctions against a Soviet gas 
pipeline were alienating Western European allies, one 
White House aide commented that Haig, 'sometimes acts 
like Europe's ambassador to Washington.' The key 
meeting on the issue [of the pipeline] was held when 
Haig was out of town and, he claimed, Clark placed 
only the most hard-line option before Reagan."
The cooperation between the Vatican and the United States 
also confirms that the priorities of Reagan's advisers did 
not lie with the European allies. The United States chose 
to share its intelligence on Poland with the Vatican, 
whereas it did not do so with London, Bonn or Paris.111 
From this perspective, relations with Western Europe must 
have been seen as irrelevant, and "succumbing" to West 
European positions as illegitimate when weighed against the 
ultimate priority of confronting the Soviet Union. Having
108Melandri, op. cit. pp. 284-288; Gill, op. cit, p. 30.
109In the words of one of the "President's men", Reagan 
governed by round tables involving officials from different 
areas and this did not "suit" Secretary of State Haig, 
Meese, op. cit. p. 65. Furthermore, when Shultz took over, 
although the policy remained the same, allied relations 
improved.
110Rubin, op. cit. pp. 211-2.
^Interview London, December 1994.
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entered the 'slippery slope' towards neutralism, the West 
Europeans had to be "put right".112 In fact, Schmidt 
points out in his memoirs that during his visit to 
Washington in January 1982, he had asked Haig why the 
United States had not consulted the Europeans before 
introducing sanctions. He received the reply that the 
United States did not think the West Europeans would agree. 
Schmidt further confirms that the Americans were correct 
in this assumption.113
It is clear that the two issues which most provoked the 
West Europeans, the grain embargo and the pipeline 
sanctions, were the subject of internal American disputes. 
Rather than softening the overall approach, these divisions 
led to further confusion as to what the objectives of the 
United States were, and thus also to further difficulties 
in Western cohesion.114
Gill argues that the attempt by the United States to 
reconstruct its relative power in the late 1970s and 1980s 
was
112Reagan, op. cit. p. 320 and Meese, op. cit. p. 65.
113Schmidt, Men and Powers, op. cit. p. 258.
114Quoting French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, 
Mastanduno argues that trans-Atlantic political relations 
had dropped to perhaps their lowest point in the postwar 
era in the summer of 1982. The French view was that: "We 
no longer speak the same language. There is a remarkable 
incomprehension, and that is grave. The United States seems 
totally indifferent to our problems. Cheysson in New York 
Times, July 23, 1982, quoted in Mastanduno, op. cit. p.
260.
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"...based upon a two-fold illusion: that of regaining 
its nuclear supremacy vis-a-vis the USSR, and that 
the USA could somehow re-create the capacity to 
impose military solutions in a world characterised by 
a massive diffusion of military capacities."115
A third illusion must be added to this, concerning the 
United States' leverage inside the Alliance, and its 
ability to ensure that the West Europeans would, 
eventually, follow the US lead, even when initially 
reluctant to do so.
In this context the United States, motivated chiefly by 
domestic considerations and hampered by bureaucratic 
struggles, produced a policy that was both ill-defined and 
confused. Most of all, the policy of the United States must 
be seen not so much as a misperception of what was at stake 
for Europe, but as a misperception of its own leverage 
inside the alliance. The United States clearly expected the 
Europeans to follow their lead and failed to realise that 
it was not possible simply to turn the clock back in terms 
of allied relations. Not only had detente changed the 
conduct of East-West relations in Europe, it had also 
affected both the West European, and, in particular, the 
West German, approach to the United States and the 
Alliance. Most of all, intra-European relations had 
changed, making it easier for individual West European 
states to oppose US initiatives after martial law in 
Poland.
115Gill, op. cit. p. 31.
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Conclusions
From the realist or neo-realist perspectives the breakdown 
of coordination amongst the Western allies after martial 
law would be explained in terms of a clash between 
conflicting national interests. The findings of this 
chapter are not consistent with these perspectives. The 
positions on neither side of the Atlantic were clear cut. 
There were disagreements between US policy-makers on the 
question of consultation with the West Europeans, as well 
as on the rationale behind imposing sanctions. Some members 
of the US adminstration were closer to West Europe than the 
realist argument would allow for. Likewise, in Western 
Europe, positions were not clear cut. In France for 
example, the response to martial law was subject to fierce 
political debate. In the case of West Germany, policy is 
best seen as the outcome of a balancing act between 
domestic and Alliance perspectives. These findings are also 
consistent with those in previous chapters. It has been 
argued that there was, throughout the Polish crisis, a 
coexistence of common and conflicting perspectives within 
the Western alliance. Chapters four and five further argued 
that despite these partly converging, partly conflicting 
perspectives, coordination was maintained until the 
imposition of martial law.
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Against this backdrop it is not possible to conclude that 
the breakdown of coordination was the inevitable outcome 
of conflicting national interests. It is clear that martial 
law triggered a sequence of events which shifted the 
emphasis away from cohesion and towards a breakdown in 
allied coordination and that national perspectives 
ultimately prevailed over a common Western response to 
martial law. Nonetheless, the realist and neo-realist 
perspectives are not helpful in explaining why this 
happened.
The neo-liberal institutionalists would emphasise the 
weaknesses of Western institutional networks in order to 
explain the failure to coordinate. Yet, although the 
institutional weaknesses pointed to in chapter six 
contributed to the breakdown of coordination, these cannot, 
on their own, fully explain the failure of Western 
coordination. Both the neo-realists and neo-liberal 
institutionalists underestimate the domestic constraints 
on foreign policy, and the ability of these domestic 
constraints to hamper governments' ability to coordinate 
positions with allied states.
This chapter has showed that the domestic political context 
in the Western states was important in driving the Western 
allies apart after martial law. Domestic political 
considerations were particularly important for the United 
States' and for the Federal Republic's reactions to martial
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law. In the Federal Republic, the question of martial law 
fed into the ongoing West German debate about reunification 
and about West Germany's continued commitment to NATO's 
defence strategy. Schmidt's need to balance the 
requirements of Alliance cohesion with these domestic 
political constraints is important in explaining his 
position on martial law. The United States' initiatives 
must be understood against the backdrop of the domestic 
political struggle over the control of US foreign policy. 
Events in Poland strengthened the position of those inside 
the US administration who were less interested in the 
Atlantic dimension of US foreign policy and those more 
favourable to the so-called hardline position on East-West 
relations. Secretary of State Haig, who argued for close 
transatlantic consultations was too isolated to get his 
viewpoint across. Taking a firm stand against the Soviet 
Union was more important for some members of the US 
administration than keeping cohesion in the Western 
alliance. More generally, Reagan's strong anti-Soviet 
rhetoric must be seen as part of his efforts to restore 
confidence and optimism in the United States domestically. 
In this context, there was little domestic support for 
close cooperation with the West Europeans.
Domestic political considerations did not only reduce the 
likelihood of successful alliance coordination by drawing 
individual national responses apart. Intra-bureaucratic 
struggles in the United States also meant that US policy
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was unpredictable, and led to the sending of confusing 
signals about the US position on sanctions. This was 
particularly the case with the negotiations before and 
during the G7 summit in Versailles, and it made an 
agreement more difficult to achieve.
Even in a country like France, where foreign policy is 
traditionally controlled by the President, the domestic 
political reaction to martial law affected the official 
response. Still, both for the French and the British 
refusal to follow US policy, the issue of sovereignty was 
more important than domestic constraints. Despite their 
traditional allegiance to the United States, the British 
were as embarrassed as the other Europeans about the United 
States’ refusal to consult before imposing sanctions 
against Poland and the Soviet Union, and even more so, 
about the US imposition of the clause of 
extraterritoriality in the summer of 1982. The infringement 
of British sovereignty implied in the pipeline sanctions 
was too much even for Mrs. Thatcher.
Domestic pressure does not, however, inevitably have to 
lead to a breakdown in coordination. This is illustrated 
by the consultation between France and West Germany in the 
first months of 1982. In contrast to the transatlantic 
relationship, there was a deliberate effort in the Franco- 
German relationship to maintain good relations, and to 
avoid a clash, despite the existence of different
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perspectives.116 A difference between the French and the 
American President's handling of events after martial law 
is in the importance given to domestic constraints. 
Although Mitterrand was subject to similar domestic 
pressures to take stronger measures against Poland and the 
Soviet Union, and thus to take policy further away from the 
West German position, he chose during the winter months of 
1982 to cooperate closely with Schmidt, with the aim of 
overcoming and containing the differences between the two 
governments. It must be added here that the divergences 
between France and West Germany were not as important as 
those between West Germany and the United States. Still, 
the ability and willingness of governments to act on their 
commitment to alliance cohesion, as opposed to their other 
priorities, is important for coordination to succeed. In 
turn, one must add that the differences between the West 
Europeans faded into the background as a result of the 
unilateral initiatives of the United States. These had the 
effect of "cementing" European solidarity, or to use 
Joffe's expression, of "pacifying" -albeit in this case 
unintentionally- European divergences.117
Thus, rather than being considered the only reason for the 
breakdown in Western coordination, the domestic political 
constraints on Western states must be added to the other
116The discussions between Schmidt and Mitterrand are
outlined in Schmidt, Die Deutschen , op. cit, pp. 292-300.
117Joffe, 1982, op. cit.
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factors discussed in the thesis. One other determinant of 
Alliance politics has been stressed in this chapter. The 
general crisis in the Alliance and the existence of 
alternative European fora for consultation and 
coordination. Although as previous chapters have shown, EPC 
was not at the forefront in terms of coordinating West 
European positions, it did provide a useful forum for 
legitimising European opposition to the United States. The 
underlying disagreement on detente also meant that events 
in Poland were taken to the credit of the already existing 
positions of the member states on East-West relations. 
Hence, in the United States, martial law was considered as 
further indication of the unwillingness of the Soviet Union 
to accept reform in Eastern Europe and an indication of its 
inherently aggressive foreign policy stance. In West 
Europe, the development of Solidarity was seen as a sign 
of the success of detente and the beneficial effects of 
economic and political exchange between East and West in 
Europe. In turn, this reinforced the overall sense of 
crisis in the Alliance. From the United States' 
perspective, the West Europeans' refusal to follow the 
United States' position on sanctions was seen as 
confirmation of West European neutralist tendencies. From 
the West European perspective, Reagan's policy initiatives 
were seen as additional proof of the tendency of the United 
States to move towards unilateralism and disregard the 
interests of its allies. It was not inevitable that
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coordination would break down over Poland, yet it was 
facilitated by the wider disagreements in the Alliance.
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis set out to examine to what extent the Western 
states were able to coordinate their responses to events in 
Poland in the early 1980s, and to sustain an active and 
cohesive policy throughout the crisis. By the same token it 
also undertook to define the process of coordination, as well 
as to identify and explain any difficulties encountered in 
this process.
The question of foreign policy coordination is a classic, and 
permanent, problem in international relations. It is 
important to try to explain its dynamics, and why some times 
it works better than others. What is more, the coordination 
process is not only a necessary pre-requisite to cohesion, it 
also has an impact on the substance of policy. In the context 
of the Atlantic crisis in the late 1970s early 1980s, 
providing a cohesive response to the Polish crisis was 
particularly important for the credibility of the Western 
Alliance. A failure to maintain a cohesive position would 
also make the Western allies more susceptible to Soviet 
pressure. And by coordinating their responses the Western 
states might be more effective in promoting their own values 
and objectives, as well as in pressing the Soviet Union not 
to intervene in Poland.
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Polish and Western crises
This thesis has not strictly speaking been devised as a study 
in crisis-management. Yet, the question of whether or not the 
domestic Polish crisis also was a foreign policy crisis for 
the Western states was raised in the introduction. Previous 
chapters have found that the Polish crisis cannot be 
straightforwardly defined as a foreign policy crisis for the 
Western alliance taken as a whole, or for individual Western 
states.1 There was a strange duality in Western policies 
towards Poland in that events in this part of Europe did not 
constitute a direct threat to the Western states' security, 
yet they had, indirectly, the potential for affecting their 
stability. Chapter three showed that Eastern Europe was 
strictly speaking an "out of area" issue for NATO and 
politically "off limits". At the same time, Central and 
Eastern Europe was the central front area for a NATO-Warsaw 
Pact confrontation and thus integral to Western strategic 
concerns. The possibility of a Soviet or Warsaw Pact 
intervention in Poland was of significant concern to all the 
Western states and in particular to West Germany. Hence, the
brecher defines a foreign policy crisis as "... a 
breakpoint along the peace-war continuum of a state's 
relations with any other international actor(s)". He outlines 
four characteristics to the situation of crisis: (i) a change 
in its external or internal environment, which generates; 
(ii) a threat to basic values; (iii) high probability of 
involvement in military hostilities; and (iv) finite time for 
response. Michael Brecher, "A theoretical approach to 
international crisis behaviour", pp. 5-24 in Brecher (ed), 
Studies in Crisis Behaviour, New Brunswick, Transaction Book, 
1978, see p. 6.
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domestic Polish crisis was constantly threatening .to turn 
into an East-West crisis and thus a foreign policy crisis for 
the Western states. The thesis has also shown that there were 
important political and economic dimensions to the Polish 
crisis. This meant that the Western states were presented 
with a more complex problem than a classic foreign policy 
crisis. It also made coordination more difficult to achieve.
The thesis has identified three fairly distinct phases in the 
Western responses to events in Poland. During the first and 
the second phase, the possibility of a Soviet intervention in 
Poland was looming in the background and threatening to turn 
the domestic Polish crisis into an East-West crisis. During 
the first phase, up until December 1980, the Western states 
tended to downplay the implications of events in Poland for 
East-West relations. In the second phase, the Western states 
turned to concentrate on warning off a Soviet intervention, 
and at the same made contingency planning for this 
possibility. Western governments repeatedly declared that a 
Soviet intervention would put an end to detente. The risk of 
a Soviet intervention, and thus also of an East-West crisis, 
was averted with the imposition of martial law in Poland on 
13 December 1981. This in turn did trigger an intramural
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crisis inside the Western camp, as Western efforts to 
coordinate their responses to Poland floundered.2
The Atlantic Alliance
Several conclusions can be drawn about the nature of the 
Atlantic Alliance and trans-Atlantic relations in the early 
1980s. Overall, the thesis has found that the crisis that 
erupted inside the Western camp after martial law was as much 
a crisis about the nature of the Alliance as about Poland 
itself. In this context, three issues are particularly 
important. Firstly, the issue of the suitability of the 
coordination mechanisms available to the Western states; 
secondly, there is the question of a link between the crisis 
over Poland and an overall crisis in the Western camp; and 
thirdly, following from this, is the specific problem of the 
role of the European Community and European Political 
Cooperation and their degree of capacity for splitting NATO.
The coordination mechanisms at the disposal of the Western 
states during the Polish crisis were not ideal. As chapter 
three has shown, they were fragmented into institutions 
dealing with economic issues and political-security issues. 
This made it difficult to maintain an overall view of the 
economic, political and security aspects of Western policies.
2Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis: a study in
diplomatic management, London, Oxford University press for 
RIIA, 1971, p. 7.
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The economic aspects in particular tended to slide away from 
any overall control. Also, none of the Western institutional 
mechanisms were geared towards dealing with a crisis in 
Eastern Europe. The limits to the institutional mechanisms 
were also reflected in the fact that there was a large degree 
of informal consultations, both bilaterally and 
multilaterally during the crisis. The most important examples 
of this were the ad hoc groups negotiating the rescheduling 
of Poland's private and public debt. Most importantly 
perhaps, the relatively weak coordination mechanisms of NATO 
reflect the intergovernmental nature of the organisation. 
Nonetheless, it was not the coordination mechanisms which 
ultimately led to the breakdown of coordination but the 
policy-makers themselves, and their weakening commitment to 
consultation. After the imposition of martial law, the 
Western states failed to use even those institutional 
mechanisms that actually were available to them.3
Thus the crisis over Poland indicated wider disagreements 
amongst the Western allies on East-West relations. In turn, 
it further reinforced them. The overarching disagreement was 
over whether or not to continue a policy of detente with the
3NATO sources point out that NATO did better than after 
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan because it did hold an 
emergency meeting on 11 January 1982. Yet, the compromise 
hammered out at this meeting was not sufficient to patch over 
the trans-Atlantic disagreements. The EPC crisis mechanism 
set up at the London summit in 1981 was not effective. 
Interview London, September 1994.
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Warsaw Pact. Both sides used events in Poland to strengthen
%
their own position on this issue: The United States attempted 
to use the crisis in Poland to support its argument for 
abandoning detente. The West Europeans took the opposite 
perspective, arguing that events in Poland proved that a 
policy of detente successfully encouraged change in Eastern 
Europe. Deeper divisions between West European and American 
perspectives on foreign policy also came to the surface in 
the context of the Polish crisis. The United States put 
greater emphasis on the ideological competition with the 
Soviet Union. The Europeans, no doubt influenced by their 
geographical proximity to the Soviet Union, tended to 
emphasise the security dimension of the relationship rather 
than the ideological aspects. The emphasis on ideology can be 
seen as a permanent feature in the United States' foreign 
policy, yet it was taken to an extreme under Reagan's 
presidency, thus making transatlantic cooperation even more 
difficult in the early 1980s. The decade of superpower 
detente had also increased European fears about a weakening 
of the United States' commitment to the defence of Europe. 
The European commitment to a European detente on the other 
hand led the United States to question the European 
commitment to NATO. These mutual suspicions were further 
reinforced by events after martial law.
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The Polish crisis could be seen as a "European crisis", 
emerging as a consequence of the changes in East-West 
relations in the 1970s, and the changes inside both the 
Soviet Union's and the United States' spheres of influence.4 
As the West Europeans clashed with the United States over how 
to respond to martial law, with the West Europeans arguing 
that detente was divisible and that superpower tension should 
not affect relations among European states, it could be seen 
as a sign of a growing tendency of "Europeanisation" of the 
problems in Europe. Although triggered by specific 
initiatives taken by the United States, the crisis was also 
a symptom of a wider structural imbalance in the trans- 
Atlantic relationship. The gradual strengthening of the West 
European economies and the intensification of European 
cooperation through the European Community and European 
Political Cooperation had made the Europeans less prone to 
accept US hegemony.
As has been argued throughout, however, the situation inside 
the Alliance in the early 1980s was not so clear cut. Events 
surrounding the Polish crisis do not indicate a desire on the 
part of the West Europeans to move towards "all-European" 
solutions to Europe's dilemmas. Although there were moves to
4Halliday argues that the US' aim in the Second Cold War 
was to reinstate its control over the Western alliance, Fred 
Halliday
The Making of the Second Cold War, London, Verso, 1989.
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strengthen EPC in the early 1980s, it was still eclipsed by 
allegiance to NATO on East-West issues. Throughout most of 
the crisis in Poland, the European Community and EPC took a 
back seat. Coordination took place mainly bilaterally or 
within the context of NATO, and under the leadership of the 
United States. The EC did take charge of organising food aid 
from the member states. Yet this did not make it the dominant 
actor even on the economic side of Western responses to 
Poland. It was only one actor, among several others, inside 
the wider framework of the Western alliance.
There was an inherent contradiction in the transatlantic 
relationship in the early 1980s. One of the most vital 
elements in the Western alliance at the time of the Polish 
crisis was what Putnam has called "the European hunger for US 
leadership".5 The West Europeans had high expectations for 
Reagan to provide this. Also, there were as many similarities 
between the United States', French and British interpretation 
of events in Poland as there were amongst the West European 
states' view of the crisis. What kept the European states 
together after martial law was their shared frustration with 
the United States, not a general agreement on what to do, or 
even less so a deliberate attempt at providing a distinct 
European response to events in Poland.
5Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, Hanging Together: 
Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits, London, 
Sage Publications Ltd, 1987.
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The ambiguities of transatlantic relations in the early 1980s 
are even more evident when one considers developments in the 
medium term. The failure of the United States to impose its 
own policy-preferences on its West European allies is an 
indication of its reduced authority within the Alliance. But 
at the same time, the West European reluctance to follow 
American initiatives was not followed up by a reinforcement 
of the Europeans' own identity, or even a strengthening of 
their ability to discuss security.6 Furthermore, the West 
Europeans, despite having won the short term battle with the 
United States by refusing to accept the embargo on the 
pipeline, lost the medium term, and probably most important 
battle, over the continuation of detente. Paradoxically, the 
Western crisis over Poland, in its own right a sign of the 
contradictions and internal entanglements of the Alliance, 
further reinforced the contradictions and brought the allied 
states wider apart, without bringing them closer to a 
breakup. Nothing in Europe replaced the reduced authority of 
the United States, nor was a fundamental review of the terms 
of the transatlantic relationship undertaken.
6Indeed, the difficulties of the Europeans in 
establishing European defence structures are manifest also in 
the post-Cold War world. See for example Simon duke, "The 
Second Death (or the Second Coming?) of the WEU", pp. 167-190 
in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 34, No. 2, June 
1996.
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The problem of foreign policy coordination
The question of success and failure of foreign policy 
coordination has a relevance beyond the context of the 
transatlantic relationship in the early 1980s. The difficulty 
of foreign policy coordination arises from the unique nature 
of international society, as a society in which actors are 
not subject to a central authority. It is this absence of a 
central authority which has led the realists to consider that 
coordination, and the ability of states to sustain coherent 
foreign policies, is extremely limited.
The findings of this thesis only partially confirm the 
classical realist perspective, and much less so the more 
determinedly structuralist, neo-realist version.7 It is clear 
from the previous chapters that, ultimately, national 
positions prevailed over any common Western policy. The 
domestic "solution" to the Polish crisis divided the West 
European aspirations for continued detente, from the United 
States’ wish for a return to a discourse, if not a policy, of 
"liberation". The coordination process was initiated and 
controlled by states and the Western institutional framework 
was not strong enough to draw them together after the 
imposition of martial law.
7For an exposition of the similarities between the 
realist and neo-realist perspective see Andrew Linklater, 
"Neo-realism in Theory and Practice", pp. 241-262 in Ken 
Booth and Steve Smith (eds), International Relations Theory 
Today, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995.
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Yet, the realist perspective does not help us to understand 
why coordination functioned reasonably well up until the 
imposition of martial law in Poland. Neither does it shed 
much light on what led the Western states to take diverging 
positions on Poland after the 13 December 1981. There is no 
evidence to indicate that the "national interests" of the 
Western states changed after December 13 1981, still, after 
this, cohesion broke down. The realists, and the neo­
realists, need, at the least to explain how governments 
define their interest and why there is a change in policy. 
They also need to pay closer attention to the long term 
impact of alliance ties on the foreign policy of individual 
states. The view that national divergencies stem from the 
anarchical structure of the international system which forces 
states into antagonistic behaviour, is an over­
simplification. It is even more so in the context of an 
institutionalised alliance such as NATO. The following 
section will first look at the suggestion that there is a 
qualitative difference in relations between states bound 
together through institutional links and sharing broad long 
term goals, and states who are not interlinked through such 
ties. Subsequently, it will look at the importance of 
domestic politics. And finally, it will highlight the limits 
to the assumption of rationality which is part of both the 
realist, neo-realist and the neo-liberal institutionalist 
perspectives.
Constraints on the anarchical condition
Despite the fact that the institutional constraints were not 
strong enough to guarantee cohesion, relations between 
Western states were qualitatively different from those at the 
level of the international system.8 The Western institutional 
framework did provide an important setting inside which the 
Western states interacted. It provided channels of 
communication and fora for consultation, as well as, in the 
case of the EC, instruments for common action in the area of 
food aid. The realists, and neo-realists, have underestimated 
the impact of participation in a permanent institutionalised 
structure such as the Atlantic Alliance on the individual 
states. By entering the Western alliance states, albeit for 
different and distinctly national reasons, had perhaps 
unwittingly accepted certain constraints on their foreign 
policies. And over time, the structures of the Western 
alliance had bound its member states even closer together.
Chapters four and five show that there was a commitment on 
the part of all member states to ensure that the Alliance 
provided a cohesive response to events in Poland. There was 
concern to learn from the mistakes made after the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan, and to avoid a similar collision
8Some have attempted to call this an international 
regime. It may well be that there was a Western regime, 
although the definition of a regime is unclear, yet this 
conclusion is not helpful because it does not tell us 
anything about interaction inside the regime itself.
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inside the walls of the Alliance. This commitment is 
illustrated in the efforts made by the Western states to 
consult with one another, and exchange information over 
Poland up to martial law. This emphasis on alliance relations 
was an important consideration in the formulation of each 
states' policy.
It is true at the same time that events in Poland raised a 
different set of concerns for each of the Western states. At 
one extreme was West Germany: The possibility of a Soviet or 
Warsaw Pact military intervention (including East German 
participation) in Poland raised considerable concern. Not 
only would such an intervention have unravelled the carefully 
established edifice which was the West German Ostpolitik. It 
could also have ended the rapprochement with East Germany. 
Finally, at a time when West Germany was living through a 
phase of domestic uncertainty about its international role, 
the presence of East German troops on Polish soil would have 
been a highly uncomfortable reminder of the past. From across 
the Atlantic, the Polish crisis presented itself in a 
different way. The Polish crisis fitted perfectly into the 
increasingly confrontational discourse of US foreign policy 
in the early 1980s, and presented a good opportunity for the 
American President to present himself as "leader of the free 
world, defender of democracy and human rights". What is more, 
the Polish crisis played into the hands of those who were
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critical of the West Europeans' attachment to detente, and 
Poland became not only a stick with which the US could beat 
the Soviet Union, but also a stick with which it attempted to 
beat its European allies.
At the same time, a set of common concerns about Poland were 
present in all the four major Western states. The long term 
objective of increased liberalisation of Poland was shared by 
all the Western states. All the Western states, including 
Margaret Thatcher's Britain, welcomed the creation of an 
independent trades union and the possibility of the 
development of political pluralism in Poland. There was 
agreement in condemning the imposition of martial law, the 
internment of the Solidarity leadership and the later 
dissolution of Solidarity. France, the United States and 
Britain harboured no doubts that the imposition of martial 
law was the result of Soviet pressure on the Polish 
leadership. At the same time, the Western states all 
recognised that they had limited resources available to them 
to promote this kind of change. The underlying assumption of 
anarchy does not take into consideration the coexistence of 
converging and conflicting priorities inside the Western 
alliance. Neither does it help us to understand the 
commitment to coordination as such amongst the allied states, 
or its success up until the imposition to martial law.
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The importance of domestic constraints
Even more important for the prospects of coordination than 
institutional frameworks are domestic politics. Chapter seven 
has shown that in order to understand why Western 
coordination broke down after the imposition of martial law 
in Poland it is vital to look at the domestic political 
context in the United States. Chapter seven confirms that 
domestic politics influenced the United States' policy after 
martial law in Poland. This helps explain why the Reagan 
administration refused to consult with the West Europeans 
before launching into a policy which went directly against 
the wishes of its allies. The lifting of the grain embargo in 
April 1981, which contributed to West European resentment 
against the United States, came about for domestic political 
reasons, rather than as a result of foreign policy 
considerations. The pipeline embargo was also part of a wider 
foreign policy strategy aimed at gaining support from the 
American public opinion by presenting the US president as a 
crusader against the "evils of communism". Finally, the issue 
of consultation with the West Europeans was caught up in a 
wider struggle inside the US adminstration over the control 
of foreign policy. The Secretary of State, who advocated 
consultation with the West Europeans, was too isolated to 
impose his views against the wishes of Reagan's personal 
advisors.
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Domestic politics are also important in understanding the 
West German position after martial law, and in understanding 
why West Germany, which otherwise tended to be a more loyal 
ally to the United States than for example France, became the 
United States' main antagonist after martial law. The Polish 
question fed directly into the ongoing domestic political 
debate about West Germany's relations with the GDR, about the 
memories of Nazi Germany and its role in Poland, as well as 
West Germany's role in the Atlantic Alliance. Thus, rather 
than being the exclusive result of external pressures from 
the international system, the crisis in the Western alliance 
was reinforced by domestic pressures.
Yet, although domestic pressures tested the solidarity among 
allied states to a breaking point, they did not always 
prevent coordination. France and West Germany, although 
subject to domestic pressures which would take their policies 
in opposite directions, were quite successful in patching up 
their differences. Schmidt's memoirs indicate that there was 
a commitment at the highest political level to protect the 
Franco-German alliance from a potential split over Poland. 
Hence, domestic politics do not inevitably take primacy over 
external pressures. Coordination must be understood in the 
context of a continuous flow of interaction between domestic 
and external impulses, including a commitment to alliance 
cohesion.
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The limits to rationality
The failure of the realist perspective to recognise the 
ability of institutions to constrain states and to change 
states' conception of their self interest, is underlined by 
the neo-liberal institutionalists.9 Institutionalists such as 
Keohane and Putnam recognise the need to look inside the 
state, at domestic politics. Yet, the neo-liberals remain 
within the same framework as the neo-realists by maintaining 
the assumption of rationality of actors.10 This is the basis 
for Putnam's study of coordination as a two-level game.11 
This thesis has found that by opening the black box of the 
state, many of the rationalistic assumptions are undone, and 
that the Western states' policies towards Poland, and their 
efforts to coordinate these policies, cannot be explained 
purely by calculations of interests and a cost-benefit 
analysis. They are better seen as the result of complex 
interaction between domestic and external pressures, with the
9David Baldwin (ed), Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism: The 
Contemporary Debate, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1993. 
p. 271 .
10See also Steve Smith, who stresses that the positions 
of the neo-realists and the neo-liberals are not really that 
far away from each other, Steve Smith, "The Self-Images of a 
Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory", 
pp. 1-37 in Booth and Smith, op. cit. Especially p.24.
11Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and domestic Politics: The 
logic of two-level games", first published in International 
Organization. 42, summer 1988, pp. 427-460, reprinted in 
Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam (eds), Double 
edged diplomacy. London, University of California Press, 
1993.
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policy-objectives evolving throughout the crisis, rather than 
being fixed from the outset.
Starting with the level of national policies, these can only 
with difficulty be seen as the result of a rational 
assessment of how best to defend the self interest and 
enhance the power of the individual state. Once the black box 
of the state is opened, it is no longer clear who's interest 
is being defended or whose power is being "enhanced". Chapter 
seven has showed that there was no unified perception of 
events inside each member state, nor was there always a clear 
definition of national policy objectives. What is more, the 
position of each individual state was not formed in isolation 
from, but by interacting with, the other Western states. The 
policy objectives of the individual states (as well as those 
of the West as a whole) evolved throughout the crisis, in 
accordance with events in Poland, as well as in accordance 
with the domestic and external pressures that they were 
subjected to. The broad aspirations of encouraging change in 
Poland while maintaining stability in Europe, as well as that 
of maintaining alliance cohesion, were shared by all four 
governments. Yet these broad aspirations existed in parallel 
with conflicting national priorities and domestic pressures, 
such as the West German concern about the impact of the 
Polish crisis on relations with East Germany, and the United
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States' desire to use Poland to change NATO's East-West 
policy.
.A*
Finally, not only is it difficult to identify clear cut and 
irreconcilable national interests. It is also difficult to 
understand a state's overall policy only in terms of 
interests. National priorities are bound up with a nation's 
view of itself and its past experiences. Policy-makers may 
not always learn the right lessons from history, but this 
does not mean that past experiences do not have an impact on 
present policies. Nowhere is this more clear than in the case 
of West Germany's position on Poland. Hence, a state's 
foreign policy must be seen as influenced also by values, 
assumptions and expectations from wider society, and not only 
from clearly calculated interests.
Moving from the national level to the level of the Alliance, 
a fragile compromise was built against the backdrop of these 
partly converging, partly contradictory concerns and remained 
intact until the imposition of martial law. It took the shape 
of an understanding rather than a bargain based on well 
defined national interests. The main device of this 
'consensus building' was to focus on the issues on which 
there was agreement and leave aside the issues that were 
divisive, either by not dealing with them, or by delaying to 
deal with them. The cornerstone of this policy was the
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warnings against a Soviet military intervention. It was 
followed up with the food aid and credits, as well as the 
attempt at renegotiating Poland's debt. This was not really 
a policy of a minimum common denominator, because policy- 
proposals were not watered down, but excluded altogether.
The process of policy-coordination inside an alliance is more 
complex than the realist or neo-liberal institutionalist 
perspectives admit. The formulation of each national 
perspective took place as a result of interaction between 
domestic and external pressures. The maintenance of cohesion 
emerged not only as a result of institutional links and a 
political commitment to it, but also because of the ability 
of the Western states to focus on policy initiatives which 
kept them together, and excluding those that divided them. It 
backfired after martial law, when the United States' 
administration gave priority to domestic concerns, and 
erroneously assumed that its authority inside the alliance 
was such that the West Europeans would follow suit. Domestic 
pressures were ultimately more important to the United States 
than was the commitment to alliance diplomacy, and the weak 
institutional structures could not compensate for this. Along 
the road, coordination became an end in itself, rather than 
a means to an end.
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Western coordination and Poland
It has not been the purpose of this thesis to examine the 
content of Western policies, to evaluate to what extent these 
policies were the best in terms of influencing events in 
Poland, or the right ones from the perspective of the Poles 
themselves. Nonetheless, this question should not be 
completely ignored, not least because the efforts to 
coordinate the Western states’ policies had an impact on 
their content.
Most of the literature on the policies of Western governments 
during the Polish crisis is critical of their efforts. The 
West has been criticised mainly on four accounts. In the 
period up until the imposition of martial law, two types of 
criticisms were made against Western policies: Firstly, it 
has been argued that Western economic aid, both the handling 
of the debt question and the provision of food aid, was 
insufficient. The assumption of this criticism is that if 
"more" had been done, this might have helped to stabilise the 
political climate in Poland and might have strengthened the 
chances of political reform.12 Secondly, Western policies 
have been criticised for failing to predict, prepare and 
prevent martial law. Cynkin argues that the United States
12Portes called for an overall economic plan to 
reschedule or restructure Poland's debt, and expected this to 
rally Solidarity behind a programme of economic reform. 
Richard Portes, The Polish Crisis: Western Economic Policy 
Options. RIIA, London, 1981, (introduction).
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should have used the threat to declare Poland default as a 
bargaining chip with the Soviet Union to prevent martial 
law.13 The third reproach against Western policy refers to 
the period after the imposition of martial law. The Western 
states were criticised for not condemning martial law 
strongly enough, and in particular for not taking sufficient 
action to 'punish' the Soviet Union.14 Later on, and this 
constitutes the fourth criticism, there was increased support 
for the argument that sanctions had been kept in place for 
too long and ought to be lifted, and that the best way to 
promote change in Poland would be to restart economic aid to 
the country.15
It is not altogether straightforward to assess the validity 
of these criticisms. They are based on different assumptions 
both about what kind of objectives the West could reasonably 
expect to obtain in Poland; about the significance of martial 
law (in particular on whether or not it was a lesser evil 
than Soviet intervention); and about what alternative 
outcomes, other than martial law or a Soviet intervention, 
one could realistically hope for in Poland. Yet one thing
13Thomas Cynkin, Soviet and American Signalling in the 
Polish Crisis. London, Macmillan, 1988, p.38 and p.221.
14Claude Lefort, "Sagt rett fra leveren" (Speaking one's 
mind), pp. 20-22, in Kontinent Skandinavia. K/S/82.
15John Edwin Mroz, "Aider la Pologne", Politique 
Internationale, 26 (1), summer 1983, pp. 129-155.
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they have in common is that they do not take into 
consideration the alliance dimension, or the impact of the 
process of coordination on the content of policies. Neither 
do they seek to understand why Western policies were often so 
limited in scope. Cynkin, for example, focuses exclusively on 
the policy of the United States. But the United States alone 
did not hold a large enough share of Poland's debt to make 
the threat of default a real one. In order to have any chance 
of succeeding, the policy he advocates would have had to have 
been supported by the West Europeans, who were Poland's main 
creditors.
No doubt, the Polish crisis highlighted many of the 
contradictions and weaknesses of Western policies towards 
Poland as well as Eastern Europe overall. As chapter two 
showed, Poland was never on top of the list of priorities for 
the Western states. Rather than a separate "object" towards 
which Western states had distinct aims and objectives, it was 
one factor in the Western states' overall policy towards the 
Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. The Western states favoured 
stability in Europe over political change in Eastern Europe, 
and were concerned about not encouraging "radical" change in 
Poland, which might lead to instability. At the same time, 
they were struggling with a political commitment to support 
the principles of democracy and human rights as specified in 
the UN Charter and the Helsinki Declaration.
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In addition to these permanent constraints on Western 
policies towards Poland, what this thesis has shown is that 
the commitment to coordination contributed, paradoxically, to 
the lack of efficiency in the Western response. The objective 
of Western policies was to create a feasible policy, rather 
than a "good policy" from the Polish perspective. There was 
a clear tendency throughout the crisis for cohesion, rather 
than Poland itself, to take over as the main policy concern. 
Although martial law was a known possible outcome of events, 
no contingency planning was made to prepare Western states 
for this eventuality. The Western allies did not manage to 
come to an agreement on what should be done if there was an 
internal Polish crackdown. Likewise, the provision of food 
aid was caught up in EC disputes about the share of each 
member states in the overall aid.16 The negotiations on 
rescheduling the debt were dogged by arguments between the 
Western creditors and slowed down the process of negotiating 
a solution to the question. Chapter six showed that sanctions 
were lifted only gradually and in a disorganised fashion, 
with reference chiefly to internal Western negotiations
160ne might add that it is far from certain that more 
economic aid would have been sufficient to stabilise Poland 
and prevent the imposition of martial law. The protest 
movement in Poland quickly moved from an economic issue to 
politics, and economic aid would most likely not have been 
enough to prevent this escalation. Also, previous chapters 
have shown that there was a greater effort by Western states 
to respond to the Polish crisis and a greater concern about 
the significance and consequences of the Polish crisis, than 
the Czech crisis in 1968 and the Hungarian crisis in 1956.
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rather than in response to the economic and political 
conditions in Poland. There was a reluctance on the part of 
the Western states to break the fragile consensus that they 
had established during the autumn of 1982.
In other words, if, ideally, more could have been done for 
Poland, in practice the West was constrained not only by the 
risk of instability in Poland, or by its limited ability to 
protect democracy in Poland, but equally by its own internal 
disagreements. This not only dragged out the process of 
decision-making, but led to policies which were often not 
directed in any rational way towards Poland, but towards the 
Western alliance itself. Increased coordination is ideally 
supposed to lead to increased influence, but at the same 
time, it can, and did, to some extent in the case of the 
Polish crisis, rebound and lead to a less efficient policy 
response.
Although this thesis has maintained a state-centric 
perspective, it does not find the realist conception of 
policies as resulting exclusively from interaction between 
rationally defined and clearly distinguishable national 
policies satisfactory. It has argued that states should be 
seen as navigating inside the constraints of domestic 
politics, alliance politics and international [in this case
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East-West] relations. Thus, the argument has moved away from 
the realist and neo-realist perspective without embracing the 
neo-liberal institutionalist perspective. It 'is in the 
tradition of foreign policy analysis that this thesis has 
found the most useful insights, both in understanding the 
position of individual states and the interaction between 
them. It has taken what Waltz calls a "reductionist" 
perspective, by concentrating the analysis at the level of 
the individual actors (the states). It has emphasised the 
importance of the policy-choices made by governments which 
are seen as constrained, but not determined, by both their 
domestic and their external structures. And these processes 
of choice, in their turn, help us to understand the sometimes 
strange and almost always unpredictable course of 
international history.
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APPENDIX 1. CHANGES IN WESTERN GOVERNMENTS DURING THE POLISH CRISIS
Britain
Federal Republic
France
United States
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Margaret Thatcher (Conservative Party)
Foreign Secretary:
Lord Carrington
Helmut Schmidt (SPD)
Foreign Minister: 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher (CSU)
Helmut Kohl (CDU)
Valery Giscard d'Estaing(UDF) Frangois Mitterrand (PS)
Prime Minister:
Raymond Barre (indep.) 
Foreign Minister: 
Claude Cheysson (UDF)
Pierre Mauroy (PS)
Jean Frangois-Poncet (PS)
Jimmy Carter (Democrat)
Secretary of State:
Edmund Muskie
National Security
Adviser: Zbigniew Brzezinski
Ronald Reagan (Republican)
Alexander Haig George Shultz (July 1982)
Richard Allen William Clarke
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APPENDIX 2. EAST-WEST TRADE RELATIONS
Table 1. Exports of Western states to Poland.1
(in 1000 US $)
1970 1975 1977 1980 1982
France 81177 626605 482703 830997 432550
UK 135145 390577 349384 689007 232869
FRG 179733 1302294 1245708 1458980 883912
US 69838 580090 436536 710447 292607
Table 2. Imports of Western states to Poland.2
(in 1000 US $)
1970 1975 1977 1980 1982
France 67968 352652 425691 583673 332912
UK 151253 253994 304074 451652 265560
FRG 203342 581797 901761 1376950 878567
US 97946 243097 329085 459313 229189
^OMECON Foreign Trade Data, 1984 and 1980,Ed. by the 
Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, London, 
Macmillan, 1985 and 1981.
2Ibid.
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Table 3. Western trade dependence on CMEA states1
(Percentage of total trade)
1957 1962 1970 1976 1979 1980
France Ex 2.3 3.6 3.6 4.9 4.2 4.5
Im 2.1 2.6 2.4 3.1 3.1 3.9
UK Ex 1.7 2.9 3.1 2.5 2.3 2.4
Im 2.6 3.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 2.5
FRG2 Ex 2.7 3.8 3.8 6.1 5.1 4.9
Im 3.1 3.6 5.8 4.6 5.0 4.5
USA Ex 0.4 0.6 1 .0 3.1 3.3 1 .7
Im 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6
Table 4. Poland's foreign trade. Shares of trading partners 
in %.3
1960 1970 1980 1981 1983
USSR Ex 29.4 35.3 31 .2 32.4 31 .2
Im 31.1 37.7 33.1 41 .7 36.8
France Ex 1 .1 1 .7 2.9 2.2 2.5
Im 1 .7 2.4 4.2 3.7 2.0
UK Ex 7.5 4.3 3.2 3.0 4.9
Im 5.9 5.3 3.5 2.5 3.6
FRG Ex 5.2 5.1 8.1 7.9 8.3
Im 5.9 5.3 3.5 2.5 3.6
USA Ex 2.4 2.6 2.5 2.5 1 .7
Im 5.6 1 .6 4.0 4.7 1 .4
1Taken from Stephen Woolcock, Western Policies on 
East-West Trade, London, RIIA, 1982. Figures are based
on OECD, Foreign Trade Statistics, Series B.
2Excludes intra-German trade.
3Source, COMECON Foreign Trade Data, 1984. Ed. by the 
Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, 
London, Macmillan, 1985.
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>PENDIX 3. THE WESTERN INSTITUTIONAL NETWORKS
a. Geographical scope of institutions
SCO
^ris group1 
>ndon group2
istralia
istria
Inland
;w Zealand
>rtugal
>ain
jeden
/itzerland
NATO
G7
Japan
Canada
Quad
USA
France i
Federal Republic 
United Kingdom
Italy
CoCom
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Greece (1981)
European Community
European Political Cooperation
Ireland
Norway
Turkey
Iceland
^ d  hoc group organised at the initiative of the French government, in late 1980, to 
jgotiate Poland's public debt. Composed of Poland's largest creditors (France, FRG, United 
ngdom, United States, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, 
jnmark, Spain, Finland, Italy, Japan).
2Ad hoc task force of Western banks (varying in size from 15 to 21), negotiating with 
land on behalf of the country's commercial creditors.
.b. Principal areas of activity for individual Western institutions
military/security economic political/diplomatic
flATO X (X)
(European Community X
teuropean Political 
Cooperation
X
CoCom
\
(X) X *
Paris group 
(ad hoc)
X
London group 
(ad hoc)
X
OECD X
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APPENDIX 4
July 1980
August 1980
September 1980
October 1980
December 1980
January 1981
CHRONOLOGY
Polish government raises prices of meat. 
Strikes start in Lublin and spread to the 
Baltic Sea region.
Signature of the Gdansk agreement.
Schmidt cancels planned visit to the GDR.
Carter writes to Schmidt, Thatcher and 
Giscard d'Estaing to discuss ways in which 
the Western states could respond positively 
to Poland's demands for economic aid.
West German banks give a loan of $674 m. to 
Poland.
AFL-CIO informs the Carter administration 
of its plans to provide economic aid 
directly to Solidarity.
The Carter administration announces $ 670 
m. in credits for export of agricultural 
products to Poland.
Brzezinski convenes meeting of the Special 
Coordinating Committee of the NSC to review 
the Polish crisis.
European Council in Luxembourg declares 
willingness to provide economic aid to 
Poland and warns all states to allow Poland 
to solve its difficulties on its own.
A Warsaw Pact meeting is held in Moscow to 
discuss the Polish crisis (5 December). 
Western intelligence reports that a military 
intervention is imminent.
NATO's Foreign Ministers task NATO's 
ambassadors with preparing a package of 
political, diplomatic, economic, financial 
and commercial contingency measures for 
implementation if the Soviet Union 
intervenes in Poland.
Carter warns the Soviet Union to stay out 
of Poland in his last State of the Union 
speech.
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April 1981
July 1981
August 1 981 
October 1981
November 1981 
December 1981
Western governments agree with Poland, in 
the framework of the Paris group, on a 
rescheduling of its public debt for 1981.
Reagan lifts the grain embargo against the 
Soviet Union.
Ottawa G7-summit. Reagan presses for 
stricter control of exports to the Soviet 
bloc and for the West Europeans to abandon 
the pipeline agreement.
The European Parliament pledges EC member 
states to speed up the programme of food aid 
to Poland.
The London Report on European Political 
Cooperation establishes procedures for rapid 
consultation amongst EC-member states in 
situations of crisis.
The Federal Republic signs the pipeline 
agreement with the Soviet Union.
Schmidt arrives in the GDR (11 December). 
The last visit to the GDR by a Chancellor 
of the FRG was in 1970.
Martial law is imposed in Poland (13 
December).
Schmidt in East Berlin declares that both 
Honecker and himself were concerned about 
the fact that the imposition of martial law 
had been "necessary".
French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson 
declares that "naturally we shall do 
nothing" about martial law.
US Secretary of State for European Affairs, 
Lawrence Eagleburger, visits Europe to gain 
support for sanctions in reaction to martial 
law, but returns to the US empty handed. 
(20-30 December).
Reagan announces sanctions against Poland 
(23 December) and against the Soviet Union 
(29 December), without consulting with the 
European allies.
After a failed attempt to call an emergency 
meeting of EC foreign ministers, EC foreign 
policy officials meet in London to discuss 
sanctions (30 December).
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January 1982 EC foreign ministers meet in London to 
discuss Poland. The important role of the 
Soviet Union in Poland is acknowledged. 
Agreement is achieved on avoiding any 
measures that might undermine US sanctions. 
No commitment to impose European sanctions 
(4 January).
Schmidt visits Washington and is met with 
a storm of protest against the West German 
position on martial law.
A special ministerial session of the North 
Atlantic Council. End communique calls for 
lifting of martial law, release of prisoners 
and restoration of political dialogue. 
Agreement is achieved for individual 
governments to study appropriate means to 
protest against martial law (11 January). 
Agreement is achieved to freeze further 
discussions on the rescheduling of Poland's 
official debt.
A special ministerial meeting of CoCom is 
held, for the first time in its history, at 
the initiative of the Reagan administration 
for the first time in its history, to 
discuss stricter control over exports to the 
Soviet bloc.
Schmidt visits Mitterrand to calm French 
fears of West Germany's position on 
Poland.
France signs the trans-siberian gas-pipeline 
agreement.
February 1982 The Buckley mission goes to Europe to gain 
support for further economic sanctions.
Britain is the first West European state to 
impose minor sanctions (restrictions on the 
movement of Soviet and Polish diplomats).
EC Foreign Ministers agree to restrict 
import of Soviet goods.
West Germany follows Britain in imposing 
limited sanctions.
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June 1982
July 1982 
August 1982 
October 1982
November 1982
December 1982
February 1 983 
July 1983 
September 1983
November 1983 
December 1983
Versailles G7-summit. An apparent agreement 
on export credits to the Soviet Union falls 
through. In the midst of confusion about the 
content of the agreement, Reagan announces 
an extension of the ban on products to the 
Siberian pipeline to cover US companies 
abroad as well as foreign companies using 
US equipment.
The French government orders French 
companies to honour their contracts on the 
pipeline despite the US ban.
The British and West German governments 
order their companies to honour the pipeline 
contracts.
The United States lifts MFN status of 
Poland after the Sejm dissolves Solidarity. 
The West Europeans do not agree to take 
further sanctions.
The United States lifts sanctions on the 
pipeline. An agreement is achieved amongst 
Western governments to study ways to control 
exports to the Soviet bloc. France denies 
the existence of such an agreement.
Agreement is reached for the rescheduling 
of Poland's private debt for 1982. 
Negotiations on Poland's public debt are 
still frozen.
Martial law is held in suspension. EC 
restrictions on import of Soviet goods are 
prolonged for one year.
The West Europeans seek an early lifting of 
sanctions against Poland.
Martial law in Poland is lifted, yet all its 
measures are incorporated into Polish law.
A decision "in principle" is taken to 
reopen discussions on rescheduling Poland's 
official debt.
The United States agrees to take part in 
negotiating a rescheduling of Poland's debt 
on a year by year basis. It continues to 
delay discussion on Poland's application for 
membership in the IMF.
Walesa declares himself in favour of a 
lifting of sanctions against Poland.
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January 1984
December 1987
The European Community's restrictions on 
import of Soviet goods are not renewed.
Western governments agree to restart 
negotiations on rescheduling Poland's public 
debt for 1982.
US restores MFN status to Poland.
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